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Abstract 
 
This thesis is a critical study of the work of John Rawls, political 
philosopher, and Reinhold Niebuhr, theologian. The work of these two 
scholars is brought into dialogue with theological thought to work towards 
a Christian notion of justice which seeks more than justice as fairness but 
realises the impossibility of perfect love in this world.  
 
Rawls’s two principles of justice form the basis of the discussion, with 
liberty placed prior to equality, and permissible inequalities only allowed 
when the weakest benefit. He excludes religion and moral reasoning from 
justice, essentially any thick theory of the good, in favour of the right; any 
conception of the good must be in agreement with the right and a thin 
theory of the good is necessary to guide people in the right direction. In 
his later works he accepts that people will mostly be guided by some 
moral or religious thought.  
 
Niebuhr believed that a prophetic religion combines an utmost 
seriousness about history with a transcendent norm. Hope, faith and love 
form the foundation of a call to a continual struggle for justice and 
equality. The boundaries in which justice is sought are being continually 
extended as global cooperation and dependence increase. Perfect justice 
would be a state of solidarity with no conflict of interests. Because people 
are a combination of vitality and reason, the social coherence of life can 
never be based on pure rationality. Our truth is never the truth; we are 
always subjective and prejudiced. There can be no universal rational 
standards of justice or neutrality in social struggle. Love is the primary 
law of nature and a fundamental requirement of social existence. We are 
called to involvement in society by the very nature of our justification by 
faith. Equality as the pinnacle of the ideal of justice points towards love as 
the final norm of justice; for equal justice is the realization of community 
under the conditions of sin. Justice as imperfect love aims for an equality 
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which is increasingly inclusive and continuously creates space for people 
to live in harmony. 
 
In the final chapter, Rawls and Niebuhr are brought into critical 
discussion with other theologians. The Christian preference for the poor, 
an inherent part of theological justice begins the discussion. The 
importance of moral reasoning for justice comes into conflict with Rawls’s 
idea that there should be no thick theory of the good influencing justice. 
Human dignity is an important facet of justice. The inalienable dignity 
owed to every human being, created in the image of God, is an essential 
part of theology and can enrich secular theories of justice. Justice 
necessitates community. People learn how to behave in a way which is 
just, moral and ethical from their associations in communities. The church 
community can provide an important place where dialogue and learning 
can take place. The boundaries of justice are ever-increasing. 
Globalisation presents challenges to where and how justice is 
implemented and we become increasingly aware of how our actions affect 
other people. The responsibility of the struggle for justice is ever-
increasing. The eschatological hope and the specific way of life which can 
be offered by the church complete the Christian notion of justice.  
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Opsomming 
 
Hierdie tesis is ’n kritiese studie van die werk van die politieke filosoof 
John Rawls en die teoloog Reinhold Niebuhr. Hierdie denkers se werk 
word met teologiese nadenke in gesprek gebring om sodoende ’n 
Christelike idee van geregtigheid te vorm wat meer as billikheid wil wees, 
en wat terselfdertyd die onmoontlikheid van perfekte liefde in dié wêreld 
erken.  
 
Rawls se twee beginsels van geregtigheid vorm die basis van die 
argument, deurdat vryheid voor gelykheid geplaas word en met die 
enigste toelaatbare ongelykhede dié wat tot die swakstes se voordeel is. 
Hy maak nie gebruik van godsdienstige of morele arugmente om 
geregtigheid te begrond of vul nie – enige begrip van die goeie moet in 
ooreenstemming met die regte wees en slegs ’n dun teorie van die goeie is 
nodig om mense in die regte rigting te lei. Hy aanvaar in sy latere werk 
dat die meeste mense tog deur morele denke of godsdiens gelei sal word.  
 
Niebuhr glo dat ’n profetiese godsdiens ’n diepe erns met die geskiedenis 
met ’n transendente norm kombineer. Hoop, geloof en liefde vorm die 
grondslag van ’n oproep tot ’n voortdurende stryd om geregtigheid en 
gelykheid. Die beperkinge waarbinne geregtigheid gesoek word, word 
voortdurend uitgebrei soos globale samewerking en afhanklikheid 
verhoog. Volmaakte geregtigheid sou ’n toestand van solidariteit met geen 
konflik van belange wees. Omdat mense 'n kombinasie van vitaliteit en 
rede is, kan die sosiale kohesie van die lewe nooit op suiwer rasionaliteit 
gebaseer word nie. Óns waarheid is nooit dié waarheid nie en ons is altyd 
subjektief en bevooroordeeld. Daar kan geen universele rasionele 
standaarde van geregtigheid of neutraliteit in die sosiale stryd wees 
nie. Liefde is die primêre wet van die natuur en ’n fundamentele vereiste 
vir sosiale bestaan. Ons word geroep tot betrokkenheid in die samelewing 
op grond van die regverdigmaking deur geloof. Gelykheid as die toppunt 
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van geregtigheid verwys na liefde as die finale norm van geregtigheid, 
want gelyke geregtigheid is die verwesenliking van die gemeenskap onder 
die voorwaardes van die sonde. Geregtigheid as onvolmaakte liefde het 
gelykheid wat toenemend inklusief is en voortdurend ruimte skep waar 
mense in harmonie kan lewe ten doel. 
 
In die laaste hoofstuk van hierdie studie word Rawls en Niebuhr in 
kritiese gesprek met ander teoloë gebring. Die bespreking begin met die 
Christelike voorrang vir die armes, ’n basiese element van teologiese 
geregtigheid. Die belang van morele redenering vir geregtigheid kom in 
konflik met Rawls se idee dat enige dik teorie van die goeie geregtigheid 
nie behoort te beïnvloed nie. Menswaardigheid is 'n belangrike faset van 
geregtigheid. Elke mens – as beeld van God – se onvervreembare 
waardigheid, vorm ’n noodsaaklike deel van die teologie en kan sekulêre 
teorieë van geregtigheid verryk. Geregtigheid vereis gemeenskap. Mense 
kan in gemeenskappe leer hoe om op te tree op 'n manier wat regverdig, 
moreel en eties is. Die kerk as gemeenskap kan 'n belangrike  plek wees 
waar dialoog en opvoeding kan plaasvind. Die omvang van geregtigheid 
neem steeds toe. Globalisering bied uitdagings oor waar en hoe 
geregtigheid geïmplementeer behoort te word en ons raak meer bewus van 
hoe ons aksies ander mense beïnvloed. Die verantwoordelikheid vir die 
stryd om geregtigheid neem ook steeds toe. Die eskatologiese hoop en die 
manier van lewe wat die kerk kan aanbied voltooi die Christelike idee van 
geregtigheid.  
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
 
 
1.1 The Research Question 
 
During my undergraduate years, and in particular during my research for 
my masters degree on justice and love, I became increasingly interested in 
and passionate about justice, predominantly in how theological ethics 
relates to and dialogues with social, economic and political justice. As a 
theologian, I am convinced that theology has a specific role to play in 
being a voice for the voiceless, and looking after the weak and poor. The 
necessity of entering into dialogue with other disciplines cannot be 
overlooked, hence my interest in a more philosophical background to this 
theme. The necessity of encouraging dialogue not only inter-disciplinary 
dialogue but also interaction between the various strata of the 
community, the refusal to accept the status quo and the recognition that 
our truth is not the only truth has become increasingly clear to me. Our 
justice will never be completely just, and it is this realization that needs to 
call us into continual action, struggling for a better and more equal 
justice.  
 
There are many theories of justice, many of them opposing theories. 
Justice is not a straightforward matter with easy answers; the injustice 
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which remains rampant in society is testament to this. Justice needs to 
take seriously the injustice in the world and the specific contexts in which 
the injustice occurs. Most situations require a unique response, grounding 
justice firmly in a specific place and time. At the same time there needs to 
be some sense of what justice is, in order to recognise injustice and to 
realize the shortcomings of justice. Justice therefore needs to be both 
timeless and ahistorical and firmly grounded in the historical.1   
 
Justice needs to, therefore, be relevant to the particular situation. The 
injustices may change over time, and what was once a just system may, 
over a certain period, become unjust. It is necessary to be continually 
critical of our laws and policies to guard against moral superiority and 
oppression. Karen Lebacqz suggests that when talking about injustice, a 
plurality of theories of justice is needed (1986:123). This thesis proposes 
that it is not necessarily a theory or theories that are necessary, but a 
notion of justice. Developing a Christian conscience about injustice and 
living in hope which leads to action may be more important than a theory 
of justice. This necessitates dialogue between various disciplines and 
theories about justice. There are many elegant and persuasive theories of 
justice.  Rawls and Niebuhr represent just two of the people who have 
offered influential contributions to the subject. Any discussion about 
justice needs to remain open ended; until perfect justice is attained there 
can be no final word on the subject.  
 
For John Rawls, fairness is the starting point for developing the principles 
of justice. These principles form the basis of just institutions and will be 
acceptable to all rational people. In turn, the just institutions will ensure 
                                                 
1
 In her later book, Karen Lebacqz suggests that justice is both pre-eminently historical and 
radically free from history. “It must be pre-eminently historical because it originates in the protest 
against injustice. In order to understand the injustice, and to know where justice would lie in correcting 
it, attention must be paid to history. Justice is not simply treating people in accord with ‘need,’ because 
it makes a difference why the need arose. Where someone has been wronged by another, there are 
special obligations of justice in addition to any obligations created by the mere existence of need. At 
the same time, justice must be radically free from history, for the future to be posited is not dependent 
on the possibilities inherent in the past. If the future depends on the past, then patterns of injustice will 
be perpetuated into that future” (1987:153 my italics).  
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that society is ordered in the most just and fair way possible. For Reinhold 
Niebuhr, justice is imperfect love. Christian realism means that we do not 
have a utopian view of the world, but accept our finiteness and our 
dependence upon God. In response to the saving grace of God, we live lives 
which are always seeking to be more just. Rawls offers a philosophical 
starting point and Niebuhr an ethical one. These two traditions are often 
viewed as mutually exclusive. Justice as fairness seeks primarily to 
exclude any ethical and religious concept in its attempt to reach an 
overlapping consensus. Justice as imperfect love will always contain 
elements of love, but this is not enough because it will always be 
imperfect. The challenge is to develop and apply a Christian notion of 
justice in a way which is acceptable and understandable outside of 
theological circles while seeking a way for justice to be more than fairness. 
 
Interesting and varied discourses have developed from the work of both 
John Rawls and Reinhold Niebuhr, as various scholars and schools have 
grappled to either improve upon or disprove the theories and ideas 
originally put forward by these two scholars. This thesis will enter into a 
critical dialogue with Rawls and Niebuhr in an attempt to extend Rawls’s 
idea of justice as fairness with a broader idea of Christian love. Perfect 
love remains a hope for the future however, so justice and equality can 
hopefully find a space beyond fairness, which does, however, become more 
inclusive and love-filled. Justice is not only about eradicating injustice 
and forming a fairer and more equal society where people can live a good 
life. There is another part of justice which goes hand in hand with giving 
people equal liberty, equal opportunity and ensuring that they can use the 
resources which they have available to them. Theology should take 
seriously the dignity of each person.  
 
Thus, the proposed research question is: Justice between fairness and 
love? Developing a Christian notion of justice in critical dialogue with 
John Rawls and Reinhold Niebuhr.  
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1.2 The Research Process 
 
This thesis is a literature study. Both primary and secondary sources will 
be used. The main works will be A Theory of Justice (1972) by John 
Rawls, as well as his more recent Justice as Fairness, A Restatement 
(2001) and various essays and responses to criticisms. The main focus on 
Reinhold Niebuhr’s work on love and justice will be his books Moral Man 
and Immoral Society (1932), and The Nature and Destiny of Man (Vol I 
and II) (1941) with reference to collections of essays and smaller 
publications.  
  
Secondary sources will include critical works by various theologians and 
social scientists including Wolfgang Huber, Heinrich Bedford-Strohm, 
Nicholas Wolterstorff, Duncan Forrester, David Fergusson, Martha 
Nussbaum, Karen Lebacqz and Amartya Sen. South African perspectives 
include Piet Naudé’s master’s thesis (Regverdigheid as billikheid : ’n 
kritiese analise van die objektiwiteitsideaal in John Rawls se sosiale 
kontrakteorie van distributiewe regverdigheid (1982)) and Steve de 
Gruchy’s doctoral dissertation (Not liberation but justice. An Analysis of 
Reinhold Niebuhr’s Understanding of Human Destiny in the Light of the 
Doctrine of the Atonement (1992)).  
 
In the second chapter the investigation begins with an introduction to and 
a critical analysis of the discourse which developed from the theory of 
John Rawls, with particular emphasis on how responsibility and 
community are developed in his work. Rawls based his argument for 
justice as fairness on the social contract theories of Kant and Rousseau, 
where the moral sovereignty of each individual is realized. The most 
important contribution of Rawls is his theory of justice as fairness, 
published in 1971. He described the one practicable aim of justice as 
fairness to provide an “acceptable philosophical and moral basis for 
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democratic institutions and thus to address the question of how the claims 
of liberty and equality are to be understood” (Rawls 2001:5). The concept 
of ‘justice as fairness’ is developed from the original position in which the 
principles of justice are selected.  This idea is worked out in conjunction 
with two companion ideas, namely the idea of citizens as free and equal 
persons, and the idea of a well-ordered society. The influence of this work 
on many democratic governments is undeniable, as well as forming the 
basis for many discussions on justice. I will argue that it offers a good 
theoretical starting point for any practical theory of justice. This theory is 
not only metaphysical, but it is inherently political (particularly in the 
later collection of essays published in Political Liberalism (1993)), and 
Rawls himself emphasized the importance of looking for such a conception 
of justice in a democratic society (Rawls 2003:187).  
 
Rawls’s theory is based on two principles of justice where the first 
principle claims equal liberties for all and permitted inequalities are 
formulated in the second principle providing they comply with certain 
conditions:2  
Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate 
scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with 
the same scheme of liberties for all; and 
Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: first, 
they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all under 
conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they are to 
be the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of society 
(the difference principle) (Rawls 2001:43) 
The first principle is prior to the second; and in the second principle fair 
equality of opportunity is prior to the difference principle. The role of the 
principles of justice is to specify the fair terms of social cooperation (Rawls 
2001:7). The first applies roughly to the constitutional structures and 
guarantees of the political and legal systems, and the second to the 
operation of the social and economic systems, particularly insofar as they 
                                                 
2
 This is the most recent formulation of the two principles of justice as rewritten by Rawls in 
Justice as Fairness (2001) 
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can be affected by tax policies and various approaches to social security, 
employment, disability compensation, child support, education, medical 
care, and so forth (Nagel 2003:66).  
 
The first principle is a principle of strict equality, while the second a 
principle of permissible inequality. Some inequalities are thus allowed, 
but only those that protect or improve the position of the least advantaged 
in society. A less extensive liberty must strengthen the total system of 
liberty shared by all, and a less than equal liberty must be acceptable to 
those with lesser liberty, ensuring that all people are treated fairly at the 
outset and given equal opportunity to participate in society (Will 
1994:107). Thus, equality remains subordinate to liberty.  
 
Fair equality of opportunity requires that everyone, whatever their 
starting place in life, has the same opportunity to develop their natural 
talents regardless of background. If the broad structure of society satisfies 
the principles of justice in its large-scale statistical effects on the life 
prospects of different groups, then, according to Rawls, any individual 
inequalities that emerge will be just. The difference principle is 
particularly notable, since it is one of few philosophical principles which 
represent the Christian notion of the priority of the poor.  
 
Rawls believed that justice cannot be based upon any general moral 
conception of justice such as a religious grounding (Rawls 2003:188). 
Because of the diversity of doctrines and a plurality of conflicting 
conceptions of the good the idea of fairness found in the original position is 
dissociated from any moral formation and denies the participants’ 
connections within a community; Rawls speaks of the ‘veil of ignorance’ 
where none of the participants know their own status, skills, or individual 
ends and goals. Any decision made regarding justice will be completely 
rational, since no individual identity exists. Behind the veil, no knowledge 
of the good is permitted.  
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By using the two principles of justice, justice as fairness attempts to 
adjudicate between contending traditions with regards to basic rights and 
liberties, creating a space for citizens to follow various conceptions of the 
good. For this to be attained, it is necessary to avoid disputed 
philosophical, moral and religious questions (Rawls 2003:194). Rawls says 
that these issues are avoided not because of lack of importance, but rather 
because they are too important and there is no way that they can be 
politically resolved. Thus, a religious grounding for justice is not 
acceptable in the political realm, primarily because it will not be 
acceptable to all thus excluding those who do not find it acceptable.  
 
The idea of the original position, as Rawls emphasises in his later work, is 
idealistic. It is introduced because there is no better way to develop a 
political conception of justice for the basic political structure than from the 
fundamental idea of society as a fair system of co-operation between 
citizens as free and equal persons. The emphasis needs to fall on the idea 
of citizens as free and equal persons where no-one is forced into a certain 
way of thinking by a certain community. By thinking of society as a fair 
system of social co-operation the most appropriate principles for realizing 
liberty and equality in the society are realized.  
 
Rawls realises that there is no agreement on the way basic institutions of 
a constitutional democracy should be arranged if they are to specify and 
secure the basic rights and liberties of citizens and answer to the claims of 
democratic equality when citizens are free and equal persons. Justice as 
fairness tries to adjudicate between the contending traditions and find a 
solution which is acceptable to all, thus the exclusion of morally justifiable 
principles (Rawls 2003:190). The two principles put forward by Rawls are 
intended to create a space where different institutions and historical 
traditions can recognize common basic ideas and principles. Justice as 
fairness avoids the autocratic use of state power by creating a principle of 
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toleration; the state cannot attain public agreement on basic philosophical 
questions without infringing on basic liberties (Rawls 2003:194).  The 
over-arching fundamental idea is that of society as a fair system of co-
operation between free and equal persons. In political thought, Rawls 
emphasizes that citizens do not view the social order as a fixed natural 
order, or as an institutional hierarchy justified by religious or aristocratic 
values.  
 
The third chapter examines the ideas of justice in the work of Reinhold 
Niebuhr. Niebuhr believed that a prophetic religion combines an utmost 
seriousness about history with a transcendent norm; never permitting us 
to ignore history, escape from it or find our answers within it. This 
theology is an attempt to live out a reality in today’s world of how things 
are supposed to be and will one day be; thus imperfect history merges 
with a striving for the perfect outcome. Niebuhr believed that hope, faith 
and love form the foundation of a call to a continual struggle for justice 
and equality (Niebuhr 1974:1). 
 
For Niebuhr, the struggle for justice seeks the possibilities and limits of 
historical existence as well as truth (1988:174). The boundaries in which 
justice is sought are being continually extended as global cooperation and 
dependence increases. Perfect justice would be a state of solidarity with no 
conflict of interests; but because people are a combination of vitality and 
reason, the social coherence of life can never be based on pure rationality 
(Niebuhr 1988:174). Because we are always subjective and prejudiced 
there can be no universal rational standards of justice or neutrality in 
social struggle. The struggle for justice will always be a struggle because 
sinful people will never voluntarily give up their power and self-interest. 
Nevertheless, the justice which has been achieved in society proves that 
people are not only ever self-interested. People are able to synthesize 
opposing ideas and reach a solution which is tolerably just, which shows 
that they are capable of considering interests other than their own 
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(Niebuhr 1964b:249). Even without coercive force, people are capable of 
living together and can find a meeting point between opposing interests.  
 
Because of the social nature of humanity, love is the primary law of 
nature and brotherhood (in Niebuhr’s terminology) is the fundamental 
requirement of social existence (Niebuhr 1964b:244). However, this 
presents a perfection which is unattainable because of the sinfulness of 
human nature, so while justice may be a continual striving towards a 
state of perfect love, it will always lack the perfection of love. While justice 
is, and must be, constantly improved, it must also always remain aware of 
its own imperfections and shortcomings in relation to the perfection 
towards which it strives.  
 
The rules of justice relate positively to the law of love in three ways by 
extending a sense of obligation towards the other  “from an immediate 
obligation, prompted by obvious need, to a continued obligation expressed 
in fixed principles of mutual support; from a simple relation between a 
self and one ‘other’ to the complex relations of the self and the ‘others’; and 
from the obligations discerned by the individual self, to the wider 
obligations which the community defines from its more impartial 
perspective” (Niebuhr 1964b:248). But there is also a negative 
relationship between love and justice. Justice remains only an 
approximation of fraternity insofar as it protects the interests of certain 
individuals and communities by drawing boundaries which cannot be 
crossed and protecting the rights of people in complex social relationships. 
But justice can never achieve the perfection of love as it attempts to find 
equality between all peoples.  
 
The love which Niebuhr talks about is a mature love, which does not get 
caught up in sentimentality. Niebuhr describes love as the belief “that life 
has no meaning except in terms of responsibility; responsibility toward 
our family, toward our nation, toward our civilization and, now, by the 
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pressures of history, toward the universe of mankind which includes our 
enemies (1974:35).” This talk of responsibility, written in the midst of 
World War II, still speaks loudly to us today. Now, more than ever, love 
must be extended to all peoples as the global network becomes 
increasingly smaller, and the horrors of injustice become increasingly 
apparent. Justice must seek to prevent the strong from taking advantage 
of the weak, and help the weak to become stronger.  
 
For Niebuhr, it is necessary for the government to keep power in control 
because power without control would result in anarchy (1964b:265-266). 
There needs to be a tolerable equilibrium between the various powers, 
even though this equilibrium results in tension. This equilibrium is a form 
of justice in that it prevents domination, but it is the government that is 
the social necessity which keeps a check on the power. The government is 
a conscious attempt to arrive at justice, although it may itself be a bearer 
of injustice and corruption. The beauty of democratic government is that 
the government is protected (to a greater or lesser degree) from abuse by 
the government itself. Niebuhr points out that to understand the failure of 
the government in preventing the misuse of power enables the people to 
work towards a higher justice (1964b:284). This is, by the very nature of 
the political realm, imperfect justice. 
 
Relative justice involves the calculation of competing interests, the 
specification of duties and rights, and the balancing of life forces. These 
complex relations require justice, but such justice is always capable of 
improvement as is clear when viewing the continual evolvement of society. 
The laws and rules of justice will always reflect the partiality of human 
perspectives. Our justice can never fully be what it is meant to be since 
there are no universal or absolute standards of justice. Any attempt to 
codify justice, such as a list of rights, always results in injustice for one 
group of people, while others will benefit to a greater extent. Freedom is 
the essence of human nature and stands as a crucial value, but it must 
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always stand in deference to justice, community and equality. We must 
not forget that the freedom of one person ends where the freedom of the 
other begins.  
 
Niebuhr sees a higher justice as meaning a more equal justice. He refers 
in particular to special privilege and the resulting tension which it creates 
between those who have it and those who do not. Equality as the pinnacle 
of the ideal of justice points towards love as the final norm of justice; for 
equal justice is the realization of community under the conditions of sin 
(Niebuhr 1988:181). Justice as imperfect love aims for an equality which 
is increasingly inclusive and continuously creates space for people to live 
in harmony.  
 
The research process will conclude with a comparison of these two 
different approaches to justice, with particular emphasis on theological 
dialogue. Thus, in the final chapter, Rawls and Niebuhr are brought into 
critical discussion with other theologians. A brief summary of the most 
crucial points of their work for this thesis is followed by a critical 
theological discussion.  
 
Firstly, the Christian preference for the poor, an inherent part of 
theological justice begins the discussion. Secondly, the importance of 
moral reasoning for justice comes into conflict with Rawls’s idea that there 
should be no thick theory of the good influencing justice. The necessity of 
a positive view of toleration is discussed here. Thirdly, human dignity is 
an important facet of justice. The inalienable dignity owed to every human 
being, created in the image of God, is an essential part of theology and can 
enrich secular theories of justice. Fourthly, justice necessitates 
community. People learn how to behave in a way which is just, moral and 
ethical from their associations in communities. The church community 
can provide an important place where dialogue and learning can take 
place. Lastly, the boundaries of justice are ever-increasing. Globalisation 
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presents challenges to where and how justice is affected and we become 
increasingly aware of how our actions affect other people. The 
responsibility is ever-increasing.  
 
 Niebuhr was intensely aware of our finiteness and fallibility. For him, our 
striving for justice was part of the perfection wherein lies our hope. The 
eschatological aspect of our faith, manifested in our responsibility, was 
inseparable from our struggle for justice.  The eschatological view was 
both an acknowledgement of our sin and an acceptance of our 
responsibility to not live passive and apathetic lives. The church offers a 
specific way of life, situated in the person of Jesus Christ. We are called to 
live in a certain way, according to a certain ethic.  
 
The dialogue between theology and other disciplines, the ability to 
translate our specific Christian views of justice into conversations which 
can be understood by non-Christians, and the acceptance of the economic, 
social and political realms without attempting to Christianise the 
government, offer some idea of the complexity of a Christian notion of 
justice which attempts to take into account the fallibility of human beings, 
take seriously the poverty and oppression and need for dignity, and find a 
way which is acceptable to many people while respecting everyone’s need 
for justice.   
 
In South Africa, as in the rest of the world, the struggle for justice 
continues, often in the face of overwhelming odds. It is my hope that this 
thesis can enrich discussions about justice, equality and human dignity on 
both a local and global level. The injustice in the world cannot be ignored. 
Hopefully a Christian notion of justice as developed from a critical 
dialogue between Rawls and Niebuhr will enrich the arguments and 
debates surrounding justice in theological contexts, the broader academic 
world, and the local churches.  
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Chapter 2 
 
John Rawls: Justice as Fairness? 
 
 
2.1 Introduction 
 
John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice is often described as one of the most 
influential political philosophical works on justice during the last century. 
His work is controversial and has probably received as much criticism as 
it has praise. However, the effect it has had on discussions of justice in 
political philosophy and beyond is undeniable. Despite numerous 
problems with Rawls’s work, including the original position and the 
validity of the two principles of justice, and the relationship between 
justice, individuals and institutions, the enlightenment which his work 
has given to critics and supporters alike is described as a “pioneering 
contribution” by Sen (2009:58). 
 
Rawls’s secular ideas of justice are not entirely strange to theology. Some 
of his fundamental ideas, such as the difference principle and the 
consideration of people as free, equal and rational beings, can be 
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supported theologically. It is the contention of this thesis that Rawls is a 
valuable partner to a theological discussion on justice. 
  
The chapter begins with a short intellectual biography, followed by a 
general background to Rawls’s ideas of justice. This is followed by an 
analysis of the theory of justice as found primarily in A Theory of Justice, 
but with the revisions found in Rawls’s later works, most notably Political 
Liberalism and The Law of Peoples, both of which significantly impact the 
interpretation of Rawls’s idea of justice. Although the discussion follows 
formal headings as important sections of Rawls’s earlier work dictates, it 
is also interspersed with the more practical justice as it changes in his 
later works to a more political rather than philosophical concept and the 
relation of justice to community, which is often implied in Rawls’s work, is 
emphasised.  
 
The final section of the chapter focuses specifically on the relation of 
justice to community. The morality of justice and its development in 
community is an important aspect of Rawls’s work, one which is sadly 
often ignored. The place of family, morality and religion in his work is 
discussed here, as well as the application of justice between generations. 
Although Rawls himself refused to make use of morality or religion in his 
discussion of justice, he also admitted the importance of a thick theory of 
justice and his work is undeniably tinged with some religious motivation. 
Rawls’s view of tolerance and later willingness to create space for different 
moral theories and good is of distinct importance for the argument of this 
thesis.  
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2.2 Biography  
 
John Rawls was born on 21 February 1921 in Baltimore, Maryland.1 He 
completed his undergraduate studies in philosophy at Princeton 
University. His only recently published senior paper, A Brief Inquiry into 
the Meaning of Sin and Faith, shows definite leanings towards his 
Episcopalian upbringing.2 He ironically rejects social-contract liberalism 
in this paper because of its failure to recognize that “individuals become 
persons insofar as they live in community” (Rawls 2009:3). His “notions of 
sin, faith, and community are simultaneously moral and theological and 
despite fundamental differences they prefigure the moral outlook found in 
A theory of Justice” (Cohen and Nagel 2009:7).3  Gregory says that “the 
thesis and Rawls’s late unpublished remarks on religion and World War II 
offer a new dimension to his intellectual biography. They show the 
                                                 
1
 For a detailed biography, see chapter 1 in Rawls, by Samuel Freeman, published by Routledge as 
part of the Routledge Philosophers series. Here Freeman very helpfully discusses the motivations for 
Rawls’s work as well as the various factors which influenced his thought throughout his career. 
 
2
 In this thesis Rawls “develops a Trinitarian model of community, which he terms a 
‘revolutionary’ alternative to the inadequate ‘naturalism’ of Greek philosophy, early modern 
liberalism, Marxism and National Socialism. He charges Augustine and Aquinas with corrupting 
authentic Christianity by mediating these pernicious forms of individualism and naturalism. 
Throughout the thesis, Rawls effectively anticipates many of the claims made by his secular and 
religious critics alike” (Gregory 2007:183).  
 
3
 Piet Naudé, a prominent South African theologian, did a theological evaluation of Rawls’s work, 
by examining his assumptions about justice from a theological perspective for his licentiate thesis (see 
also his master’s thesis on Rawls). For example, he points out that Rawls views people as rational 
moral personalities who have a natural sense of justice and who prioritise freedom in the realization of 
their life plans, which include a concept of the good (1981:55).  While such a study undoubtedly offers 
much value to a Christian view of justice, we cannot forget that Rawls is not a theologian and therefore 
speaks in philosophical, not theological terms. However, Naudé concludes that Rawls must be included 
in discussions of justice, because of the general revelation by the Spirit of God. We cannot place a box 
around God, allowing Him only to work in theological discussions (1981:66).  
Although there is Christian support of Rawls’s work (Harlan Beckley and Richard Rorty to 
mention a couple), Timothy Jackson in To Bedlam and Part Way Back: John Rawls and Christian 
Justice, claims that the two are incompatible. He argues that Christians will be acting on unchristian 
principles and being unfaithful to Christian beliefs when they are sympathetic to Rawls’s theory of 
justice. I disagree. Rawls offers a space for Christians to enter into dialogue with non-Christians 
without forcing the Christian beliefs on them. We can, however, always enter into this dialogue 
knowing that our humanness including our freedom is grounded upon and founded in God.  
Beckley conversely sees Rawls’s theory as being founded upon general moral beliefs which can be 
accepted and affirmed by both Christians and others alike, without either side surrendering their beliefs 
(A Christian Affirmation of Rawls). In his second part of the essay published a year later, Beckley 
discusses the relationship of agape to Rawls’s theory where he claims that “love affirms, but does not 
replace Rawls’s idea of justice as fairness” (1986:240).  
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significance of his humanist response to the moral impossibility of 
political theology. Moreover, they also reveal a kind of Rawlsian piety 
marginalized by contemporary debates over religion and liberalism” 
(2007:179). This is an interesting beginning for someone who made so 
little use of morality and religion in his life’s work.  
 
Rawls served in the US infantry, from 1943-1946, and these years were 
critical in turning him from budding theologian to philosopher. He 
married Margaret Warfield Fox in 1949 and in 1950 received his Ph.D. 
from Princeton. After spending a year at Oxford University, he moved to 
Cornell University. In 1962 he joined the Philosophy Department at 
Harvard University, where he would remain until his retirement in 1991.4 
He is described by Samuel Freeman as a “quiet, witty, and modest man... 
a private person who spent his time either at his work, or with his family 
and close friends. He regularly declined requests for interviews, and chose 
not to take an active role in public life” (Freeman 2007:5).  
 
In 1999, Rawls was awarded a National Humanities Medal by President 
Clinton and is cited by the NEH as being “one of the 20th century's most 
influential political philosophers, widely read among political scientists, 
economists and legal theorists for his views on justice, basic rights and 
equal opportunity.” He has received honorary degrees from Oxford, 
Princeton, and Harvard. Rawls died on 22 November, 2002. 
                                                 
4
 Martha Nussbaum (along with others such as Andrew Reath, Barbara Herman and Christine 
Korsgaard) claims that Rawls was responsible for renewing an interest in the history of ethics.  “His 
writing has revivified not only the social contract tradition and the tradition of Kantian ethics, but also 
the Aristotelian search for the well-lived life, Hume’s and Rousseau’s theories of moral development, 
and Henry Sidgwick’s account of method in ethics. ... Given Rawls’s great personal modesty and his 
love for the great works of the tradition, he almost always taught from historical texts” (1999:425 my 
italics).  
Two volumes of Rawls’s lectures, Lectures on the History of Moral Philosophy (2000) and the 
recently published Lectures on the History of Political Philosophy (2007) show the main influences on 
Rawls’s work. Moral Philosophy includes lectures on Hume, Leibniz, Kant and Hegel, with the 
lectures on Kant forming almost half of the content of the book. Hegel is used mainly as a bridge 
between Kant’s moral ethics and liberalism, in particular, his idea of sittlichkeit. Political Philosophy 
focuses on Hobbes, Locke, Hume, Rousseau, Mill and Marx. Throughout the lectures, Rawls seeks to 
draw parallels between his own work and the various philosophers, as well as relating the work to 
modern politics and liberalism.  
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Rawls’s first book, for which he is probably best known, is A Theory of 
Justice (first published in 1971, with a revised edition published in 1999). 
In this work he wished to “articulate the sense of justice that people living 
in modern, liberal societies share” (Levine 2002:184).5 The question with 
which Rawls is concerned throughout his work is how to make life fair 
when where we are born, when we are born and to whom we are born is a 
matter of luck. Each person’s prospects and opportunities are influenced 
by their situation in life and it is to rectifying the situation of social 
injustice with which Rawls concerns himself, with an intensely moral 
approach (Nagel 2002:78).6 
 
In Political Liberalism, first published in 1993, Rawls aims to show “how 
it is realistically possible for reasonable democratic citizens to agree upon 
and endorse for moral reasons a liberal conception of justice that assigns 
priority to the basic liberties of free and equal citizens and provides a 
reasonable social minimum” (Freeman 2007:363). He begins by asking a 
fundamental question, namely “what is the most appropriate conception of 
justice for specifying the fair terms of social cooperation between citizens 
regarded as free and equal, and as fully cooperating members of society 
over a complete life, from one generation to the next” and seeks to find a 
way in which differing points of view can converge on a reasonable 
political conception of justice (Rawls 1993:4).7   
                                                 
5
 Levine goes on to say that “A Theory of Justice is about our sense of fairness, as [Rawls’s] use of 
the indirect article suggests. Rawls never claimed to have elaborated the theory of justice, an account 
that would hold for all peoples everywhere. In all likelihood, no such theory is possible because 
notions of fairness and therefore of justice are always historically specific” (2002:184).  
 
6
 It is important to note the fundamental moral concerns upon which Rawls based his theory of 
justice, a point which is too often over-looked. “When [these] views were set out at length in A Theory 
of Justice, the book was immediately given the full attention of an academic world hungry for serious, 
morally based political theory. ... Rawls had already had an influence in the direction of substantive 
moral thought, also provoked by the Vietnam War and domestic controversies over affirmative action, 
sexual freedom, and legalized abortion. His contribution was a large, intellectually rich theory – above 
all a theory that had strong and highly contestable consequences. By showing that disagreements about 
how society should be ordered could be traced to differences in fundamental moral conceptions, he 
illuminated not only the views of those who agreed with him but also those of his opponents” (Nagel 
2002:82 my italics).  
 
7
 Rawls’s views of public reason become particularly important when discussing his critical view 
towards any moral contribution to public discourse on justice. His thought changed in many ways 
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The Law of Peoples published in 1999 consists of two essays, namely The 
Idea of Public Reason Revisited and The Law of Peoples, which is a major 
reworking of a shorter article by the same name. Rawls says that “by the 
‘Law of People’ I mean a particular political conception of right and justice 
that applies to the principles and norms of international law and practice” 
(Rawls 1999a:3). In this book, he attempts to put forward principles which 
would be respected by “a society of well-ordered people.” These often bear 
close resemblance to what we recognise today as the human rights put 
forward in various bills of rights. Rawls points out on numerous occasions 
that the “decent hierarchical societies,” as opposed to liberal societies are 
less than just and therefore, many of the principles which apply to liberal 
politics cannot be applied to them.8  Alistair Macleod suggests that in the 
Law of Peoples, Rawls appears much more willing to settle for a less 
expansive doctrine of human rights, possibly because he does not see his 
own liberal democratic principles being accepted by the international 
community (2006:136).  
                                                                                                                                           
between Theory and Political Liberalism. “I end by pointing out the fundamental difference between A 
Theory of Justice and Political Liberalism. The first explicitly attempts to develop from the idea of the 
social contract, represented by Locke, Rousseau, and Kant, a theory of justice that is no longer open to 
objections often thought fatal to it, and that proves superior to the long dominant tradition of 
utilitarianism. A Theory of Justice hopes to present the structural features of such a theory so as to 
make it the best approximation to our considered judgments of justice and hence to give the most 
appropriate moral basis for a democratic society. Furthermore, justice as fairness is presented there as a 
comprehensive liberal doctrine (although the term ‘comprehensive doctrine’ is not used in the book) in 
which all the members of its well-ordered society affirm that same doctrine. This kind of well-ordered 
society contradicts the fact of reasonable pluralism and hence Political Liberalism regards that society 
as impossible.  
Thus, Political Liberalism considers a different question, namely: How is it possible for those 
affirming a comprehensive doctrine, religious or nonreligious, and in particular doctrines based on 
religious authority, such as the Church or the Bible, also to hold a reasonable political conception of 
justice that supports a constitutional democratic society? The political conceptions are seen as both 
liberal and self-standing and not as comprehensive, whereas the religious doctrines may be 
comprehensive but not liberal. The two books are asymmetrical, though both have an idea of public 
reason. In the first, public reason is given by a comprehensive liberal doctrine, while in the second, 
public reason is a way of reasoning about political values shared by free and equal citizens that does 
not trespass on citizens’ comprehensive doctrines so long as those doctrines are consistent with a 
democratic polity. Thus, the well-ordered constitutional democratic society of Political Liberalism is 
one in which the dominant and controlling citizens affirm and act from irreconcilable yet reasonable 
comprehensive doctrines. These doctrines in turn support reasonable political conceptions – although 
not necessarily the most reasonable – which specify the basic rights, liberties, and opportunities of 
citizens in society’s basic structure” (Rawls 1999:179-180).  
 
8
 For example, he says that he is not saying that “a decent hierarchical society is as reasonable and 
just as a liberal society… a decent hierarchical society meets moral and legal requirements sufficient to 
override the political reasons we might have for imposing sanctions on, or forcibly intervening with, its 
people…” (1999a:83).  
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In 2001 Rawls published Justice as Fairness. This was a major reworking 
of key ideas in his Theory, a response to criticism and serious faults that 
Rawls himself found in Theory, as well as an attempt to connect ideas of 
Theory to those found in later essays. Most notably, it changes how justice 
as fairness should be understood. Originally, it was intended as part of a 
comprehensive moral doctrine, but it is now presented as more of a 
political conception of justice (2001:xvi). Rawls describes how the 
principles of justice relate to domestic justice as the primary structure in 
which institutions and associations operate. The law of peoples describes 
how the principles are extended to a global level (2001:11-12).  
 
Rawls’s particular interest lay in political philosophy, which he saw as 
being clearly differentiated from any moral conception of justice. His ideas 
with regards to justice are not intended to be moral doctrines, and indeed 
do not argue from a moral or religious point of view. He attempted to 
create a space where diverging viewpoints with regards to justice could 
find a platform for convergence, an idea he called the ‘overlapping 
consensus’. Despite the lack of morality in his political theory, he saw 
political philosophy as but one part of moral theory, thus leaving a huge 
space for religious, moral and ethical interaction.9  
 
The importance of Rawls’s work is obvious not only from the number of 
works which use it as a basis, but also from the amount of critique which 
it has received. Rawls defends himself against much of the critique in 
later works, and adjusts some of his thinking accordingly in places. The 
majority of the critique is concentrated on the original position and the 
veil of ignorance, the two principles of justice (including the priority given 
to liberty, the ordering of the principles and the difference principle), as 
                                                 
9
 Rawls believed that all the “essential elements for a political conception of justice be contained 
within the category of the political. ... the extensions of the political always remain political, and 
comprehensive doctrines, religious, philosophical, and moral, always extend beyond it” (2001:18). In 
the dialogue with Niebuhr, the political and philosophical will again appear as a question of central 
importance.  
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well as Rawls’s contract method and use of Kantian principles. The 
libertarian critiques (particularly Robert Nozick) and the communitarian 
critiques probably form the most extensive critiques of Rawls’s work.10  
 
2.3 Background to Rawls’s Theory of Justice 
 
Rawls believed that justice cannot be compromised.11 The only reason to 
suffer a theory which is unjust and, assuming the practical 
implementation of this theory, a society which is unjust is because of a 
lack of a better theory to make society more just. The history of the world, 
and the history of Christendom, is overflowing with the blood of the 
innocent shed in the name of justice, the Crusades, slavery, Nazism and 
Apartheid to name but a few; oppression bred of false superiority, death 
as a result of intolerance.  
 
For a society to be just, it is necessary that there are stabilizing forces 
such as laws and institutions which are accepted by the people. Distrust, 
resentment, suspicion and hostility destroy justice and cause people to act 
in ways in which they would not normally act (Rawls 1971:6). A theory of 
justice should seek first to provide adequate principles to ensure that all 
people are treated equally with the realization that respect for human 
beings, for human life and dignity are non-negotiable parts of justice, and 
that the basic requirements of all people are provided. Rawls emphasises 
the influence which the political and the moral spheres have on the 
behaviour of people. He believes that the “great evils of human history” 
                                                 
10
 An in-depth study of the major criticisms of Rawls’s work can be found in Rawls "A Theory of 
Justice" and Its Critics by Chandran Kukathas & Philip Pettit. 1990. Stanford: Stanford University 
Press.  
 
11
 Despite his arguments against a religious justification for political life, Rawls’s influence was 
initially religious. “Rawls’s lifelong interest in justice developed out of his early concern with the 
basically religious question: Why is there evil in the world and is the human existence redeemable in 
spite of it? This question eventually led him to inquire whether a just society is realistically possible. 
His life’s work is directed towards discovering what justice requires of us, and showing that it is within 
human capacities to realize a just society and a just international order” (Freeman 2007:5).  
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are a result of political injustice and  that by establishing just institutions 
and just social policies, these injustices (or evils) will eventually disappear 
(Rawls 1999a:7).  In short, he is concerned with principles, institutions 
and policies.  
 
A Theory of Justice was certainly one of the most influential contributions 
to the justice debate in political philosophy during the twentieth century. 
This 600-page work sparked many debates and discussions, forcing people 
to move beyond the utilitarian view of justice.12 Rawls rejects the 
utilitarian view of justice, which claims that an action or situation is just 
insofar as it maximises the happiness of the majority. He maintained that 
the well-being of even a few people cannot be sacrificed for the well-being 
of the majority, and so any theory of justice should ensure that the 
situation of the least well-off be improved.  
 
Rawls based his argument for justice as fairness on the social contract 
theories of Kant13 and Rousseau14 (among others), where the moral 
sovereignty of each individual is realized. Even though the state, in a 
                                                 
12
 Naudé describes Rawls as using the contract tradition in an original way despite many problems 
surrounding his methodology. There are three main points to his argument; firstly, Rawls highlights the 
shortcoming of utilitarianism by contrasting them with his contract theory, however, he then makes use 
of utilitarian elements and proposes unfair conditions for equality; secondly, he develops a Kantian 
theory to confirm the autonomous rationality of his procedural decisions in his theory, but his radical 
reversal of Kant’s understanding of rationality undermines his starting point; lastly, his starting point is 
the general original position where institutions bind justice and generally accepted conditions together, 
but the particular conditions of the contract situation are morally controversial and the methodological 
intension accommodates inherent contradictions which therefore cannot guarantee objectivity (Naudé 
1982:221-222).  
 
13
 “Rawls’s lengthy lectures on Kant (nearly 200 pages in Lectures on the History of Moral 
Philosophy) indicate that Kant is the philosopher who most profoundly influenced him. From the idea 
of ‘the priority of right over the good’ and the Kantian interpretation of justice as fairness in A Theory 
of justice, to Kantian (and later Political) Constructivism and the Independence of Moral Theory, then 
the conception of moral personality and the distinction between the Reasonable and the Rational in 
Political Liberalism, and finally the rejection of a world state and the idea of a ‘realistic utopia’ in 
Rawls’s Law of People, one can discern that many of Rawls’s main ideas were deeply influenced by 
his understanding of Kant” (Freeman 2007:21). 
 
14
 Rawls’s idea of people as free and equal developed from Rousseau. “Rousseau says that the 
common good is justice, and he specifies justice in terms of measures that promote the freedom and 
equality of citizens… Rawls’s democratic conception of justice is built around an ideal of free and 
equal moral persons” (Freeman 2007:217).  
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modern, democratic, liberal society, must be granted a monopoly of force 
in order to serve the collective interests and preserve the peace among the 
citizens, the very idea of the autonomous individual implies limitations on 
the ways in which the state can legitimately restrict the liberty of 
individuals. Freedom of religion, speech, association, the conduct of 
private life and the use of private property form the core of the protected 
liberties. Modern forms of egalitarian liberalism, such as the liberalism 
which is promoted by Rawls, have developed from the realization that a 
society can impose inequalities on its members in many ways other than 
by legally enforcing them.15 The entire system of social and economic 
institutions offers very unequal life chances and opportunities to different 
persons, depending on where they are situated in it by fate (Nagel 
2003:64). This polarization is becoming increasingly evident as society 
becomes more specialized technologically. A firm foundation is thus 
needed to defend the rights of all citizens to freedom and justice and to 
ensure that the citizens are not imposed upon by the state. Every person 
no matter race, class, gender or creed should have equal rights and 
liberties and should be allowed to participate in society without being 
marginalised or excluded. At the same time, the cohesiveness of society is 
dependent upon the respect for the other; thus an individual is an 
individual within a community of others. The rights of each person also 
come with responsibility to other people; it is necessary to respect the 
rights of others and not infringe upon their liberties. An egalitarian 
justice cannot be just without taking into account the right which other 
people have to their share of the benefits. 
 
                                                 
15
 Rawls’s theory can be described as a liberal, democratic and egalitarian concept. It gives priority 
to certain equal basic liberties while respecting individuals’ choices with regards to religious, 
philosophical and moral doctrines. It also provides for equal political rights and prioritizes equal 
opportunities. It finally seeks to benefit the least disadvantaged (see the discussion in chapter 2 of 
Freeman 2007).  
Levine, however, argues that Rawls’s theory can never by fully egalitarian, despite having far-
reaching egalitarian principles, because individuals are held accountable for the distributional 
consequences of their own free choices (2002:195).  
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Rawls begins from the supposition that reasonable people will be prepared 
to support a set of principles which assign basic rights and duties, and 
distribute the benefits and burdens of social cooperation (1971:5).16 Even 
though people may disagree about what is just and unjust, they can agree 
that institutions are just when they generally satisfy the accepted 
principles of justice. Thus, it is necessary to find certain principles which 
will be generally accepted by all people and will be applicable in all 
situations. These principles need to transcend moral, cultural and social 
preconceptions, thus making it easier for them to be accepted by all 
people.17 An important part of the principles of justice is equal 
opportunity just distribution, since this is an undeniable building block of 
a just society: “political and social justice for all citizens, securing basic 
freedoms, the fullness and expressiveness of the society’s civic culture, as 
well as the decent economic well-being of all its people” (Rawls 1999a:45) 
are necessities in a decent society. It is imperative that certain basic 
needs are met, since there are necessities which should not be denied to 
anyone including physical resources and access to opportunities.  
 
The principles of justice are a part of a social ideal which in turn is 
connected with a certain conception of society, a vision of the way in which 
the aims and purposes of social cooperation are to be understood (Rawls 
1971:9), although in his later works (cf. Political Liberalism) Rawls 
emphasises the need for cooperation and pluralism in a democratic 
society, rather than the principles.18 An understanding of justice and 
injustice, of a right and wrong way to behave towards others, is of the 
                                                 
16
 The concept of reasonable people is crucial in Rawls’s work. Rawls says that “reasonable and 
rational agents are normally the units of responsibility in political and social life and may be charged 
with violations of reasonable principles and standard.” He goes on to say that “the reasonable and the 
rational are complementary ideas” and that they cannot stand without the other (2005:50-52).   
 
17
 Rawls points out that justice as fairness attempts to establish justice by taking what persons 
would view as their “reciprocal advantage” rather than God’s law, for example (2005:97).  
 
18
 Rawls consistently moved to a less restrictive view. Gregory notes that his mature statements 
become fairly acceptable to religious critics. “Rawls is clear that citizens are free to argue as they wish 
in what he calls the ‘background culture.’ He also is clear that he intends no favour for secular reasons 
over against religious reasons” (Gregory 2007:198).  
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utmost importance in society. Justice is inseparable from relationships 
with others, the boundaries of which are continually being extended as it 
moves from local to national to global level. Justice between individuals, 
justice within nations (including economic, class and race relations), as 
well as justice and cooperation between nations (protecting the poor from 
the political, military and economic might of the powerful) are important. 
Every person, group and nation has a duty to not infringe on the rights of 
other persons, groups and nations. There should be a certain correct and 
acceptable division of social advantages, rights and duties (Rawls 
1971:10), a division which is not unjust and exploits neither people nor 
nations. People (in an ideal sense decent peoples (cf. Rawls 1999a)) have a 
definite moral nature, which includes a certain sense of pride and honour; 
and decent governments will treat citizens and other nations in the same 
just and respectful way in which they expect to be treated (Rawls 
1999a:44-45). 
 
Rawls always intended his theory as originally presented in Theory as an 
abstract one; a purely hypothetical situation which would lead to a certain 
conception of justice (1971:12): “Justice as fairness conveys the idea that 
the principles of justice are agreed to in an initial situation that is fair.” 
This does not mean that the concepts of justice and fairness are the same; 
justice must not be confused with fairness and what is just will not 
necessary appear to be fair. This theory was later concretised in Law of 
Peoples where it became more of a basis for a liberal democratic society 
than an abstract philosophical theory.19  
  
The feasibility of the principles of justice is determined by the initial 
situation in which they are chosen. “One conception of justice is more 
reasonable than another, or justifiable with respect to it, if rational 
persons in the initial situation would choose its principles over those of 
                                                 
19
 Rawls explains this movement from a moral philosophical doctrine to a political concept in 
Justice as Fairness.  
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others for the role of justice” (Rawls 1971:17). The principles of justice 
chosen in a situation similar to the original position will be accepted 
because of the circumstances under which they were originally 
formulated. The aim here is to make different ideas of justice converge at 
a specific point despite various and often greatly diverse opinions with 
regards to ethics, religion, intuition and prudence.  
 
Though the starting points for theories of justice may differ and even the 
broader concepts and end points may differ there needs to be some 
agreement between divergent viewpoints. There need to be courses of 
action which are accepted as just, and various other actions which are 
recognized as unjust. This highlights the necessity for certain unwavering 
principles of justice which are universal in their nature. Because of the 
necessity of the universality of the principles of justice acting on a local 
level (that is, between institutions and associations), we need to ask how 
it is possible for such principles to be formulated in a world with so much 
diversity, even on a national level, without compromising personal 
beliefs.20 And specifically to this thesis, it is necessary to investigate how 
the voice of theology can enrich the debate in a way which makes it 
possible to enter into a dialogue with dissenting voices. Rawls speaks 
about the overlapping consensus, which will be found in the political 
realm, particularly although not exclusively on a national level. This then 
translates into the law of peoples, which is a broader view of justice which 
relates to all decent societies.  
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
20
 Despite his appeal to universal rights, Rawls hardly even speaks about what inherent rights his 
principles are based on. He scarcely mentions natural rights in Theory, despite seeming to assume the 
right of all people to be treated equally. Nicholas Wolterstorff concludes that Rawls’s approach is 
based on “the right of rational moral agents to be treated with equal respect” rather than honouring all 
the inherent natural rights, although this argument is implicit (2008:17).  
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2.4 The Theory of Justice 
 
2.4.1 The Principles of Justice 
 
Rawls speaks of institutions, by which he means a public system of rules 
which specify “certain forms of action as permissible, others as forbidden” 
(1971:55). The rules should encourage behaviour which furthers socially 
desirable ends (cf. Adam Smith – the work of the invisible hand) (Rawls 
1971:57). It is important, however, that both the institutions and the 
society are just, not merely one or the other. Rawls envisioned two roles 
for the principles of justice as fairness – namely to provide “the basis for 
social unity in a well-ordered society”21 and to “enable the assessment of 
the justice of policies and to give practical guidance in formulating laws” 
(Freeman 2007:199).22 The main subject of justice as fairness is the basic 
structure of a well-ordered society. This is because the basic structure 
affects “citizens’ aims, aspirations and character, as well as their 
opportunities and their ability to take advantage of them” (Rawls 
2001:10). Justice moves from the inside out: first local justice, followed by 
domestic justice and finally global justice. Justice as fairness applies only 
to the institutions and associations which form the structure of society.  
 
Of course, the people also have to act in a way which is just, and Rawls 
claims that by our very nature we are unjust because we are continually 
                                                 
21
 The idea of the well-ordered society is an idealistic one: “it is a society in which everyone 
accepts and knows that everyone else accepts the very same political conception of justice; the basic 
structure of the society satisfies the principles of justice and citizens have a sense of justice which 
enables them to understand and apply the principles of justice. This idealization is necessary to 
determine how the principles of justice will fair in a system of free and equal cooperation between 
citizens” (Rawls 2001:8-9).  
 
22
 Rawls neatly summarises the aim of justice as fairness as being practical: “It presents itself as a 
conception of justice that may be shared by citizens as a basis of a reasoned, informed, and willing 
political agreement. It expresses their shared and public political reason. But to attain such a shared 
reason, the conception of justice should be, as far as possible, independent of the opposing and 
conflicting philosophical and religious doctrines that citizens affirm. ... The religious doctrines that in 
previous centuries were the professed basis of society have gradually given way to principles of 
constitutional government that all citizens, whatever their religious view, can endorse. Comprehensive 
philosophical and moral doctrines likewise cannot be endorsed by citizens generally, and they also no 
longer can, if they ever could, serve as the professed basis of society” (Rawls 2005:9-10).  
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influenced by “personal, monetary or other considerations” (1971:59), 
considerations which will cause us to act out of self-interest rather than 
with regard for the other. In Theory Rawls developed two principles of 
justice (which he reworked throughout his career) that encompassed what 
he expected a theory of justice to incorporate and that he believed would 
provide the guidelines for any institution and society to behave in a just 
way.23  
 
Rawls described the one practicable aim of justice as fairness to provide 
an “acceptable philosophical and moral basis for democratic institutions 
and thus to address the question of how the claims of liberty and equality 
are to be understood” (Rawls 2001:5). It is a “political conception of justice 
for basic structure of a modern democratic society” (Rawls 2001:14). The 
concept of justice as fairness is developed from the original position in 
which the principles of justice are selected behind the veil of ignorance.  
The two principles of justice on which Rawls’s theory is based are as 
follows:24  
1. Each person has the same indefeasible claim to a fully adequate 
scheme of equal basic liberties, which scheme is compatible with 
the same scheme of liberties for all; and 
2. Social and economic inequalities are to satisfy two conditions: 
first, they are to be attached to offices and positions open to all 
under conditions of fair equality of opportunity; and second, they 
are to be the greatest benefit to the least-advantaged members of 
society (the difference principle) (Rawls 2001:43)25 
                                                 
23
 “Von den vorgeschlagenen Gerechtigkeitsgrundsätzen behauptet Rawls nicht, sie seien 
notwendige Wahrheiten oder aus solchen ableitbar. Vielmehr ergibt sich ihre Rechtfertigung aus der 
gegenseitigen Stützung vieler Erwägungen und intuitiver Prämissen, aus denen sich dann eine 
einheitliche Theorie zusammenfügt. Die Bedeutung dieser methodischen Grundentscheidung für das 
Fruchtbarmachen der Rawlsschen Gerechtigkeitstheorie für die theologische Ethik wird uns noch zu 
beschäftigen haben“ (Bedford-Strohm 1993:209). We will see how the idea of toleration and of 
acceptance plays an important part in Rawls’s later works, particularly in connection with his idea of 
an overlapping consensus. The principles of justice aim to provide a place where people of different 
religions and cultures can find common ground when talking about justice.  
 
24
 This is the most recent formulation of the two principles of justice as rewritten by Rawls in 
Justice as Fairness (2001) 
 
25
 The original wording of the principles in “A Theory of Justice” (1971) was as follows:  
First Principle 
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The first principle is prior to the second; and in the second principle fair 
equality of opportunity is prior to the difference principle. In the basic 
liberties of citizens, Rawls includes “political liberty together with freedom 
of speech and assembly; liberty of conscience and freedom of thought; 
freedom of the person along with the right to hold (personal) property; and 
freedom from arbitrary arrest and seizure as defined by the concept of the 
rule of law” (1971:61). These are the liberties referred to in the first 
principle and which take absolute priority. The role of the principles of 
justice is to specify the fair terms of social cooperation (Rawls 2001:7). The 
first principle applies to the constitutional structures and guarantees of 
the political and legal systems, and the second applies to the operation of 
the social and economic systems, particularly insofar as they can be 
affected by tax policies and various approaches to social security, 
employment, disability compensation, child support, education and 
medical care (Nagel 2003:66).  
 
While the first principle is a principle of strict equality, the second 
principle is one of permissible inequality. Therefore, some inequalities are 
permitted, but only those that protect or improve the position of the least 
advantaged26 in society. The second principle applies to the distribution of 
                                                                                                                                           
Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive total system of equal basic liberties 
compatible with a similar system of liberty for all. 
Second Principle 
Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both: 
a) to the greatest benefit of the least advantaged, consistent with the just savings principle, and 
b) attached to offices and positions open to all under conditions of fair equality of opportunity. 
 
26
 It is important to note that by “least advantaged” Rawls is referring to those people who have the 
lowest income and who are “economically” least advantaged. “Who are the least advantaged members 
of society? Rawls means least advantaged in the sense of a group’s share of primary goods. He says 
that, since one’s share of income and wealth generally corresponds also with one’s share of the 
primary goods of powers, positions of authority, and bases of self-respect, we can regard the least 
advantaged to be the economically least advantaged people in a society – i.e., the poorest people 
(though they may not in fact be poor in an absolute sense). So the least advantaged are not the people 
who are the unhappiest or the unluckiest, nor are they the most handicapped. Rawls deals with the 
problem of special needs, such as handicaps, separately from the difference principle. Nor are the last 
advantaged even the poorest among people, those who are unemployed because they are unable or 
unwilling to work… Rawls deals with the homeless, beggars, and the unemployed under separate 
principles other than the difference principle. By ‘least advantaged,’ Rawls means the least advantaged 
working person, as measured by the income he/she obtains for gainful employment. So the least 
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income and wealth. While the distribution of wealth and income need not 
be equal it must be to everyone’s advantage, and at the same time 
positions of authority and offices of command must be accessible to all 
(1971:61): “The distribution of wealth and income, and the hierarchies of 
authority, must be consistent with both the liberties of equal citizenship 
and equality of opportunity.”27 A less extensive liberty is acceptable only 
when it strengthens the total system of liberty shared by all, and an 
unequal liberty must be acceptable to those with less liberty, ensuring 
that all people are treated fairly at the outset and given equal opportunity 
to participate in society (Will 1994:107). Thus, equality remains 
subordinate to liberty, with liberty taking absolute priority in the 
principles of justice. For Rawls, liberalism “assigns precedence to 
maintaining the basic liberties over other social needs and aims, including 
the majority’s will. A liberal constitution guarantees basic liberties first 
and above all else” (Freeman 2007:64).  
 
The principles of justice are necessary in a just society because people are 
incapable of benevolence on such a large scale; the self will always look 
out for its own interests.28 Rawls points out that while love would seek to 
advance the good of other people (or, at least, of another person), love of 
several people would lead to confusion, since it is impossible to determine 
whose good would then be prioritised: “Benevolence is at sea as long as its 
many loves are in opposition in the persons of its many objects” 
                                                                                                                                           
advantaged are, in effect, people who earn the least and whose skills are least in demand – in effect, the 
class of minimum-wage workers” (Freeman 2007:106 my italics).  
 
27It is not only monetary wealth but also the investment of time, energy, capital and skills into the 
community such as social services and aid organizations that is important.  
 
28
 Rawls is following Hume when he claims that humans are not benevolent, thus needing 
principles to govern justice. “Hume says that if humans were impartially benevolent, equally 
concerned with everyone's welfare, then justice would be ‘superfluous.’ People then would almost 
always willingly sacrifice their interests for the greater advantage of others and thus would rarely fight 
over whose interests should prevail. They would not be concerned about their personal rights or 
possessions. But we are naturally more concerned with our own aims and interests—which include our 
interests in the interests of those nearer and dearer to us—than we are with the interests of strangers 
with whom we have few if any interactions. This implies a potential conflict of human interests” 
(Freeman 2009). 
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(1971:190). Rawls places love secondary to the principles of justice because 
love is neither impartial nor fair. When interests clash, the decisions of 
love will be guided by “what individuals themselves would consent to in a 
fair initial situation which gives them equal representation as moral 
persons” (1971:191). Thus it is clear that there is no place for love in the 
initial position. While both love and a sense of justice include a desire to 
act justly, love goes beyond justice in an attempt to not only fulfil all the 
natural duties, but to go beyond their requirements. The principles of 
justice provide a way in which love can become justice in a situation of 
conflicting needs and desires. But ultimately, love will seek to move 
beyond justice, giving more than what is required.  
 
The two principles of justice come into play at different levels. The first 
principle of equal liberty is included in the constitutional convention; the 
fundamental liberties of the person as well as liberty of conscience and 
freedom of thought are protected by the constitution and the political 
process which implements the constitution should be just. The second 
principle forms a part of the legislature where social and economic policies 
must be aimed at “maximizing the long-term expectation of the least 
advantaged under conditions of fair equality of opportunity” (Rawls 
1971:199). The two principles are thus built into the very groundwork of 
the country, to ensure the protection of all the citizens. Equal liberty is 
the primary requirement (1971:207). Liberty cannot be sacrificed for 
greater economic and social benefits. Rawls views a common 
understanding of justice as fairness as making a constitutional democracy 
because “the basic liberties of a democratic regime are firmly secured by 
this conception of justice” (1971:243).29 
 
                                                 
29
 It is important to note here that a democracy (a well-ordered, democratic society) is not a 
community. Rawls says that “to think of a democracy as a community overlooks the limited scope of 
its public reason founded on a political conception of justice. It mistakes the kind of unity a 
constitutional regime is capable of without violating the most basic democratic principles” (2005:42).  
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Rawls realises that there is no agreement on the way the basic 
institutions of a constitutional democracy should be arranged if they are 
to specify and secure the basic rights and liberties of citizens and answer 
to the claims of democratic equality when citizens are free and equal 
persons.30 Justice as fairness tries to adjudicate between the contending 
traditions and find a solution which is acceptable to all, thus the exclusion 
of morally justifiable principles (Rawls 2003:190). The two principles are 
intended to create a space where different institutions and historical 
traditions can recognize common basic ideas and principles. Justice as 
fairness avoids the autocratic use of state power by creating a principle of 
toleration; the state cannot attain public agreement on basic philosophical 
questions without infringing on basic liberties (Rawls 2003:194).  The 
over-arching fundamental idea is that of society as a fair system of co-
operation between free and equal persons. In political thought, Rawls 
emphasizes that citizens view the social order neither as a fixed natural 
order nor as an institutional hierarchy justified by religious or aristocratic 
values. Aristotle (Politics, bk. 1, ch. II, 1253a15 cited in Rawls 1971:243) 
remarks that it is a peculiarity of people that they possess a sense of the 
just and the unjust and that their sharing a common understanding of 
justice makes a polis. Thus it is necessary, as Rawls contends, to find an 
idea of common justice which will be supported by the free, equal and 
rational citizens.31  
 
                                                 
30
 A person as “free and equal” is an essential concept in Rawls’s theory, since it gives a clue to 
what kind of people make up society. “What does Rawls mean when speaking of ‘free and equal’ 
persons? Moral persons are ‘equal in that they regard one another as having an equal right to determine 
the first principles of justice.’ They are free in three ways: firstly, they have the ability to have a 
conception of the good; secondly, they do not see their conception of the good as being imposed upon 
them by any authority; and thirdly, they assume responsibility for their ends – as their circumstances 
change, their ends can change” (Freeman 2007:294-295). 
 
31
 It is important to note that the emphasis which Rawls places on citizens as free, equal and 
rational is compatible, in certain ways, with the anthropological statement of Christian theology. In his 
study of Rawls’s theory of justice, Bedford-Strohm concludes that there are similarities between 
Rawls’s understanding of human nature and a Christian anthropology: “Die Grundannahmen der 
Rawlsschen Theorie weisen ein hohes Mass an Kompatibilität mit den anthropologischen Aussagen 
des christlichen Glaubens auf.” He discusses Rawls’s view of people as free, equal, rational people 
(1993:300-303).  
 32 
What is central to the contract view and thus central to Rawls’s thesis is 
that people are defined as ends, not merely as means. This implies that 
they must be treated in accordance with the principles to which they 
would consent in an original position of equality. “To regard persons as 
ends in themselves in the basic design of society is to agree to forgo those 
gains which do not contribute to their representative expectations. By 
contrast, to regard persons as means is to be prepared to impose upon 
them lower prospects of life for the sake of the higher expectation of 
others” (Rawls 1971:180). Thus, the value of the person lies in his or her 
humanity itself. The person, by the very nature of their humanness, 
deserves to be treated with dignity and respect within the other first 
principles of justice. No one may be used for the benefit of another; in 
Rawls’s theory of justice people are not means to an end, but rather the 
end in itself, although this idea remains detached from religious or moral 
value.  
 
2.4.2 The Original Position and the Veil of Ignorance 
 
The idea of the original position is derived from Kant’s conception of 
autonomy and the categorical imperative. Rawls describes the original 
position as a ‘procedural interpretation’, where the nature of persons as 
free, equal and rational is expressed (1971:256). He believes that justice 
cannot be based upon any general moral conception of justice (for example 
a religious grounding) (Rawls 2003:188). The growth of constitutional 
governments and the institutions of large industrial market economies 
provide alternatives in a democratic state which allow for a diversity of 
doctrines and a plurality of conflicting conceptions of the good. Thus 
fairness is dissociated from any moral formation and denies the 
participants connections within a specific community; Rawls speaks of the 
‘veil of ignorance’ where none of the participants know their own status, 
skills, or individual ends and goals. Any decision made regarding justice 
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in such a setting will be completely rational, since no individual identity 
exists. Behind the veil, no knowledge of the good is permitted.  
“We should not attempt to give form to our life by first looking to 
the good independently defined. It is not our aims that primarily 
reveal our nature, but rather the principles that we would 
acknowledge to govern the background conditions under which 
these aims are to be formed and the manner in which they are to 
be pursued. For the self is prior to the ends which are affirmed by 
it” (Rawls 1971:560).  
A person’s intelligence and skills, their gender, religion, race, income, 
wealth and health are not good reasons to justify principles of justice, 
which is exactly what Rawls is attempting to do with his hypothetical 
situation. When the people are placed behind the veil of ignorance, no one 
knows any specific facts about themselves or anyone else, or about their 
historic and social situation. “The parties’ decision is to be based entirely 
on their knowledge of general facts that they share in common with each 
other, which include general knowledge of psychology, economics, and 
other relevant social, biological, and physical sciences” (Freeman 
2007:155).  
 
Rawls suggests that the original position is the point of view from which 
noumenal selves see the world (1971:255). The parties have complete 
freedom to choose whatever principles they wish, but they will still 
naturally attempt to express their rational natures and their equality. 
Thus, the principles they choose will be those which best manifest their 
freedom in their community in everyday life, and “fully reveal their 
independence from natural contingencies and social accident” (1971:255).  
 
Rawls assumes that the people in the original position are rational.32 
Because they are rational, they are presumed to be capable of a sense of 
justice (Rawls 1971:145). For Rawls, rationality implies an inherent 
                                                 
32
 The fact that Rawls includes only rational people in the original position has led to much 
criticism about the exclusiveness of this theory. Amartya Sen defends Rawls saying that it seems to 
“focus more on the characterization of deliberating human beings rather than on the categorization of 
some ‘reasonable persons’ while excluding others. The role of unrestricted public reasoning is quite 
central to democratic politics in general and to the pursuit of social justice in particular” (2009:44).  
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knowledge of right and wrong – some things are just while others are 
clearly unjust. In choosing between various principles of justice each 
person would try to advance their own interests, an act which in turn 
would be beneficial to all the people involved (1971:142). This implies that 
they have no conception of a specific good as an end and they are not 
influenced by religious or other reasons. They would want to choose 
principles which would ensure them more primary social goods rather 
than less. Because they have no idea of their own social standing, they 
would accept those principles which would be most beneficial to all the 
members of society. Rawls assumes that in such a situation they will ‘try 
to protect their liberties, widen their opportunities, and enlarge their 
means for promoting their aims” (1971:143).  
 
Rawls assumes that the choices of the parties in the original position will 
be restricted by natural laws, and those deciding will have certain 
inclinations to choose among them (1971:159). However, these 
‘assumptions’ must be true and suitably general. Thus, concludes Rawls, 
there may be good reasons for embedding convictions of justice more 
directly into first principles (1971:160-161). In this way, the convictions 
will become public knowledge. Society and institutions therefore become 
important in developing peoples’ ideas of justice. Rawls emphasises the 
role of the family in moral formation and promoting a sense of justice in 
people. The constitution and politics of a country which regulate the ‘well-
ordered’ society, the institutions and associations which form the society 
as well as the family need to be just, equal and fair.  
 
The idea of the original position, as Rawls emphasises in his later work, is 
idealistic and should be understood as such.33 It is introduced because 
there is no better way to develop a political conception of justice for the 
                                                 
33
 Beckley understands the original position as a “fictive heuristic device which invites us to accept 
its restrictions in order to get beyond the subjective circumstances of justice which prevent agreement 
on the principles of justice. It is not a description of the true moral self nor is it imposed upon us 
without an appeal to the beliefs and values we actually hold and consider constitutive to ourselves” 
(1985:228).  
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basic political structure than from the fundamental idea of society as a 
fair system of co-operation between citizens as free and equal persons. The 
idea is somewhat abstract, but it must be seen only as a device of 
representation (Rawls 2003:203).  People will never actually have to face a 
choice between cooperation and noncooperation but the original position 
does present the alternative of cooperation to domination (Nussbaum 
2006:60). 
 
Thus the emphasis falls on the idea of citizens as free and equal persons; 
no-one is forced into a certain way of thinking by association with a 
certain community. Thinking of society as a fair system of social co-
operation needs to highlight the most appropriate principles for realizing 
liberty and equality in the society. The concept of people as free, equal and 
rational is not a “neutral concept” (Lebacqz 1986:41). People, and 
concomitantly their ideas, are not ahistorical but will, to a greater or 
lesser degree, be grounded in their ethnic, cultural, religious and 
educational background, to name just a few of the outside factors which 
influence people. It cannot be assumed that these influences will 
encourage a sense of justice, equality or freedom. 
 
2.4.3 Priority of fair opportunity  
 
Fair equality of opportunity requires that all people, whatever their 
starting place in life, have the same opportunity to develop their natural 
talents to the level of which they are capable so that they can compete for 
a position without handicaps resulting from a deprived and under-
privileged background.34 This demands a lot of state action and 
                                                 
34
 Neither social circumstances nor talent should play a part in the distribution of primary goods. 
Based on Rawls’s concept of the natural lottery, Barry speaks of “three lotteries” (1989:227): There is 
the natural lottery, which distributes genetic endowments; there is the social lottery, which distributes 
more or less favourable home and school environment; and then there is what Hobbes called “the 
secret working of God, which men call Good Luck” – the lottery that distributes illnesses, accidents, 
and the chance of being in the right place at the right time.  
So equality does not mean making “the same proportionate contribution to each person’s realizing 
the best life of which he is capable” (Rawls 1971:510). The only contingency which forms the basis of 
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institutional involvement to ensure that the doors are open to anyone who 
qualifies (Nagel 2003:69).35  If the broad structure of society satisfies the 
principles of justice in its large-scale effects on the life prospects of 
different groups then, according to Rawls, any individual inequalities that 
emerge will be just.  
 
Injustice is comprised of inequalities that do not benefit everyone (Rawls 
1971:62) and includes the various ways in which discrimination and an 
absence of equality of opportunity unfairly affect the distribution of 
“income and wealth, powers and positions of office, and the bases of self-
respect are familiar: racial, ethnic, gender, religious, and other forms of 
discrimination have long prevented people from economic, education, and 
professional advancement” (Freeman 2007:129). Inequalities, insofar as 
they cannot be avoided, are permitted only as far as they ensure that all 
people have the best quality of life available to them (a group of people 
cannot have a lower quality of life so that another group of people can 
become wealthy). Inequalities should also not limit people in their 
opportunities. The institutions need to regulate any inequalities to ensure 
that they are just.  
 
This regulation is an ongoing process. In a just society, the institutions 
and practices among people will continue to satisfy the relevant principles 
of right and justice, even though their relations and success are 
continually changing in view of political, economic, and social trends 
(Rawls 1999a:45). The quality of life for all should be continually 
                                                                                                                                           
equality is the capacity for a sense of justice. Any distribution of talent will be unjust since people do 
not deserve the unequal shares of beauty (if you are born beautiful) or wealth (if you are born into a 
wealthy family), for example. This is a rather controversial point in Rawls’s theory. Maybe it does give 
us something to think about where beautiful people are idolized because they are beautiful, sports stars 
earn millions etc. What example are these people really setting?  
 
35
 According to Freeman, the difference principle does not only hope to maximize the position of 
the worst-off. Rather, “it imposes a two-fold requirement (1) to institute that economy that consistently 
makes the poorest class better off than they would be in any other economy (compatible with basic 
liberties and fair equal opportunities), and then (2) to maximize the poor’s position within that “most 
effective” system” (Freeman 2007:121).  
 
 37 
improved.36 Both equal opportunity and the difference principle are 
superior alternatives to the trickle-down effect which is often advocated as 
being beneficial to the poor (Freeman 2007:188ff). For the trickle-down 
effect to improve the quality of life of the poorest members of society, the 
wealthy need to benefit greatly before the wealth trickles down. With the 
difference principle, the wealthy cannot benefit unless the poor are 
benefitting; the poor need to benefit the most from any unequal 
distribution.37 Rawls admits that life might always be unfair due to 
certain natural facts, but what is just and unjust is the way in which 
institutions deal with these inequalities. He proposes that we have to 
agree to share one another’s fate, thus taking seriously the opportunities, 
income and wealth of everyone. 
 
As with the least disadvantaged, fair opportunity is open only to those 
who are able to and motivated to participate. “The second principle only 
requires equal life prospects in all sectors of society for those similarly 
endowed and motivated” (Rawls 1971:301). It is now necessary to question 
just how far equality of opportunity can be carried out. While the 
government may provide equality on a certain level (equal access to 
education, for example) family circumstances may prevent individuals 
from being able to make adequate use of the opportunities presented to 
them. A poorer family may not have transport, so the children are limited 
                                                 
36
 Rawls has often been criticized for not taking into account the needs of the mentally and 
physically disabled in his theory. However, Freeman argues that Rawls does not sideline the 
handicapped. They “should be addressed by principles and duties of remedial justice, such as the duty 
of mutual aid, duties of assistance and rescue, and the duty of mutual respect for persons” (Freeman 
2007:107).  
Rawls argues, in response to Sen’s objection that people have different capabilities and so might 
not be able to use their opportunities unless they have more assistance, that primary goods do actually 
take into account the basic “capabilities of citizens as free and equal persons in virtue of their two 
moral powers ... that enable them to be normal and fully cooperating members of society.” (Rawls 
2001:169). With regard to illness and disability, it is not the task of the original position and therefore 
the principles of justice to deal with this, but it must be dealt with at the legislative stage (Rawls 
2001:173).  
 
37
 Naudé speaks of the “sensitivity” which Rawls shows to the least advantaged and the convincing 
way in which he shows that the debates about social justice cannot ignore the idea of fairness towards 
everyone (1982:7).  
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to schools and sports clubs within walking distance. Older siblings may be 
required to care for younger ones while the parents are at work, which 
will impact negatively on their involvement in after-school activities as 
well as limiting time to do homework and study. Poor schooling means 
that adults do not have equal chances of competing for jobs and 
participating in society. Lack of transport means that the job market may 
be very limited, or parents may have to leave their children in the care of 
other relatives while they live elsewhere. This leaves us with the question 
of whether fair opportunity begins before or after class segregation.  
 
With reference to liberty, Rawls says that “liberty can be restricted only 
for the sake of liberty” (1971:302). A less extensive liberty must 
strengthen the total system of liberty shared by all and a less than equal 
liberty must be acceptable to those with the lesser liberty. In the same 
way, an inequality of opportunity must enhance the opportunities of those 
with the lesser opportunity and an excessive rate of saving must alleviate 
the burden of those bearing this hardship (1971:302 -303). Maybe this 
view is a less utopian way of attempting to attain equality.  
 
The general conception which Rawls emphasises is that “all social primary 
goods – liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and the bases of self-
respect – are to be distributed equally unless an unequal distribution of 
any or all of these goods is to the advantage of the least favored” 
(1971:303). Primary goods are “things citizens need as free and equal 
persons living a complete life; they are not things it is simply rational to 
want or desire, or to prefer or even to crave.” Rawls distinguishes five 
such goods: the basic rights and liberties, freedom of movements and free 
choice of occupation, powers and prerogatives of offices and positions of 
authority and responsibility, income and wealth and the social bases of 
self-respect. These are needed by citizens to fulfil their idea of the good life 
(Rawls 2001:58-61). These primary goods are resources and they are 
means rather than ends (Levine 2002:187). This is also in keeping with 
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Rawls’s idea of people as ends in themselves rather than as means to an 
end. Rawls emphasises self-respect over income and wealth.38 This is 
giving to each person the inherent respect due simply because they are 
human. Regardless of the inequalities, no person may be treated as less of 
a person simply because they are different, be it with regards to race, 
education, income or any other reason. Giving someone the respect they 
deserve not because of what they have achieved or the position they 
occupy in society but because they are fellow human beings gives them the 
opportunity to live in such a way that given the right concrete 
opportunities they will not be afraid to take them.  
 
What is not specifically mentioned are the primary needs of people, but 
this is perhaps lost in the idea of achieving equal basic liberties of each 
citizen, with the result of compensation for a lesser liberty becoming 
unimportant (see the discussion in Rawls 1993:324ff for his argument for 
this). He possibly also expects it to be covered by the primary goods of 
income and wealth. But surely shelter, food and security need to be 
provided before equality of income and wealth can be guaranteed. 
Although conversely, income and wealth will actually provide these basic 
necessities, so we need to ask if it is necessary to then specify basic 
necessities if all people have a suitable income. The basic needs are not 
adequate measures of equality even if they are the first measures. There 
can never be enough equality while some people are profiting at the 
expense of others.39  
 
Rawls does, however, make the point in Political Liberalism that basic 
liberties are “a framework of legally protected paths and opportunities” 
                                                 
38
 Rawls spends an entire section (§67) discussing self-respect, excellences, and shame.  Here he 
talks about having a rational plan of life and also being appreciated and confirmed by others. This is an 
essential part of human dignity and thus of particular relevance for our later argument.  
 
39
 The issue of hunger, starvation and medical neglect is raised by Sen in his discussion of the 
absolute priority which Rawls accords to liberty. He suggests a “weighting scheme” in which priority 
can be attached to “one concern over another, without making that priority totally unbeatable under 
any circumstances” (Sen 2009:65).  
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(2005:325). While poverty and ignorance may prevent people from using 
the opportunities offered to them, this affects the “worth” of the liberty 
(that is, the usefulness of the liberty) rather than the liberty itself. So in 
justice as fairness, while the basic liberty may remain the same for all 
people, the worth of the liberty is not the same.  Capability is also an issue 
here. If people are not capable of using the resources given to them, due to 
disability for example, it is unfair.40 Capability, and worth of liberty (in 
Rawlsian terms), is closely linked to the idea of dignity; giving each person 
enough to live in a dignified and decent way despite their limitations.  
 
2.4.4 Distributive Justice 
 
The difference principle is closely connected to fraternity and seems to be 
employed by Rawls to develop certain attitudes, possibly compassion and 
even benevolence. “A further merit of the difference principle is that it 
provides an interpretation of the principle of fraternity. …(I)t is thought 
to convey certain attitudes of mind and forms of conduct without which we 
would lose sight of the values expressed by these rights. ...(T)he difference 
principle seems to correspond to a natural meaning of fraternity” (Rawls 
1971:105-107). Fraternity, then, is a value which is instilled in society by 
certain rules and regulations which are put into place by the institutions 
around which society is structured. The social responsibility of individuals 
is cultivated by a society which is just, and in turn the just actions of the 
individuals create a just society.41   
 
                                                 
40
 Both Sen (2009) and Nussbaum (2006) argue for the inclusion of capability in determining who 
gets what in society. A capabilities approach “envisages human beings as cooperating out of a wide 
range of motives, including the love of justice itself, and prominently including a moralized 
compassion for those who have less than they need to lead decent and dignified lives” (Nussbaum 
2006:156).  
 
41
 Freeman makes the important observation that for Rawls, the difference principle would seem to 
rely on “the conception of free and equal moral persons and on the idea of a well-ordered society.” 
Hence the idea of a well-ordered society plays a crucial role in Rawls’s argument for justice as fairness 
(Freeman 2007:196). Well-ordered societies, or decent societies, are also important in Rawls’s later 
works where he discusses justice on an international level.  
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The difference principle assumes that in a competitive economy with an 
open class system excessive inequalities will not be the rule (Rawls 
1971:158). With the distribution of raw materials in the world and the 
availability of other natural assets, as well as the laws of motivation, 
great discrepancies in wealth should not exist. There is enough for 
everybody to ensure their survival and comfort.42 But the way things 
should be is not the way things are. Primary social goods are not shared 
fairly.  
 
The primary social goods are rights and liberties, opportunities and 
powers, and income and wealth (Rawls 1971:92).43 Justice as fairness 
seeks to ensure that every person has the equal liberty to pursue 
whatever plan of life they choose, as long as it does not violate what 
justice demands. People share primary goods on the principle that some 
can have more if they are acquired in ways which improve the situation of 
those who have less (Rawls 1971:94). Further,  
the difference principle gives some weight to the considerations 
singled out by the principle of redress. This is the principle that 
undeserved inequalities call for redress; and since inequalities of 
birth and natural endowment are undeserved, these inequalities 
are to be somehow compensated for. Thus the principle holds that 
in order to treat all persons equally, to provide genuine equality of 
opportunity, society must give more attention to those with fewer 
native assets and to those born into the less favourable social 
positions (Rawls 1971:100 my italics).  
Rawls holds that a meritocratic society can have a place in a democratic 
conception of justice because the difference principle “transforms the aims 
of society in fundamental respects” which ultimately gives everyone an 
“equal chance to leave the less fortunate behind in the quest for influence 
                                                 
42
 However, the reality of the economic and social world has ensured that some are benefiting at the 
expense of other. The powerful, wealthy nations are profiting at the cost of the poorer, less-developed 
countries. 
 
43
 The primary social goods seem to imply the fulfilment of basic needs (food, shelter and clothing) 
and even security. Or is it rather asking for more than just the basic needs to be met – not only basic 
food, shelter etc, but opportunity to improve the situation and acquire more (i.e. a better lifestyle). 
Surely, justice cannot assume this. Before people can be given a chance to live better, they need to live. 
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and social position” (1971:106-107).  The difference principle is thus the 
key to ensuring a more just and equal society.  
 
Primary goods are those basic goods that must be available to all people in 
society and help them to pursue their idea of what is good (that is their 
own specific goals and dreams for their life).44 These primary goods assist 
in providing a moral standard which is acceptable to all people. They must 
be distributed in such a way as determined by the institutions when 
applying the principles of justice to society. Society (be it the government 
or some other institution) offers all citizens equal basic liberties and fair 
equality of opportunity and must also ensure a fair share of other primary 
goods, but each individual is then responsible for their ‘application’ or ‘use’ 
in their life (Rawls 1999b:369-371). These primary goods (along with 
opportunity and justice) are needs, they are required by people in order to 
live (this can be compared to, for example, the need of a sick person and 
the health care which is then received).45 That which is desired, or that 
which is considered an entitlement (or moral desert), is rejected and has 
no place in the discussion of justice.  
 
In a well-ordered society where equal basic liberties and fair equality of 
opportunity are secured, the distribution of income and wealth illustrates 
what Rawls calls “pure background procedural justice” (Rawls 2001:50).46  
                                                 
44
 See Rawls’s chapter on “Social Unity and Primary Goods” in Collected Papers. Ed. Samuel 
Freeman. Harvard University Press: Cambridge, Massachusetts. Pp. 359-387. Distributive justice also 
forms an important part of his argument in The Law of Peoples.  
 
45
 Rawls describes the difference between needs, desires and deserts as follows: “[There are three 
kinds of considerations (needs (medical), desires (birthday present), deserts (teacher offering reward))] 
– certain needs alone are relevant in questions of justice. Primary goods are things generally required 
or needed by citizens as free and equal moral persons who seek to advance conceptions of the good. It 
is the conception of citizens as such persons, and as normal cooperating members of society over a 
complete life, which determines what they require. Since the notion of need is always relative to some 
conception of persons, and of their role and status, the requirements, or needs, of citizens as free and 
equal moral persons are different from the needs of patients and students. And needs are different from 
desires, wishes and liking” (1999b:373). 
 
46
 By this Rawls means that there should be certain rules in place to ensure a system of social 
cooperation which will remain fair over time, from one generation to the next (2001:51).  
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The basic structure of society is arranged in such a way that when people 
follow the rules or principles of justice the distribution of goods will be 
acceptable. Property and wealth should be evenly distributed in society 
and where economic and social inequalities do exist, they need to 
contribute in an effective way to the general good and be the advantage of 
the least-advantaged members of society.47 
 
Thus Rawls understands distributive justice as pure procedural justice 
(2001:52). No distribution should take place based on merit, social class, 
or even talent. This distribution perhaps echoes the idea of the veil of 
ignorance. Just distribution, and fair opportunity means that all people 
get the choice to decide what to do with their opportunities. Although 
Rawls does not explicitly refer to basic needs, and at times seems to ignore 
these completely in A Theory of Justice (which has resulted in much 
criticism), it is implied that they will definitely form the basic building 
blocks of any fair society since they are needed for equal participation.48 
We cannot speak of equality of opportunity if the basic needs of the people 
are not being met. Rawls later says, in Political Liberalism, that “the basic 
liberties are a framework of legally protected paths and opportunities. Of 
course, ignorance and poverty, and the lack of material means generally, 
prevent people from exercising their rights and from taking advantage of 
these openings” (2005:325-326).49 
                                                 
47
 Rawls argues for a property-owning democracy rather than a capitalist welfare society because 
the wealth is more evenly distributed rather than a minority having ownership and control. What Rawls 
understands by a property-owning democracy is widespread ownerships of both capital and other 
means of production, with varying degrees of worker participation and democratization of 
management (Freeman 2007:220). Rawls seems to assume that alleviating poverty will not be a 
concern in a property-owning democracy – “assuming full employment and widespread availability of 
education, training, skills, and access to real capital, even the least advantaged should be fairly well 
off” (Freeman 2007:234). This perhaps explains the lack of basic needs in Rawls’s work.  
 
48
 He does not directly address this problem in his later works, either.  
 
49
 This refers to what Rawls calls “equal worth of liberties.” While the liberties may be the same for 
everyone in justice as fairness, the liberties are not as useful to everyone (that is, the worth of the 
liberties may be less for some people than for others). The basic structure of society should be arranged 
so that “it maximizes the primary good available to the least advantaged to make use of the equal basic 
liberties enjoyed by everyone” (2005:326 my italics). For Rawls, this is one of the central aims of 
political and social justice.  
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Justice as fairness rejects the conception that distributive justice should 
be realized by society as circumstances permit. Justice is not happiness 
according to virtue (Rawls 1971:310). Because distribution occurs along 
the lines set out in the principles and rules of society, the idea of just 
desert is therefore unfounded. Rawls claims that a just scheme satisfies 
the legitimate expectations of people as founded upon social institutions. 
A just society will ensure that the distribution in society is just and this 
will meet the expectations of the people as they are formed by society. 
“[What the people] are entitled to is not proportional to nor dependent 
upon their intrinsic worth. The principles of justice that regulate the basic 
structure and specify the duties and obligations of individuals do not 
mention moral desert, and there is no tendency for distributive shares to 
correspond to it” (1971:311). The actual distribution does not conform to 
any “observable pattern” or any specific degree of inequality. Rather, the 
idea of the two principles is that permissible inequalities contribute to the 
expectation of the least favoured, where “this functional contribution 
results from the working of the system of entitlements set up in public 
institutions” (Rawls 1993:283). Rawls sees the main problem of 
distributive justice as “fairly designing the system of basic legal 
institutions and social norms that make production, exchange, 
distribution, and consumption possible among free and equal persons” 
(Freeman 2006:245).  
 
Thus we can conclude that Rawls regards just distribution as an ongoing 
duty of society.50 Although Rawls does not go so far as to say it, just 
distribution is to a large extent dependent upon our humaneness. The 
very fact that a person is a human being entitles him or her to a certain 
standard of living; the same standard of living applies to everyone 
                                                                                                                                           
Sen argues that Rawls does not take seriously enough the “importance of human freedom in giving 
people real ... opportunity to do what they would like with their own lives” (2009:64).  
 
50
 See Rawls’s discussion of distributive justice in The Law of Peoples page 113ff. Here Rawls 
claims that a society has an ongoing duty to redistribute wealth and resources in society to ensure that 
the predicament of the worst-off people is continually improved.  
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regardless of where they live, how they choose to live, or what they choose 
to do with what is given to them. Society has a duty of assistance, but this 
has a target or cut-off point which is not found in distributive justice.  
 
Though the ends may be unequal where not everyone will be earning the 
same amount of money or have access to the same resources, the least 
advantaged will be benefiting from their wealthier counterparts and from 
the very fact that some members of the society are wealthier. “…the basic 
structure is just throughout when the advantages of the more fortunate 
promote the well-being of the least fortunate, that is, when a decrease in 
their advantages would make the least fortunate even worse off than they 
are. The basic structure is perfectly just when the prospects of the least 
fortunate are as great as they can be” (1999b:138). All citizens are 
required to have access to the same basic liberties and enjoy equality of 
opportunity.51 Those who have more than others are entitled to this only if 
the way in which it has been acquired benefits those who have less and if 
by having more, they continue to help those who do not have as much.52 
Rawls has been criticised on this point for only taking into account income 
and wealth. How position and power are influenced by wealth appears to 
be ignored (Lebacqz 1986:44). Discrimination of any type (including racial, 
gender, sexual orientation and disability) does not appear to be accounted 
for. Failure to address these problems possibly highlights serious 
shortcomings in Rawls’s Theory as he fails to take seriously the root 
causes of injustice. Lebacqz later suggests that while Rawls approach 
                                                 
51
 Political justice concerns itself with the basic structure of society as “the encompassing 
institutional framework within which the natural gifts and abilities of individuals are developed and 
exercised” (Rawls 2003:302). By having equal access to various opportunities, people are offered the 
opportunity to perform to the best of their ability.  
 
52
 Rawls believes that fair equality of opportunity will correct social class differences (e.g. 
educational and job privileges are more accessible to the middle- and upper-classes. Freeman offers an 
interesting discussion on fair equality of opportunity and affirmative action, which Rawls regarded as 
incompatible (Freeman 2007:90-91). Fair equality of opportunity is necessary in a society to 
complement the difference principle, although preferential treatment of certain “disadvantaged 
minorities” is a temporary remedy for the “present effects of past discrimination.” See Sandel’s 
discussion of affirmative action for where he discusses the feasibility of compensating for past wrongs, 
rights and racial preferences and justice without moral dessert (Sandel 2009:167-183).  
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protects the least advantaged it does not appear to “require any new 
beginnings,” an approach which is “inadequate to a world in which 
injustice is already rampant” (1987:156-7). It is necessary to recognise 
how sin distorts rationality in the world.  
 
Rawls rejects the idea of moral desert outside of the rules of justice, which 
he refers to as entitlement of just expectations.53 If the rules of the basic 
structure of society are met, the resulting distribution will be just and 
there is therefore “no prior or independent idea” of what may be expected. 
This presents a very different way of regarding reward and entitlement.  
 
Rawls has often been criticised for not applying the difference principle on 
an international level. However, because distributive justice is primarily 
social and political, it becomes very difficult to implement the distribution 
on a global level in the absence of a global social or political structure.54 
Hence, agreement between various nations becomes important when 
talking about distributive justice on an international level, because what 
is nationally acceptable needs to be accepted internationally (Freeman 
2006:245-247). While it is possible that Rawls’s principles of international 
morality do not go far enough in demanding justice between nations, 
Barry emphasises that from the point of view of mutual advantage Rawls 
demands too much of rich and powerful states (1989:187).55 However, the 
circumstances of justice particularly take into account a world of relative 
                                                 
53
 Sandel explores the concept of detaching moral desert and distributive justice further 
(2009:164ff).  
 
54
 See the discussion in Miller (2006). He says that the “famous Rawlsian principles of basic justice 
– equal liberty, equality of opportunity and the difference principle – do not apply at global level” 
(Miller 2006:191). 
 
55
 Barry interprets Rawls’s principles of international justice as “an uneasy compromise between 
justice as mutual advantage, which requires the principles to be equally to the advantage of all parties 
under actual conditions of international relations, and justice as impartial agreement, which looks only 
to the advantage of parties in an original position constructed so as to deny them knowledge of their 
actual prospective advantages and disadvantages under alternative principles” (1989:189). It is 
necessary to note here that Barry is referring to Rawls’s discussion in A Theory of Justice. This 
problem is partly addressed by Rawls in The Law of Peoples, where conditions are established under 
which all decent peoples will agree to certain principles of justice.  
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scarcity (Levine 2002:180). In such a situation, questions of justice become 
increasingly urgent. Because of this scarcity and because we are not 
impartially benevolent, it is necessary to formulate principles of justice. 
 
2.4.5 Justice as Fairness and the Good 
 
2.4.5.1   Duty and Obligation 
 
While many people use the terms ‘duty’ and ‘obligation’ interchangeably, 
Rawls does not. Duties are those required politically while obligations 
arise in a more personal setting. With regard to duties, Rawls says that 
(f)rom the standpoint of the theory of justice, the most important 
natural duty is that to support and to further just institutions. 
…(F)irst, we are to comply with and to do our share in just 
institutions when they exist and apply to us; and second, we are to 
assist in the establishment of just arrangements when they do not 
exist, at least when this can be done with little cost to ourselves 
(Rawls 1971:334).  
Thus, in a just society, every person is bound by certain duties. They are 
required to act towards society and the community in a way which is just 
and fair. Natural duties are universal, those duties we have towards 
others persons as persons. Included here is the duty to show respect, 
which can be done in several ways, such as our willingness to see the 
situation of others from their point of view, from the perspective of their 
conception of their good; and in our being prepared to give reasons for our 
actions whenever the interests of others are materially affected (Rawls 
1971:337).  
 
Voluntary obligations, on the other hand, are obligations which are not 
universal and arise from consent; that is, they are a result of our 
voluntary acts. Thus they are very specific obligations, situated in a 
specific time and space. Rawls links obligations to the principle of 
fairness, which applies to individuals rather than institutions. Justice as 
fairness and rightness is where fairness provides a “definition of the 
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concepts of justice and right.” This principle requires that a person do 
their part as defined by the rules of an institution that accepts the 
principles of justice and when the person voluntarily accepts the benefits 
of the arrangement (1971:112). There will be rules which specify what it is 
that is required in a certain situation and obligations are normally owed 
to specific individuals so that everyone will benefit fairly.  
 
Sandel points out that there is a large gap between natural duties and 
voluntary obligations. What about the specific responsibilities we have to 
one another as fellow citizens, people with whom we have not necessarily 
entered into a specific agreement? Because we are members of a family or 
nation or people, our identities are a part of who we are and should 
therefore influence our moral responsibilities (Sandel 2009:223-225). 
Sandel links this to MacIntyre’s narrative conception of a person and the 
realization that our life stories are intertwined with the life stories of 
others.  
 
2.4.5.2   The Theory of the Good 
 
For Rawls, the good is closely linked to rationality; in fact, the two cannot 
be separated. It is necessary that citizens understand themselves as 
having the capacity for a sense of justice as well as a capacity for a 
conception of the good.56 For Rawls, these two capacities form the basis of 
democracy, in that we recognise in each other the ability to reason rather 
than recognising each other as having equal rights (Cohen 2003:107).57 
                                                 
56
 Having a capacity for the conception of the good means that individuals have the capacity “to 
form, to revise, and rationally to pursue such a conception… of what we regard as a worthwhile human 
life. A conception of the good normally consists of a determinate scheme of final ends and aims, and of 
desires that certain persons and associations, as objects of attachments and loyalties, should flourish. 
Also included in such a conception is a view of our relation to the world – religious, philosophical, or 
moral – by reference to which these ends and attachments are understood” (Rawls 1993:302).  
 
57
 Rawls explains this reasoning as follows: “Since we start within the tradition of democratic 
thought, we also think of citizens as free and equal persons. The basic intuitive idea is that, in virtue of 
what we call their moral powers, and the powers of reason, thought, and judgement connected with 
those powers, we say that persons are free. And in virtue of their having these powers to the requisite 
degree to be fully co-operating members of society, we say that persons are equal. Since persons can 
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These two capacities are thus essential to understanding citizens as free 
and equal persons. To achieve a certain level of good in society, people 
need to be able to rationally participate in society.58 Here Rawls moves 
from the first context in which justice takes place in society, namely the 
institutions needed for justice which form the basic structure of society, to 
the legislation and implementation of justice as fairness in the 
development of his ‘reflective equilibrium’ where the focus is on “personal 
assessments of goodness and rightness” (Sen 2009:53-54).    
 
Although there are certain primary goods, which are  “what persons need 
in their status as free and equal citizens, and as normal and fully 
cooperating members of society over a complete life” (Rawls 2001:xiii), 
Rawls’s theory of the good mainly allows for the rational way in which a 
person would make choices for their life. “A person’s good is determined by 
what is for him the most rational plan of life given reasonably favourable 
circumstances” (Rawls 1971:395). In Rawls’s theory, the concept of right 
remains prior to the concept of the good. He assumes that people will 
automatically select a good which is consistent with the principles of the 
right for the given society and that they therefore will not conflict. Some of 
the rights may even be developed from an idea of what is good.59 The 
                                                                                                                                           
be full participants in a fair system of social co-operation, we ascribe to them the two moral powers 
connected with the elements in the idea of social co-operation noted above: namely, a capacity for a 
sense of justice and a capacity for a conception of the good. The sense of justice is the capability to 
understand, to apply and to act from the public conception of justice which characterizes the fair terms 
of social co-operation. The capacity for a conception of the good is the capacity to form, to revise, and 
rationally to pursue a conception of one’s rational advantage, or good. In the case of social co-
operation, this good must not be understood narrowly but rather as a conception of what is valuable in 
human life. Thus, a conception of the good normally consists of a more or less determinate scheme of 
final ends, that is, ends we want to realize for their own sake, as well as of attachments to other persons 
and loyalties to various groups and associations. In addition to having the two moral powers, the 
capacities for a sense of justice and a conception of the good, persons have at any given time a 
particular conception of the good that they try to achieve. Since we wish to start from the idea of 
society as a fair system of co-operation, we assume that persons as citizens have all the capacities that 
enable them to be normal and fully co-operating members of society” (Rawls 2003:198 my italics). 
 
58
 Rawls regards as “full and equal members of society” those who can “take part in social 
cooperation over a complete life, and who are willing to honor the appropriate fair terms of 
cooperation” (2005:302). 
 
59
 Certain restrictions need to be placed on the good in political liberalism. Rawls specifies that the 
“ideas of the good included must be political ideas” which means that “they are, or can be shared by 
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parties’ motives in the original position will be influenced by some notion 
of the good, so it is necessary to have some idea of what is meant by 
goodness. But this idea of good is restricted to the mere basics, what 
Rawls calls the “thin theory of the good” and includes liberty and 
opportunity, income and wealth, and self-respect.  
 
For goodness to determine moral worth, “the virtues are properties that it 
is rational for persons to want in one another when they adopt the 
requisite point of view” (Rawls 1971:404). Thus, what is good is that which 
will neither conflict with nor impinge on someone else’s rights, or even on 
the rights of the persons involved. Goodness is thus a rational reasoning; 
something’s being good is its having the properties that it is rational to 
want (Rawls 1971:405).  
 
In Political Liberalism, Rawls discusses how a political conception limits 
its scope when talking about the good. The political conception of justice is 
applicable to the basic structure of society (that is, the main institutions of 
political and social life) and does not “presuppose accepting any particular 
comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine.” It is thus a 
doctrine which can appeal to diverse people in a democratic society. 
Additionally, a conception is comprehensive when it includes “conceptions 
of what is of value in human life, as well as ideals of personal virtue and 
character, that are to inform much of our non-political conduct (see the 
discussion in Rawls 1993:174-76).60  
                                                                                                                                           
citizens regarded as free and equal and they do not presuppose any particular fully (or partially) 
comprehensive doctrine” (2005:176). 
 
60
 Buchanan argues that Rawls shortens his list of human rights by arguing for “non-parochialism.” 
Because Rawls does not include a right to freedom from discrimination (including religious, racial, 
gender or ethnic discrimination) he sees Rawls as accepting a society in which there is a “permanent 
racial, ethnic, religious, or gender underclass” (Buchannan 2006:152) This, surely, is not what Rawls 
has in mind. Rawls is attempting to develop a set of principles for justice which will be acceptable to 
liberal societies as well as decent hierarchical societies. Rawls says that “what have come to be called 
human rights are recognized as necessary conditions of any system of social cooperation. When they 
are regularly violated, we have command by force, a slave system, and no cooperation of any kind. 
These rights do not depend on any particular comprehensive religious doctrine or philosophical 
doctrine of human nature. The Law of Peoples does not say, for example, that human beings are moral 
persons and have equal worth in the eyes of God; or that they have certain moral and intellectual 
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Rawls does not intend the conception of the good to refer only to an 
instrumental or economic theory of value. The good is extended to also 
include moral worth, so that a person who is just or benevolent is 
described as morally good. The thin theory of the good needs to change 
into a full theory (Rawls 1971:434-435). Rawls defines a good person or a 
person of moral worth as “someone who has to a higher degree than the 
average the broadly based features of moral character that it is rational 
for the persons in the original position to want in one another” (Rawls 
1971:437). So the definition of goodness as rationality is extended to 
persons. The thin theory of the good must explain and include the primary 
goods (liberty and opportunity, income and wealth, and self-respect). 
These are the goods which all people will want regardless of what their 
life-plans are.  
 
Rawls goes on to discuss the good as a plan for life: “A person’s plan of life 
is rational if, and only if it is … consistent with the principles of rational 
choice… and would be chosen by him with full deliberative rationality… 
Secondly, a person’s interests and aims are rational if they are to be 
encouraged and provided for by the plan that is rational for him” 
(1971:408-409). A person will be (or at least should be) happy when his life 
is going according to his plans for them. It is assumed that these plans 
will not infringe on the rights of others.61  
 
Rawls describes a person’s future as being good if they can make a 
rational selection for planning their life. Rawls assumes that the person, 
being rational, will know exactly what they want in life, and will be 
satisfied and happy when they achieve it (Rawls 1971:416-417). This 
                                                                                                                                           
powers that entitle them to these rights. To argue in these ways would involve religious or 
philosophical doctrines that many decent hierarchical peoples might reject as liberal or democratic, or 
as in some way distinctive of Western political tradition and prejudicial to other cultures. Still, the Law 
of Peoples does not deny these doctrines” (2005a:68).   
 
61
 Deliberative rationality is an individual perspective which is based on our individual goods. For 
Rawls, pluralism of values is a fundamental feature. In an ideal society, the decisions made by an 
individual would be congruent with those made in the original position (Freeman 2003:284-285).  
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assumes that the person is not limited by circumstances and all the 
various courses of action are open to them. Once again, a certain level of 
rationality is expected, and the person needs to consider all the options 
open to them; they needs to decide what it is they want and what the most 
rational and satisfying way of fulfilling the desires are.  
 
Rawls bases part of his argument of the right and the good on the 
Aristotelian Principle. According to this principle, other things equal, 
human beings enjoy the exercise of their realized capacities (their innate 
or trained abilities), and this enjoyment increases the more the capacity is 
realized, or the greater its complexity (Rawls 1971:426). So inequality is 
then not only about material goods, but about the opportunity to live a 
good life, in which rational decisions regarding the future can be made. 
People who are limited to certain (mostly menial) activities will not be 
able to enjoy their life since they are not realizing their full capacity, nor 
do they have the opportunity to participate in activities of greater 
complexity. The Aristotelian Principle says that “whenever a person 
engages in an activity belonging to some chain he tends to move up the 
chain” (Rawls 1971:430). This principle does not seem to take into 
consideration those people who cannot move up the chain and who are 
caught up in the lowest level because of race, poor education, social 
background. The principle goes on to characterize human beings as 
“importantly moved not only by the pressure of bodily needs, but also by 
the desire to do things enjoyed simply for their own sakes, at when the 
urgent and pressing wants are satisfied” (Rawls 1971:431). Once again, 
there are many people for whom the pressing wants and needs are never 
satisfied. Each day is a struggle to put a sufficient amount of food on the 
table, to find fuel for fire, water for cooking, shelter, clothes and security. 
For these people, it is perhaps inconceivable to do things simply for their 
own pleasure.  
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This principle is closely linked to self-respect, which Rawls has 
characterized as a primary good. The more a person achieves and the 
higher up the chain they move, the better they fulfil their plans for their 
life and the more self-respect they will attain. So those people who do not 
have the necessary opportunities in life do not only suffer the disrespect of 
poverty and injustice, but lack the means to improve their self-respect and 
their standing in society. Self-esteem is, according to Rawls, the most 
important primary good. Goodness as rationality associates self-esteem, 
the sense of our own worth, as being dependent upon a rational life plan 
and having both our self and our actions affirmed by others (Rawls 
1971:440). In his later book, Political Liberalism, Rawls determines that 
self-confidence is developed firstly by being a fully cooperating member of 
society and secondly by the conviction that we can “carry out a worthwhile 
plan of life” (2005:319). Thus both the integration and affirmation of all 
individuals in society is of the utmost importance when talking about 
justice.  
 
2.4.6 Contrasts between the Right and the Good 
 
For the theory of the good, there are no pre-chosen principles. The good 
develops along with the life of an individual and so can change over time.  
There will need to be sufficient rational evidence to support the goods 
chosen (for example primary goods can be rationally explained) and none 
of the decisions are allowed to affect the principles of justice as chosen in 
the original positions. Wyatt points out that this “self-determination” 
leads to an avocation of a “neutral state” (2008:124).62  In such a state, the 
value of a particular conception will not be judged.  
 
Because of this freedom, individuals will have varying conceptions of the 
good; what is good for one person will not necessarily be considered good 
                                                 
62
 A neutral state allows citizens to seek their own conceptions of the good. 
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for another person. In contrast, with regard to the right, the principles 
will be universal in a well-ordered society.  
In a well-ordered society, the plans of life of individuals are 
different in the sense that these plans give prominence to different 
aims, and persons are left free to determine their good… (N)ow 
this variety in conceptions of the good is itself a good thing, that is, 
it is rational for members of a well-ordered society to want their 
plans to be different (Rawls 1971:227-228). 
This lack of involvement of the state has received much criticism from 
those who feel that there should be some idea of a common good in 
society.63  
 
The veil of ignorance restricts many of the applications of the principles of 
justice. However, when making a decision of the good, the particular 
situation and circumstances of the individual will influence the decision. 
“A rational plan of life takes into account our special abilities, interests, 
and circumstances, and therefore it quite properly depends upon our 
social position and natural assets” (Rawls 1971:448-449). There as many 
ideas of the good as there are people, and each individual’s idea of what is 
good will change over time.  
 
“…(I)n justice as fairness the concepts of the right and the good have 
markedly distinct features. These differences arise from the structure of 
the contract theory and the priority of right and justice that results” 
(Rawls 1971:451). How an individual chooses to live his life and whatever 
the particular circumstances, in the contract theory (i.e. justice as 
fairness) it must always be done so in accordance to the principles of 
justice (1971:449). Bedford-Strohm explains that the good will always be 
determined according to individual circumstances taking into account the 
needs and desires of the specific person or persons involved.  The right 
will be that which maximises the good (Bedford-Strohm 1993:215). He 
later suggests that rather than speaking of the priority of the right over 
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 A “politics of the common good” will “encourage conceptions of the good that adhere to 
standards in the larger community” (Wyatt 2008:124).  
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the good, it would be better to speak of the “Begrenzung des Guten durch 
das Rechte” (290). Each individual’s specific conception of the good needs 
to fall into line with the generally accepted conception of the right. It is 
thus the duty of each individual to not infringe on the rights of others and 
to ensure that their concept of the good can be integrated with the right. 
Wyatt sees the right and the good as being complementary and any 
concept of the good must be acceptable to the people; “just institutions and 
political virtues must sustain conceptions of the good that people regard 
as worthy” (2008:147).  
 
Justice as fairness is framed with the idea of a well-ordered society, in 
which everyone “accepts and knows that the others accept the same 
principles of justice, and the basic social institutions satisfy and are 
known to satisfy these principles… There is no necessity to invoke 
theological or metaphysical doctrines to support its principles, nor to 
imagine another world that compensates for and corrects the inequalities 
which the two principles permit in this one. Conceptions of justice must be 
justified by the conditions of our life as we know it or not at all” (Rawls 
1971:454).  It seems as if Rawls does not take into account the work of 
theology, the church and other religious bodies in the social and political 
world and in the development of justice and human rights, although 
remembering that the principles need to be acceptable to all people, a 
principle may be grounded in religion but needs to be tailored to appeal to 
the non-religious person as well. 64  Nowhere does Rawls deny that the 
principles may be accepted by religion and applied in a religious setting. 
What he later talks about in Political Liberalism is toleration and liberty 
of conscience. Although his reasoning behind why religions should endorse 
the principles of justice is to “ensure the liberty of its adherents consistent 
with the equal liberties of other reasonable free and equal citizens” 
                                                 
64
 Sandel explains that Rawls is not a moral relativist since no theory of justice and rights can be 
morally neutral. Rather, whatever ends a person might choose for their life respects other people’s 
right to do the same. “The appeal of a neutral framework lies precisely in its refusal to affirm a 
preferred way of life or conception of the good” (2009:216).  
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(2005:460) the point is also made that religions should not oppress either 
the followers or the non-believers.  
 
Rawls sees the identity of citizens as being free from any connection to a 
particular conception of the good, but they will be free to “conceive of 
themselves and of one another as having the moral power to have a 
conception of the good” (2005:30). If citizenship was based upon a 
particular conception of the good the liberal political ideal would be 
violated (Mulhall 2003:466).65 However, “[J]ustice as fairness assumes... 
that the values of community are not only essential but realizable, in the 
various associations that carry on their life within the framework of the 
basic structure” (Rawls 2003:146). Mulhall argues that political liberalism 
embodies a vision of the intrinsic value of a properly constituted political 
community; in such a community, the members are committed to a shared 
goal; they are not only driven by personal advantage (2003:469). They are 
drawn together not by a common notion of the common good, but by each 
individual’s right to freedom, equality and ultimately participation in 
various communities.66  
 
The concept of moral worth remains secondary to those of right and of 
justice, because it “can be characterized as desires or tendencies” to act 
upon the principles of justice (Rawls 1971:312-313). The theory of justice 
recognizes that people are responsible for their own ends.67 Although each 
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 Citizens have the capability of revising and changing their conception of the good “on reasonable 
and rational grounds” (Rawls 1993:30).  
 
66
 “The essentially social nature of the human beings is important; the self is formed by its roles, 
attachments, and relationships with other people, institutions, communities and traditions. Conceptions 
of what is right and how society should be organised always presuppose some vision of the common 
good” (Fergusson 1998:139).  
 
67
 The “fully adequate scheme” of basic liberties is to “be equally provided for all citizens.” 
Although “the worth of a basic liberty to a person depends on her circumstances, things such as wealth, 
education, intelligence, interests, and so on, and individual circumstances inevitably will differ in these 
and other respects. In justice as fairness the measure for determining the fair worth of the basic 
liberties (aside from the political liberties) is not determined by the first principle, but is settled by the 
difference principle. Rawls says that justice as fairness, rather than aiming to secure equal worth of the 
basic liberties, aims to maximize the worth of the basic liberties of the worst-off.” The difference 
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person is regarded “as someone who can and who desires to take part in 
social cooperation for mutual advantage” they ultimately make their own 
decisions as to how to make the best use of their resources” (Rawls 
1999b:365). Society will not suppress the will and desire of people for a 
certain lifestyle, ambitions or goals; a just society will seek to ensure that 
in pursuing their own ends people do not compromise the justice of others.   
 
Mutual respect is extremely beneficial where the right and the good are 
concerned, with the behaviour of people becoming somewhat reciprocal. 
“Everyone benefits from living in a society where the duty of mutual 
respect is honored. The cost to self-interest is minor in comparison with 
the support for the sense of one’s own worth” (Rawls 1971:338). If 
everyone acts in way which is just (as determined in the original position), 
it stands to reason that everyone will benefit and no one will be treated 
unfairly, since the only inequalities allowed are those which benefit the 
least disadvantaged. But this requires that all citizens act in this way and 
behave decently (cf. Rawls’s concept of decent peoples) and fairly (cf. the 
same reasoning for mutual aid (Kant) Rawls 1971:338). Miller claims that 
Rawls holds people responsible for their conceptions of the good and 
therefore for the good which they can derive from their portion or 
allocation of primary goods (2006:197).68 This places a lot of responsibility 
on individuals to behave in a certain way and also assumes that they will 
learn to think and behave according to certain rules which they learn from 
interaction in society and the institutions to which they belong.  
 
Rawls suggests the use of the two principles of justice as a part of the 
conception of right for individuals (1971:335); their sense of the right and 
of the good is determined by their participation in society.  If citizens are 
                                                                                                                                           
principle thus enables citizens “to enjoy basic liberties that are fully adequate to the exercise and 
development of their moral powers to be reasonable and rational” (Freeman 2007:117). 
 
68
 Rawls uses the example of someone who surfs all day at Malibu. Such a person would not be 
entitled to public funds because he has chosen not to work (1999b:455). 
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‘conditioned’ to act in a certain way, it will be natural for them that the 
right is prior to the good. Thus, the just actions of institutions are 
invaluable in creating a just society and forming the consciousness of 
citizens and encouraging them to act in a good way which is in accordance 
with the right.   
 
2.5 Justice as Fairness and Society  
 
2.5.1 The Relationship between Justice as Fairness and Society 
 
Justice as fairness encourages people to act autonomously because 
they are acting from principles that they would acknowledge under 
conditions that best express their nature as free and equal rational 
beings… (M)oral education is education for autonomy. In due 
course everyone will know why he would adopt the principles of 
justice and how they are derived from the conditions that 
characterize his being an equal in a society of moral persons 
(Rawls 1971:515-516).  
Acting autonomously is acting from principles that people would consent 
to as free and equal beings, and is the way we would expect others to act. 
For this reason, a contract approach is appealing because there is 
something of a self-interested perspective even if, for Rawls, this is hidden 
behind the veil of ignorance. Also, cooperation with others is needed to 
achieve the goals in society, so cooperative behaviour is chosen as it is 
most beneficial for meeting self-interested needs (Sen 2009:202-203). 
However, it is important that the principles of justice as fairness be within 
the reach of human capacities, especially considering the important part 
they play in justice as fairness and in the formation just behaviour 
(Freeman 2003:288). 
 
Rawls emphasises throughout his work that the principles of justice are a 
part of the basic structure of society; they are both compatible with and 
define the idea of good in the society. Just as an economic system not only 
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satisfies wants and need, but is a way of creating and fashioning want in 
the future, the social system of a society shapes the people who live in it. 
(1971:259). The principles of justice want to bring the citizens to a certain 
sense of justice, and to encourage the virtue of justice in them. “[They] 
define a partial ideal of the person which social and economic 
arrangements must respect” (Rawls 1971:261). According to Rawls, a 
society which is regulated by a public sense of justice will be stable. The 
relationship between people and their loyalty to each other, to institutions 
and to society as a whole will contribute to the stability as the sense of 
justice in society increases (Rawls 1971:496ff).69 While distributive justice 
and equality are important, it is also vital that everyone has a reason to 
endorse justice and equality in society. Larmore points out that equally 
important is the publicity of the defining principles of justice, so that “our 
reason for accepting them turns on others having reason to accept them 
too” (2003:370).  
 
The principles of justice need public justification. For Rawls, there are 
three ideas which relate to this justification, namely reflective 
equilibrium, an overlapping consensus and free public reason. Justice as 
fairness is a political conception of justice because while it is a moral 
conception it is worked out specifically for the basic structure of a 
democratic society and has nothing to do with any particular 
comprehensive doctrine (Rawls 2001:27). It seeks to find principles which 
would be most acceptable to the majority of people, without excluding 
anyone because of their particular beliefs or cultural practices.  
 
                                                 
69
 Freeman explains what requirements must be met for a stable society where a sense of justice is 
taken seriously. “Where (1) there is a freestanding political conception of justice (2) that is acceptable 
to reasonable persons and endorsed by all reasonable comprehensive doctrines in an overlapping 
consensus, and (3) that provides content to public reasoning about constitutional essentials and basic 
justice – then a liberal and democratic well-ordered society is stable for the right reasons: its 
conception of justice is generally acceptable to and guides the actions of free and equal citizens on the 
basis of moral reasons implicit in their sense of justice and also in their reasonable comprehensive 
views” (Freeman 2007:329).  
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For Rawls, the idea of the overlapping consensus is fundamental to the 
functioning of principles of justice in society. The overlapping consensus 
was introduced to “make the idea of a well-ordered society more realistic 
and to adjust it to the historical and social conditions of democratic 
societies, which include the fact of reasonable pluralism” (Rawls 2001:32). 
This is where people with different doctrines, religious creeds and 
philosophies can find a common ground.70 Rawls expects religion, 
philosophy and morality to remain “background culture” as part of a 
comprehensive doctrine (2005:14). This results in the “political” becoming 
the determiner of what actions are just and acceptable in society.71 On 
this ground it is necessary for public reasoning, and following this a 
political conception of justice, to be complete, so that society avoids 
appealing to religious, philosophical or moral doctrines when making 
decisions with regards to critical issues (Freeman 2007:405). Thus, a 
community which is conceived by political liberalism derives from an 
“overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice suitable for a 
constitutional regime” rather than a community united by comprehensive 
religious, philosophical, or moral doctrine (Rawls 1993:201).72 However, 
knowledge of one another’s religious and nonreligious doctrines is 
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 Rawls has often been misunderstood on this point. He is not saying that there is no overarching 
theory of justice; rather he is saying that there needs to be a certain conception of justice where 
different points of view can meet, thus enabling a specific conception of justice to endure politically 
(Larmore 2003:377).  
 
71
 “In a democratic society there is a tradition of democratic thought, the content of which is at least 
familiar and intelligible to the educated common sense of citizens generally. Society’s main 
institutions, and their accepted forms of interpretation, are seen as a fund of implicitly shared ideas and 
principles” (Rawls 1993:14). This means that “reasonable though opposing religious, philosophical, 
and moral doctrines that gain a significant body of adherents and endure over time from one generation 
to the next” will contribute to and support a reasonable overlapping consensus (Rawls 2001:32).  
 
72
 “The political conception of justice is worked out first as a freestanding view that can be justified 
pro tanto without looking to, or trying to fit, or even knowing what are, the existing comprehensive 
doctrines. It tries to put no obstacles in the path of all reasonable doctrines endorsing a political 
conception by eliminating from this conception any idea which goes beyond the political, and which 
not all reasonable doctrines could reasonably be expected to endorse (to do that violates the idea of 
reciprocity)” (Rawls 1993:389). 
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essential, so that citizens can recognize how the various doctrines support 
the principles of justice (Rawls 1993:462).73 
 
Because of the priority of the political conception of justice, it is important 
that there is not only one political conception. An overlapping consensus 
will include “different conceptions of society and of citizens as persons, as 
well as principles of justice, and an account of the cooperative virtues 
through which those principles are embodied in human character and 
expressed in public life” (Rawls 2001:195). The “principles, ideals, and 
standards that may be appealed to are those of a family of reasonable 
political conceptions of justice and this family changes over times” (Rawls 
1993:453). Rawls has often been criticised for not creating a space for 
unreasonable persons. However, as Freeman points out, any overlapping 
consensus with unreasonable persons or doctrines will end up being 
unreasonable itself. Unreasonable people often do not accept the 
pluralism found in a democratic society and will refuse to cooperate on 
reasonable terms (2007:371).74  
 
Rawls identifies two different forms of discourse that can be used in public 
reasoning. The first one is the declaration of a comprehensive doctrine, 
either religious or non-religious. Rawls refers to the Gospel parable of the 
Good Samaritan, which can be used to give a public justification of 
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 Rawls refers in a footnote to the specific importance of recognizing the religious (and other) 
roots. He quotes David Hollenbach (Professor of Theology at Boston College) in support of dialogue 
in the public sphere between the church and civil society (2005:463-464).  Rawls makes it clear that 
the religious roots of political liberalism should not be forgotten, even though political liberalism itself 
need not study it.  
 
74
 “Unreasonable persons will end up being intolerant of other people or doctrines, or they might 
refuse to accept the role of society to meet the basic needs of all people” (Freeman 2007:371). Freeman 
earlier makes the point that when talking about conception of the good the “crucial assumption is that, 
as individuals tend to develop a desire to support just institutions that benefit them and those they care 
for, so too will they incorporate this desire, in some form, into their conception of the good. This 
means that, from among the many possible religious, philosophical, and ethical doctrines, those that 
will gain adherents and thrive in a well-ordered society will be reasonable and will endorse (or at least 
will be compatible with) the public principles of justice, each for their own specific reasons” 
(2003:307).  
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political values.75 This creates ties between Christians and non-
Christians, who can endorse the same public principles from their 
different perspectives. Secondly, we can try to show other people why they 
can endorse a reasonable political conception (Rawls 1993:465-466). Thus 
there is an ongoing dialogue between people speaking from very different 
doctrines and viewpoints.76  
 
The principles of justice place certain limits on the conception of the good 
because justice has priority over efficiency and liberty is prioritised over 
social and economic advantages. So desires which conflict with the 
principles of justice must be discouraged (Rawls 1971:261). Here, it once 
again becomes necessary to question the priority of liberty over social and 
economic advantages. While liberty clearly is of great importance in 
society to avoid oppression, the social and economic needs of people surely 
need to be met before their liberty is guaranteed. Or is this a false 
impression? Perhaps freedom will always (or should) stand prior to social 
and economic needs (for as long as life is being sustained) so long as it 
does not gain absolute precedence. Rawls associates liberty with the first 
principle, equality corresponds to the idea of equality in the first principle 
as well as equality of fair opportunity and fraternity is found in the 
difference principle (1971:106). Sen interprets the priority of liberty not as 
an extreme position, but rather as a more general claim that “liberty 
cannot be reduced to being only a facility that complements other facilities 
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 What exactly are the political values that Rawls talks about? Freeman has drawn up an extensive 
list which he defines as “a complex array of considerations that are especially relevant to citizens’ 
achieving their status as free and equal democratic citizens and pursuing reasonable conceptions of 
their good” (2007:388). Included in this list are: “appropriate respect for human life, the full equality of 
women, the reproduction of liberal society over time and respect for requirements of public reason 
itself in political discussion of controversial issues… the equality of children as future citizens, the 
freedom of religion and the value of the family in securing the orderly production and reproduction of 
society and its culture form one generation to the next” (2007:389).  
 
76
 For an overlapping consensus to develop it is important that there is a “certain looseness” in our 
comprehensive views, as well as them being only partially comprehensive. Rawls considers three 
possibilities about how our allegiance to a political conception might depend on its derivation from a 
comprehensive view: “(a) the political conception is derived from the comprehensive doctrine; (b) it is 
not derived from but it compatible with that doctrine; and last, (c) the political conception is 
incompatible with it.” Generally, a comprehensive doctrine (be it religious, philosophical or moral) are 
only partially comprehensive and so open to cohere with the political conception (Rawls 2001:193).  
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(such as economic opulence)” and points out the necessity of “personal 
liberty in human lives” (2009:59). For Rawls, liberty is both a personal 
freedom and a basic necessity placing it both prior to and equal to equality 
and fraternity.   
 
The idea of justice as fairness is to use the notion of pure procedural 
justice to handle the contingencies of particular situations. The social 
system is to be designed so that the resulting distribution is just however 
things turn out. To achieve this end it is necessary to set the social and 
economic process within the surroundings of suitable political and legal 
institutions. Thus it is necessary to have what Rawls refers to as 
“background institutions” (1971:274-5). The expectation here is that the 
background institutions themselves will be just (governed by the 
principles of justice).77 Inequalities in distribution of assets, social 
security, wealth and income then become acceptable, because they are the 
result of a just original position.  
 
Rawls views a democratic government as the way to meet the principles of 
the original position. There is a list of requirements which are necessary 
to achieve and sustain stability in a country, and which will (or at least 
should) ensure that inequalities are kept to a minimum. These 
requirements are satisfied by the principles of justice of all liberal 
conceptions (that is, democratic governments). They cover essential 
prerequisites for a basic structure within which the ideal of public reason, 
when conscientiously followed by citizens, may protect the basic liberties 
and prevent social and economic inequalities from becoming excessive. 
Rawls lists five important requirements necessary to achieve stability 
(Rawls 1999a:50-51): 
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 Political and social life is often pervaded by injustice. Thus it is necessary for a structural ideal to 
“specify constraints and to guide adjustments.” There needs to be a conception of justice which will 
“specify the requisite structural principles and point to the overall direction of political action.” Thus 
an ideal theory which specifies a completely just basic structure provides direction to society (Rawls 
1993:284-85). 
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A certain fair equality of opportunity, especially in education and 
training 
A decent distribution of income and wealth: all citizens must be 
assured the all-purpose means necessary for them to take 
intelligent and effective advantage of their basic freedoms 
Society as employer of last resort through general or local 
government, or other social and economic policies  
Basic health care assured for all citizens 
Public financing of elections and ways of assuring the availability 
of public information on matters of policy 
 
The corruption of power more often than not leads to an unjust starting 
point, which in turn makes for unjust distribution and unjust equalities. 
Individuals and groups will put forward competing claims, and will not 
abandon their interests for the sake of justice, despite a willingness to act 
justly. Rawls points out that “a society in which all can achieve their 
complete good, or in which there are no conflicting demands and the 
wants of all fit together without coercion into a harmonious plan of 
activity, is a society in a certain sense beyond justice” (1971:281).  
 
“Justice as fairness has a central place for the value of community… the 
essential idea is that we want to account for the social values, for the 
intrinsic good of institutional, community and associative activities, by a 
conception of justice that in its theoretical basis is individualistic” (Rawls 
1971:264). By looking after the well-being of each individual, the 
community will benefit. A just community should also create just 
individuals – forming their thoughts on certain acceptable ways of life 
which will be in accordance with the just policies and formations of the 
society in which they participate. The justice will also be acceptable to 
different people insofar as it is not based upon a single religious or moral 
idea, but rather political principles: “Political liberalism proposes that, in 
a constitutional democratic regime, comprehensive doctrines of truth or of 
right are to be replaced in public reason by an idea of the politically 
reasonable addressed to citizens as citizens” (Rawls 1999a:55). People 
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thus become political beings rather than religious or moral beings, 
although the religious and moral nature is not denied, since this is then 
required in that they can be influenced by the political policies.78  
 
Rawls realises that there is no agreement on the way basic institutions of 
a constitutional democracy should be arranged if they are to specify and 
secure the basic rights and liberties of citizens and answer to the claims of 
democratic equality when citizens are free and equal persons. Justice as 
fairness tries to adjudicate between the contending traditions and find a 
solution which is acceptable to all, thus the exclusion of morally justifiable 
principles becomes necessary (Rawls 2003:190).79 The two principles put 
forward by Rawls are intended to create a space where different 
institutions and historical traditions can recognize common basic ideas 
and principles. Justice as fairness avoids the autocratic use of state power 
by creating a principle of toleration; the state cannot attain public 
agreement on basic philosophical questions without infringing on basic 
liberties (Rawls 2003:194).  Rawls emphasizes that on political thought 
citizens do not view the social order as a fixed natural order, or as an 
institutional hierarchy justified by religious or aristocratic values. The 
over-arching fundamental idea is that of society as a fair system of co-
operation between free and equal persons in which everyone’s good is 
understood and respected. Social cooperation contains three important 
elements (Rawls 2003:196):  
Co-operation is guided by publicly recognized rules and procedures 
which those who are co-operating accept and regard as properly 
regulating their conduct 
Co-operation involves the idea of fair terms of co-operation. This is 
accomplished by specifying basic rights and duties within the main 
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 However, for justice to be an intrinsic good means that “exercise of the capacities for justice in 
appropriate settings is an activity worth doing for its own sake” (Freeman 2003:291).  
 
79
 Naudé criticises Rawls for basing moral interaction between individuals on the institutions under 
which they live (1981:61).  He claims that Rawls is unable to adequately accommodate the moral 
obligations of individuals towards each other in his theory. Rawls assumes, incorrectly according to 
Naudé, that the moral relationships between individuals can be derived from the institutions under 
which they live.  
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institutions of society, and by regulating the institutions of 
background justice over time so that the benefits produced by 
everyone’s efforts are fairly acquired and divided from one 
generation to the next.  
The idea of social co-operation requires an idea of each 
participant’s rational advantage or good. 
 
The idea of justice as fairness is a conception for a democratic society 
partly because it is offered as a practical guide for citizens who, as 
ultimate political authority, are assumed to rely in their political 
judgements on a conception of justice, to be uncertain about what the best 
conception is, and to take an interest in defending their views by reference 
to the most reasonable conception for a society of equals (Cohen 2003:103).  
The original position reflects Rawls’s view that justice requires that 
people be treated as equal and as free (Mulhall 2003:465). Equality and 
freedom can only be attained and respected if the parties are not 
motivated by inequalities or by any prior conception of the good.  
 
2.5.2 Justice, Morality and Community 
 
Rawls abandons the idea of community as “a political society united on 
one (partially or fully) comprehensive religious, philosophical, or moral 
doctrine” since it does not fit in with the idea of reasonable pluralism 
(Rawls 2001:199). Instead, he views a social unity as “deriving from an 
overlapping consensus on a political conception of justice.” A social unity 
is understood as the “most desirable conception of unity available” and 
thus a well-ordered society is not a private society because “citizens do 
have final ends in common.” The more citizens come to realize the good of 
political society for themselves “both as a corporate body and as 
individuals,” the less they will act out of “envy, spite, the will to dominate, 
and the temptation to deprive others of justice” (Rawls 2001:202).  
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In a well-ordered society, with its idealistic idea of justice as fairness as 
well as the resulting overlapping consensus taken for granted, it is 
perhaps necessary to ask why people would care about justice in the first 
place and why they would subordinate their own ends to the requirements 
of justice.80 Rawls offers psychological reasoning for why people will 
behave in this way; as they develop and learn to interact first in a family 
and eventually in broader society, they will naturally develop a sense of 
justice. This sense of justice must correspond to the person’s idea of good if 
they are to act on it (cf. Rawls’s idea of good and a rational life plan). 
Society, and participation in society, is thus an important good because it 
secures “the good of justice and the social bases of mutual- and self-
respect” for citizens (Rawls 2001:200). By securing the “equal basic rights, 
liberties, and fair opportunities, political society guarantees persons 
public recognition of their status as free and equal” and by doing so 
answers to their “fundamental needs.”  
 
The social nature of humans cannot be denied and the moral feelings and 
sentiments are a natural outgrowth of this nature. Fair terms of social 
cooperation will appeal to people who can appreciate the resulting mutual 
benefits.  
Once the powers of understanding mature and persons come to 
recognize their place in society and are able to take up the 
standpoint of others, they appreciate the mutual benefits of 
establishing fair terms of social cooperation. We have a natural 
sympathy with other persons and an innate susceptibility to the 
pleasures of fellow feeling and self-mastery, and these provide the 
affective basis for the moral sentiments once we have a clear grasp 
of our relations to our associates from an appropriately general 
perspective. Thus this tradition regards the moral feelings as a 
natural outgrowth of a full appreciation of our social nature (Rawls 
1971:459-460).  
                                                 
80
 For a full discussion between the relationship of morality and congruence and the relevance for 
justice see Samuel Freeman Congruence and the Good of (2003). Here Freeman argues that it is 
necessary to show how people come to care about justice and why they should care about it sufficiently 
so that they will subordinate pursuit of their ends to requirements of justice (2003:280).  
Sen makes a similar point when questioning whether just institutions will be dependent on just 
behaviour and points out that reasonable behaviour is very difficult to assume (2009:68). 
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Because of the appeal of mutual benefits and our social nature, 
community is an essential part of our formation with regards to justice. In 
the last third of his book, Rawls speaks of how a person’s idea of justice is 
formed in a community, and nurtured within the bond of the family, 
associations and interaction with others.81 He formulates three laws for 
the psychological development of justice in a person. The aim of his 
argument is to show that justice as fairness is “compatible with human 
nature and general facts about social cooperation and institutions” 
(Freeman 2007:41).  
 
The idea of the family as an essential building block of society is 
emphasized in Rawls’s work. The family arranges “in a reasonable and 
effective way the raising of and caring for children, ensuring their moral 
development and education into the wider culture” (Rawls 1993:467). 
Rawls’s reasoning behind the family as basic structure is because of its 
“essential roles to establish the orderly production and reproduction of 
society and of its culture from one generation to the next” (Rawls 
2001:162). The first law, morality of authority, is formed in the family. 
This assumes that the parents will love the child and that they will care 
for the good of the child. In this way, the child learns about love and 
respect, and certain values are developed. Essential to this morality is 
love, mutual trust, and developing the child’s sense of self-respect 
(Freeman 2007:256). Freeman goes on to caution against not 
misinterpreting this morality with a punitive morality that is based on 
fear, oppression and lack of respect. It is crucial to realize that members of 
a family are firstly citizens and as such the basic claims of equal citizens 
cannot be violated. Therefore wives and husbands are equal, and children, 
as future citizens, have a right to the same liberties. While the political 
principles need not apply directly to family life but there needs to be some 
                                                 
81
 Rawls is quoted as saying that he had planned on doing some other things mainly connected with 
this part of the book, “the part on moral psychology,” which was the part he liked best. He was, 
however, side-tracked by the many criticisms of his theory of justice and he “wanted to find ways to 
strengthen the idea of justice as fairness and to meet the objections” (Freeman 2007:7).    
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sense of justice and fairness within the family which in turn will cultivate 
attitudes and virtues which support just institutions (Rawls 2001:165, 
168).82 
 
The second law, morality of association, is developed from increased 
interaction in the broader community, given that the foundation was laid 
in accordance with the first law. Over the years, a person develops 
connections with more people and organisations and feelings of trust and 
friendship are continually extended.  The content of this morality is 
characterized by the cooperative virtues: those of justice and fairness, 
fidelity and trust, integrity and impartiality (1971:472). The morality of 
association (involvement in the community in various organisations, 
teams, clubs and schools) leads to knowledge of the “standards of justice” 
(1971:473). Similarly to the family, though, associations and institutions 
as a whole are answerable to the principles of justice which govern society 
and may not violate the rights of the members as citizens.  
 
In the third law, the morality is extended to the broader public 
community. However, this implies that the institutions are just, and that 
they are publically known to be just and accepted by the citizens as such. 
People will now realize that justice extends beyond their immediate 
associations, such as family and various communities of interaction, and 
that justice is given and received in a much broader sense on a national, 
and increasingly international, level.83 “Eventually one achieves a 
mastery of these principles and understands the values they secure and 
the way in which they are to everyone’s advantage” (1971:473)  
 “Once the attitudes of love and trust, and of friendly feelings and 
mutual confidence, have been generated… then the recognition 
that we and those for whom we care are the beneficiaries of an 
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 Nussbaum expresses disappointment in Rawls’s limited use of the family and his failure to 
properly deal with the family being shaped in fundamental ways by laws and social institutions 
(2006:105-6).  
 
83
 See Rawls’s A Theory of Justice §75. 
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established and enduring just institution tends to engender in us 
the corresponding sense of justice. We develop a desire to apply 
and to act upon the principles of justice once we realize how social 
arrangements answering to them have promoted our good and that 
of those with whom we are affiliated. In due course we come to 
appreciate the ideal of just human cooperation” (Rawls 473-474 my 
italics).  
For Rawls, it is not personal feelings between individuals which unite 
them but rather “their common allegiance to justice” where they recognise 
that the rules which each person respects are also respected and accepted 
by the other members of the society. Because of the sense of justice, people 
will be willing to advance just institutions, both those that directly affect 
our good as well as those that affect the good of the larger community 
(Rawls 1971:474).84 Those who grow up in a well-ordered society, who 
have a rational life plan and who believe everyone else to have a sense of 
justice, have “sufficient reason founded on their good (rather than on 
justice) to comply with just institutions” (Rawls 2001:202). Thus for 
Rawls, the stability of a just society is dependent on developing the right 
attitudes and sentiments in people (Nussbaum 2006:411). 
 
The sense of justice cannot be separated from the idea of respect for 
persons. When there are two conflicting ideas of what is right and just, 
Rawls suggests that we need to fall back on the virtues such as 
truthfulness, commitment and sincerity (1971:519). The basic idea behind 
the feelings of love, friendship and even justice which arise from the 
various relationships is one of reciprocity. Because we recognise that other 
people wish us well, we will care for them in return (1971:494).85 This is 
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 Rawls acknowledges that it may seem strange that people will act from a conception of right and 
justice. However, he provides three responses to this objection. Firstly, because the moral principles 
are chosen by rational persons to “adjudicate competing claims” and because they are ways of 
advancing human interests it is necessary to secure these ends. Secondly, the “sense of justice is 
continuous with the love of mankind.” The principles of justice guide benevolence, and are therefore 
completely natural and intelligible. Finally, by acting on these principles, people “express their nature 
as free and equal rational beings” (1971:476).  
 
85
 “The citizen body as a whole is not generally bound together by ties of fellow feeling between 
individuals, but by the acceptance of public principles of justice… (T)heir common allegiance to 
justice provides a unified perspective from which they can adjudicate their differences … and a sense 
of justice gives rise to a willingness to work for (or at least not to oppose) the setting up of just 
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closely related to the idea of cooperation. Rawls says that when reasonable 
citizens view each other as free and equal, they will offer terms of justice 
that they consider reasonable and they will act on those terms provided 
that the other citizens also accept the terms. Even though citizens may 
differ in what they think is most reasonable when talking about justice, 
they must be able to agree that all are reasonable (Rawls 1993:446).  
 
Rawls sees self-command as being the underlying virtue in promoting 
right and justice in the society. He claims that “love of mankind” is beyond 
the capabilities of most people, and is reserved for those few people who 
are acutely aware of the needs of their neighbours, characterised by 
benevolence and “a proper humility and unconcern with self” (1971:479). 
But self-command on the other hand, is something which can be practiced 
by all and contributes to the establishment of justice in society. Related to 
this is the idea that a person who possesses a certain degree of self-
command will also value trust and friendship and relationships and 
therefore also justice because conversely, someone who rejects justice is, 
according to Rawls, a person who lacks certain feelings and natural 
attitudes. Freeman summarises the human condition and the resulting 
circumstances which Rawls considers necessary for developing moral 
motives of justice:  
Assume individuals are not egoists; that is, the objects of human 
desire include not just states of the self (one’s own security, 
comfort, reputation, appearance, etc.). Humans normally have 
other ends that do not specifically relate to states of themselves 
(cultural, political, and social ends). Moreover, we often desire the 
good of others for its own sake (as in love, friendship, solidarity, 
etc.). Humans are then normally altruistic. But we are ‘limited 
altruists,’ and not ‘pure’ altruists – that is, we are not impartially 
benevolent, equally concerned for everyone’s good. These are 
among the subjective circumstances that make justice necessary 
(2007:253). 
                                                                                                                                           
institutions, and for the reform of existing ones when justice requires it... This inclination goes beyond 
the support of those particular schemes that have affirmed our good. It seeks to extend the conception 
they embody to further situations for the good of the larger community” (Rawls 1971:474).  
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It is our inability to be purely benevolent and entirely motivated by love 
which necessitates justice.  
 
Rawls relates the morality of the principles of justice to a sense of right 
and justice on one hand, and to the love of humankind and self-command 
on the other. Right and justice are available to all as part of our good 
while love and self-command are reserved by Rawls for the saint and the 
hero. The love of humankind advances the common good beyond the 
requirements natural duties and obligations which place it out of the 
reach of ordinary persons, demanding the virtues of “benevolence, a 
heightened sensibility to the feelings and wants of others and a proper 
humility and unconcern with self.” Self-command at its best displays 
characteristic virtues of “courage, magnanimity, and self-control in actions 
presupposing great discipline and training” (Rawls 1971:479).  
 
Rawls spends twelve pages refuting the criticism of the contract doctrine 
as individualistic (1971:520-534). He contrasts the social nature of human 
beings with the conception of private society. From his perspective, 
human beings are dependent upon one another and need to be able to 
share in each other’s successes. Each individual cannot hope to accomplish 
alone what can be accomplished by working with others. “When men are 
secure in the enjoyment of the exercise of their own powers, they are 
disposed to appreciate the perfections of others, especially when their 
several excellences have an agreed place in a form of life the aims of which 
all accept” (1971:523).86  
 
Community is not necessarily only spatial, but is also temporal, extending 
throughout history so that the contributions of successive generations can 
be seen forming a chain which contributes to the good of society 
                                                 
86
 He later uses an illustration of an orchestra, and how the various members are dependent upon 
one another. “In each case, persons need one another, since it is only in active cooperation with others 
that any one’s talents can be realized, and then in large part by the efforts of all” (Rawls 1993:321).  
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(1971:523). Science and art provide some examples of how community can 
benefit all both temporally and spatially. Here, the ends are valued for 
themselves. Rawls points out that it is also only in community that 
individuals can be complete. Our different talents and gifts complement 
each other. It is “only in active cooperation with others that any one’s 
talent’s can be realized, and then in large part by the efforts of all” (Rawls 
1993:321). The basic structure of society should provide a platform in 
which the various activities relating to talents and gifts can be carried 
out. A condition which Rawls places on our use of talents is that those who 
do succeed must use their talents in the community to the benefit of 
everyone.87  
 
Art, science, religion and culture are all important parts of our communal 
life and present a degree of satisfaction in life.  
The development of art and science, of religion and culture of all 
kinds can be thought of in much the same way. Learning from one 
another’s efforts and appreciating their several contributions, 
human beings gradually build up systems of knowledge and belief; 
they work out recognized techniques for doing things and elaborate 
styles of feeling and expression. … When [the] end is achieved, all 
find satisfaction in the very same thing; and this fact together with 
the complementary nature of the good of individuals affirms the tie 
of community (Rawls 1971:526).  
In the same way that people participate together in community, Rawls 
expects people to want everyone in society to act on the same principles 
which ensure just outcomes for everyone; when everyone acts justly, 
everyone will be satisfied with the outcome. This requires a basis of moral 
principles upon which everyone will act (1971:527).  
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 With regard to talent, Michael Sandel offers an interesting discussion on moral arbitrariness. He 
points out that “handicapping” individuals so that they cannot benefit from their talents is a far less 
desirable alternative to ensuring that individuals use their talents to benefit the community. He also 
considers the necessity of incentives, that is, what is necessary to encourage talented people to use their 
talents (Rawls’s argument for differences in wages). While some may argue that effort deserves to be 
rewarded, it is impossible to argue that success can be attributed to effort alone; some form of morally 
arbitrary factors which are beyond our control (2009:153-159). 
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The social union now becomes a necessary part of the theory of justice, for 
justice can only function in a society where people are dependent upon 
each other and realize this dependence; that is, they realize that they 
alone cannot attain all their goals but they require the assistance and 
expertise of others. Justice functions well when people behave in a moral 
way according to principles, such as the two principles of justice proposed 
by Rawls, which are agreed upon and accepted by all.   
 
Rawls is often criticised by communitarians for the individualism of his 
theory.88 Communitarians believe that community should be treated at 
least on an even par with the concepts of liberty and equality (Wyatt 
2008:122). It typically begins with criticisms of liberalism which seeks to 
provide a moral basis for societies in the absence of any shared conception 
of the good (Fergusson 1998:138). The basis of rights of individual citizens 
to various freedoms and equality of treatment is viewed as too thin a basis 
to sustain the polity of a pluralist society. This is criticising the core 
argument of Rawls that the common good cannot sustain justice, a neutral 
position is necessary which excludes different moral and religious views 
since these divergent views can never be reconciled. Rawls counters this 
argument with his view of community as a society of citizens with the 
same end in mind. He continues to hold, however, that his political 
conception of justice is not a comprehensive one, but instead connects 
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 Modern-day communitarianism began in the upper reaches of Anglo-American academia in the 
form of a critical reaction to John Rawls’s A Theory of Justice. Political philosophers such as Alasdair 
MacIntyre, Michael Sandel, Charles Taylor and Michael Walzer disputed Rawls’s assumption that the 
principal task of government is to secure and distribute fairly the liberties and economic resources 
individuals need to lead freely chosen lives (Bell 2005). It is necessary to mention that these critics of 
liberal theory never did identify themselves with the communitarian movement (the communitarian 
label was pinned on them by others, usually critics, they have all attempted to avoid being labelled as 
communitarians), much less offer a grand communitarian theory as a systematic alternative to 
liberalism. The arguments of these scholars vary considerably; MacIntyre opposing even the nation-
state of liberalism while Walzer attempts to redefine communities within the liberal state. Nonetheless, 
there are certain core arguments which are meant to contrast with liberalism's devaluation of 
community and recur in the works of the four theorists, most notably the arguments centring on 
Rawls’s use of the Archimedean point, his priority of the right over the good and the lack of a common 
good in society.   
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citizens, understood as reasonable and rational beings, as free and equal 
(Rawls 1993:380). 
 
2.5.3 Rawls’s Theory of Justice and Religion 
 
Rawls clearly, time and again, places comprehensive moral doctrines, 
including religion, outside the scope of justice as fairness. Although with 
his idea of the overlapping consensus, place is later made for 
comprehensive moral ideas to be entered into the public realm, no 
indication is given as to the religious roots of justice. Gregory describes 
the restrictions placed on religious contributions to politics in liberal 
democracy as “troubling.” He feels that Rawls does not take into account 
the importance which religion has had on political formation in the past; 
neither does he respect democratic right of citizens to practice their faith 
publicly:  
They are (1) impractical (rational justifications are always relative 
to epistemic or cognitive context); (2) historically naive (religious 
convictions have inspired some of the most democratic episodes in 
public life); (3) strategically self-defeating (regulating public 
speech will not alleviate, and may fuel, the very real political 
dangers of religious convictions); and (4) antidemocratic (these 
restrictions impose an unjust political burden on many religious 
citizens that often betrays an excessive fear of democratic politics 
itself) (Gregory 2007:198).  
Rawls is not, however, attempting to remove religion from the public 
sphere and banish it to the private sector. He is merely seeking to contain 
it, or present it, in a way which is acceptable to those who do not 
necessarily share the same religious view and to ensure that it does not 
impose on the freedom and dignity of those people. This does beg the 
question of whether religion and politics can, and should, be separated to 
such a large extent. Rawls argues that the political realm is just one part 
of the domain of the moral (2001:14).  
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Despite his arguments for keeping justice in the political free from 
religious conceptions, there is something decidedly religious about Rawls’s 
work, although he himself does not admit to any religious leanings. Nagel 
says that the religious aspect of Rawls’s work, “born of a vivid sense of 
religion in human life and the historical crimes committed in its name” 
sets him apart from other philosophers. “Though his work is entirely 
secular, he has, I believe, a religious temperament and an understanding 
of both the power and danger of transcendence with its capacity to 
overwhelm worldly constraints” (Nagel 2002:76). Since Rawls never made 
a religious statement, it is difficult to know what his reply to such a 
statement might have been.89 His strong emphasis on morality, formed 
within and without the institutions of justice, suggest that he never 
intended to deny the influence of the religious, but sought a platform to 
make religious (and other) worldviews inclusive rather than exclusive. He 
says that “reasonable comprehensive doctrines, religious or non-religious, 
may be introduced in public political discussion at any time, provided that 
in due course proper political reasons ... are presented that are sufficient 
to support whatever the comprehensive doctrines introduced are said to 
support” (2005:462).  
 
In his essay, The Idea of Public Reason Revisited, Rawls stresses the 
difference between a political idea which belongs to the category of the 
political and comprehensive religious doctrine (2005:486). He upholds that 
public reason “does not trespass upon religious beliefs and injunctions 
insofar as these are consistent with the essential constitutional liberties... 
There is, or need be, no war between religion and democracy.” The aim of 
a well-ordered constitutional democratic society is “one in which the 
dominant and controlling citizens affirm and act from irreconcilable yet 
reasonable comprehensive doctrines [which] in turn support reasonable 
                                                 
89
 There is a short document (7 pages) entitled On my Religion which is published with Rawls’s 
senior thesis but this is more a justification of religions existing in harmony than a personal confession 
of faith. 
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political conceptions ... which specify the basic rights, liberties, and 
opportunities of citizens in society’s basic structure” (Rawls 1993:490). It 
is the contention of this thesis that Rawls offers a place for theology to 
enter the political debate; how and where theology may do so is not 
necessarily a task for political philosophers but rather for theologians.  
 
Perhaps the biggest difference between political philosophy and theology, 
and more specifically between Rawls’s work and that of Niebuhr, is the 
idea of a “realistic utopia.”90 Any Christian hope for justice is grounded in 
an eschatological hope. Rawls was of the opinion that this would cause 
people to become apathetic.  Instead he found the solution to cynicism and 
resignation by “showing how the social world may realize the features of a 
realistic utopia” working towards this “gives meaning to what we can do 
today” (Rawls 1999:128). Despite the fact that his principles of justice can 
be orientated within an option for the poor, a theological view will always 
place principles of justice in an eschatological horizon (Bedford-Strohm 
1993:298).91  
 
However, Rawls’s difference principle can be related to the option for the 
poor found in theology. Bedford-Strohm suggests that Rawls’s theory 
offers both convincing reasons and practical reasoning for an option for 
the poor (1993:306). Similarly, Naudé compares a “partisan or prioritarian 
notion of justice” to the distributive justice developed by Rawls (2007:41). 
Rawls’s law of peoples, which requires that people have a duty to assist 
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 Edmund Santurri argues that between utopianism and cynicism, realism offers a “life that is 
worthwhile even if the ultimate source of meaning is something beyond human making and that this 
conviction about life’s meaning should suffice to sustain the struggle for justice, as impoverished and 
as unfinished as this struggle must be in the course of human history” (2005:812). Santurri proposes 
that a Christian political realism survives Rawls’s polemic against political realism and also that Rawls 
himself needs some form of political realism to be fully persuasive in his arguments (Global Justice 
after the Fall: Christian Realism and the “Law of Peoples”).  
 
91
 „An der Option für die Armen orientierte Grundsätze der Gerechtigkeit schafffen einen Rahmen 
für die faire Verteilung dieser Güter. Aus theologischer Sicht stehen solche Grundsätze der 
Gerechtigkeit in einem eschatologischen Horizont.” 
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other people living under unfavourable conditions, moves Rawls’s 
egalitarianism towards its “special version of prioritarianism.”92  
 
2.5.4 Justice between the Generations 
 
Rawls describes the just savings principle as an “understanding between 
generations to carry their fair share of the burden of realizing and 
preserving a just society” (1971:289). Although Rawls is referring 
primarily to economic wealth, resources can also be considered in the 
same way. This is perhaps of particular importance in the face of the 
growing energy crisis. Natural resources are being depleted, and we can 
no longer afford to not look towards the future. We are continually being 
made more aware of the effects which our actions have on the 
environment, on the health of people and on the sustainability of life. 
While it is becoming imperative to employ conservation for our own 
generation, it is necessary to do so for the sake of the future generations 
as well.  
 
A part of justice is to save for future generations.93 Rawls says that the 
people in the original position must  
ask what is reasonable for members of adjacent generations to 
expect of one another at each level of advance. They try to piece 
together a just savings schedule by balancing how much at each 
stage they would be willing to save for their immediate 
descendants against what they would feel entitles to claim of their 
immediate predecessors. ... When they arrive at an estimate that 
seems fair from both sides, with due allowance made for the 
improvement in their circumstances, then the fair rate (or range of 
rates) for that stage is specified (1971:289-290). 
                                                 
92
 He notes the particular African perspective which can be given to Rawls’s work by using 
concepts like “holism, vitalism and ubuntu” (Naudé 2007:43).  
 
93
 Barry believes that Rawls’s justice between the generations is the closest he gets to setting out 
his fundamental idea of justice as fairness. “The key to justice is a willingness to claim and be claimed 
on in virtue of a given principle. Justice must be ‘fair from both sides’” (Barry 1989:200).  
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The just saving principle must be combined with the two principles of 
justice and the difference principle remains subordinate to the savings 
principle.  
 This is done by supposing that this principle is defined from the 
standpoint of the least advantaged in each generation. It is the 
representative men from this group as it extends over time who by 
virtual adjustments are to specify the rate of accumulation. They 
undertake in effect to constrain the application of the difference 
principle. In any generation their expectations are to be 
maximized subject to the condition of putting aside the savings 
that would be acknowledged. Thus the complete statement of the 
difference principle includes the savings principle as a constraint. 
Whereas the first principle of justice and the principle of fair 
opportunity limit the application of the difference principle within 
generations, the savings principle limits its scope between them 
(1971:292).  
Therefore, present generations are bound by certain duties and 
obligations to future generations. Rawls says that “the present generation 
cannot do as it pleases but is bound by the principles that would be chosen 
in the original position to define justice between persons at different 
moments in time” (1971:293). Justice exists not only for the present, but 
for the future. Each generation has a moral obligation to ensure that there 
will be enough for their children, and for their children’s children. This is 
becoming ever clear as we face the reality of fuel and food shortages. Our 
community encompasses not only the people who surround us, but those 
who are still to come.  
 
Justice between generations obviously becomes a lot more complicated 
when we begin talking about reparation. How is it possible to right the 
injustices of previous generations? This is reflected well by the situation 
in South Africa. Here, it becomes obvious exactly how complicated it is to 
ensure justice between generations. The injustice from the previous and 
present generations has major consequences for the younger generation 
and we now find it necessary to ask how things can be improved for the 
next generation. How do you justify the younger generation paying for the 
injustices of the previous generations? How is it possible to rectify such 
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gross inequalities in living conditions, income and education? These are 
questions that are not addressed by Rawls. Miller speaks of an 
“intergenerational account of collective responsibility” where a people 
today are “entitled to inherit the legitimate gains of its predecessors and 
liable to make redress for the injustices they perpetrated, in cases where 
these injustices can be shows to have had a lasting effect” (2006:200). This 
form of responsibility surely cannot be ignored when talking about justice. 
It does, however, remain a very complicated part of justice.  
 
2.5.5 Justice and Equality 
 
Justice as fairness is an egalitarian view of justice. Rawls feels that 
economic and social inequalities should be regulated because unless there 
is real scarcity, all should have enough to meet their basic needs and it is 
wrong that “some or much of society be amply provided for, while many, or 
even a few, suffer hardship, not to mention hunger and treatable illness” 
(Rawls 2001:130).  
 
Inequalities should also be controlled to prevent one part of society from 
dominating the rest. Those with educated intelligence and property should 
not be allowed to dominate the rest of society. Basic rights and liberties 
should not vary according to capacity; all people are owed the guarantees 
of justice (Rawls 1971:506-512). All people are entitled to equal liberty, 
whether they have a capacity for justice or not; any inequalities are 
justifiable only by means of the difference principle. The potential which a 
person has for a sense of justice and for morality entitles them to be 
included and protected by the principles of justice; a person cannot be 
denied basic rights simply because they do not have the mental capacity 
to demand them. The minimum capacity which is demanded by the 
contract theory insures that everyone has equal rights. “Equality does not 
presuppose an assessment of the intrinsic worth or persons, or a 
 81 
comparative evaluation of their conceptions of the good. Those who can 
give justice are owed justice” (Rawls 1971:510).  
 
Class difference and perceptions of rank are often responsible for political 
and economic inequalities. “Significant political and economic inequalities 
are often associated with inequalities of social status that encourage those 
of lower status to be viewed both by themselves and others as inferior” 
(Rawls 2001:131). The result is deference and servility on one side and 
arrogance and a will to dominate on the others; the effects of these 
inequalities “can be serious evils and the attitudes they engender great 
vices.” Rawls is particularly critical of status which is ascribed by birth, 
gender or race as well as monopoly and the dominance of a wealthy few.  
 
Being a citizen should ensure equality. Equality as respect which is owed 
to persons regardless of their social position is fundamental; it is defined 
by the first principle of justice and is owed to human beings as moral 
persons. Equality as it is in connection with the second principle involves 
the distribution of goods which will inevitably be unequally distributed 
according to status (1971:511). For Rawls, the difference principle curbs 
this unequal distribution of goods. He feels that people will be more 
accepting of inequalities when the prosperity of others benefits the 
disadvantage of others. Basically, social barriers are unacceptable 
determinates of distribution. If everyone has an equal opportunity to 
compete, they will not be resentful on missing out on an opportunity 
because of certain social barriers. The difference principle applies in the 
first instance to economic systems and legal institutions, such as “the 
market mechanism, the system of property, contract, in heritance, 
securities, taxation and so on” (Freeman 2007:99). With regard to 
international differences, the difference principles cannot apply. But still, 
 82 
Rawls claims that on an international level, well-ordered and decent 
societies have a duty of assistance toward burdened peoples.94  
 
Of course, there are still inequalities in income. But the difference 
principle’s guarantee of a “social minimum” means that although “there 
are those who are “least advantaged,” as there must be in any society with 
unequal incomes, but the least advantaged should have more than 
sufficient resources – more than they would in any other social system 
compatible with equal basic liberty – to effectively exercise their basic 
liberties and pursue their ends” (Freeman 2007:61). The difference 
principle should also mean that when we are talking about division of 
labour, each person will have a choice available to him or her so that their 
work can be meaningful. No one should be “servilely dependent on others 
and made to choose between monotonous and routine occupations which 
are deadening to human thought and sensibility” (Rawls 1971:529). A 
social minimum is dependent on the public political culture, which in turn 
is dependent on how political society is conceived by its political 
conception of justice. Thus for Rawls, the appropriate minimum is 
politically rather than psychologically or biologically determined and is set 
out in the terms of justice as fairness (2001:132).  
 
 
 
 
                                                 
94
 Freeman points out that for Rawls, “the duty of assistance to burdened peoples, to meet their 
basic needs, is to be satisfied, like the just savings principle, before determining the distributive shares 
of the least advantaged in one’s own society under the difference principle” (2006:248) (this is based 
on Rawls’s statement in A Theory of Justice that the difference principle uses the savings principle as a 
constraint. In the same way, a nation must ensure that the welfare of other nations is attended to before 
applying the difference principle to their own society).  
However, Rawls attributes the economic poverty of burdened society primarily to cultural and 
political factors and argues “that the main aim of the duty of assistance should be to help engineer 
change in these dimensions rather than to send material assistance in the form of foreign aid.” He 
appears to underestimate the link between economic inequalities and inequalities of power.  (Miller 
2006:198 and 203).  
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2.6 Conclusion 
 
With his theory of justice, Rawls attempts to develop a space where 
principles of justice acceptable to most, if not all, peoples can be founded 
and implemented and in so doing actively shape society. He accepts that 
people may not agree on what is just or unjust, or on the reasoning behind 
certain principles, but he expects people to agree on certain principles and 
therefore accept the institutions that uphold these principles to be just 
institutions.   
 
Rawls places a lot of emphasis on how the community and society in 
which people live, engage and interact, influences the way in which they 
think. This is no different for the way in which they will think about 
justice, and what they will come to view as acceptable or unacceptable 
behaviour. Rawls’s two principles of justice form the basis of the rest of his 
work; if any principle cannot be explained by these two principles, it is 
unjust. Equal liberty forms the cornerstone of justice with people having 
equal access to resources such as education, property and freedom. 
Inequalities are permitted only insofar as they protect the least 
vulnerable in the society. For Rawls, equality remains subordinate to 
liberty.  
 
The primary social goods are rights and liberties, opportunities and 
powers, income and wealth (Rawls 1971:92). Justice as fairness seeks to 
ensure that every person has the equal liberty to pursue whatever plan of 
life they choose, as long as it does not violate what justice demands. 
People share primary goods on the principle that some can have more if 
they are acquired in ways which improve the situation of those who have 
less (Rawls 1971:94). Thus the notion of community and care of the 
neighbour is an important part of Rawls’s work, even if he does not 
specifically mention it. According to him, fraternity, then, is a value which 
is instilled in society by certain rules and regulations which are put into 
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place by the institutions around which society is structured. The social 
responsibility of individuals is cultivated by a society which is just, and in 
turn the just actions of the individuals create a just society. 
 
The principles of justice are formulated behind a veil of ignorance. There 
are no moral or personal reasons for choosing certain principles. Because 
the individuals are unaware of their own standing in society, they will 
choose principles which benefit everyone. The principles chosen would 
reflect the freedom which all individuals would desire in everyday life. 
Decisions would also be influenced by natural law – every individual has 
an idea of right and wrong without being taught.  
 
The difference principle protects society from gross inequality. Wealth at 
the cost of others is not permitted. The only way in which it is justifiable 
for some members of society to be wealthier than others is when the less 
well-off benefit. I understand Rawls to include far more than only 
monetary wealth – health care, education, food and other basic resources 
must also be distributed equally in the society. It is unacceptable that 
there will be people who are struggling to live while others live in the lap 
of luxury.  
 
The rationality of individuals is an important part of Rawls’s theory. 
People will respect other people because of their ability to rationalise and 
participate in society. Rationality is also closely linked to the theory of the 
good. The good plans which people will have for their lives will always be 
influenced by the right – they will not choose to behave either in a way 
which infringes on the rights of others or in a way which rebels against 
the principles of justice. An important part of justice and equality is to 
ensure that each individual is equipped with the ability to make rational 
life decisions.  
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Justice cannot be removed from community. Rawls believes that who we 
are is shaped by the society in which we live, and this is where our 
concept of what is just is developed, starting with our parents. Our 
responsibility is not only to ourselves, but to the other members of our 
community. As rational people, Rawls expects that choices made by 
individuals to not be harmful in any way to others. In the same way, this 
care and respect extends beyond the present time to ensure that resources 
are protected for future generations.  
 
Although not at all theologically motivated, I believe that Rawls’s theory 
of justice can offer much to a theological discussion on justice. Care and 
respect of all people and the importance of community are certainly very 
relevant. Perhaps we can find here a starting point of translating Biblical 
values into a universal language which can be understood beyond the 
confines of the theological community. However, whenever we are talking 
about justice we are talking about it from a specific context, within a 
certain epoch. We cannot hope to address all the injustice in the world at 
all times.95 
 
The importance of justice in community cannot be ignored in Rawls’s 
argument. Conversely, the role which community plays in justice also 
forms an important argument. When dealing with justice, it is impossible 
to separate justice from the community. And this community is made up 
of individuals, each one of whom needs to be given a space to develop as a 
person who is treated with respect and allowed a space to develop their 
                                                 
95
 “Die ‚wohlüberlegten Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen‘, von denen Rawls ausgeht – so Joseph De 
Marco – sind in Wirklichkeit in hohem Maβe von einer bestimmten historischen und gesellschaftlichen 
Situation sowie einem bestimmten Klassenstandpunkt geprägte Konzepte. Daran kann auch das Hin- 
und Hergehen zwischen diesen Urteilen und den Bedingungen der Vertragssituation, das das 
Überlegungsgleichgewicht kennzeichnet, nichts ändern, denn beide Pole sind in hohem Maβe relative 
Standpunkte und bestätigen sich eher gegenseitig als daβ sie sich in Frage stellen. Die Zeitlosigkeit der 
Rawlsschen Grundsätze wird deutlich widerlegt durch eine Analyse der dramatischen Unterschiede 
zwischen den verschiedenen Gerechtigkeitsvorstellungen in den einzelnen Epochen der Geschichte” 
(Bedford-Strohm 1993:235).  This idea is based on the criticism of Joseph de Marco in Responses to 
Rawls from the Political Left  
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talents and dreams. In turn, each person has a responsibility to the 
community to act in a way which is just.  
 
Rawls’s theory does not exclude Christianity, and theology should not 
exclude those insights of his which are useful when entering a public 
discussion on justice in the political realm. Having some form of justice 
which appeals to people across nations and religions is of the utmost 
importance. Theology can take Rawls’s ideas, and build on them, using a 
comprehensive doctrine to show why it is that we, as Christians, respect 
each individual. Rawls offers valuable insights into thinking 
constructively about justice, but it is necessary to move from the 
intellectual to the practical. 
 
Rawls shows that it is possible for people from different backgrounds and 
beliefs to reach some sort of agreement about what is just. His priority of 
liberty and equality find many roots in Christian thinking – the freedom 
which people find in Christ, the respect which people deserve as created in 
the image of God and equality of all people, regardless of race, gender or 
status, before God. Theology must always assume a Biblical basis for 
justice, but finding a space to talk to those with other bases is also 
essential. Albeit with its own difficulties, Rawls creates just such a 
philosophical platform.    
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Chapter 3 
Reinhold Niebuhr: Justice as love? 
 
 
3.1 Introduction 
 
Reinhold Niebuhr is considered to be one of the most influential 
theologians of the 20th century, particularly as theologian in the political 
realm. For Niebuhr, hope, faith and love form the foundation of a call to a 
continual struggle for justice and equality. He believed that our truth is 
never the truth and that our justice will never be perfect. Thus, it is 
necessary to always seek for a higher and more equal justice. 
 
A brief introduction to Niebuhr, his theology and his published works lays 
the foundation for how his influence extended beyond academia into the 
political and social realm, and the various influences on his work, which 
remained intensely contextual in nature. He was motivated by the social 
and political world which surrounded him, and this is reflected in his 
theology.  
 
The discussion then moves to Christian Realism, which is purported to 
have begun with Reinhold and H Richard Niebuhr. This view is important 
to understanding Niebuhr’s work, which is neither pessimistic nor 
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optimistic. Understanding Niebuhr’s view of human nature and human 
destiny are essential for understanding his view of justice. The finiteness 
of humanity finds hope in the cross; we are not destined to a hopeless 
existence but live knowing that our reality can be different.  
 
Injustice is the result of human pride and sensuality, which is the specific 
sin which refuses to accept human finitude and tries to control human 
destiny. This results in an abuse of power and a denial of our dependence 
upon God. However, through religious community, and discovering love, 
the impossible possibility, as our highest aim, it is possible to become 
aware of our arrogance and to accept our finitude, taking responsibility for 
our actions and our part in reaching for a more equal justice.  
 
The chapter closes with a brief discussion of how Niebuhr sees salvation 
as a call to responsibility. He practiced a theology which was intensely 
critical of various worldviews, and which remained critical of itself as well.  
 
It is necessary to note that Niebuhr consistently spoke of “men,” and 
“mankind.” I have retained this use in direct quotations. It was not 
exclusive language for him, but should rather be viewed as a matter of 
semantics.1 Elsewhere, however, I make use of more inclusive language 
and substitute “fraternity” for “brotherhood.” 
 
3.2 Biography 
 
3.2.1 Biographical Information 
 
Reinhold Niebuhr was born in Wright City, Missouri, USA. He was the 
elder son of German Evangelical pastor Gustav Niebuhr and his wife. 
                                                 
1
 Richard Fox writes about Niebuhr’s use of the masculine: “Niebuhr was untroubled by the use of 
the generic ‘man,’ as he made clear in the titles of several of his books. He was aware of the possible 
slight to women. On a radio panel in 1939 about the threat to ‘mankind’ he prefaced his remarks with 
the warning that when he spoke of ‘men’ he meant to include women. He saw no alternative to the 
male generic noun and pronoun” (1985:x). 
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Reinhold followed in his father’s footsteps and entered the ministry. He 
studied at Elmhurst College, Eden Theological Seminary and finally at 
Yale University. He was always exceedingly uncomfortable amongst his 
peers, feeling like a “mongrel among thoroughbreds.” 
 
After completing his MA in 1915, Niebuhr opted for ‘”relevance rather 
than scholarship” and “he decided against pursuing an academic career 
and entered the active ministry” (Durkin 1989:2). After ordination he 
became a very popular pastor at a Bethel Evangelical Church in Detroit, 
Michigan, where he served for 13 years. During this time he gained a 
reputation as a powerful preacher, one which he never lost. “His sermons 
consistently combined priestly and prophetic postures: a priestly gospel of 
hope for coping with the everyday perplexities and tragedies of earthly 
life; a prophetic gospel of repentance for confronting personal sin and 
social evil” (Fox 1985:64).  
 
During this time, the wisdom of the young pastor was already apparent in 
how he dealt with the day to day ministry in his parish. Although he 
sometimes spoke harshly of his parishioners (some of whom irritated him) 
and was extremely critical of other ministers, he was dedicated to the 
church and had from the start of his ministry a profound insight as to 
what the role of the church in society should be.2 Alan Paton described 
him as “the wisest man [he] ever knew, with an understanding of human 
nature and of human society that no one has equalled in our century” 
(cited in Forrester 1997:219). 
 
                                                 
2
 “(U)pon leaving the parish in 1928, he wrote glowingly of the opportunities available to the 
minister; no other profession had as many opportunities to serve in different areas. He enumerated 
particularly the chance to influence the lives of children and young people, the opportunity to engage 
in significant social action, the challenges of race relations in a polyglot city, and the provision of a 
message of hope to men and women who needed guidance in finding goals worthy of devotion. He 
took up the task of helping people to separate hope from dreams so that religious faith would not perish 
with the shattering of illusions” (Stone 1992:24). 
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It is clear that Niebuhr’s early theology was influenced by the harsh 
industrial reality he encountered in Detroit3 (he was very critical of Henry 
Ford, who installed the first moving assembly line the year before 
Niebuhr arrived in Detroit and while being lauded for his “Five Dollar 
Day” plan, was criticised by Niebuhr for the harsh conditions under which 
workers suffered), the First World War and the onset of the worldwide 
depression.4 His theological reflections during his time in Detroit were 
concerned with how human nature and human destiny are impacted by 
their inherent involvement in history. This was the line of thinking which 
remained characteristic of Niebuhr throughout his life. In the introduction 
to Reinhold Niebuhr, Theologian of Public Life, Rasmussen describes 
Niebuhr’s theology as follows: 
Niebuhr’s attention was not to the Godhead itself (he didn’t write 
about the Trinity, for example). His attention was to the relation of 
this God to the self and to history, to what the relationship means 
for human possibilities and how it sets the direction for relevant 
public action. (For Niebuhr, ‘relevant public action’ meant action 
creative of a progressive justice in the moment history now 
presents us) (1989:5). 
                                                 
3
 His reflections of his time as a pastor can be found in Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed 
Cynic. During his years in ministry he continually grappled with the influence of the ever-changing 
technology on the working people. It is in this book that the social conscience which would later 
influence so much of his theological thought  becomes apparent, and brilliant insights (of an albeit 
young pastor) show the clarity with which he saw the world around him. He is often critical of the 
treatment of workers at the factory of Henry Ford: “We went through one of the big automobile 
factories to-day. . . . The foundry interested me particularly. The heat was terrific. The men seemed 
weary. Here manual labour is drudgery and toil is slavery. The men cannot possibly find any 
satisfaction in their work. They simply work to make a living. Their sweat and their dull pain are part 
of the price paid for the fine cars we all run. And most of us run the cars without knowing what price is 
being paid for them. . . . We are all responsible. We all want the things which the factory produces and 
none of us is sensitive enough to care how much in human values the efficiency of the modern factory 
costs” (1929:79-80). 
 
4
 Rasmussen describes “the Detroit experience” as follows: “On the anvil of harsh industrial reality 
in Detroit, the trauma of the First World War, and the onset of the worldwide Depression Niebuhr 
tested he alternatives he would find wanting – religious and secular liberalism and Marxism – even 
when he remained a sobered and reformed liberal and a socialist… Detroit kindled the Christian 
indignation that would always fire Niebuhr, as well as the restless quest to theologically illumine the 
events of the day and thereby render them meaningful” (1989:7). In Moral Man and Immoral Society 
we see how great Niebuhr believed the influence of the industrial era to be: “The moral cynicisms, the 
equalitarian idealism, the rebellious heroism, the anti-nationalism and internationalism, and the 
exaltations of their class as the community of significant loyalty, all these characteristic moral attitudes 
of the modern working classes are the products of the industrial era” (Niebuhr 1932:142).  
 
91 
 
In 1928 Niebuhr became a professor of Practical Theology at Union 
Theological Seminary in New York. Niebuhr remained at Union Seminary 
until his retirement in 1960. During this time he produced hundreds of 
articles, edited various journals, published a few full-length books, 
continued preaching on a regular basis and became increasingly politically 
involved. Ronald Stone describes Niebuhr as being defined by his work at 
Union Seminary: 
Offers came from Harvard, Yale and elsewhere to move him from 
Union Theological Seminary, but he stayed and, from September 
through May for thirty-two years, taught Protestant social ethics. 
This was his vocation. It was his life project (1992:xii). 
 
In 1931 he married Ursula Keppel-Compton, who later became the 
professor of religion at Barnard College in New York City. She was 
invaluable to Niebuhr’s work throughout his career, particularly in the 
later years after he suffered his first stroke in 1952. After Niebuhr’s 
death, Ursula compiled a book of his essays, sermons and letters. In the 
introduction to Man’s Nature and His Communities, Niebuhr admits that 
it would be hard to separate Ursula’s thought from his own and attributes 
much of his wisdom to her influence.5  
 
Niebuhr continued lecturing and publishing after his stroke, although his 
public appearances became significantly fewer as the years went by. He 
was greatly troubled about not being able to keep up the same hectic 
schedule as previously.  After their retirement to Stockbridge, 
Massachusetts, Reinhold Niebuhr died on 1 June 1971 at the age of 78.  
 
                                                 
5
 “Writing these lines in my old age and being conscious of the spiritual and intellectual debt I owe 
my wife, not to speak of more precious debts incurred in decades of happy marriage, I must close this 
autobiographical introduction with a confession. I do not know how much Ursula is responsible for 
modifying my various forms of provincialism and homiletical polemics. But I know she is responsible 
for much of my present viewpoint and that it would be difficult for either of us to mark any opinion 
expressed in these pages as the unique outlook of one or the other. … I know my wife is the more 
diligent student of biblical literature and of the relation of psychology to literature and social dynamics. 
… I will not elaborate an already too intimate, autobiographical detail of a happy marriage except to 
say that this volume is published under my name, and the joint authorship is not acknowledged except 
in this confession. I will leave the reader to judge whether male arrogance or complete mutuality is the 
cause of this solution” (Niebuhr 1965:28-29). 
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3.2.2 Niebuhr’s Theology 
 
Niebuhr’s theology was prompted by the political and social circumstances 
which surrounded him. The first and second world wars, the industrial 
situation, the Russian political movements and the Cold War and the rise 
and fall of fascism  and his own support and later rejection of Marxism are 
only a few of the external influences on his theological thought. The 
political events which inspired him are strange to us today and there are 
many political and ethical dilemmas which we face that he never touched 
upon. But despite this, he did generalize some of his theory, and it is 
possible to intimate what he may have to say (Wightman Fox 1989:1-2).6 
 
Niebuhr believed, as is reflected throughout his theology, that a prophetic 
religion combines an utmost seriousness about history with a 
transcendent norm. His entire life’s work was centred around his view of 
Christian realism. It never permitted history to be ignored, nor did it seek 
to escape from it; yet it did not find its ultimate goals or standards within 
history (Lebacqz 1986:83). Niebuhr’s theology is an attempt to live out a 
reality in today’s world of how things are supposed to be and will one day 
be; thus imperfect history merges with a striving for the perfect outcome 
which will one day be completed, but not by human endeavour. Niebuhr 
said that 
Nothing that is worth doing can be achieved in a lifetime; therefore 
we must be saved by hope. Nothing which is true or beautiful or 
good makes complete sense in any immediate context of history; 
therefore we must be saved by faith. Nothing we do, however 
                                                 
6
 “It is not so easy to imagine Reinhold in our midst. The social basis for the touring liberal 
preacher has disappeared. His special forums – the college-chapel circuit, summer assemblies of liberal 
Christian students, conventions of liberal political and labor cadres – have shrunk in significance. 
Moreover, he is indelibly association with certain pivotal events of the middle third of the twentieth 
century. … Niebuhr was the product of, and a producer of, a world we have in important respects left 
behind. His specific social and political stances emerged as parts of an integral response to his world. 
We cannot tell what he would have thought about abortion, or Star Wars, or the women’s movement in 
the 1980s. … Of course, much of what Niebuhr said, wrote, and did can be appropriated for our time. 
He did generalize from his experience, and even when he did not generalize from it, we can do so in 
retrospect” (Wightman Fox1989:1-2).  
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virtuous, can be accomplished alone. Therefore we are saved by 
love (1974:1).  
Hope, faith and love form the foundation of a call to a continual struggle 
for justice and equality. 
 
Niebuhr never referred to himself as a theologian, despite being regarded 
by his contemporaries (and since) as one of the greatest and most 
influential theologians of the twentieth century. He preferred to refer to 
himself as a “teacher of social ethics” (1956:3). He was in constant 
dialogue with the political and social world. At various point in his career 
he was a Christian Socialist, a pacifist, an advocate of U.S. intervention in 
World War II, a staunch anticommunist, an architect of cold war 
liberalism and a critic of the Vietnam War.7 Throughout his work he drew 
heavily on theology, church history and biblical studies, but a lot of his 
work referred to political theory, philosophy, social science and law. 8 
Often the theological was eclipsed by the political and sociological thought 
in his writing, although the theological influence clearly always 
                                                 
7
 See the introduction to The Irony of American History by Andrew Bacevich, p. X 
Niebuhr was influenced by many traditions, not all of them Christian. This is probably partly because 
he was “not merely and not primarily a systematic theologian, he is rather, and first of all, an ethical 
teacher, a religious political, and most of all a prophetic preacher. The historical roots of this thought 
are therefore widespread. They embrace not less than the whole tradition of western civilization. ... All 
theological doctrines from that of the apostle Paul to those of Schleiermacher and Ritschl may be 
called the roots of his thought; but he is also tinged or even formed by the main political and social, 
scientific and literary upheavals and revolutions” (Kroner 1956:178). 
 
8
 Rather than offer a Christian apologetic, he would criticize other social theories and note their 
shortcomings. “This is the heart of his apologetic: he does not prove this vertical dimension or the 
relatedness to God which it implies. Rather he seeks to persuade us that we cannot make either human 
nature or history intelligible without that dimension, that other viewpoints contradict either themselves 
or the faces, and that a Biblical understanding rightly interprets the common but otherwise incoherent 
facts of experience” (Gilkey 2001b:80). 
Brown sees Niebuhr’s influences as being twofold: On the one hand, he made use of his particular 
Christian faith and drew particularly on “the Hebrew prophets, Jesus, Paul, the Reformers, and 
Kierkegaard” and on the other hand he made use of the tools he acquired throughout his life in social 
science, political philosophy and history (1986:xiii).  
Wightman Fox describes Niebuhr’s theology, which he calls “public theology,” as “a paradoxical 
mix of secular and religious conviction. On one level it was firmly, zealously secular… But Niebuhr’s 
public theology was also deeply religious –in two senses. First, his vision of the secular world as a 
field of colliding, self-interested units flowed out of his biblical understanding of human nature.  … 
Second, his vision was religious in that he believed that the secular world could not simply be left to 
itself: it had to be judged, challenged by the biblical commitment to justice” (1989:14). 
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undergirds his thought and the influence of Augustine on his work is 
unmistakable. 9  
 
Lovin describes Niebuhr’s theological contribution as showing “how closely 
[this] pragmatic theological realism could be related to other moral 
discourses and to illuminate the specific difference that it makes to affirm 
that God is the center of meaning in a morally coherent universe” 
(1995:33). It is possibly this that led to the dialectical nature of Niebuhr’s 
theology (for example, he describes love as an “impossible possibility” 
numerous times throughout his work).10 The opening lines of the second 
volume of The Nature and Destiny of Man are, “Man is, and yet is not, 
involved in the flux of nature and time.”  
 
Despite many criticisms of his work and particularly his lack of a specific 
systematic theology, Niebuhr is undeniably one of the most influential 
pastors of the previous century. Gilkey describes Niebuhr’s theology as a 
“political theology:” 
That is to say, it is a theology concerned above all with the social 
existence of human beings and with the health and disease of that 
existence. It has, to be sure, individualistic, existential, and 
personal elements at its very center. Nevertheless the abiding 
focus, from beginning to end, is on society, history, and politics 
rather than on the inner, private, individual consciousness... 
Niebuhr’s theology is, therefore, in many ways exceptional. He is 
an existentialist for whom social rather than individual issues are 
primary. And he is a political theologian for whom the 
transcendent God is above us in the present, as in the past and the 
future, rather than, as with the eschatological political 
theologians, the God solely of the future (2001:20-21 my italics).  
                                                 
9
 Stone writes of Niebuhr’s passion for Augustine: “On hearing Niebuhr’s lecture on Augustine, the 
students knew he was at home. Augustine provided Niebuhr with more than did other thinkers. Some 
of what Augustine provided, Niebuhr had learned first from Paul, Luther, and his Lutheran-Calvinist 
church. Distinctive elements in Augustine in which Niebuhr participated were the conjoining of 
philosophy and biblical faith, the centrality of love in ethics, the need for a socially responsible ethic, a 
tendency to write and speak in a dialectic fashion, the setting of ethics in historical terms, a search for 
world history, and a Christian realism. Niebuhr saw Augustine as the first Christian realist” (Stone 
1992:67-68). 
 
10
 This is discussed more fully in the introduction by Brown to The Essential Reinhold Niebuhr p. 
xvi ff. 
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His contribution to politics, economic and social thought as well as, of 
course, theology, cannot be underestimated. This was an important part of 
his life, one which he thoroughly enjoyed: 
Niebuhr was a public intellectual and enjoyed it, an activist-
scholar held in high respect in his culture who nonetheless 
cultivated a stand of sharp, independent criticism. He was, in fact, 
a prophet heard in the king’s chapel and the king’s court, 
chastising the certitudes of a confident culture and exposing its 
fault lines with rhetorical power and the sheer force of his 
personality (Rasmussen 1989:1).  
 
In his doctoral thesis on Niebuhr’s understanding of human destiny in 
relation to the doctrine of the atonement Stephen De Gruchy, a South 
African theologian, made use of David Tracy’s idea that each theologian 
addresses three social realities. De Gruchy relates Niebuhr to three 
distinct publics, namely the church, the academy and the wider society 
(1992:11ff). Niebuhr remained active in the church throughout his life, 
preaching regularly even after he left full-time ministry for academic life. 
The majority of the students he taught were preparing for life in the 
ministry, a fact of which he was conscious in his teaching. As well as being 
a renowned pastor, he was also a well-respected academic and had an 
undeniable influence on North American theology. But his theology was 
not only limited to academia. He was in constant dialogue with broader 
society. He was not only involved in speaking and lecturing about political 
and sociological issues, he was involved in numerous organisations and 
societies in the public sphere, social welfare groups and held positions in 
political organisations. Dennis McCann describes Niebuhr’s theology as 
being shaped by his historical consciousness and the “signs of the times”: 
The origin of Niebuhr’s distinctive religious vision and its role in 
shaping Christian realism forms the theological dimension of his 
experience. His reflections as a practical theologian ... stemmed 
from his historical consciousness of the problem of being a modern 
Christian in a modern world. Given his sense of history, theology 
for Niebuhr is meant to interpret the “signs of the times.” In other 
words, theology seeks to discover what God is allowing us – the 
individual believer, the community of faith, the community of all 
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persons – to be and to do in this particular historical moment 
(2001:19 my italics). 
 
Niebuhr did not ask “What is true,” nor did not attempt to systematise his 
theology or expound upon church doctrine. Rather, he dedicated his life 
and his work, both as pastor and theologian, to answering the question, 
“How shall I live my life” (De Gruchy 1992:21). Paul Tillich rather 
negatively describes Niebuhr’s thought as having no epistemology: 
Niebuhr does not ask, “How can I know?” he starts knowing. And 
he does not ask afterward, “How could I know?” but leaves the 
convincing power of his thought without epistemological support 
(1956:36).  
And his answer to this question is that we should live responsibly. His 
theology always remained in service to his ethics and he arrived at his 
“interpretation and use of crucial Christian myths and doctrines through 
his polemics against other uses of them by assessing the moral and social 
consequences of other views” (Gustafson 1986:37).11 Although he appears 
to develop much of his theology from observation of human life and 
                                                 
11
 See Gilkey’s discussion of the relationship between Niebuhr’s theology and social theory in On 
Niebuhr: Theological Study. Gilkey sees an intimate relationship between Niebuhr’s social theology, 
political ethics and high theology as coming to a fore in his discussion of powerlessness. For Niebuhr, 
it is only God who can provide meaning for life and it is the role of faith to recognize this.  
To briefly summarize: “This intimate relation in Niebuhr between social theology, political ethics, 
and ‘high theology’ (Atonement and Christology) is nowhere more evident than in Niebuhr’s 
discussion of ‘powerlessness’, the powerlessness and so the ultimate vulnerability of Jesus as the 
Christ. Here the agape of God, which represented the pinnacle of the divine transcendence and 
mystery, becomes in historical enactment the apparent opposite of transcendence, its paradoxical 
partner, powerlessness and vulnerability. In the divine love the ultimately unconditioned becomes the 
absolutely conditioned. And this paradox of unconditioned majesty and radically conditioned 
vulnerability, of ultimate power and absolute powerlessness, is for Niebuhr the center of the Christian 
gospel and of the Biblical message...  
We should not miss the strong antihumanist thrust of Niebuhr’s thought: if humans take their own 
salvation as the fulfillment of meaning in their life into their own hands, the inevitable result if 
idolatry, pride, and destruction on the one hand or despair and enervation on the other. Only God can 
provide a sufficient and creative meaning for life; this is the meaning of Christ and of grace. And it is 
precisely the role of faith to recognize and assent to this... As a consequence it cannot possibly be 
understood – as many have sought to do – as primarily brilliant social commentary with the pious 
icing, so to speak, of theological or Biblical rhetoric. Such an interpretation is clearly untrue to 
Niebuhr’s texts; but even more, it completely falsifies what he wished to say in every line he wrote. 
Without God – and God’s judgment and mercy – there are only the possibilities of idolatry and 
destruction or despair and enervation; without God, therefore, there is hope of neither meaning nor 
renewal in life or in history. Without God – and the agape of Christ – mutual love, descending rapidly 
into the self-interested calculation of survival, remains our only ‘norm’ and the secure establishment of 
the self and its community our only moral ideal” (2001:186-188 my italics).  
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history (mostly in critical dialogue with other traditions, even various 
Christian traditions), the Biblical basis is never far from his work 
(although it may often be more implicit rather than explicit).12 He at times 
goes so far as criticize the Biblical view with Paul often bearing the brunt 
of his sharp tongue, and in a few places even the teachings of Jesus are 
shown to be lacking.  
 
He was extremely critical of the likes of Billy Graham, because he felt that 
the type of Christianity popularised by him is not much help in dealing 
with political crises; teaching people to be good would not lead to peace 
and justice.13 The prophetic tradition of the Christian faith meant a 
passion for love and for justice, the continual search for a higher and a 
better justice which would continually be practiced in wider borders 
amongst more people. Love would always be the plumb line by which 
                                                 
12
 Niebuhr often had an original way of interpreting and integrating Biblical texts; he never 
discarded the Bible for reason. “Niebuhr has, in one sense, and perhaps to his own surprise, a very high 
view of biblical revelation. He does not simply discard the reported teaching of Jesus where they are 
inconvenient, or deny awkward doctrines, developed from biblical interpretation, of Original Sin and 
the Second Coming of Christ. On the contrary, he accepts them as providing insights unperceived by 
reasoning alone. Even though his overt appeal is to the nature of human experience and its analysis, he 
in practice accepts a set of concepts derived from biblical tradition to analyse experience, and does not 
drop them when they seem difficult at first. Even though his overt appeal is to the nature of human 
experience and its analysis, he in practice accepts a set of concepts derived from biblical tradition to 
analyse experience, and does not drop them when they seem difficult at first. He gives to these biblical 
concepts, however, a powerful and original interpretation, taking religious symbols to be expressions of 
the relation of the historical to the eternal, applicable to every historical moment in the life of man. It 
is clear that reason still serves a vital double role in religion” (Ward 1986:77 my italics).  
There are many critics who accuse Niebuhr of subjecting theology to ethics, but Gilkey makes a 
convincing argument that this is not so. “Despite Niebuhr’s passion for social ethics, the ethical is for 
Niebuhr subordinate to the religious; the second commandment to love our neighbour in effect 
becomes a function of the first commandment to worship God alone. As sin represents a break in the 
relation to God, so faith represents the reestablishment of that crucial relation – and it is sin that brings 
about the evil actions of history just as faith and grace determine its possibilities of moral renewal. The 
religious relation to God is hence no longer an expression of the human quest for the good and so of 
the goodness and idealism of human being, as it was in much of liberalism. On the contrary, the quest 
for God can only be infinitely frustrated until the actual religious relation to God is rectified – and that 
becomes possible only through God’s initiative, through revelation and through grace (Gilkey 2001:25 
my italics). 
 
13
 “Billy Graham thinks that the problem of atomic warfare could be solved if one could convert 
“bad” people to become “good” so that they would not use atomic weapons. But he cannot have 
anything to say to good people who are increasingly concerned about the undue reliance of our nation 
upon nuclear weapons but who do not find it possible to be responsible for the security of our 
civilization and simply renounce nuclear weapons” (Christianity in Crisis, Vol. 26 no. 3, 1956. Cited 
in: de Gruchy 1992:22).  
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justice would be measured and even though it could not be attained in 
history, it would always remain relevant – it would force justice and ethics 
to always be more just and more ethical (Stone 1992:106).  From his time 
in Detroit as a pastor, Niebuhr spent his life calling people to be ethically 
responsible. He preached sermons, wrote books and articles and addressed 
the public convinced of the fact that people could take action and be 
responsible because he firmly believed that this could and would make a 
difference, despite his belief that history could not be changed.14 He 
believed that Christian thought in particular had much to offer politics.15  
 
He in no way wanted to fuse politics and religion but he certainly believed 
that a specific Christian view and Christian Realism in particular, offered 
hope to a society which was in danger of becoming hopeless and that a 
Christian input into the political sphere was imperative. Niebuhr was 
always involved with the relevant political and social issues of his day, 
and, when necessary, changed his opinion accordingly.16 He was probably 
                                                 
14
 See the following discussion on his critique of other worldviews as the denial of history and the 
worship of history in §4. 
 
15
 Niebuhr clearly appreciated the relevance of Christianity and the Bible and saw faith as a call to 
involvement in the political and social world – accepting neither political religions nor 
otherworldliness. “If I believe that the Christian understanding of man could help solve some of these 
crucial issues and could conserve the best achievements of liberalism better than traditional liberalism 
can conserve them, I do not for that reason wish merely to hitch Christian faith to this or that political 
task. Christianity faces ultimate issues of life which transience all political vicissitudes of 
achievements. But the answer which Christian faith gives to man’s ultimate perplexities and the hope 
which it makes possible in the very abyss of his despair, also throw light upon the immediate historical 
issues which he faces. Christianity is not a flight into eternity from the tasks and decisions of history. It 
is rather the power and wisdom of God which makes decisions in history possible and which points to 
proximate goals in history which are usually obscured either by optimistic illusions or by the despair 
which followed upon the dissipation of these illusions. Christianity must therefore wage constant war, 
on the one hand against political religions which imagine some proximate goal and some conditioned 
good as man’s final good, and on the other against an otherworldliness which by contrast gives these 
political religions a seeming validity” (Reinhold Niebuhr, ‘Ten Years That Shook My World,’ The 
Christian Century, Vol. 56, No. 17, April 26, 1939 p. 545, quoted in Rasmussen 1989:18). 
 
16
 Durkin notes the historical influences on Niebuhr’s thought: “By the end of the 1930’s four 
historical facts influenced the future direction of Niebuhr’s thought. The threatened judgement on the 
capitalist system was not to be executed by Communism; Stalin had transformed the dictatorship of the 
proletariat into a tyranny; the Socialist Party in America was hopeless isolationist, and the New Deal 
was having a measure of success in dealing with severest crisis which capitalism had experienced.  
Niebuhr responded to these facts by recommending full support to the Allied war effort even 
though it meant saving the capitalist system; resigning from the Socialist Party; and supporting a third 
term for Roosevelt, and eventually working for the Roosevelt administration”  (Durkin 1989:95). 
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one of the most influential theologians in the twentieth century when it 
came to politicians and policy-makers. There was even a group of foreign 
policy-makers and theorists who were dubbed ‘Atheists for Niebuhr’ 
(Forrester 1997:215).  
 
Niebuhr’s theological reflections on justice cannot be examined apart from 
his view of human history and human involvement in history (or human 
destiny), as is probably made most clear in the two volumes of The Nature 
and Destiny of Man. He was critical of many other worldviews including 
the classical Greek view, the rationalistic view, Romanticism, the 
Renaissance, Naturalism and communistic Marxism. This critique was 
mostly used to justify his own perspective by contrasting it with a 
worldview he felt inadequate. He has often been criticized for his lack of 
historical accuracy, but he never intended his critique to be used as a 
record of these views, they rather served the purpose of establishing his 
own view in opposition to them. De Gruchy suggests that “one reads 
Niebuhr’s arguments about a worldview not so much to gain a 
sympathetic interpretation of that particular worldview, but rather to 
gain a deeper understanding of Niebuhr’s own thinking” (1992:50).  
 
Niebuhr was always involved with the question of justice. However, he 
never developed a theory of justice, as such.17 For all his shortcomings and 
his lack of systematising his theology properly, he definitely has left 
behind a legacy upon which his students and their students have built.  
Given a more positive understanding of the resurrection of Jesus, a 
deeper awareness of biblical exegesis, and a careful examination of 
                                                                                                                                           
Ronald Stone suggests that it is impossible to understand Niebuhr correctly without studying the 
development of his thought in a chronological manner: “Too often the chronological development of 
his tough has not been taken seriously enough. Niebuhr’s thought altered significantly though more 
than half a century of writing, and no interpretation of his though can neglect the chronology and 
remain accurate (Stone 1992:8).  
This study is not a chronological study of the development of love and justice in Niebuhr’s thought, 
but rather seeks to establish the link between love and justice and ultimately responsibility.  
 
17
 Emil Brunner criticizes Niebuhr of never working out a definition of justice: “[Niebuhr] has 
never worked out a clear concept of justice whereby the difference between the demands of justice and 
those of the supreme ethical norm of love might be understood” (1956:30).  
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the disciplines of the social sciences, it is possible to build on the 
theological foundation laid by Reinhold Niebuhr (Durkin 
1989:192). 
Niebuhr’s insights into justice were and are still profound. He always 
remained extremely contextual in his work, responding to social 
challenges rather than providing a grand theory. And it is possibly this 
that has contributed to the timelessness of his work; the very fact that it 
is so historically based. It does not provide a theory of justice applicable 
only in an unrealistic utopia, but it is grounded in reality and the 
experiences of the current social systems where it strives towards 
rectifying the injustices by making institutions and policies more just. 
This being said, it always bears in mind the eschatological hope, in which 
all things will be made perfect.  
 
For Niebuhr, the struggle for justice is as profound a revelation of the 
possibilities and limits of historical existence as is the quest for truth 
(1989:174). The boundaries in which justice is sought are being 
continually extended as global cooperation and dependence increases. 
Perfect justice would be a state of solidarity with no conflict of interests, 
but because people are a combination of vitality and reason, the social 
coherence of life can never be based on pure rationality (Niebuhr 
1989:174). The result of this is that our truth is never the truth; we are 
always subjective and prejudiced. There can be no universal rational 
standards of justice or neutrality in a social struggle. It is not only a 
matter of distribution that is important when speaking about justice, but 
it is also a question of the proper order and balance of power (Lebacqz 
1986:89) The centres of power are found in the political and economic 
spheres. When talking about justice, Niebuhr maintains that sinful people 
will never voluntarily give up their power and self-interest; much more so 
for groups or nations. For this reason, he believes that the struggle for 
justice will always be a struggle in the face of human sin and pride.18 
                                                 
18
 It is this sense of never-ending struggle which characterizes Niebuhr’s theology. His study of 
human history and human nature, his continuous search for a higher justice and a more equal justice 
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Nevertheless, the justice which has been achieved in society proves that 
people are not always only self-interested, even though injustice always 
remains a threat. People are able to synthesize opposing ideas and reach a 
solution which is tolerably just, which proves that they are capable of 
considering interests other than their own (Niebuhr 1943:249). Even 
without coercive force, people are capable of living together reasonably 
peacefully and can find a meeting point between opposing interests. It is 
necessary to find a balance between debilitating cynicism and idealistic 
utopia.  
 
Because of the social nature of humanity love is the primary law of nature 
and fraternity the fundamental requirement of social existence (Niebuhr 
1943:244). However, this perfection is unattainable because of the 
sinfulness of human nature and so justice remains a continual striving 
towards a state of perfect love and fraternity, but it will always lack the 
perfection of love; there will always be elements of love missing from 
justice. Niebuhr describes this as the dialectical nature between love and 
justice (1943:246). So while justice is, and must be, ever improved, it must 
also always remain aware of its own imperfections and shortcomings in 
relation to the perfection towards which it strives.  
 
It would be inappropriate to speak of Niebuhr’s theology without 
mentioning his view of feminism and the critique offered by feminist 
scholars. He never specifically campaigned for women but every now and 
again his work is littered with references to women. The Children of Light 
and the Children of Darkness offers one of few exceptions, where Niebuhr 
                                                                                                                                           
and all of his political writings are coloured by his sense of realism and the hope which springs from 
the Christian faith. “There is, Niebuhr concludes, no final answer to the problem of justice. Some 
political systems are better than others, and pragmatic choices must be made between them. Relative 
achievements of more justice, more equality, and more peace are, therefore, possible, if one’s 
commitments are firm and one’s policies tentative. History is always open to such relative progress, 
and it is this for which we should work. Catastrophe, however, is always possible, and every balance of 
power is a potential chaos. Thus we need an unflinching realism about our social world and especially 
about our own ambiguity within that world, an undiscouraged concern for more justice and a 
permanent (and so transcendent) principle of criticism and of hope” (Gilkey 2001b:49).  
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directly addresses the issue of feminism.19 His conceptions of sin and 
grace have been particularly problematic with regard to feminine 
perspectives and have borne the brunt of feminist criticism.20 Despite this, 
his acknowledgement of Ursula Niebuhr’s influence and indispensability 
to his work as well as her standing in society is perhaps testament to the 
choices he believed women had a right to make.  
 
With regard to religious pluralism, Niebuhr does not have much to say, 
although he makes the occasional reference to Jewish scholars and rabbis, 
and often draws comparisons between Christian and Protestant lines of 
thought.21 In the introduction to Man’s Nature and His Communities he 
writes about his “increasing devotion to the principles of religious 
                                                 
19
 “The truth in modern feminism came into history with some help from the errors of an inorganic 
and libertarian conception of the family and of an abstract rationalism which defied the facts of nature. 
The mother is biologically more intimately related to the child than the father. This fact limits 
vocational freedom of women; for it makes motherhood a more exclusive vocation than fatherhood, 
which is indeed no more than an avocation. The wider rights of women have been achieved in the 
modern period, partly by defying this limitation which nature places upon womanhood. But it is also a 
fact that human personality rises in indeterminate freedom over biological function. The right of 
women to explore and develop their capacities beyond their family function was unduly restricted in 
all previous societies. It was finally acknowledged in our society, partly because the bourgeois 
community had lost some of its appreciation of the organic integrity of the family. Had this error been 
prematurely suppressed, the new freedom of women would also have been suppressed. It must be 
added that the wisdom of the past which recognized the hazard to family life in the freedom of women, 
was not devoid of the taint of male “ideology.” The male oligarchy used fixed principles of natural law 
to preserve its privileges and powers against a new emergent in history” (Niebuhr 1944:76-77). 
 
20
 Judith Plaskow offers an insightful critique of how women’s experience can flesh-out Niebuhr’s 
theology. She suggests that he should have made use of his own critique of dominant relations in his 
theology. “Again and again in the course of this writings, Niebuhr reminds us that there are infinite 
possibilities for realizing the norm of love in all personal and social relations, and that the 
contradictions which hound every step in love’s direction must never become excuses for inaction. He 
devotes whole books to this theme and dozens of articles. His application of the quest for justice to the 
situation of women is sometimes ambivalent, but in his article on the ordination of women, in his 
response to Karl Barth, and in numerous scattered references throughout his thought, he demonstrates 
his awareness of women’s situation. If he argues that ‘a rationalistic feminism is undoubtedly inclined 
to transgress inexorable bounds set by nature,’ he also acknowledges that the effort to define these 
bounds will inevitably result in the incorporation of male arrogance into the standard. ‘The sinfulness 
of man makes it inevitable that a dominant class, group, and sex should seek to define a relationship, 
which guarantees its dominance, as permanently normative.’ Surely this lesson must be applied to his 
theology as well” (1980:93-94). 
 
21
 Niebuhr himself admits that he was long appreciative of Jewish thought: “My appreciation of the 
Jewish capacity for civic virtue and social justice was not a belated, but an early, insight. It was 
prompted partly by my experience with Jewish idealists in the political movements, left of center, in 
which I was engaged” (1965:17). He goes on to speak of the Catholic Church: “My increasing 
admiration for the Catholic faith had the same socially pragmatic prompting. Catholics, unlike many 
Protestants, never had any doubt about the social substance of human existence” (1965:19). 
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pluralism” and that non-believers should have the right to “convict the 
believers when faith is not fruitful of justice” (1965:27).  
 
3.2.3 Niebuhr’s Works 
 
Niebuhr’s first book, published in 1927, Does Civilization Need Religion? 
A study in the Social Resources and Limitation of Religion in Modern Life, 
was a direct outgrowth of his experiences in Detroit. This was followed by 
Leaves from the Notebook of a Tamed Cynic (1929), which is a collection 
of journal entries from his years as pastor rather than a theological work. 
Despite not being an academic work it does, however, contain many 
elements of the ideas which he expanded in his later works and is an early 
affirmation of an exceedingly sharp and critical mind.   
 
Moral Man and Immoral Society (1932) and Reflections at the end of an 
Era (1934) are far more political than they are sociological.22  Here too, it 
is clear that he is not yet overly critical of Marxism and sees this 
philosophy as offering much from which Western society could benefit, 
certainly far more than what capitalism could ever hope to achieve in 
establishing a just society.23 He criticises Protestantism for its lack of 
understanding of the human situation and he encourages a realistic view 
of both human life and politics. For Niebuhr, “a political morality is 
required and it must combine the insights of the political realist who 
accepts the necessity of coercion, and the moral idealist who wants to 
extend social intelligence and increase moral goodwill” (Durkin 1989:54). 
                                                 
22
 Niebuhr here is clearly a political theologian – if we can call him in these writings a ‘theologian’ 
at all! His only concern is the political (or social) life of humans and how that life can be made more 
just.  His interest in social theories, philosophy or religion is clearly subordinate to that central concern 
(Gilkey 1986:158). 
 
23
 Niebuhr always remained critical of capitalism and in his later years was very critical of Marxism 
(this was particularly after communism made its failings, and potential failings, apparent.) This said, 
however, Durkin argues that “Niebuhr did not reject Marxism; he never really embraced it in the first 
instance. The most that can be said is that for a time he held the view that the social ownership of the 
means of production was more conducive to social justice than to continue its private ownership 
(1989:188). 
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In An Interpretation of Christian Ethics (1935) Niebuhr returned “to the 
central ethical framework of Moral Man asking about the moral 
responsibility of Christians in the face of injustice” (Fox 1985:164) leaving 
behind the detachment which characterised Reflection at the End of an 
Era.  
 
Two years later he published Beyond Tragedy (1937), a collection of 
sermons, which attempted to show that “Christianity went beyond a 
merely tragic vision of human life” (Fox 1985:182). In the preface, Niebuhr 
states that “Christianity’s view of history is tragic insofar as it recognizes 
evil as an inevitable concomitant of even the highest spiritual enterprises. 
It is beyond tragedy inasfar as it does not regard evil as inherent in 
existence itself but as finally under the dominion of a good God.”  
 
The most systemised collection of Niebuhr’s thought is without a doubt 
the two volumes of The Nature and Destiny of Man (1941 and 1943), 
published after the Gifford lectures in Edinburgh. Here he employed a 
theological anthropology to explain history and human nature and it is his 
first attempt at some sort of systematization of his theology, although it is 
most certainly not systematic theology.  He never really developed a 
systematic theology, and it was probably never his intention to do so, 
since he was primarily an ethicist.24 But it becomes clear in his work that 
the crux of the issue is humanity’s relatedness to God, and it is this fact 
which is sorely missing from secular theories.25  It is here that the link 
between his anthropology and soteriology emerges. 
                                                 
24
 Reinhold Niebuhr’s interests were primarily in the arena of morality and politics in contrast to 
systematic theology. ... One finds almost no developed systematic attention, for example, to the Trinity 
or to salvation of individuals and of the world as one does in the thought of most historic Christian 
theologians (Gustafson 1986:30). 
 
25
 The key point of Niebuhr's understanding, the point to which this whole analysis has inevitably 
(though not necessarily) led, is that it is the relatedness to God of this self-transcendent creature that is 
crucial to the goodness or the health of the human being. And while both creatureliness and self-
transcendence are available to ordinary understanding – and illustrated in every philosophical account 
of human existence – the relatedness of self-transcendence to God is not so easily discernible. It is, 
therefore, in ignoring this dimension that secular views fail and end in one-sidedness, in confusion and 
contradiction, and above all in obscuring the facts of ordinary experience  (Gilkey 2001b:96). 
105 
 
In 1944, Niebuhr published The Children of Light and the Children of 
Darkness. He was very complacent about the “democratic processes in 
advanced industrial society.” Fox intimates that “had the younger 
Niebuhr reviewed The Children of Light he would have scoffed at its 
confidence in justice through adjustment, its belief that the debates of the 
“open society” operated equally in the interests of all” (1985:220) 
 
The theology from The Nature and Destiny of Man is further developed in 
Faith and History (1949) although the interpretation here is based very 
much on Niebuhr’s experiences during and immediately after WW II and 
the changes in society which were taking place. This was closely followed 
by The Irony of American History (1952) and Christian Realism and 
Political Problems published the following year.  
 
Niebuhr then began work on what he called his magnum opus. The Self 
and the Dramas of History (1955) is a comprehensive statement of 
Niebuhr’s theological method and purpose. It is an attempt to systematize 
his approach to theology” (Durkin 1989:164). 
The one constant feature of Niebuhr’s work is the theme that all 
knowledge must be situated ultimately in an ultra-rational 
framework. As his work developed he insisted that the primary 
myths of biblical religion, the creation, the fall, the atonement, and 
the Parousia, provided the substance for this ultra-rational 
framework (Durkin 1989:175). 
 
In one of his last works, Man’s Nature and His Communities: Essays on 
the Dynamics and Enigmas of Man’s Personal and Social Existence 
(1965), Niebuhr thanks his wife for the important influence she has had 
for his work. This book is an attempt to summarise his theology and to 
show how his thought had changed with regard to some important 
matters over the years.  
Although Niebuhr’s work may be criticised for a lack of systematic 
theology, and although he may not have left behind answers which are 
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pertinent to current social problems, he without doubt left behind a 
lasting legacy in his dynamic thoughts and social involvement.26  
 
3.3 Background to Niebuhr’s Christian Realism 
 
[A] free society prospers best in a cultural, religious and moral 
atmosphere which encourages neither a too pessimistic nor a too 
optimistic view of human nature (Niebuhr 1944). 
 
“Religious realism” or a “realistic theology” originated amongst a small 
group with ties to Yale Divinity School including both Richard and 
Reinhold Niebuhr (Lovin 1996:xii).27 This realism recognised the self-
interest of all individuals in society, thus rejecting the idealistic theories 
of liberalism and the social gospel.28 It perceived liberalism’s greatest 
faults to be sentimentality and optimism (Williams 1956:199). Although, 
this being said, Niebuhr was strongly influenced by both liberalism and a 
Protestant (in particular, Lutheran) background.29 While the regulative 
                                                 
26
 Niebuhr is often criticised for not developing a proper theology, included in this his ecclesiology 
and Christology. He is also criticised for misunderstanding the relationship between the Christian 
community and society. Niebuhr’s concept of sin has drawn much criticism, here also from feminist 
scholars. Niebuhr is criticised for his white, male perspective and not seeing the world through the eyes 
of the oppressed. For discussion of these criticisms, see the recently published Reinhold Niebuhr and 
Contemporary Politics: God and Power. Harries R. and Platten S. (eds).  
 
27
 Niebuhr gave the name “Christian realism” to his specific approach to theology. “[It] being with 
the obstacles to faith and charts its course by identifying the inadequate and mistaken views it must 
reject or move beyond. This negative, dialectical method set Niebuhr in opposition to much of the 
received wisdom of his time, yet he came to represent active, living Christian faith for many of his 
contemporaries, both in the church and in the worlds of politics and diplomacy” (Lovin 2007:ix-x). 
 
28
 Niebuhr was always strongly critical of the social gospel: “The Social Gospel made the mistake 
of assuming that the Christian could express his social responsibility merely by applying the love-
commandment to the larger, rather than to the more personal and intimate, relations of life. Its 
defective analysis of human nature made it oblivious to the relation of love to justice and to the factors 
of interest and power which must be reckoned with in any system of justice. In modern parlance, it 
lacked ‘realism’ ” (1968:127). 
  
29
 Rasmussen points out the inevitable influence of liberalism in Niebuhr’s work: “Liberalism as 
‘faith in man’ and ‘soft utopianism’ rejected, Niebuhr retained many fundamental elements of German 
theological and American religious and secular, liberalism.  … Niebuhr’s theological starting point 
was that of Protestant liberalism: human needs, powers, and responsibilities. His thought moved from 
human experience and historical consciousness into the knowledge of God, rather than the reverse 
(neo-orthodoxy’s emphatic preference)” (1989:25). 
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principles of his justice were the same as those of liberalism (namely 
equality and liberty), he did, however, disagree with both traditions on 
various issues. Niebuhr did not think that people or societies would, or 
could, conform to moral ideals which would make society more just (Moral 
Man and Immoral Society is based upon this realism). All people, 
according to him, are seeking more power, and power more often than not 
will lead to abuse and injustice.30 He later dismissed society’s dream of 
bringing the “whole of human history under the control of human will 
[because] no group of idealists can easily move the pattern of history 
toward the desired goal of peace and justice” (Niebuhr 1952:2-3). Some 
sort of coercion is always necessary in society to keep the selfish impulses 
in check because sin will always get in the way of achieving complete 
harmony in a community.31 Niebuhr’s Christian realism called people to 
“an active commitment to social and political action while holding that 
action under the sanction of divine judgement. There could be no peace for 
the Christian realist – only an occasional deep breath before the next in a 
never-ending series of re-examinations” (Fox 1986:22).   
                                                                                                                                           
Niebuhr’s view of liberalism is therefore not exclusively negative. “…the fundamental problems 
which Niebuhr sets out to solve are the characteristic problems of liberalism: The discovery of the 
meaning of the Bible beyond a literalistic orthodoxy, the establishment of the practice of tolerance, the 
relating of the Gospel to cultural movements and the search for its intelligibility in relation to human 
movements and the search for its intelligibility in relations to human experience, the discovery of the 
theological basis of democracy (Williams 1956:194). 
  
30
 Rasmussen defines Niebuhr’s realism as follows: “‘Realism’ certainly was a key category for 
Niebuhr. It means that while human nature exhibits both self-regarding and other-regarding, or social, 
impulses, the former are generally stronger than the latter. Moreover, self-regarding impulses are 
compounded in the lives of groups… A decent life in society, then, is not guaranteed ‘by a more 
perfect system of education or by a more ethically rigorous religion but only by a system of checks and 
balances that preserves unto each group a measure of power sufficient to weight effectively against 
that of any other group by which it might be maltreated’” (1989:21). 
 
31
 “Political strategy, therefore, always involves a combination of coercive and persuasive factors. 
Sentimental moralism which underestimates the necessity of coercion, and cynical realism which is 
oblivious to the possibilities of moral suasion are equally dangerous to the welfare of mankind. The 
former spends its energies in vain efforts to achieve a purely voluntary reorganization of society; the 
latter resorts to violent conflict and makes confusion worse confounded. The welfare of society 
demands that enough social intelligence and moral idealism be created to prevent social antagonism 
from issuing in pure conflict and that enough social pressure be applied to force reluctant beneficiaries 
of social privilege to yield their privileges before injustice prompts to vehemence. And violence.”  
(Niebuhr 1968:80-1). 
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In The Nature and Destiny of Man, Niebuhr identifies the human problem 
as refusing to accept the finitude of humanity. We are continuously living 
our lives by trying to break the boundaries and our freedom thus becomes 
one of the major stumbling blocks. We believe that perfectionism is within 
our grasp and it is this denial of our finitude that forms the basis of 
Niebuhr’s excursus on sin; as we seek more power, injustice increases. 
Man knows more than the immediate natural situation in which 
he stands, and he constantly seeks to understand his immediate 
situation in terms of a total situation. Yet he is unable to define 
the total human situation without colouring his definition with 
finite perspectives drawn from his immediate situation (Niebuhr 
1941:182) 
Niebuhr believes that the human situation was best described as anxious. 
Although our knowledge is temporally and spatially limited, we are aware 
of a certain transcendental element to life, and so anxiety becomes the 
“inevitable concomitant of the paradox of freedom and finiteness in which 
man is involved” (1941:182).32 This anxiety is closely related to the 
concept of “man as sinner” (this will be discussed in detail in the following 
section). This is a theme which echoes throughout the majority of his 
work. In The Irony of American History the emphasis is continually on 
the power which individuals and nations seek to achieve in history in 
order to fulfil their meaning within history. This view results in either 
utopian views of history or in very materialistic conceptions of human 
ends (Niebuhr 1952:6). Niebuhr cautions against placing all hope in 
democracy, because “no society, not even a democratic one, is great 
enough or good enough to make itself the final end of human existence” 
                                                 
32
 Niebuhr describes this situation as the tension between “man, being both free and bound, both 
limited and limitless” (1941:182).  Self-centeredness will always be the result – “all human life is 
involved in the sin of seeking security at the expense of other life. The perils of nature are thereby 
transmuted into the more grievous perils of human history. Or again: man’s knowledge is limited by 
time and place. Yet it is not as limited as animal knowledge. The proof that it is not so limited is given 
by the fact that man knows something of these limits, which means that in some sense he transcends 
them.”  
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(1944:133). He does, however, believe that democracy offers hope for a 
more just society, it must just not be confused with ultimate hope.33 
 
Sin is a refusal of human beings to accept their limitations, including the 
finiteness of their perspectives. We are continuously trying to convince 
ourselves that we have escaped from our human situation, denying its 
complexity and our inability to escape from it.  
“[They] pretend to have achieved a degree of knowledge which is 
beyond the limit of finite life. This is the ‘ideological taint’ in which 
all human knowledge is involved, and which is always something 
more than mere human ignorance. It is always partly an effort to 
hide that ignorance by retention” (1941:182). 
Niebuhr insists that we need to accept our incomprehension of the world 
and our lives in it rather than continually attempting to overcome it 
because our attempt to stand outside the world can never be plausible 
(1941:124). The only way we can attempt to find some sort of meaning for 
life is by searching outside of ourselves and being dependent upon a 
principle of comprehension which is beyond our comprehension (this will 
later be discussed more fully in the section on Niebuhr’s understanding of 
human nature and human destiny).  
 
In the introduction to The Nature and Destiny of Man, Lovin points out 
that “Christian Realism” is a “synthesis of political, moral and theological 
reflection, which the undeniability of human freedom and the in-
escapability of its limits are the twin realities that together form a 
framework for understanding both the multiplicity of our specific choices 
and the ultimate unity of the environment in which they all take place” 
(2001:xvi). Christians are called to live in the world, but not to be 
completely a part of it. This is a call to be responsible for what is 
happening in the world and it is this vocation which runs through 
Niebuhr’s work, be it academia or pastoral. For Niebuhr, faith and 
responsibility are inseparable. The very fact that we believe calls us to 
                                                 
33
 “Man's capacity for justice makes democracy possible; but man's inclination to injustice makes 
democracy necessary” (1944:xiii). 
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action and it is our faith that inspires hope within us that things can be 
different. Richard Fox describes Niebuhr’s faith as a matter of trust 
rather than belief, because 
(T)rue faith was ‘childlike in its single-heartedness’ while avoiding 
the ‘childish belief that God is on the side of the believer’. To 
believe in God was not to feel oneself chosen, set apart from other 
human beings by some eternal favour, but to feel oneself judged ... 
The Christian in Niebuhr’s view was called to be in the world but 
not entirely of it; in that unsettling tension Christians could live 
lives that were, as he put it to Will Scarlett, ‘full of grace and grief’ 
(Fox 1986:22). 
 
Niebuhr attempts to make sense of the anxiety and the lack of 
comprehension from which it arises in a theologically based method. This 
paradox between freedom and finiteness is not answered in many of the 
worldviews which Niebuhr examines, criticizes and discards because he 
feels adequate answers are lacking. Niebuhr’s lack of faith in human 
possibility seems at times to be pessimistic, rather than realistic, although 
his pessimism results in action rather than inaction. It appears that there 
can be no chance of improvement in history or at the very most only a 
slight improvement, because of the continual self-centredness of humans 
and the abuse of power driven by self-interestedness. It is Niebuhr’s 
contention that society fails to understand the twofold character of human 
life in nature – both its finiteness and transcendence or the resulting sin 
of “self-sufficient efforts to escape from the weakness, dependence and 
insufficiency of the human situation” as a result of this misunderstanding 
(Niebuhr 1943:53). He insists that we must “toss aside the ‘halo of moral 
sanctity’” and “disenthrall ourselves from the self-aggrandizing parable” 
in which we are the makers of our own salvation (Bacevich 2007:xiii). 
In the introduction to Moral Man and Immoral Society Niebuhr states 
that all classes and nations are only acting for their own power, wealth 
and security. The actions may be intentioned to retain wealth and power 
or to gain it, but it is always self-interested, no matter how universal the 
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values behind the actions may seem (1932:XIV). And this self-
interestedness becomes even more acute when talking about classes. 
 “No complex society will be able to dispense with certain 
inequalities of privilege. Some of them are necessary for the proper 
performance of certain social functions; and others (though this is 
not so certain) may be needed to prompt energy and diligence in 
the performance of important functions. But rational privilege 
must be related to function and to the capacity to perform it. If 
such a principle is incompatible with complete equalitarianism, it 
is equally incompatible with the preservation of class privileges. 
Privileged classes are maintained by the inheritance of privileges 
without regard to individual capacities for exploiting them for the 
common good” (Niebuhr 1932:128 my italics).  
For Niebuhr, injustice springs from this selfishness of individuals, nations 
and classes and their desire to maintain their power and superiority. In 
seeking to maintain their power, other nations, people or individuals lose 
their place in the harmony of society and their powerlessness becomes the 
source of the injustice which is committed against them (Niebuhr 
1937:102).  
 
It is realism, a not quite pessimistic or cynical view of humanity and 
history, which is supposed to counter the optimism of culture and politics. 
Niebuhr quotes Machiavelli on realism: “Realism is to “follow the truth of 
the matter rather than the imagination of it; for many have pictures of 
republics and principalities which have never been seen.” While idealism 
may be defined by its proponents as an attempt to “bring self-interest 
under the discipline of a more universal law and in harmony with a more 
universal good,” its critics accuse it of ignoring, or at least being 
indifferent to, “the forces in human life which offer resistance to 
universally valid ideals and norms” (Niebuhr 1989:120-121). Niebuhr 
believed that too much faith was being placed in liberalism and 
technology. He quite scathingly referred to the  
romantic overestimate of human virtue and moral capacity, 
current in our modern middle-class culture, [which] does not 
always result in an unrealistic appraisal of present social facts… 
[but] nevertheless a considerable portion of middle-class culture 
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remains quite unrealistic in its analysis of the contemporary 
situation. It assumes that evidences of a growing brotherliness 
between classes and nations are apparent in the present moment 
(1932:xx). 
 
Having an optimistic view of society will not do much to further justice. 
The limits of society should be accepted so that the sentimentality can be 
removed from justice. Niebuhr’s approach to theology ensured that he 
entered into dialogue with many participants of varying faiths and 
academic disciplines.34 Lovin describes the interaction between faith and 
moral obligation, which formed a central part of Niebuhr’s Christian 
realism as not always being dependent upon God. It is not necessary to 
base moral obligations upon “divine commands or an ultimate center of 
value. Rather, God provides a reality in which a comprehensive unity of 
moral meanings is conceivable” (Lovin 1995:67). Because of the possibility 
of separating God and morality, Niebuhr was also relevant outside of 
Christian circles. 
 
3.4 Human Nature and Human Destiny  
 
Niebuhr’s anthropological discourse is most commonly explained in his 
view of human nature and human destiny.35 To explain this simply, 
human nature describes people before salvation. Human destiny refers to 
the “possibilities for humanity as a result of salvation” (De Gruchy 
                                                 
34
 “The minimal answer is that a moral and theological realism of the sort that Reinhold Niebuhr 
elaborates demonstrates that religious thinking need not be dogmatic or divisive and that when it is not, 
it can be admitted to the public discussion along with all the other participants” (Lovin 1995:55). 
 
35
 Gilkey discusses Niebuhr’s view on human nature and destiny and points out how intricately 
they are intertwined with his thoughts on justice: “In Niebuhr’s earlier political writing two 
‘theological’ subjects steadily seemed to gain prominence: the nature of human being on the one hand 
and the character and meaning of history on the other. These two questions are for him deeply 
intertwined: if we would undergird the hope for justice in an unjust world, we must understand the 
sources for the pervasive patterns of human social behaviour in the structure of human being... The 
questions of social justice (Niebuhr’s abiding passion) – immediately involves the questions of the 
nature of human being and the nature of history; in the context of justice, neither can be explored 
without the other” (2001:142-43). 
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1992:25). Real, lived life (human nature) is continually contrasted with 
the ideal life (human destiny) in The Nature and Destiny of Man. Niebuhr 
is possibly best remembered for his emphasis on sin and human nature. 
Sin is not a mistake. It is, rather, a “deliberate misuse of the freedom that 
is our image of God in an effort to deny the reality of our human 
limitation” (Lovin 2007:xii). This abuse of freedom and freewill forms an 
important part of Niebuhr’s call to responsibility and is inseparable from 
his view of human destiny.36 Although much of his theological 
anthropology is concerned with human nature, his conviction of the 
responsibility of each individual is born out of his commitment to human 
destiny. Because of the cross of Christ, Niebuhr believed we are called to 
live in an ethically responsible manner:  
A very good case could be made, I think, for claiming that Reinhold 
Niebuhr was driven to his abiding vocational concern for Christian 
ethics because his understanding of the nature of salvation was 
what it was. Niebuhr understood the work of God in Christ as 
God’s decisive participation in the historical process. This is not 
however the participation of a divine omnipotence which sets aside 
every obstacle. It is the participation of a suffering love which 
alters the world, not through power but through solidarity with 
suffering humility (Hall 1986:198 my italics). 
 
Human nature admits what a person is; human destiny recognizes what a 
person can become. The fact that humanity is created in the image of God 
sets the Christian view of humanity apart from all alternative views 
because it insists on recognising and accepting our weakness, dependence 
and finiteness and that evil prevents us from this: 
it emphasizes the height of self-transcendence in man’s spiritual 
stature... it insists on man’s weakness, dependence, and finiteness, 
on his involvement in the necessities and contingencies of the 
natural world, without, however, regarding this finiteness as, of 
itself, a source of evil in man... It affirms that the evil in man is a 
consequence of his inevitable though not necessary unwillingness 
to acknowledge his dependence, to accept his finiteness and to 
                                                 
36
 Niebuhr’s views of human nature and human destiny are often separately discussed. However, 
they are closely related and should not really be studied separately and one should not be given 
precedence over the other, since they are closely intertwined. See Robin Lovin’s Reinhold Niebuhr for 
a rich discussion resulting from examining nature and destiny together. 
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admit his insecurity, an unwillingness which involves him in the 
vicious circle of accentuating the insecurity from which he seeks to 
escape (Niebuhr 1941:150 my italics). 
 
For Niebuhr, history culminates and ends in the Cross (1941:164). It is 
here that the perfect love of Christ ends. It is here that the finite attempts 
to understand the transcendental, for the only way we can know infinite is 
from the recognition of the “finiteness of the self and of its involvement in 
all the relativities and contingencies of nature and history” (1941:170). 
Death is what ultimately distinguishes the “majesty of God and the 
weakness and dependence of man as creature” (1941:174). It is the 
expectation of Christ in human history that sets a religious view apart 
from other philosophies. “Prophetic faith finds meaning within history, 
because history is where people encounter God and find direction for their 
lives and actions. That is what Niebuhr means by ‘destiny’” (Lovin 
2007:25).  
 
The fact that Jesus, the Christ, was the suffering servant and not the 
majestic king who freed his people from bondage is crucial to Niebuhr’s 
development of human destiny. If anything, the crucifixion and 
resurrection point to the meaninglessness that is found, unchangeable, 
within history and the transcendence of the final justice and love. The 
answer to the problems of sin and injustice are found neither in history 
nor in our actions, but beyond history, in a prophetic religion and it is this 
expectation of a Messiah which sets Christianity apart from other 
philosophies and religions.37  Niebuhr later says that “the wisdom and the 
                                                 
37
 “Historic religions are by their very nature prophetic-Messianic. They look forward at first to a 
point in history and finally towards an eschaton (end) which is also the end of history, where the full 
meaning of life and history will be disclosed and fulfilled… The basic distinction between historical 
and non-historical religions and cultures may thus be succinctly defined as the difference between 
those which expect and those which do not expect a Christ. A Christ is expected wherever history is 
regarded as potentially meaningful but as still awaiting the full disclosure and fulfillment of its 
meaning” (Niebuhr 1943:4).  
Niebuhr compares the different religious views (where a Christ is expected to where a Christ is not 
expected) in great detail in the first chapter of the second volume of The Nature and Destiny of Man. 
On the one hand, the weakness of humanity is accepted, on the other, life is a continual denial and 
rejection of the incompleteness of life on this earthy. “The real problem of history is the proud 
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power in Christ is what gives life its meaning and guarantees the 
fulfilment of that meaning” (1943:55). It is in the Cross that the divine 
involvement in history is portrayed, where the divine transcendence over 
the structures of history becomes a part of history (Niebuhr 1943:71). 
Thus it is here that the paradox of history and the eternal is revealed, the 
paradox which we, in our finiteness, are constantly trying to understand 
and which in our sinfulness we are constantly trying to overcome. 38  
  
But the sin which results from attempts to overcome our finiteness is not 
the only option and is not the way it has to be. “In his major works, 
Niebuhr’s purpose is always to give Christians a way of thinking that will 
enable responsible moral choices” (Lovin 2007:23). Despite the 
hopelessness of the human condition and inevitability of sin, it is still 
possible to choose differently. Without being idealistic (we need to always 
be realistic about our limitations) and without thinking that we can 
change the world by “asking what Jesus would do,” thinking we can do 
nothing is just as harmful. Sometimes the responsibility we bear is 
making a decision between greater and lesser evils.  
 
It is Christ’s love which reveals to us how good and evil are mixed up in 
society. Judgment does not stand at the end of history or within it. 
“Judgment reveals the reality of human nature, with its mixture of divine 
image and human sin, at every point within history” (Lovin 2007:27). 
There is always a contradiction between goodness and false completions; 
striving and achievement, virtue and wisdom are always seeking for 
something more than they have, but this will always be beyond our reach.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
pretension of all human endeavors, which seeks to obscure their finite and partial character and thereby 
involves history in evil and sin” (25). The differing views of the destiny of man affect the sinfulness of 
life (cf. the nature of man and the sins of pride and sensuality).  
 
38
 Niebuhr describes this paradox by reference to the agape of God: “The agape of God is thus at 
once the expression of both the final majesty of God and of His relation to history” and later “…it can 
neither be reduced to the limits of history, nor yet dismissed as irrelevant because it transcends 
history… it is the final norm of a human nature which has no final norm in history because it is not 
completely contained in history” (Niebuhr 1943:71-75).   
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3.5 Sin and Injustice 
 
Niebuhr’s doctrine of sin, if it can be called a doctrine, is essential to a 
discussion of his justice because it is closely related to his views of 
injustice.39 If injustice is the result of domination and oppression, then the 
sin which is at the root of injustice is a person’s refusal to accept their 
mortality and attempt to escape their finitude in some way.  
The distinctively Christian doctrine [is] that sin has its source not 
in temporality but in man’s wilful refusal to acknowledge the finite 
and determinate character of his existence... (1941:177). 
It is necessary to be aware of this rebellion and accept the fragmentary 
nature of life.  
According to the Christian faith, life is and always will be 
fragmentary, frustrating, and incomplete. It has intimations of a 
perfection and completeness which are not attainable by human 
power (Christianity and Society. Autumn 1949:3). 
 
Niebuhr’s understanding of human sin begins with his conception of evil 
and the devil. The outside source of evil is what causes humanity to 
falsely interpret human finiteness and freedom (1941:180). The context in 
which humanity is tempted to this misinterpretation is “the fact that man 
is a finite spirit, lacking identity with the whole, but yet a spirit capable  
in some sense of envisaging the whole, so that he easily commits the error 
of imagining himself the whole which he envisages” (1941:181). In Beyond 
Tragedy¸ Niebuhr describes the ego as “sin in its quintessential form” 
(1937:11). Here he describes sin as either the human attempt to make 
their life rather than God the centre of existence or as life being centered 
around one impulse. In trying to overcome the finitude of life, we end up 
transgressing the limits of life. “Therefore all human life is involved in the 
sin of seeking security at the expense of other life. The perils of nature are 
                                                 
39
 “For Niebuhr, the imperfection of any human achievement of justice was based on his 
understanding of human sin. Justice was an approximation of “brotherhood” under conditions of sin. 
Precisely because it remains surrounded by conditions of sin, it can never achieve true brotherhood 
(Lebacqz 1987:142-143).” She goes on to point out how problematic such a view might be for us today 
because human mutuality and cooperation are present in society. People do accept a sense of 
community and do not act entirely out of selfishness.  
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thereby transmuted into the more grievous perils of human history” 
(1941:182). Our view of life is limited by history; and our immediate 
situation colours all our interpretations of history. He was critical of 
“moralistic Christianity” which encourages “the assumption that men are 
as good as the ideals of justice and love which they entertain” (1941:279). 
Niebuhr took seriously the imperfection of humanity, and the tendency 
towards sin, particularly where human pride and sensuality are 
concerned.40  
 
Niebuhr sees sin as the result of our insecurity with our finiteness and the 
constant attempt to overcome this supposed weakness to control our own 
destiny.41 Thus we either simply refuse to accept our finiteness or we 
imagine ourselves to be God. Our pretension of being God is possible 
because we are created in the image of God; thus we have the capacity for 
self-transcendence which permits us to see our finite existence under its 
eternal essence. While we do not “envisage reality widely enough to 
comprehend the actual center of life” we also “protest against [our] 
finiteness by seeking to make [ourselves] infinite” (Niebuhr 1935:87). 
Niebuhr, in a later work, writes that “we fall into sin by trying to evade or 
to conquer death or our own insignificance, of which death is the ultimate 
symbol” (Niebuhr 1956:6).  This sin is manifested in pride (in its different 
forms of power, knowledge and virtue (of which the Church bears the 
                                                 
40
 The gospel should convict each person of their sinfulness. “To profess a gospel of love without 
letting that gospel convict each one of us of sinful selfishness means merely that we will suffer from 
the illusion that our actions have been brought into conformity with the ideal we profess, when in 
reality our ideal merely obscures the ethically indifferent character of our motives. The gospel of love 
and holiness has been at war with the immediate impulses of human nature from the very beginning. It 
is not maintained that a new malice has entered the human heart in our age which would make the 
preaching of repentance more needed than in other ages. But it is probably true that selfishness 
expresses itself in greed and in the lust for power more unrestrainedly in our civilization than in any 
other” (Niebuhr 1959:71). 
 
41
 Niebuhr describes this modern secularism as containing “an implicit or explicit self-glorification 
and deification in the sense described in the letter to the Romans. Humanistic rationalism, forgetting 
that human reason as well as human physical existence is a derived, dependent, created and finite 
reality, makes it into a principle of interpretation f the meaning of life; and believes that its gradual 
extension is the guarantee of the ultimate destruction of evil in history. It mistakes the image of God in 
man for God Himself” (1986: 80-1).  
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brunt of responsibility) and sin as sensuality. Niebuhr claimed that all 
power results in pride and injustice, because with power, we forget that 
we are finite and do not control our destiny: 
All power leads to pride and injustice; to the pride of “them that 
despise me,” the pride of men who have forgotten that they are 
creatures and that no creaturely human strength is strong enough 
to make nature purely the servant of man rather than his nemesis; 
to the injustice of those who create their security at the expense of 
the security and freedom of others. ... The achievements of science 
and technics have beguiled us into a false complacency. We have 
forgotten the frailty of man (Niebuhr 1937:100). 
 
3.5.1 The Sin of Pride 
 
For Niebuhr, the sin of pride is inseparable from the injustices in our 
society. The superiority of power, knowledge and virtue leads to the 
oppression, suppression and abuse of others in the attempt to save the self 
from becoming finite.42 Niebuhr distinguishes between three types of 
pride:43 pride of power, pride of knowledge and pride of virtue (1941:188). 
This sin is inseparable from some form of deceit. Our pride, which 
develops to a certain extent from our self-love, needs to deceive itself 
about the love which it deserves. Self-deception precedes the deceit of 
others (we need to firstly convince ourselves of our importance (over and 
                                                 
42
 Fox believes that Niebuhr “was a deep believer in the sin of pride because he was so sensitive to 
his own. There was nothing he hated more than pretentiousness – unless it was passivity.” This was a 
man with “enormous ambition” and “extraordinary talent” who had “the wisdom to detect the subtle 
spread of self-satisfaction” (1985:67). If Fox is correct, it could explain the privileged place given to 
pride in Niebuhr’s doctrine of sin.  
Mark Lovatt has suggested that Niebuhr’s theology is “an attempt to provide a Christian answer to 
the existence of human evil. … Niebuhr begins his theology ‘from below’ with the problem of evil, 
and takes Christian (and non-Christian) concepts to make sense of the situation with which he is 
concerned. He then returns to the world at large to offer his insight, engaging with issues using the 
arsenal of resources he has accumulated. … by allowing his theological agenda to be set in this way, 
rather than beginning with biblical analysis, or careful consideration of Christian tradition, his theology 
develops unsystematically, and in a way which some see as being at odds with orthodox theology. This 
emerges in the way he allows his understanding of sin as will-to-power to dominate his thinking” 
(2001:190). This led to a second outcome, that “theology becomes a matter of ethics. How are we to 
act, as Christians, in response to the will-to-power” (192). 
 
43
 The Biblical and distinctively Christian conception of sin as pride and self-love is related by 
Niebuhr to the “observable behavior of men” (1941:188). 
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against our finitude) before we can convince others of our superiority).  
But the self never quite believes this deception; if others accept the 
deception it becomes easier for the self to obscure the truth and deny the 
insecurity which causes the self-deception in the first place. 
 
The pride of power refuses to accept the limitations and finite character of 
humanity and the “ego assumes its self-sufficiency and self-mastery.”  
Pride does not only use power as a means to an end, but power also has 
pride as its end. Although it is prompted on the one hand by our refusal to 
acknowledge the finite character of life, it is also a denial of this finite 
character – an attempt to avoid the insecurity which is created by the lack 
of control of life. “The first form of the pride of power is particularly 
characteristic of individuals and groups whose position is, or seems to be, 
secure” (Niebuhr 1941:189).44 Any attempt of an insecure people to obtain 
security through pride of power will come at the expense of other people 
and of nature. Nations and individuals attempt to deny their insecurity by 
“arrogating a greater degree of power to the self” (1941:190). 
 
Niebuhr views greed as a particularly obvious ‘modern’  sin because 
technology has given people a false sense of security of what power they 
can achieve and leads to the overestimation of the elimination of 
insecurity. Physical comfort and security is the final good which people 
desire, but the degree to which this can be achieved is beyond human 
possibilities, although few would admit this (Niebuhr 1941:191). As we 
will see, the failure of modernity and other worldviews to meet the 
expectations of people is severely criticized by Niebuhr. The hope which 
they give is false because the finitude of life cannot be forgotten and 
brushed aside.  
 
                                                 
44
 Niebuhr’s footnote refers to the situation of both Great Britain and Germany. In the case of Great 
Britain, the sense of security was too great which prevented it from taken proper precautions and 
defending itself, and Germany’s “maniacal will-to-power” developed from its inner insecurity due to 
the inferiority (1941:189).  
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Greed is a vicious cycle because in the end, the more we have, be it power, 
political control, business interests or wealth, the greater our fear of 
losing it. Pride is the sin of the rich and powerful because they have the 
most to fear by losing something.45 The power and the resulting injustice 
of this power are not necessarily, or only, the triumph over nature and 
self, but they are tightly woven with the insecurities of finiteness, 
weakness and dependence, and the desire and need to eliminate these 
insecurities and it is the resulting “...disproportion of power in society 
[which] is the real root of social injustice” (Niebuhr 1932:163).  
 
                                                 
45
 “The more man establishes himself in power and glory, the greater is the fear of tumbling from 
his eminence, or losing his treasure, or being discovered in his pretension. Poverty is a peril to the 
wealthy but not to the poor. Obscurity is feared, not by those who are habituated to its twilight but by 
those who have become accustomed to public acclaim. Nor is this sense of insecurity of the powerful 
and the great to be wholly discounted as being concerned with mere vanities. Life’s basic securities are 
involved in the secondary securities of power and glory. The tyrant fears not only the loss of his power 
but the possible loss of his life. The powerful nation, secure against its individual foes, must fear the 
possibility that its power may challenge its various foes to make common cause against it. The person 
accustomed to luxury and ease actually meets a greater danger to life and mere existence in the 
hardships of poverty than those who have been hardened by its rigors. The will-to-power is thus an 
expression of insecurity even when it has achieved end which, from the perspective of an ordinary 
mortal, would seem to guarantee complete security” (1941:193-194).  
Niebuhr is criticized by feminist scholars as neglecting to consider sin from an inferior feminine 
perspective. Daphne Hampson says that “the problem women have is not with pride, but that they have 
not yet even begun to find themselves. I find Niebuhr’s discussion of sin as pride is inappropriate for 
women” (1986:50). She quotes Judith Vaughn, who criticises Niebuhr for failing to understand “those 
powerless ones who must proudly claim power in order to become more human.” Sin is thus not only 
the “refusal to relinquish power but also the refusal to claim it.  
It is not only the feminists who are critical of Niebuhr. He is accused of seeing seeing the world 
through a white, male, North American middle-class lens. This was the circle in which he 
moved: “Niebuhr’s experience and perspective, and the circles in which he moved, were largely North 
Atlantic, largely white, largely male and certainly those of the influential” (Rasmussen 1989:33). This 
is, undeniably, the circle in which he moved and much of the criticism is valid. It is not my intention to 
get into a debate with his critics here, but rather to mention he criticism that is levelled against him. It 
has been suggested that he did not realize the extreme difficulty of mobilizing oppressed people who 
had lost all dignity to action. Niebuhr has relatively little to say about the common and terrible places 
where “frustration is so oppressive that it is hard to awaken people to action; where the development of 
some pride, or at least self-respect, is painfully difficult; where apathy day in and day out is a greater 
enemy than the fanaticism that occasionally breaks out; where progress depends less upon shattering 
vain ambition than upon overcoming hopelessness. He has less to say about defeatism than about 
vanity, about indifference than fanaticism” (Roger Shinn, The New Humanism. quoted in Rasmussen 
1989:32-33) 
Such criticism does not make Niebuhr’s work any less worthy. It does, however, perhaps open our 
eyes to the extremely complicated nature of injustice. Though it might be easy enough to speak out for 
the disadvantaged and oppressed, we may, as some accuse Niebuhr of doing, never understand them 
enough to incorporate them into our theology.  
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Intellectual pride refers to human knowledge which always “pretends to 
be more true than it is” (Niebuhr 1941:194). No knowledge can be final 
and ultimate; it is always tainted by our particular perspective and 
experience. Despite that knowledge is finite knowledge, it pretends to be 
infinite. Every generation believes it has arrived at the final truth, only to 
be disappointed that the cure for human finiteness has not yet been 
discovered. But it is also more complicated than this: 
[I]ntellectual pride is something more than the mere ignorance of 
ignorance. It always involves, besides, a conscious or subconscious 
effort to obscure a known or partly known taint of interest 
(Niebuhr 1941:195). 
It is far easier to recognise the limitations of others, than to recognise 
one’s own limitations. To be able to be so objective in thinking is a rare 
gift. It is only by recognising and admitting ineptitude that our truth will 
never be confused with the truth and it is only then that we can actually 
make progress and remain humble at the same time. Intellectual pride 
went far beyond this discussion of sin for Niebuhr. It characterized the 
very essence of his realism; for we need to always know that we never 
actually discover the truth; rather, what we believe to be truth can (and 
probably will) be ever-changing. Thus a lifetime is spent in search of a 
better truth, a better way of living, and a higher justice.  
 
The intellectual pride of refusing to admit other truths is closely related to 
moral pride which is revealed in self-righteousness; that is seeing our 
good as being the good. Any standards which do not conform to our own 
standards are regarded as “bad”, or “evil”, to use Niebuhr’s terminology.46  
Both intellectual and moral pride are the basis of the prejudice which in 
turn leads to the injustices of our society – the superiority of one race or 
one nation (or even one person) over another. Each person needs to be 
                                                 
46
 “When the self mistakes its standards for God’s standards it is naturally inclined to attribute the 
very essence of evil to non-conformists… Moral pride is the pretension of finite man that his highly 
conditioned virtue is the final righteousness and that his very relative moral standards are absolute. 
Moral pride thus makes virtue the very vehicle of sin…” (Niebuhr 1941:199).  
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aware of their own sin and not assume themselves to be less of a sinner 
than their neighbour and fellow human being: 
 The sinner who justifies himself does not know God as judge and 
does not need God as Saviour... [The sin of self-righteousness] is 
responsible for our most serious cruelties, injustices and 
defamations against our fellowmen. The whole history of racial, 
national, religious and other social struggles is a commentary on 
the objective wickedness and social miseries which result from self-
righteousness (Niebuhr 1994a:200 my italics). 
 
The injustice which results from moral pride and the injustice which 
results from spiritual pride (which also results in prejudice and 
superiority) are almost inseparable. The idea that our salvation, our 
righteousness and our standards are ultimate and superior cause us to no 
longer regard ourselves as judged by Christ, but to become Christ’s judge 
in this world. Niebuhr regards religious class domination as the worst 
form of class domination with the worst form of intolerance being religious 
intolerance, “in which the particular interests of the contestants hide 
behind religious absolutes” (Niebuhr 1994a:201). As soon as we consider 
ourselves more righteous than others, we are guilty of the sin of self-
righteousness. Instead of judging others, we need to be aware that a 
religion of revelation means that through the voice of God we discover 
that our highest is short of the highest and that it is dishonest to claim 
that our highest is the highest (1941:203).  
 
This individual pride is true of nations (or any social unit for that matter) 
as well. The nation sees itself as all-powerful and omnipotent, “the nation 
pretends to be God” (Niebuhr 1941:212). In a group, individuals are given 
an opportunity to lose themselves and at the same time it offers them a 
chance improve their confidence and deny their finiteness. “In its whole 
range pride of family to pride of nation, collective egotism and group pride 
are a more pregnant source of injustice and conflict than purely individual 
pride” (Niebuhr 1941:213). The sense of belonging and the pride which 
develops from this will convince people to follow the rules and adhere to 
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the claims laid out by the group, rules and claims which are often not 
justified, but seek only to protect the self-interest of the group (especially 
when it feels threatened).  
 
Individuals will look for security from belonging to a group. They will seek 
some sense of permanency and infinitude from their associations when 
they cannot find this security in their own life. This does not have to be 
negative, though. It is from our sense of community and our involvement 
and interaction with others in a positive way, that society can develop and 
individuals can learn to take responsibility and behave in a way which is 
life-affirming.  
 
3.5.2 Sin as sensuality 
 
Niebuhr’s view of sin as sensuality can easily be misunderstood. It is not 
referring only to sexual sins, but rather to a lifestyle which includes a 
range of actions and relationships in which the self seeks to find itself.47 
                                                 
47
 Niebuhr defines sensuality very broadly, but it is precisely this broad definition which Judith 
Plaskow (1980) claims he ignores. This is because if he were to take seriously his own broader 
definition of sensuality “it would be very difficult for him to insist on pride as the primary human sin.” 
It is precisely this primacy of pride in Niebuhr’s work that his doctrine of sin fails to take account of 
women’s experience. “The problem is not simply that Niebuhr subordinates sensuality to pride. The 
flaw in his doctrine of sin lies in the fact that, in subordinating sensuality, he loses sight of it as a 
significant human sin and one independent of pridefulness” (Plaskow 1980:63)  
It is sensuality, rather than pride, that might be the primary female sin: “…women’s experiences 
are continually shaped and formed by social expectation, and that these expectations present 
themselves as “natural” and “proper.” … The roles which women traditionally have been assigned 
seem to be more clearly dictated by their biological nature than male roles are dictated by “male 
nature.” These expectations concerning women’s experience are relevant to Niebuhr’s doctrine of sin 
because they predispose women to certain life patterns. Women are steered toward certain functions 
from the time they are born and taught to see these functions as expressing their true female nature. It 
would not be surprising, therefore, if the particular sin of women were the adoption of society’s view 
of themselves to the detriment of their freedom. It would not be surprising, in other words, if sensuality 
and not pride were the primary female sin” (Plaskow 1980:64).  
Plaskow suggests that the perspective of a women’s experience (particularly pregnancy and 
motherhood) can also make creatureliness more positive, rather than the negative light in which 
Niebuhr depicts it. “Human finitude, while not evil, and while necessarily recognized and respected, is 
definitely an unpleasant fact for Niebuhr, one which sets boundaries to human freedom but does not 
endow it with any positive content” (Plaskow 1980:69-72). Added to this, his “language of self-
sacrifice conflicts with personhood and becomes destructive when it suggests that the struggle to 
become a centered self, to achieve full independent selfhood, is sinful. In this case, theology is not 
irrelevant to women’s situation but rather serves to reinforce women’s servitude. It becomes another 
voice in the chorus of external expectation defining and confining the way women ought to live” 
(Plaskow 1980:87). 
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These actions and relationships are “larger than [the people] themselves, 
so that their freedom is completely absorbed by the demands and 
possibilities offered by some limited good that becomes the object of their 
complete devotion” (Lovin 2007:17). Whereas pride attempts to take 
control of destiny, sensuality gives itself over to whatever may be on offer.  
 
Niebuhr begins by questioning the relationship of sensuality to selfishness 
and self-love. He maintains that sensuality is, in fact, both a form of sin 
and an extension of selfishness. “If selfishness is the destruction of life’s 
harmony by the self’s attempt to centre life around itself, sensuality would 
seem to be the destruction of harmony within the self, by the self’s undue 
identification with and devotion to particular impulses and desires within 
itself. The sins of self sensuality...have always been subject to a sharper 
and readier social disapproval than the more basic sin of self-love” 
(1941:228). Sensuality is often an escape from the self – “the self, finding 
itself to be inadequate as the centre of its existence, seeks for another god 
amidst the various forces, processes and impulses of nature over which it 
ostensibly presides” (1941:234).  
 
Society often attempts to reduce life to sensuality, to systems and orders 
that are immediately available to the senses. There is a surplus of 
solutions on offer today to help people find their meaningful existence in 
the world. Instead of seeking salvation outside of history, salvation is 
offered within history. Lovin sees Niebuhr as recasting “the classical view 
as a version of the prideful denial of finitude, while modern scientific 
accounts of history and nature seem often to accept the sensual solution of 
reducing human life to systems and processes that are immediately 
available to the senses” (2007:17). 
 
How much of this sensuality is reflected in injustice? It makes a 
perversion and mockery of the fact that some people have so much and 
others have so little. Our lives are too often governed by our status 
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symbols which makes us protective of what we have, and afraid of what 
we can lose. All forms of fanaticism can probably fall under this category 
too, in the sense that complete and often irrational dedication to a 
worldview is an attempt to escape from the world.48 Niebuhr cautions 
against the danger of any view, perceived to be the absolute truth, as 
leading to disaster: 
Rationalistic humanism…forgets the finiteness and creatureliness 
of man. It does not subject human righteousness to a transcendent 
righteousness, the righteousness of God. Thus it tempts men to “go 
about establishing their own righteousness” and finally 
degenerates into a fanaticism more grievous than that of dogmatic 
religion (1937:237).  
In accepting that our truth is never the only truth, we open ourselves to 
dialogue which in turn will give us the opportunity to find the elements of 
truth in various positions and philosophies. Niebuhr says that “there is an 
element of truth in each position which becomes falsehood, precisely when 
it is carried through too consistently. The element of truth in each creed is 
required to do full justice to man’s real situation. For man transcends the 
social and historical process sufficiently to make it possible and necessary 
deliberately to contrive common ends of life, particularly the end of 
justice” (Niebuhr 1952:107-08).  
 
3.5.3 Justitia Originalis 
 
Niebuhr related the sin of pride to the inferiority which people feel in the 
face of their finitude, and the desire to establish power over others to 
                                                 
48
 Lovin supplements Niebuhr’s account of sin by adding what he calls “institutional sin” which 
demands commitments from people and in so doing removes certain choices and responsibilities from 
them. “Perhaps the most important point at which Niebuhr’s account of sin needs to be supplemented, 
however, is in the delineation of institutional sources of sensuality. In addition to the pride and 
collective egotism of groups that is expressed in totalitarian politics or imperialistic foreign politics, we 
must also identify a form of institutional sin that elicits sensuality or sloth from persons by demanding 
commitments that preclude responsible attention to the range of choices and responsibilities that they 
ought to be attending to for themselves. ... The rising executive or scholar abandons the difficult 
balancing of obligations that marks a life of freedom constrained by human finitude, and substitutes a 
single set of goals defined by outside authorities. ... The over-achiever stills anxiety in precisely the 
way that Niebuhr describes the sensual evasion, ‘by finding a god in a person or process outside the 
self’” (Lovin 1995:150). 
126 
 
diminish this feeling of powerlessness. He goes on to claim that the sin of 
pride and of self-love points to a lack of trust in God because the self seeks 
to “establish itself independently... [and] seeks to find its life and thereby 
loses it” (1941:252). Elsewhere he says “human life points beyond itself. 
But it must not make itself into that beyond. That were to commit the 
basic sin of man” (1941:258). He accuses rationalists of using a supposed 
knowledge of the perfect (of perfect justice, for example) as proof that it 
can be transmuted into actuality. Rather, says Niebuhr, our own 
standards will always fall short of being perfect, no matter how intelligent 
we may become (1937:12-13).  
 
Self-realization is the acceptance of the self as finite, and realizing that 
God is the fulfilment of this finiteness (Niebuhr 1941:259-260). 
Paradoxically, it is in realizing that we are not free that we discover the 
most freedom. “The ultimate proof of the freedom of the human spirit is its 
own recognition that its will is not free to choose between good and evil 
(1941:258). Sin is a result of a lack of trust and faith in God.49 So it is only 
in and through God that the anxiety caused by finiteness of humanity can 
be overcome.50 God’s will must become the norm for any life a person 
wishes to overcome the sin in their actions, although part of this self-
realization is the realization that we are never free from sin.  
“It is within and by his freedom that man sins. The final paradox 
is that the discovery of the inevitability of sin is man’s highest 
assertion of freedom. The fact that the discovery of sin invariably 
leads to the Pharisaic illusion that such a discovery guarantees 
sinlessness in subsequent actions is a revelation of the way in 
which freedom becomes an accomplice of sin” (1941:263).  
 
                                                 
49
 “Sin can never be traced merely to the temptation arising from a particular situation o condition 
in which man as man finds himself or in which particular men find themselves. Nor can the temptation 
which is compounded of a situation of finiteness and freedom, plus the fact of sin, be regarded as 
leading necessarily to sin in the life of each individual, if again sin is not first presupposed in that lie” 
(Niebuhr 1941:254). 
 
50
 In Niebuhr’s view of original sin, all human beings share in Adam and Eve’s disobedience in 
turning away from the “innocence in which God had created them.” God’s assistance is needed to 
overcome the inevitable choices we face because of our knowledge of good and evil (Lovin 2007:18). 
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There is some knowledge which resides in each person of how life is 
supposed to be. For Niebuhr, this means that “the contrast between what 
man is truly and essentially and what he has become is apparent even to 
those who do not understand this contrast is to be found in every human 
being and has its seat in the will of man itself” (1941:265).51 This means 
that we should all have some sense of justice and equality, or most 
basically a sense of what is right because we should be able to recognise, 
to some extent, what is unjust, what is unfair and what is wrong.   
 
Although Niebuhr does not agree entirely with the idea that the 
conscience is the righteousness of the sinner, he does state that “the 
conscience is primarily known to man in terms of the disquiet, the sense of 
inner conflict which expresses itself in all moral life” (1941:274ff). The 
biblical idea that the law is written in the heart is translated by Niebuhr 
as meaning that the law which dictates action is part of the real self.  
Righteousness remains with sinful humanity as “the knowledge of what 
he ought to be, as the law of his freedom” (1941:280). Original justice and 
natural law cannot be separated because “the freedom of man sets every 
standard of justice under higher possibilities, and the sin of man 
perennially insinuates contingent and relative elements into the 
supposedly absolute standards of human reason” (1941:281). Original 
righteousness is experienced transcendentally. Sin, however, arises in the 
place between freedom and finitude because outside of history the self is 
sinless, but once it acts in history it begins to sin. It is within and by our 
freedom that we sin; our self-love and self-centredness is inevitable 
(Niebuhr 1941:263).  
 
Niebuhr sees the nature of humanity as having two elements: on the one 
hand “all his natural endowments, and determinations, his physical and 
                                                 
51
 Niebuhr is critical of the traditional view of the fall – see 1941:267ff. The fall should not be 
viewed as a single event in history, but rather as a “symbol of an aspect of every historical moment in 
the life of man” (269). 
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social impulses, his sexual and racial differentiations...on the other the 
freedom of his spirit, his transcendence over natural process and finally 
his self-transcendence” (1941:270). The first element relates to natural 
law and the second to theological virtues of faith, hope and love. Although 
sin is inevitable, it is not necessary. Ultimately, we remain responsible for 
the choices we make. Love stands as a contradiction to sin, because in love 
there is no commandment. The biblical law of love reveals more than just 
law, it is a state of “heart and mind, a harmony between the soul and God, 
a harmony within the soul and a harmony between the self and the 
neighbour, which, if attained, would exclude all commandment” (Niebuhr 
1941:286).52   
 
3.6 Justice and Community 
 
Niebuhr’s first chapter in Moral Man and Immoral Society is entitled: 
Man and Society: The art of living together. This, according to Niebuhr, 
we have not yet learnt to do well and the further society advances, the 
greater the scope of the injustice as we continue to cover each other “with 
mud and blood.”53 Almost ten years later, he noted that “(t)he task of 
creating community and avoiding anarchy is constantly pitched on 
broader and broader levels” (Niebuhr 1943:245). But community remains 
central to our humanness. It is only in relationship to other people that 
we can realize ourselves. Thus love and fraternity are necessities in our 
lives because we are social beings and being a part of a community is an 
essential part of our nature. But the relationships within the community 
                                                 
52
 In communion with God, love demands nothing, because it is beyond law and commandment. 
“The perfect harmony of the soul with itself is thus a derivative of its perfect communion with, and 
love of, God. Where the love of God transcends obedience, the soul is centered in its true source and 
end without reservation…the sense that an obedience which is less than love is not normative even 
though it is universal, is the Justitia Originalis. It is the sense that there ought not be a sense of ought; 
it is the “thou shalt” which suggests that there are no “thou shalts” in perfection” (Niebuhr 1941:293).  
 
53
 “For all the centuries of experience, men have not yet learned how to live together without 
compounding their vices and covering each other ‘with mud and with blood’” (Niebuhr 1932:1).  
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and between communities is corrupted by sin, which ultimately leads to 
injustice.  
 
Power is becoming increasingly unevenly distributed in society on local, 
national and international levels. Already in the 1920’s Niebuhr was 
critical of the increased centralisation of economic power which was 
occurring hand in hand with the technological progress.54 The power has 
become more covert than overt as it became more economic than military. 
For Niebuhr, it is economic interests that divide people and groups more 
than any other type of social conflict (Lovin 2007:4). Gilkey says that: 
...there is little question that the main groups Niebuhr has in mind 
are classes and that the primary social conflicts are class conflicts. 
He is convinced that economic power is the central form of social 
power; that economic injustice is more fundamental than is 
political injustice; and that therefore the levelling of economic 
privilege and power remains the central task for modern society, if 
it would achieve greater justice (1986:164) 
It is this view which is probably shared by many theologians. We are 
constantly speaking about the ‘haves’ and the ‘have-nots’. Society is 
separated into two poles – the wealthy and the poor. And the wealthy 
generally exploit the poor because they have access to resources which 
make them more powerful while keeping the poor suppressed.  
 
Niebuhr spends two chapters discussing the different points of view of the 
proletarian and privileged classes in Moral Man and Immoral Society and 
favourably describes the working class view of society as having more 
                                                 
54
 “With the increased centralization of economic power in the period of modern industrialism, this 
development merely means that society as such does not control economic power as much as social 
well-being requires; and that the economic, rather than the political and military, power has become 
the significant coercive force of modern society. Either it defies the authority of the state or it bends 
the institutions of the state to its own purposes. Political power has been made responsible, but 
economic power has become irresponsible in society” (Niebuhr 1932:15 my italics).  
Niebuhr, writing about the disorders of technological society, wrote that: “The modern machine 
long since has divorced the skill of the worker from his tool. It has to a certain degree divorced the 
worker from his skill, which is now increasingly in the machine. It has thus made the worker 
powerless, except insofar as common organized action has given him a degree of social and political 
power. It has on the other hand constantly increased the power of fewer and fewer centers of economic 
authority” (1989:44).  
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clarity about what is happening in society than the upper class and 
promoting a “rigorous ethical ideal” for society:  
If we analyse the attitudes of the political self-conscious worker in 
ethical terms, their most striking characteristic is probably the 
combination of moral cynicism and unqualified equalitarian social 
idealism which they betray. The industrial worker has little 
confidence in the morality of men; but this does not deter him from 
projecting a rigorous ethical ideal for society (Niebuhr 1932:144-
145).  
 
For Niebuhr, it is unquestionable that a group can exist without some 
form of coercion, no matter how peaceful the co-existence of the 
individuals in the group might be. He also views a group as offering 
individuals opportunities to exercise their pride on a level other than an 
individual one (he specifically mentions patriotism as a form of 
selfishness, despite its apparent altruistic nature).55 In a group, the self-
interest of the individual is replaced with the self-interest of the group 
and there are many things that a group will do that an individual will not 
do to protect their own interests. “There is a notable difference between 
the moral behavior of individuals – where there is some real possibility of 
self-sacrifice for others, though it is rare enough! – and the behavior of 
groups –families, clans, classes, races, genders, states, or nations. With 
communities, the self-interest of the group is inevitably the pre-dominant 
                                                 
55
 “The larger social groups above the family, communities, classes, races and nations all present 
men with the same twofold opportunity for self-denial and self-aggrandizement; and both possibilities 
are usually exploited. Patriotism is a high form of altruism, when compared with less and more 
parochial loyalties; but from an absolute perspective it is simply another form of selfishness. The 
larger the group the more certainly will it express itself selfishly in the total human community. It will 
be more powerful and therefore more able to defy any social restraints which might be devised. The 
larger the group the more difficult it is to achieve a common mind and purpose and the more inevitably 
will it be unified by momentary impulses and immediate and unreflective purposes. The increasing 
size of the group increases the difficulties of achieving a group self-consciousness, except as it comes 
in conflict with other groups and is unified by perils and passions of war. It is a rather pathetic aspect 
of human social life that conflict is a seemingly unavoidable prerequisite of group solidarity. 
Furthermore the greater the strength and the wider the dominion of a community, the more will it seem 
to represent universal values from the perspective of the individual” (Niebuhr 1989:52 my italics). 
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factor” (Gilkey 2001a:xiv).56 Already in the introduction of Moral Man 
Niebuhr expresses his negativity towards groups:  
The inferiority of the morality of groups to that of individuals is 
due in part to the difficulty of establishing a rational social force 
which is powerful enough to cope with the natural impulses by 
which society achieves its cohesion; but in part it is merely the 
revelation of a collective egoism, compounded of the egoistic 
impulses of individuals, which achieve a more vivid expression and 
a more cumulative effect when they are united in a common 
impulse than when they express themselves separately and 
discreetly (Niebuhr 1932:xxv).  
He later goes on to speak of the “brutal character of the behavior of all 
human collectives and the power of self-interest and collective egoism in 
all inter-group relations” (1932:xxx). Because of the passion and prejudice 
which characterise societies, conflict will always be inevitable and 
Niebuhr says that “our contemporary culture fails to realise the power, 
extent and persistence of group egoism in human relations... the relations 
between groups must therefore always be political rather than ethical...” 
(1932:xxxi). Niebuhr holds out little hope for the role of education in 
improving group relations and making people more tolerant of each other. 
It may have a place in society, but education cannot be expected to fix 
what is essentially a problem of faith; that is, a lack of trust in our 
finiteness.57 Power will be dominant and morality will play a far lesser 
role. Because of the limitation of the mind and imagination of individuals, 
the selfishness of individuals makes ‘force an inevitable part of the 
                                                 
56
 Niebuhr says that there are limits for the possibility of intelligence to increase benevolence in a 
society because of the selfish impulses of individuals (1932:3). He did, however, in his later works 
become more positive about the morality of groups while at the same time becoming considerably less 
positive above the morality of individuals.  
 
57
 Gilkey eloquently words Niebuhr’s opinion that the lack of morality in a group is a religious 
problem: “If the fault is spiritual and not natural, then a spiritual resolution is required at the very 
deepest level: not mere education, more inquiry, more intelligence, excellent as each of these may be. 
Rather we need the religious recognition of our own involvement in pride, humble repentance about 
our claims for security, for truth, and for virtue, and finally the acceptance of forgiveness and the 
beginning of trust... we find ourselves here in the midst not only of religion but even more of the piety 
of justification by faith: of repentance on the one hand and trust in grace on the other” (Gilkey 
2001b:107). 
 
132 
 
process of social cohesion” (1932:6). This coerciveness needs to be 
eliminated before justice and peace can occur in society (1932:19ff).  
 
How this is to be done? Niebuhr is extremely critical of both the religious 
idealists (who emphasize selfishness, not ignorance, as the root of social 
injustice) and the rationalists (who think that increasing intelligence will 
overcome injustice) (1932:23). We will always place our needs above those 
of others, not matter how intelligent we may be, says Niebuhr. Education 
will not prompt benevolence, at least not beyond an intimate 
community.58  Society depends upon justice, not upon benevolence, and 
justice is the product of the mind, not the heart (Niebuhr 1932:29ff). 
Justice is the result of reason, and a reasonable and rational society will 
be critical of injustice. But justice can never be separated from the 
political, and power will always play against power.59 Education may play 
an important part in educating people against injustice, but it can also be 
misused in the hands of the powerful: education is both a tool of 
propaganda in the hands of dominant groups, and a means of 
emancipation for subject classes (Niebuhr 1932:122). The intelligence of 
the general community cannot be “raised to such a height that the 
irrational injustices of society would be eliminated” because there is no 
such general community; perspectives are always influenced by economic 
interest (Niebuhr 1932:213ff).  
 
                                                 
58
 As relationships in society become independent and less personal, the nature of ethical attitudes 
change and mutual responsibility rather than benevolence becomes predominant. “The dependence of 
ethical attitudes upon personal contacts and direct relations contributes to the moral chaos of a 
civilization, in which life is related to life mechanically and not organically, and in which mutual 
responsibilities increase and personal contacts decrease” (Niebuhr 1932:28-29).  
 
59
 Niebuhr believed that the dominant classes would not easily relinquish their power, guarding 
their privileges carefully. “Dominant classes are always slowest to yield power because it is the source 
of privilege. As long as they hold it, they may dispense and share privilege, enjoying the moral 
pleasure of giving what does not belong to them and the practical advantage of withholding enough to 
preserve their eminence and superiority in society. While education is potential power, because it 
enables the disinherited to protect their own interests by organised and effective methods, the dominant 
classes have suppressed their fears of this effect of education by the thought that education could be 
used as a means for inculcating submissiveness” (Niebuhr 1932:121).  
 
133 
 
It is sometimes unclear whether the lack of group morality is a result of 
the lack of individual morality, maybe Niebuhr never intended to imply 
here that individuals are moral, rather, that they are more moral (or less 
immoral) than the collective group.60 But his lack of hope for the 
community cannot be disputed, although by the end of the book, and 
definitely in his later works, this apparent hopelessness does appear to 
resolve itself to some extent. But certainly in his earlier thinking he 
remained very negative and critical of the group mentality and the 
security which individuals attempt to achieve through group cohesion and 
within the group:  
As individuals, men believe that they ought to love and serve each 
other and establish justice between each other. As racial, economic 
and national groups, they take for themselves, whatever their 
power can command (1932:9).  
Individuals will most often accept the moral opinions of their society, 
rather than forming their own judgments (Niebuhr 1932:36).  Here 
Niebuhr mentions the idea of the conscience as a moral resource or “a 
sense of obligation towards the good” (1932:37). Individuals can only be so 
moral, or, encouraged to be so moral; in other words, there are limits to 
moral reason,61 hence the argument for justice over benevolence 
(especially in a social or political context). But values in the community 
remain important. It is as part of a community that people learn how to 
behave, and it is from political values of society that their individual and 
personal values often develop. Despite Niebuhr’s pessimism regarding 
                                                 
60
 He writes of the individual that “...there is good reason to believe that the sentiments of 
benevolence and social goodwill will never be so pure or powerful, and the rational capacity to 
consider the rights and needs of others in fair competition with our own will never be so fully 
developed as to create the possibility for the anarchistic millennium which is the social utopia, either 
explicit or implicit, of all intellectual or religious moralists” (Niebuhr 1932:3).  
In one of his last works, Man’s Nature and His Communities, Niebuhr stated that he should perhaps 
have titled his early book The Not So Moral Man in His less Moral Communities (1965:22).  
 
61
 Niebuhr refused to believe that human morality was without limits; people could only be so good 
and will probably never be able to fully comprehend their social situation. “The possibilities of 
increasing both the rational and the more uniquely moral resources of individuals is so real that it is not 
surprising that those who study the possibilities should frequently indulge the hope of solving the 
problems of society by this method. They easily fail to recognize the limits of morality in human life. 
The possibility of extending reason does not guarantee that is can be extended far enough to give a 
majority of individuals a comprehension of the total social situation in which they stand” (1932:40).  
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community, he never denied the importance of the values formed in 
society although he remained wary of their ability to corrupt.62  
 
The sins of anxiety, pride and selfishness are not easily overcome, and will 
always taint any knowledge we might have of what is right and good. 
Loyalty to the nation will also often influence behaviour. Because personal 
relations will always develop the greatest sensitivity (1932:53-54), 
Niebuhr suggests that the nation attempts to gain the loyalty of the 
individual by having a person as a symbol (he uses the example of the 
king in Britain). In this way, individuals belonging to a certain group will 
try to protect their own economic and political interests over those of 
others.  
“Since those who hold special privileges in society are naturally 
inclined to regard their privileges as their rights and to be 
unmindful of the effects of inequality upon the unprivileged, they 
will have a natural complacence toward injustice. Every effort to 
disturb the peace, which incorporates the injustice, will therefore 
seem to them to spring from unjustified malcontent” (Niebuhr 
1932:129).  
He was continually critical of the rich and powerful. Not only is it the 
economic situation and the unequal distribution of power which leads to 
injustice, but the close ties between culture and social inequality cannot 
be denied (Niebuhr 1937:57-58).63  
                                                 
62
 Niebuhr recognised the importance and necessity of values in the community, however, he 
remained cautious as to the role they could play and was aware of the ways in which they could be 
misused. “Values are values, and no community can get along without them. They make common and 
so also individual life not only bearable but good – creative, joyous, and fulfilling. Mutual kindness 
and trust, caring for one another, tolerance, generosity, freedom, as well as cooperation, personal 
autonomy, and personal responsibility – these are values utterly essential to creative community and 
individual human life within community. They are for most us socially enshrined best within the more 
general ‘political’ values of democracy... Niebuhr thoroughly believed in these values... their clear and 
intrinsic value did not mean that they could be misused... the very nobility of a community’s ideals 
represents a temptation to such pride, and, as one of its direct consequences, can be used as the 
justification for vanquishing and dominating the other. Niebuhr saw this clearly, and his wariness 
about our common democratic social values thus reinforces rather than contradicts his own devotion to 
those values” (Gilkey 2001b:111).  
 
63
 Niebuhr was of the opinion that communities would be less moral than individuals and already at 
the beginning of his career was he aware of the problems that technology would create and the 
difficulties which would arise in trying to deal with these problems. “Since both sympathy and justice 
depend to a large degree upon the perception of need, which makes sympathy flow, and upon the 
understanding of competing interests, which must be resolved, it is obvious that human communities 
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It is the dominance of one group over another in protecting its own 
interests, and the unwillingness for the more powerful and wealthier 
group to relinquish some of that power and wealth, which is often the 
cause of conflict in society. The interests of the group will mostly extend 
only as far as protecting those interests. Thus when their privileges are no 
longer available, their interests will align closer to the interest of the 
nation (Niebuhr 1932:89). But, says Niebuhr, class loyalty is far less 
ingrained than national loyalty because it is the sum of the collective 
individual egos, which may mean that class loyalty can be changed more 
easily by encouraging an ethical and moral change in thought and 
behaviour.64 
 
However, there is no guarantee that increased morality will completely 
eradicate these loyalties. The pride and selfishness of the individuals 
which comprise the group cannot be swept away in a few years of 
education; morality is not something which can be forced upon an 
individual or a group.65 It can only be hoped that a more moral attitude 
and a responsible ethic will develop over time.66   
                                                                                                                                           
have greater difficulty than individuals in achieving ethical relationships. While rapid means of 
communication have increased the breadth of knowledge about world affairs among citizens of various 
nations, and the general advance of education has ostensibly promoted the capacity to think rationally 
and justly upon the inevitable conflicts of interest between nations, there is nevertheless little hope of 
arriving at a perceptible increase of international morality through the growth of intelligence and the 
perfection of means of communication. The development of international commerce, the increased 
economic interdependence among the nations, and the whole apparatus of a technological civilisation, 
increase the problems and issues between nations much more rapidly than the intelligence to solve 
them can be created” (Niebuhr 1932:85). 
 
64
 “The group egoism of a privileged class is therefore more precisely the sum and aggregate of 
individual egoisms than is the case in national selfishness...[and this] may mean that the unethical 
character of class prejudices may, being less complex, be more easily dissolved by reason than similar 
national attitudes” (Niebuhr 1932:140).  
 
65
 Changes in moral attitude will not be enough to change class division. “It must be taken for 
granted therefore that the injustices in society which arise from class privileges will not be abolished 
purely by moral suasion. That is a conviction at which the proletarian class, which suffers most from 
social injustice, has finally arrived after centuries of disappointed hopes” (Niebuhr 1932:141). 
 
66
 Niebuhr spoke of the equality of sin but the inequality of guilt, meaning that while all people are 
sinners, some are more guilty of sinning than other (for example, those who are dominant as opposed 
to those who are oppressed). “This fundamental inequality of guilt, in which the mighty offend against 
the weak, and through which justice is betrayed an torn asunder, is for Niebuhr first seen and made 
clear as part of the Biblical or prophetic consciousness, and so of revelation. Much of Christian 
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There is a close relationship between the power which controls the 
community (such as the coercive and organizing power of government) 
and the balance of the “vitalities and forces” in the society (Niebuhr 
1943:257). The individual is never quite as important as society would like 
them to believe, but neither can individual liberty become the unqualified 
end (Niebuhr 1952:8). The importance of the community, and the rights of 
the community rather than individual rights, cannot be ignored or pushed 
aside to give the individual the sole privilege in the community.67 There is 
a continual interaction between the reason (morality and law) and the 
vitalities of life. These vitalities, the tensions found in the community, are 
often what inform the law. It is law which will keep anti-social vitalities 
(those that are more self-interested) in check. The threat of the law is 
what helps keep a society stable and well-ordered, although the more 
stable the community the less necessary (and less frequently 
implemented) the law becomes (Niebuhr 1943:259-260).  
 
Although there is a huge discrepancy between what the law should be 
(and what justice should be) and what is actually implemented in society, 
the ideal principles are necessary as a yard-stick to keep the actual law in 
check. There will always be this failing on the part of the law because 
“insofar as thought is purer than action ‘natural law’ is purer than ‘civil 
law’ (Niebuhr 1989:180). A higher justice always means a more equal 
justice and the face that equality has always been a part of theories of 
                                                                                                                                           
tradition has overlooked it and refrained from critical judgment on the powerful; and it is surely one of 
Niebuhr’s main goals to re-establish this ‘bias toward the poor’ as a part of Biblical and Christian 
faith... The equality of sin also pierces through another illusion about the ‘righteous’ and injustice. The 
weak, the dominated, and the exploited are, as we have seen, in many ways far less guilty than their 
oppressors. However, they are by that token not necessarily at all less sinful, or potentially less sinful. 
The rightness and justice of their cause does not indicate a special hold on virtue. When, after a radical 
change of power, the oppressed become the rulers, their pride, self-concern, and tendency to absolutize 
their cause will mean that they in turn will be unjust toward those dominated by them” (Gilkey 
2001b:114-115).  
 
67
 There stark contrast between Western individualistic thought and African and Eastern mentality, 
where the good of the community is upheld over the individual rights. 
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justice and public policies proves that people care for their fellow people.68 
A more equal justice means “demanding more than mere prohibition of 
theft and murder. Higher conceptions of justice are developed. It is 
recognized that the right to live implies the right to secure the goods 
which sustain life” (Niebuhr 1935:107).  
 
There is, however, a great tension between speaking about equality and 
realizing equality in society. There is little practicality in the formation of 
a completely equal society, but even the way this discussion moves 
forward highlights the injustice of society. On the one hand, people in the 
position of privilege will emphasize the impossibility of achieving equality 
in society while the other side will tend to emphasize the absolute 
necessity of applying this norm to society.69 This does not in any way 
excuse the inequality in society or the need for greater equality. It is often 
merely one group using their resources to protect their (often 
considerable) interests. Niebuhr calls this inability to realize true equality 
in society the “ideological taint” of the principle. Also, each level of 
community runs the risk of becoming corrupt and abusing their power. 
This would mean that the principles of justice are affected and the ideal of 
                                                 
68
 Equality was extremely important for Niebuhr, and he saw the Christian ideal of love pushing 
society towards greater equality. “From each according to his ability, to each according to his needs” is 
indeed an ideal, which is as impossible of consistent application in the complexities of society as the 
Christian ideal of love. But it is an ideal toward which rational society must move, and the religious 
overtone may be regarded as a guarantee against the dilution of the ideal. Whether the reorganisation 
of society will reform human nature sufficiently to make an approximation of the ideal possible, is a 
question which only history can answer, and which sober reason would [not answer with a confident 
affirmative]... The fact that the equalitarian ideal does not spring from pure ethical imagination, but is 
the result of the peculiar circumstances of proletarian life, does not detract from its validity as the 
ultimate social ideal” (Niebuhr 1932:160).  
 
69
 Niebuhr was under no illusions that a perfectly equal society could be attained; he remained 
aware that equality does not mean the equal and exact distribution of everything, but that need and 
social function will always colour equality. “The ideological taint enters into the discussion of equality 
when those who suffer from inequality raise the principle of equality to the definitive principle of 
justice without recognizing that differences of need or of social function make the attainment of 
complete equality in society impossible. The beneficiaries of special privilege emphasize, on the other 
hand, that inequalities of social function justify corresponding inequalities of privilege. They may also 
assert, with some, but less, justification, that inequality of reward is a necessary inducement for the 
proper performance of social function. But they will seek to hide the historic fact that privileged 
members of the community invariably use their higher degree of social power to appropriate an excess 
of privileges not required by their function; and certainly not in accord with differences of need” 
(Niebuhr 1989:181). 
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fraternity becomes increasingly more distant. He speaks of the 
“organization of power and the balance of power” which are always open 
to corruption. “No possible refinement of social forces and political 
harmonies can eliminate the potential contradiction to brotherhood which 
is implicit in the two political instruments of brotherhood” (Niebuhr 
1943:258). Thus the attempt to create a more just society is always in 
danger of becoming even more unjust from the very principles which are 
meant to protect it. Niebuhr is not very confident about a more equal 
balance of power being found in an international community.70 
 
It is this same law which protects both the individual and the community, 
which should lead to a more equal (and a more just) society. But even this 
“bourgeois” worldview of equality has become sentimentalized, says 
Niebuhr. The Biblical idea of “equality of all before God and equality as a 
regulative principle of justice is made into a simple historical possibility” 
(Niebuhr 1952:13). The influence of the church is essential in the 
formation of a cohesive community. Once again, the paradox of possibility 
and impossibility is brought into play: 
“The world community, toward which all historical forces seem to 
be driving us, is mankind’s final possibility and impossibility. The 
task of achieving it must be interpreted from the standpoint of a 
faith which understands the fragmentary and broken character of 
all historic achievements and yet has confidence in their meaning 
because it knows their completion to be in the hands of a Divine 
Power, whose resources are greater than those of men, and whose 
suffering love can overcome the corruptions of man’s achievements, 
                                                 
70
 The balance of power presented, for Niebuhr, a great paradox. “[Many idealists] think that world 
government is possible without an implied hegemony of the stronger powers. This hegemony is 
inevitable; and so is the peril of a new imperialism, which is inherent in it. The peril can best be 
overcome by arming all nations great and small with constitutional power to resist the exactions of 
dominant power. This is to say that the principle of the balance of power is implied in the idea of 
constitutional justice. But if the central and organizing principle of power is feared too much, and the 
central authority is weakened, then the political equilibrium degenerates once more to an unorganized 
balance of power. And an unorganized balance of power is potential anarchy.  
Thus we face all the old problems of political organization on the new level of a potential 
international community… The new world must be built by resolute men who ‘when hope is dead will 
hope by faith’; who will neither seek premature escape from the guilt of history, nor yet call the evil, 
which taints all their achievements, good. There is no escape from the paradoxical relation of history to 
the Kingdom of God. History moves towards the realization of the Kingdom but yet the judgment of 
God is upon every new realization.”  (Niebuhr 1943: 284-285) 
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without negating the significance of our striving (Niebuhr 
1944:189-190).  
 
Niebuhr was rather pessimistic in his view of community and society, 
although the work which he did denies this to some extent. De Gruchy 
criticises Niebuhr for not adequately relating the role of cross to the 
community; his focus remains mainly on the individual and what the 
individual can achieve over and above society. De Gruchy suggests that 
the idea of reconciliation is lacking in his thought and that the focus is not 
on building “authentic relationships between people and between groups 
of people” (1992:295ff). The church as a community living under grace, 
and therefore also responsible, is given almost no attention in Niebuhr’s 
work. He also gives scant attention to the Holy Spirit and ignores the 
power of God at work in people. For a man so closely involved in the 
church, the power of the church in society does not seem to play an 
important role in his theology; it is rather the individual, albeit 
prophetically and as an agent of God, that is the element of change.  
 
3.7 Love as the impossible possibility 
 
Throughout Niebuhr’s work, the idea of the unattainable ideal of love, the 
law of life, can be found.71 The relationship between love and justice 
remains paradoxical throughout his work because love is seen as “both the 
fulfillment and the negation of law” (1937:269). He rejects love as an 
unacceptable hope for change in society while at the same time retaining 
                                                 
71
 Niebuhr’s thoughts on love are closely linked to the perfect love displayed on the cross. This 
sacrificial love is portrayed through Christ and the cross, and this is the perfection to which we reach. 
“Christ as the norm of human nature defines the final perfection of man in history” (Niebuhr 1943:68). 
He later says that it is the sacrificial love of Christ which “clarifies the Christian doctrine of the 
sinlessness of Christ. Furthermore it makes the doctrine that Jesus was both human and divine 
religiously and morally meaningful and dispenses with the necessity of making the doctrine 
metaphysically plausible” (Niebuhr 1943:70). But at the same time, the cross shows the impossibility 
of this love in the world and in history (1943:89ff).  
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the importance of love in society.72 He understood agape in the light of the 
cross and did not see how people could express altruistic love, even in 
intimate relationships (Forrester 1997:217). This view of love as complete 
self-sacrifice possibly made Niebuhr more negative of the ability of people 
to love than is actually possible. While it is true that we cannot love 
perfectly, be forced to love, or actually even be taught to love, love remains 
very much a part of life.73 Even though all people violate the law of love, 
some do so to a greater extent than others, so love certainly does not lose 
its priority in the world:   
Love is the law of life and not merely some transcendent ideal of 
perfection. All men may violate the law of life but there is a 
difference between those who seek to draw all life into themselves, 
and those who have found God in the centre of existence through 
loyalty to Him have learned to relate themselves in terms of 
mutual service to their fellows (Niebuhr 1937:258).  
Niebuhr uses agape throughout his work to refer to “the transcendent 
element continually qualifying our sensual love, our mutual love, our love 
for family, and our responsibilities to our community (justice)” (Gilkey 
2001b:86). However, he always emphasises that any form of love in society 
is open to corruption, because freedom brings with it both good and evil: 
As freedom develops, both good and evil develop with it. The 
innocent state of trust develops into the anxieties and fears of 
freedom; and these prompt the individual and the community to 
seek an unjust security at the expense of others. On the other hand 
it is possible that the same freedom may prompt larger and larger 
structures of brotherhood in human society. This brotherly relation 
of life with life is most basically the “law of life.” It alone does 
                                                 
72
 However, the importance of love in society cannot be ignored, since despite its ideal character, it 
remains very much a part of the workings society. “The whole question about the relation of love to 
law in Christian thought is really contained in the question of how love is the fulfilment of the law” 
(Niebuhr 1935:140). 
Niebuhr later wrote that “love is thus the end term of any system of morals. It is the moral 
requirement in which all schemes of justice are fulfilled and negated. They are fulfilled because the 
obligation of life to life is more fully met in love than is possible in any scheme of equity and justice. 
They are negated because love makes an end of the nicely calculated less and more structures of 
justices. It does not carefully arbitrate between the needs of the self and of the other, since it meets the 
needs of the other without concern for the self” (1941:295).  
 
73
 Niebuhr thought that we would always put ourselves at the centre of the world, even in 
relationships. “Although the self can only realize itself in relation to others, and in loving relations in 
particular, love will always be betrayed into self-love. We always comprehend the world with 
ourselves at the centre” (Niebuhr 1943:108).  
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justice to the freedom of the human spirit and the mutual 
dependence of men upon each other, their necessity of fulfilling 
themselves in each other. There is however, no development 
towards larger realms of brotherhood without a corresponding 
development of the imperial corruption of brotherhood (Niebuhr 
1943:95-96).  
 
The aim for a more perfect love is always possible, even though perfect 
love will never be realised.74 It is the attempt to fulfil this law that 
becomes the driving force that seeks a better and more equal justice and 
which calls every person to bear their share of the responsibility in the 
community. Selflessness is the highest moral ideal of the individual; 
justice is the highest moral ideal of society.  
 
Because of the failure of love in our world on both an individual and 
communal level, justice becomes the imperfect aim in our imperfect world. 
Pure love can completely ignore the self; pride and anxiety and selfishness 
find no place in love, the neighbour becomes the main focus, and the needs 
of the neighbour are no longer weighed up against the needs of the self. It 
is “only in mutual love, in which the concern of one person for the 
interests of another prompts and elicits a reciprocal affection, [that] the 
social demands of historical existence satisfied” (Niebuhr 1943:69).75 But 
this is impossible to attain and so justice becomes the standard for society. 
Love seeks to go far beyond rationality since it does not take into account 
the self but recognises the worth of the life of others: 
“A rational ethic aims at justice, and a religious ethic makes love 
the ideal. A rational ethic seeks to bring the needs of others into 
equal consideration with those of the self. The religious ethic, (the 
                                                 
74
 Niebuhr sees the value of love in intimate relationships “where human relations are intimate (and 
love is fully effective only in intimate and personal relations), the way of love may be the only way to 
justice”, but this intimacy does not exist in society, and so love becomes not only an impractical way to 
justice, but an impossible one (Niebuhr 1989:74). 
 
75
 But Niebuhr warns that mutual love is never pure (agape retain the purity). It is always self-
interested and seeks some form of happiness for the self through love (see 1943:82). Elsewhere he says 
that “love must strive for something purer than justice if it would attain justice. Egoistic impulses are 
so much more powerful than altruistic ones that if the latter are not given stronger than ordinary 
support, the justice which even good men design is partial to those who design it (Niebuhr 1989:74). 
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Christian ethic more particularly, though not solely) insists that 
the needs of the neighbour shall be met, without a careful 
computation of relative needs. This emphasis upon love is another 
fruit of the religious sense of the absolute. On the one hand 
religion absolutises the sentiment of benevolence and makes it the 
norm and ideal of the moral life. On the other hand it gives 
transcendent and absolute worth to the life of the neighbour and 
thus encourages sympathy toward him. Love meets the needs of 
the neighbour, without carefully weighing and comparing his 
needs with those of the self. It is therefore ethically purer than the 
justice which is prompted by reason” (Niebuhr 1932:57 my italics).  
 
However, love meets a problem when there is no subject or when there are 
too many subjects.76 Despite the fact that “the final pinnacle of grace in 
the realm of love is the relation between persons in which one individual 
penetrates imaginatively and sympathetically into the life of another,” 
(Niebuhr 1953:147) most people find it impossible to be as impartial as 
love requires; even those who attempt to achieve a pure justice are 
affected by egoistic desires. To help others we mostly need to weigh the 
needs of one against the needs of another, or against our own needs. The 
nearer the needs are to us, the easier it becomes to act emotionally. The 
further away the needs, the more rational the decision to help needs to 
be.77 In the complexity of society today, it becomes increasingly difficult to 
meet the needs of the neighbour, sitting on the other side of the world in a 
                                                 
76
 Love, as a way to meet needs, is only possible when there are only two people involved. A third 
person immediately creates conflicting needs. “An immediately felt obligation towards obvious need 
may be prompted by the emotion of pity. But a continued sense of obligation rests upon and expresses 
itself in rational calculations of the needs of others as compared with our own interests. A relation 
between the self and one other may be partly ecstatic; and in any case the calculation of relative 
interests may be reduced to a minimum. But as soon as a third person is introduced into the relation 
even the most perfect love requires a rational estimate of conflicting needs and interests” (Niebuhr 
1943:249). 
 
77
 Love needs a clearly defined object and becomes “baffled” by more intricate social relations. 
“Love is most active when the vividness or nearness of the need prompts those whose imagination is 
weak, and the remoteness of the claim challenges those whose imagination is sensitive. Love, which 
depends upon emotion, whether it expresses itself in transient sentiment or constant goodwill, is 
baffled by the more intricate social relations in which the highest ethical attitudes are achieved only by 
careful calculation. If it cannot find an immediate object it has difficulties in expressing itself. The 
same intellectual analysis which the complex situation requires may actually destroy the force of the 
benevolent impulse” (Niebuhr 1932:74). 
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country we have never been to, facing problems we have never 
encountered.78  
“The weaknesses of the spirit of love in solving larger and more 
complex problems become increasingly apparent as one proceeds 
from ordinary relations between individuals to the life of social 
groups. If nations and other social groups find it difficult to 
approximate the principles of justice... they are naturally even less 
capable of achieving the principle of love, which demands more 
than justice” (1932:75).  
 
And so while love should and will always remain the ideal, justice 
becomes the approximation of love.79 It is only an approximation because 
rules are laid down to prevent people from taking advantage of each other. 
Justice is a rational form of love which does not require the emotional 
element, thus making it more probable of being achieved.80  Although 
justice will always stand both in fulfilment and contradiction of love it is 
justice rather than love that nevertheless becomes the aspiration of 
society.81  Justice relates to love in both a positive and a negative way, 
                                                 
78
 Love is capable of overcoming great divides and boundaries between people, but love is never 
this perfect. “Both the resources and the limitations of religion in dealing with the social problem, are 
revealed even more clearly in its spirit of love than in its sense of contrition. Religion encourages love 
and benevolence, as we have seen, by absolutising the moral principle of life until it achieves the 
purity of absolute disinterestedness and by imparting transcendent worth to the life of others... the 
transcendent perspective of religion makes all men our brothers and nullifies the division, by which 
nature, climate, geography and the accidents of history divide the human family” (1932:71).   
 
79
 “Justice is not love. Justice presupposes the conflict of life with life and seeks to mitigate it. 
Every relative justice therefore stands under the judgment of the law of love, but it is also an 
approximation of it” (Niebuhr 1986:87).  
 
80
 Niebuhr shows how justice relates to brotherhood in three steps: “Systems and principles of 
justice are the servants and instruments of the spirit of brotherhood insofar as they extend the sense of 
obligation towards the other, (a) from an immediately felt obligation, prompted by an obvious need, to 
a continued obligation expressed in fixed principles of mutual support; (b) from a simple relation 
between a self and one ‘other’ to the complex relations of the self and the ‘others’; and (c) finally from 
the obligations, discerned by the individual self, to the wider obligations which the community defines 
from its more impartial perspective. These communal definitions evolve slowly in custom and law. 
They all contain some higher elements of disinterestedness, which would not be possible to the 
individual self (Niebuhr 1989:177). 
 
81
 There is a dialectical relationship between love and justice. “The Christian conception of the 
relation of historical justice to the love of the Kingdom of God is a dialectical one. Love is both the 
fulfillment and the negation of all achievements of justice in history. Or expressed from the opposite 
standpoint, the achievements of justice in history may rise in indeterminate degrees to find their 
fulfillment in a more perfect love and brotherhood; but each new level of fulfillment also contain 
elements which stand in contradiction to perfect love. There are therefore obligations to realize justice 
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always containing elements of love within itself and yet never being able 
to become love:  
The positive relation of principles of justice to the ideal of 
brotherhood makes an indeterminate approximation of love in the 
realm of justice possible. The negative relation means that all 
historic conceptions of justice will embody some elements which 
contradict the law of love. The interests of a class, the viewpoint of 
a nation, the prejudices of an age and the illusions of a culture are 
consciously and unconsciously insinuated into the norms by which 
men regulate their common life (Niebuhr 1943:256). 
 
The highest ideal to which an individual will aspire is selflessness, or 
“unselfishness” (Niebuhr 1932:257). But this is not easy to attain because 
love is never pure and it mostly seeks something for itself. But “the 
highest mutuality is achieved where mutual advantages are not 
consciously sought as the fruit of love. For love is purest where it desires 
no returns for itself; and it is most potent where it is purest” (Niebuhr 
1932:265).  However, if justice is continually striving towards a more 
equal justice it is pointing towards a certain “approximation of 
brotherhood under the conditions of sin” (Niebuhr 1943:254).82 Justice 
needs to be aware of its own limits, since when justice becomes all-
powerful, it becomes oppressive.  
 
Niebuhr’s realism denies what was popular opinion, which dictated that 
the world could be changed by simply applying the law of love to history. 
The fulfilment of the command to love the neighbour will not have its end 
in history.83 But despite perfect love being an ideal, it does not mean that 
                                                                                                                                           
in indeterminate degrees; but none of the realizations can assure the serenity of perfect fulfillment” 
(Niebuhr 1943:246). 
 
82
 The relationship of love to history is always paradoxical: “Love stands both inside history in so 
far as it bears the possibility of changing human relations (a reciprocal response of love, mutuality and 
respect) and it stands beyond history (as soon as it requires a reciprocal response it loses its 
disinterestedness)” (Niebuhr 1943:247). 
 
83
 “The law of love belongs to a time of fulfilment beyond history, which means that nothing we 
can do within history, even at the extreme edges of historical change, can be anything more than an 
approximation that denies part of the law of love, even in the act of fulfilling it” (Lovin 2007:8). 
 
145 
 
we cannot try to establish a grasp of love in the world. And justice 
becomes the way in which love can be a tangible reality in the world, 
because it is far clearer as to what justice is necessary and what justice 
requires. However, there is always an element of the ideal in justice and 
equality as they seek to draw nearer to the ideal of perfect by “affirming 
the life and interests of the neighbour as much as those of the self” 
(Niebuhr 1935:110).84  
 
Love always pushes the boundaries, however, forcing us to reach beyond 
what we know for something better, for something more just. “The 
freedom of man over every historic situation means that his obligation to 
others cannot be limited to partial communities of nature and history, to 
family, tribe, or nation. Love acknowledges no natural bounds and is 
universal in scope” (Niebuhr 1953:147).  
 
Love is not, however, as exclusive and unattainable as Niebuhr might 
think. His complete separation between love and justice, and his view of 
love as entirely self-sacrificial is an unfair treatment of the situation. 
People do not act entirely selfishly and are capable of some form of love, 
even if it is not completely Christ-like. Lebacqz suggests that this 
complete separation of love and justice renders justice a second class 
citizen, and does not take into account Biblical principles of justice such as 
liberation and redress (1987:159). This might be unfair to Niebuhr, 
though, because he always allowed the grace of love to give a clue to “the 
inner nature of justice.” Without love, justice would become distorted and 
                                                 
84
 “The principle of equality does not exhaust the possibilities of the moral ideal involved in even the 
most minimal standards of justice. Imaginative justice leads beyond equality to a consideration of the 
special needs of the life of the other. ... Every one of these achievements in the realm of justice is 
logically related, on the one hand, to the most minimal standards of justice, and on the other to the 
ideal of perfect love – i.e., to the obligation of affirming the life and interests of the neighbour as much 
as those of the self. The basic rights to life and property in the early community, the legal minima of 
rights and obligations of more advanced communities, the moral rights and obligations recognized in 
these communities beyond those which are legally enforced, the further refinement of standards in the 
family beyond those recognized in the general community – all these stand in an ascending scale of 
moral possibilities in which each succeeding step is a closer approximation of the law of love” 
(Niebuhr 1935:110 my italics). 
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tyrannical – kindness and tenderness is always needed in society 
(Forrester 1997:217-218).  
 
3.8 The Religious Aspect  
 
Despite this realistic, sometimes pessimistic and cynical view of society, 
there is hope. For Niebuhr, this hope is found in religion. Things are not 
as they should be, and they will not always be this way, although the 
culmination of the hope will not be achieved in history; we wait for the 
eschatological fulfilment. His view of the nature and destiny of man are 
inseparable from his faith and hope: 
If religion be particularly occupied with the absolute from the 
perspective of the individual, it is nevertheless capable of 
conceiving an absolute society in which the ideal of love and justice 
will be fully realised. There is a millennial hope in every vital 
religion. The religious imagination is as impatient with the 
compromises, relativities and imperfections of historic society as 
with the imperfections of individual life (Niebuhr 1932:61 my 
italics).  
Elsewhere, he says that 
(t)he Christian faith holds out the hope that our fragmentary lives 
will be completed in a total and larger plan than any which we 
control or comprehend, and that a part of the completion is the 
forgiveness of sins, that is, the forgiveness of the evils into which 
we fall by our frantic efforts to complete our own lives or to endow 
them with significance (Niebuhr 1956:6 my italics).  
But for Niebuhr, religion cannot be universalised, in the same way that all 
people cannot be expected to become moral and love fails because of its 
impossibility to entirely overcome selfishness and pride.85 Thus, there is 
something about faith which remains true only for the religious 
community, because it is impossible to replicate on a larger level. The “full 
force of religious faith will never be available for the building of a just 
                                                 
85
 “All men cannot be expected to become spiritual any more than they can be expected to become 
rational. Those who achieve either excellence will always be a leavening influence in social life; but 
the political structure of society cannot be built upon their achievement” (1932:73).  
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society, because its highest visions are those which proceed from the 
insights of a sensitive individual conscience. If they are realised at all, 
they will be realised in intimate religious communities in which individual 
ideals achieve social realization but do not conquer society” (Niebuhr 
1932:81).  
 
Religion will always remain apart from the secular, because the two are so 
dissimilar and what happens in the faith community cannot apply to 
society. But it cannot give up and be defeated so easily.86 We just need to 
realise that it was never the claim of religion to completely change the 
historical world: 
...the Christian faith in its profoundest versions has never believed 
that the Cross would so change the very nature of historical 
existence that a more and more universal achievement of 
sacrificial love would finally transmute sacrificial love into 
successful mutual love, perfectly validated and by historical social 
consequences (Niebuhr 1943:87). 
Religion cannot be completely separated from the worldly, but neither can 
it be expected to influence all the leaders and political policies, and make 
society more just, although this does not prevent open dialogue between 
the religious and the secular, and it also does not relieve religious leaders 
of responsibility in the political and social environment. However, religion 
still has its place within a specific community, this despite the fact that 
for many it remains the ideal towards which they strive.87 It is the 
foolishness of religion, and of faith, which makes it a completely accepted 
explanation for life and it becomes accepted as wisdom. “Revelation does 
not remain in contradiction to human culture and human knowledge. By 
completing the incompleteness, clarifying the obscurities and correcting 
                                                 
86
 “The defeatism of religion is derived from a too consistent God-world, spirit-body dualism, in 
which the fact, that natural impulses in the economic and political life move under less restraint of 
reason and conscience than in the private conduct of individuals, persuades the religious man to 
despair of bringing any ethical values into them whatsoever” (1932:78).  
 
87
 “The great seers and saints of religion have always placed their hope for the redemption of 
society in the possibility of making the love-universalism, implicit in religious morality, effective in 
the whole human society” (1932:72).  
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the falsification of human knowledge it becomes true wisdom to “them 
that are called” (Niebuhr 1943:67). To overcome pride and accept the 
finiteness of our existence, we search for security and it is the task of 
religion to provide this security. He says that “in a true religion, faith in 
the ultimate meaningfulness of existence, grounded in a God who 
transcends the caprices and contingencies of the physical order and who is 
capable of overcoming the chaos created by human sin, sit the final 
security of the human spirit” (1937:95). 
 
But at the same time, he cautions against spiritual arrogance and pride; 
we always only know part of the truth and we must guard against 
accepting our part as the whole truth. It is in the search for truth that the 
“intellectual intercourse” is one of our best defences against moral 
superiority, leading instead to a more tolerant point of view.88 Toleration 
for Niebuhr does not mean admitting defeat, giving up and losing hope in 
our own answers. Rather, toleration is “an expression of the spirit of 
forgiveness in the realm of culture” (1943:243). There is a fine line 
between knowing that we do not know and continuously searching for the 
truth on one hand, and falling into either scepticism (thinking that there 
is no answer) or fanaticism (hiding behind a wall of pretension) on the 
other.  He makes the point that all too often religion has ordained 
injustice as God-ordained. In the past, and today, “religious dogmatism 
not only accentuated intolerance and bigotry but also sanctioned the social 
hierarchy of feudal life. It persuaded men that the fate which made one 
man master and another slave was God-ordained” (Niebuhr 1937:233). 
Too often the church has had a hand in oppression, rather than offering 
the people freedom. This is not how it should be! This is not faith, or 
belief. This is the abuse and misuse of power and religion because of 
human pride and sinfulness.  
 
                                                 
88
 See Moral Man and Immoral Society Ch. VIII § III  
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Our faith will always call us to question our actions. Our responsibility 
and our striving for justice, lies within our faith.89 For Niebuhr, it is 
religion which has stood the test of time and which can give guidance in 
the struggles of life. 
Only a vital Christian faith, renewing its youth in its prophetic 
origin, is capable of dealing adequately with the moral and social 
problems of our age; only such a faith can affirm the significance of 
temporal and mundane existence without capitulating unduly to 
the relativities of the temporal process. Such a faith alone can 
point to a source of meaning which transcends all the little 
universes of value and meaning which ‘have their day and cease to 
be’ and yet not seek refuge in an eternal world where all history 
ceases to be significant. Only such a faith can outlast the death of 
old cultures and the birth of new civilizations, and yet deal in 
terms of moral responsibility with the world in which cultures and 
civilizations engage in struggles of death and life (Niebuhr 1935:34 
my italics). 
 
We have to accept that we will not be perfect in history but we do need to 
be aware of the ongoing developments between our reality and the divine 
reality or, to use Niebuhr’s words, the “human self-will and the divine 
purpose” (1943:121). Religion should not give us a sense of security. It is 
not, as we might imagine, the consciousness of our highest social values. 
Rather, “true religion is a profound uneasiness about our highest social 
values” (1937:28). We can never know the final truth, because the truth of 
God will always transcend the limits of our finiteness. We need to accept 
this with humility, rather than deceiving ourselves that we know the 
truth. Thus, even our knowledge of justice, and our hope for a completely 
just society, will remain a hope. We can always improve on previous 
mistakes, and attempt to think better, but we must never deceive 
ourselves that our justice is completely just. For Niebuhr, the motivation 
for social action is found in his faith, but this faith needs to be 
                                                 
89
 We live our lives in response to God’s action in history: “Repentance and faith in response to 
God’s judgment and mercy represent the continual possibilities of new life in history. They are the 
only guard against idolatry, the only motivation for a life devoted to increased justice, and the only 
way to avoid despair. At the center again is the paradox of grace, the ‘I, yet not I, but Christ,’ and of a 
having and yet not having” (Gilkey 2001b:192). 
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complemented by a wise understanding and a social intelligence which 
can adequately translate the Christian ethic into a suitable social ethic.90 
Niebuhr drew a sharp distinction between a person as Imago Dei and the 
creatureliness and finiteness of humanity.91 This leads to his firm belief in 
the dignity of each person, despite their being a sinner.92 
 
And yet, it is the religious ideal which forms a part of justice. Justice 
cannot be totally separated from the religious. The hope for a just society 
will always remain irrevocably religious, and will always, to a certain 
extent, have as its ideal a fraternity in which love knows no boundaries:  
Every genuine passion for social justice will always contain a 
religious element within it. Religion will always leaven the idea of 
justice with the ideal of love. It will prevent the idea of justice, 
which is a politico-ethical ideal, from becoming a purely political 
one, with the ethical element washed out... Furthermore there 
must always be a religious element in the hope of a just society. 
Without the ultra-rational hopes and passions of religion no society 
will ever have the courage to conquer despair and attempt the 
impossible; for the vision of a just society is an impossible one, 
which can be approximated only by those who do not regard it as 
                                                 
90
 Spiritual vigour and social intelligence need to be combined to transform a Christian ethic into a 
social ethic. “What is needed to make this gospel effective is a combination of two qualities which are 
not always combined with ease: spiritual vigor and social intelligence. The spiritual vigor is needed to 
create in men the desire to check their expansive desires and to bring their clamant self-will under the 
will of God. So powerful are the forces of self that only a powerful religious devotion can bring them 
in check. But sometimes religious fervor which creates the will to live the Christlike life is not 
accompanied with sufficient social intelligence to know what the Christlike ethic is. Therefore social 
education must accompany religious regeneration” (Niebuhr 1968:76). 
 
91
 “To understand the paradoxical approach of Christian faith to the problem of human freedom and 
finiteness, it is necessary to set the doctrine of man as creature in juxtaposition to the doctrine of man 
as imago Dei” (Niebuhr 1941:166).  
 
92
 Niebuhr grounded the value of each person in who they are in the sight of God; every person is 
worthy of being treated with respect and dignity. “One of Niebuhr’s most important distinctions is that 
between the value of a person and the virtue of that person. All persons are of value, even when they 
have little virtue – that is because God loves them and because they are autonomous persons, end in 
themselves. The value of those who suffer remains and calls for our justice; but this presence of value 
in the oppressed does not mean that those who are oppressed are thereby virtuous or selfless. The 
justice of the cause of the proletariat, of the peoples occupied by colonial powers, of oppressed races, 
or of dominated women did not for Niebuhr at all mean the unalloyed virtue of any of these groups, as 
liberal sensitivities are inclined to assume. Hence their value as human beings remained the constant 
ground of the requirement on each of us of giving them both justice and love – even when, as is 
frequently the case, their lack of virtue becomes evident when they in turn gain power. In sum the 
value of each creature, and especially of each human creature, is for Niebuhr central to everything 
Christian faith wishes to say” (Gilkey 2001b:204). 
 
151 
 
impossible... For what religion believes to be true is not wholly 
true but ought to be true; and may become true if its truth is not 
doubted (Niebuhr 1932:80-81 my italics).  
 
Religion calls people to be responsible and to act in a way which is in 
accordance with the religious ethical teaching.93 Throughout his writings, 
and in his sermons, it was clear that Niebuhr’s passion for justice and 
equality in society was driven by religious motivation, even if this was not 
always explicitly stated. “Religion proceeds from profound introspection 
and naturally makes good motives the criteria of good conduct. It may 
define good motives either in terms of love or of duty, but the emphasis is 
upon the inner springs of action” (Niebuhr 1932:259). The social benefits 
of love may not be guaranteed, but their possibility cannot be denied. 
“Love and benevolence may not lead to complete mutuality; but it does 
have that tendency, particularly within the area of intimate relationships. 
Human life would, in fact, be intolerable if justice could be established in 
all relationships only by self-assertion and counter-assertion, or only by a 
shrewd calculation of claims and counter-claims. The fact is that love, 
disinterestedness and benevolence do have a strong social and utilitarian 
value...” (Niebuhr 1932:264-265). 
 
The church is not only a place which critically judges the actions of its 
members and causes them only unrest when they search their souls. It is 
also a place of reconciliation, consolation and mercy (Niebuhr 1932:62). 
The realism of our finitude is tempered by the eschatological hope – we 
are not alone and our situation is not hopeless.94 But this message cannot 
                                                 
93
 It is the responsibility of the church, and of Christian leaders, to remember this responsibility for 
social involvement. It is too easy for the church to deny its responsibility in the world when the focus 
becomes too clearly fixed on its other-worldliness.  “But the Christian faith, which can easily 
degenerate into a too simple moralism, may also degenerate into a too simple determinism and 
irresponsibility when the divine grace is regarded as a way of escape from, rather than a source of 
engagement with, the anxieties, perplexities, sins, and pretensions of human existence” (Niebuhr 
1968:174). 
 
94
 “The faith of a Christian is something quite different from this optimism. It is trust in God, in a 
good God who created a good world, though the world is not now good; in a good God, powerful and 
good enough finally to destroy the evil that men do and redeem them of their sins. This kind of faith 
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be sentimentalized; it should always stand in stark contrast to the broken 
reality of our existence. Christianity remained inseparable from Niebuhr’s 
ethics and political theology, even though he may not always have overtly 
referred to Biblical or Christian sources.95 
 
3.9 Responsibility in response to salvation  
 
It is impossible to speak about our salvation without speaking about the 
responsibility that remains so central to Niebuhr’s ethics.96 We are called 
to involvement in society by the very nature of our justification by faith. 
To be realistic though, justice needs to assume the continued power of 
self-interest within the community as it extends from a simple 
relationship between two people to a more complex relationship between 
many people, and finally to the obligations which are owed to the wider 
community (Niebuhr 1989:177).97 Justice is thus far more than an 
obligation; it is a lifestyle and positive action in history as a response to 
our human destiny. For us, as for Niebuhr, it remains inextricably linked 
to the hope which we have through our faith. At one point he said, “(t)he 
                                                                                                                                           
not optimism. It does not, in fact, arise until optimism breaks down and men cease to trust in 
themselves that they are righteous” (Niebuhr 1937:131). 
 
95
 The Christian religion, in its profoundest terms, is a faith in the meaningfulness of existence 
which is able to defy the chaos of any moment, because the basis of its trust is not in any of the 
constructs of human genius or any of the achievements of human diligence which arise periodically to 
imposing heights and tempt men to put their trust in their own virtues and abilities. Christianity 
believes in a God who created the world and will redeem it; but it knows that the purposes of God may 
be momentarily and periodically frustrated by human wickedness (Niebuhr 1937:113-114). 
 
96
 Stephen de Gruchy, in his doctoral thesis, makes a compelling argument for the relationship 
between Niebuhr’s soteriology and the central theme of responsibility in his ethics (1992, 
unpublished).  
  
97
 “Systems and principles of justice are the servants and instruments of the spirit of brotherhood in 
so far as they extend the sense of obligation from an immediately felt obligation, prompted by obvious 
need to a continued obligation expressed in fixed principles of mutual support; from a simple relation 
between one self and one other to the complex relations of the self and the others; and finally from the 
obligations, discerned by the self, to the wider obligations which the community defines from its more 
impartial perspective” (Niebuhr 1989:177).  
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function of religion is to nerve men for an ethical achievement when it 
promises no immediate returns.”98  
 
“There is not enough imagination in any social group to render it 
amenable to the influence of pure love. Nor is there a possibility of 
persuading any social group to make a venture in pure love... The 
selfishness of human communities must be regarded as an inevitability” 
(Niebuhr 1932:272). Thus, each individual needs to be personally 
responsible for their moral action, and to extend this morality to the 
group. “The needs of an adequate political strategy do not obviate the 
necessity of cultivation of the strictest individual moral discipline and the 
most uncompromising idealism” (Niebuhr 1932:273). It also necessitates 
laws and rules in society in an attempt to make society just. But this will 
always be an imperfect justice.99 An imperfect justice is not an excuse for 
accepting injustice, though. Niebuhr points out that the “difference 
between a little more and a little less justice in a social system and 
between a little more and a little less selfishness in the individual may 
represent differences between sickness and health, between misery and 
happiness in particular situations” (1941:220). Niebuhr warns that 
although “all have sinned and come short of the glory of God” it must not 
inhibit preferences between oppressor and oppressed because while such a 
distinction will be appropriate at “the ultimate religious level of 
judgement” it is not necessary, or feasible, to make use of it in all 
historical situations.  
 
                                                 
98
 Does Civilization Need Religion. P 74. 
 
99
 Karen Lebacqz writes briefly about justice being borne out of injustice: “...Niebuhr’s basic 
insight regarding the imperfection of justice remains valid. If justice is wrought in response to injustice 
then justice can never be perfect. It will always be tainted by the limitations of human reason and 
vision, and it will always be restricted by the constraints of an imperfect social order. There will 
always be a “better justice toward which we might strive. ... Every earthly justice is a relative justice 
that incorporates injustice within it” (1987:143).  
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It was never Jesus’ intention, according to Niebuhr, to provide a blueprint 
for society.100 A just society is an ideal for which we strive, a reminder of 
what can one day be achieved, although this will not be realised within 
history. We have to make responsible choices and behave in a responsible 
way, because love alone will not change the world. Instead, we need a 
prophetic faith, which calls us to meaningful action which is realistic and 
to hope instead of despair.101 It is essential to engage both moralists and 
political realists in trying to prevent society from senseless coercion and 
conflict. Such a view will realise that while some coercion and conflict is 
unavoidable, it can be limited.  
An adequate political morality must do justice to the insights of 
both moralists and political realists. It will recognise that human 
society will probably never escape social conflict, even though it 
extends the areas of social co-operation. It will try to save society 
from being involved in endless cycles of futile conflict, not by an 
effort to abolish coercion in the life of collective man, but by 
reducing it to a minimum, by counselling the use of such types of 
coercion as are most compatible with the moral and rational 
factors in human society and by discrimination between the 
purposes and ends for which coercion is used (Niebuhr 1932:234).  
In his chapter on moral values in politics in Moral Man and Immoral 
Society Niebuhr discusses the serious problem which arises from 
‘punishing’ one group because of their unjust policies, and he points out 
that coercion and conflict are not always the best ways to deal with a 
problem. If, for example, a nation boycotts another nation because it 
disagrees with their political policies, it is not only the government that 
suffers, but it is the people who suffer (see pages 238ff). The innocent, in 
the end, suffer with the guilty. Society is never free from coercion in its 
attempt to eradicate injustice, be it overt or covert coercion. But “society 
                                                 
100
 See Robin Lovin, Reinhold Niebuhr, page xi ff. For Niebuhr, the Bible does not so much offer 
practical solutions to social and political problems as what it encourages a certain lifestyle amongst 
believers.  
 
101
 Lovin captures this distinction so beautifully: “Prophetic faith avoids both sentimentality and 
despair. It keeps us from the cheerful assumption that our good deeds are steadily transforming the 
world into a better place and from the paralyzing fear that nothing we can do will make any difference. 
Prophetic faith replaces optimism with gratitude and despair with contrition, so that our choices and 
actions can be realistic and life remains meaningful, in spite of our finitude and limitations” (2007:11).  
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must strive for justice even if it is forced to use means, such as self-
assertion, resistance, coercion and perhaps resentment, which cannot gain 
the moral sanction of the most sensitive moral spirit” (Niebuhr 1932:257).  
 
Responsibility for the Christian community is not about creating a 
Christian government. Rather, it is about responding to political, 
economic and social matters in a Christian manner based upon a 
Christian ethic. A prophetic Christian ethic would be more of a general 
demand than a specific programme; that is, said Niebuhr, it cannot make 
specific demands of the political and the impossible ideal should have no 
place in the discussion (1935:156). A prophetic Christian ethic stands 
outside of history, while at the same time accommodating the needs of a 
specific generation. In his article Theology and Political Thought in the 
Western World, Niebuhr writes about the Christian ethic, or attitude, 
which does not seek to play God in society, but still makes responsible 
choices which can influence political theory in a positive manner:  
We have come to the fairly general conclusion that there is no 
“Christian” economic or political system. But there is a Christian 
attitude toward all systems and schemes of justice. It consists on 
the one hand of a critical attitude toward the claims of all systems 
and schemes, expressed in the question whether they will 
contribute to justice in a concrete situation; and on the other hand 
a responsible attitude, which will not pretend to be God nor refuse 
to make a decision between political answers to a problem because 
each answer is discovered to contain a moral ambiguity in God’s 
sight. We are men, not God; we are responsible for making choices 
between greater and lesser evils, even when our Christian faith, 
illuminating the human scene, makes it quite apparent that there 
is no pure good in history; and probably no pure evil, either. The 
fate of civilization may depend on these choices (Reinhold Niebuhr. 
Faith and Politics (Stone, R. Ed) 1968:56). Cited in Lovin 1995:25 
my italics). 
Niebuhr was scathing of apathy and inaction, both personally and 
nationally. He harshly condemned the neutrality act of 1939 and 
“demanded” its instant repeal, because “it is one of the most immoral laws 
that was ever spread upon a federal statue book.” It is immoral because of  
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the evasion or denial of moral responsibility. When a man refuses 
to recognize his obligations as a member of a community, when he 
isolates himself from the affairs of his community, and acts as a 
completely unrelated individual, he is an immoral man. Morality 
consists in the recognition of the interdependence of personal life. 
The moral man is the man who acts responsibly in relations to his 
fellows, who knows the duties that communal life requires, and 
who is willing to accept the consequences that these duties impose. 
As with men, so with nations (Niebuhr 1957:177-178 my italics).  
 
3.10 A Practical Christian Realism  
 
Where do we find the way between Christianity and politics or theology 
and politics? Since our call, as part of a prophetic faith, is to take 
responsible action for the social well-being of all people, we need to ask 
where it is that we are headed when in dialogue with public and social 
policy.102 Niebuhr believed that a political morality must appeal to 
idealists and realists as well as contain a religious world-view: 
an adequate political morality must do justice to the insights of 
both idealists and political realists. It must include a political 
policy which will reduce coercive power to the minimum and bring 
the most effective social check upon conflicting egoistic impulses in 
society; it must generate a moral idealism which will make for a 
moral and rational adjustment of life to life and exploit every 
available resource of altruistic impulse and reason to extend life 
from selfish to social ends; and it must encompass a religious 
world-view which will do justice to the ideals of the spirit which 
reach beyond the possibilities of historic achievement (Niebuhr 
1989:131 my italics).  
Our goal is always for a higher justice, for a policy which will result in a 
more just society than the one we have now, and for a morality which will 
result in a more equal society. We cannot do this alone; no person, no 
group and no nation can do it alone. There needs to be continual dialogue 
and re-evaluation of our policies and ideas. We must never become too 
                                                 
102
 There is criticism against Niebuhr for not considering that Christianity possibly has no place in 
the political realm. “Niebuhr’s insistence that responsible Christianity requires a compromise of the 
demands of Jesus’ ethics fails to ask the prior question of whether Christians should be taking 
responsibility for the life of society in the first place” (Lovin 1995:94).  
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confident in our achievements but must seek always to see how the world 
can be improved. It is too easy for justice to become injustice and so all our 
policies need to be continually evaluated and critically examined.103  
 
For Niebuhr, the pathway to justice lies not only in responsibility but the 
ability to see the viewpoint of others, and refuse to accept our truth and 
our worldview as final and ultimate. We need to choose responsibly, 
because this is the way to achieving limited goals, along with the 
responsibility to not place too much glory in the achievements (Lovin 
2007:xi). Our happiness is dependent upon us having a little more justice 
and freedom and being a little more  understanding of others: 
Human happiness ... is determined by the difference between a 
little more and a little less justice, a little more and a little less 
freedom, between varying degrees of imaginative insight with 
which the self enters the life and understands the interests of the 
neighbour (Niebuhr. An Interpretation of Christian Ethics. 
1979:64. Cited in Lovin 2007:xi). 
 Although couched in negative terms, Niebuhr put forward a similar 
notion in Moral Man and Immoral Society:  
Whatever increase in social intelligence and moral goodwill may be 
achieved in human history, may serve to mitigate the brutalities of 
social conflict, but they cannot abolish the conflict itself. That 
could be accomplished only if human groups, whether racial, 
national or economic, could achieve a degree of reason and 
sympathy which would permit them to see and to understand the 
interests of others as vividly as they understand their own, and a 
moral goodwill which would prompt them to affirm the rights of 
others as vigorously as they affirm their own. Given the inevitable 
limitations of human nature and the limits of the human 
imagination and intelligence, this is an ideal which individuals 
may approximate but which is beyond the capacities of human 
societies (1932:xxv my italics).  
                                                 
103
 “Critical intelligence is a prerequisite of justice. Short of the complete identification of life with 
life which the law of love demands, it is necessary to arbitrate and adjust between competing interests 
in terms of a critical scrutiny of all the interests involved. Every historic and traditional adjustment of 
rights must be constantly subjected to a fresh examination. Otherwise the elements of injustice 
involved in every historic achievement of justice will become inordinate. They will grow not only 
because it is the tendency of all power and privilege to multiply its demands and pretensions, but also 
because shifting circumstances will transmute the justice of yesterday into the injustice of tomorrow” 
(Niebuhr 1935:163-4 my italics). 
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Equal justice was without a doubt the end which Niebuhr envisioned for 
society, although he would probably speak of a more equal justice, bearing 
in mind that equality is impossible to achieve. The coercion which is 
exercised in society and in communities, on a national or international 
level will always need to keep the end goal in mind, of creating a more 
equal society, with more people benefitting from the goods of society.104 
Niebuhr speaks of rational societies although what exactly he means by 
rational societies is not defined, but we can probably assume that he 
means a society which will not exercise coercion for its own benefit, but 
rather seek the benefit of each individual in society, increasing the 
equality in the society. For all his criticism of liberalism, he was 
supportive of its positive points, and willing to acknowledge these, such as 
tolerance, reason and the emphasis on rights.105 Coercion is often 
necessary in society to secure unreasonable loyalty – “obedience, respect 
and loyalty” – so that the ultimate social goals can be attained.  
If the mind and the spirit of man does not attempt the impossible, 
if it does not seek to conquer or to eliminate nature but tries only 
to make the forces of nature the servants of the human spirit, and 
the instruments of the moral ideal, a progressively higher justice 
and more stable peace can be achieved (Niebuhr 1932:256) 
 
                                                 
104
  Niebuhr saw conflict as an inevitable part of the search for greater equality. Conflict which 
furthers justice is acceptable, he concludes, while conflict which attempts to protect wealth should be 
condemned. “An adequate political morality…will recognize that human society will probably never 
escape social conflict, even though it extends the areas of social co-operation. … A rational society 
will probably place a greater emphasis upon the ends and purposes for which coercion is used than 
upon the elimination of coercion and conflict. It will justify coercion if it is obviously in the service of 
a rationally acceptable social end, and condemn its use when it is in the service of momentary 
passions. The conclusion which has been forced upon us again and again in these pages is that 
equality, or to be a little more qualified, that equal justice is the most rational ultimate objective for 
society. If this conclusion is correct, a social conflict which aims at greater equality has a moral 
justification which must be denied to efforts which aim at the perpetuation of privilege” (Niebuhr 
1989:55 my italics). 
 
105
 “It is quite possible that much of his method is dependent on the liberal achievements, as has 
been suggested. There are values in the liberal spirit of tolerance. Reason has its rights and its 
constructive function. … Reason has played a part in the discovery of the worth of the individual and 
is necessary to the achievement of tolerable justice in human relations. The very reliance on reason 
does tend to achieve something of a balance of power. The liberal spirit in morals is of most value in 
working out pragmatic adjustments within a fairly stable situation” (Williams 1956:203). 
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For the Christian in particular, participation in the political and social 
sphere is by no means an easy task. There are many ambiguities in 
politics and there is a certain sanctity of the Christian faith which cannot 
be brought into this sphere.  
Thus the real problem of a Christian social ethic is to derive from 
the Gospel a clear view of the realities with which we must deal in 
our common or social life, and also to preserve a sense of 
responsibility for achieving the highest measure of order, freedom 
and justice despite the hazards of man’s collective life (Niebuhr 
1989:128). 
However, this is not an impossible task, even if it is difficult. Keith Ward 
sees the Christian responsibility in society as existing on two-tiers, one 
being more easily accomplished than the other: 
What seems best to reflect Christian hope in political reality, then, 
is a two-tier political ethic. The first tier is that of justice, in the 
sense of negative rights – refraining from interfering in the 
legitimate plans and pursuits of others, and respecting their 
pursuits as part of respecting them, but also being prepared to 
prevent them from unduly obstructing the legitimate plans of 
others. The second tier is that of charity, of the pursuit of ideals of 
social self-realization, which form the real vision and inspiration of 
Christian social life. It is important to see, however, that this 
second tier proposes a set of ideals which can never be fully 
realized, whereas the first tier can and should be implemented in 
any society (1986:85 my italics). 
Justice cannot be limited to the purely political. Without individual input, 
it becomes an empty concept.  
No system of justice established by the political, economic, and 
social coercion in the political order is perfect enough to dispense 
with the refinements which voluntary and uncoerced human 
kindness and tenderness between individuals add to it. These 
refinements are not only necessary, but possible (Niebuhr 
1935:201).  
Each individual needs to become aware of their significance in society, 
and their importance in the world, not only because of their inherent 
value as a human being but because of their potential to give value and 
meaning to life in general and to the specific life of the individuals with 
whom they come into contact. This responsibility needs to be instilled in a 
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community where people feel safe and secure.106 It is here that values are 
taught and social responsibility can become second nature. The church 
has a particular role to give people courage and hope: 
There is meanwhile a very great task for the church to help people 
to live sanely in a very insecure world. A religious faith which 
trusts no historic securities too much, but understands the 
ultimate security of the assurance that ‘neither life nor death are 
able to separate us from the love of God,’ can become a resource of 
sanity in an insecure world. A religious faith which understands 
the perpetual disappointments in human history and knows that 
no historical achievement can be identified with the Kingdom of 
God, can prevent the disillusionment, bordering upon despair... 
(Niebuhr 1959:89 my italics). 
 
But of course this is no simple task. “A moral discipline calculated to 
increase the intensity and range of man’s obligation to other life involves 
two factors: The extension of the area in which life feels itself obligated to 
affirm and protect the interest of other life and the provision of an 
adequate dynamic to support this obligation” (Niebuhr 1935:202). 
Niebuhr’s life was a continual quest for justice, while avoiding self-
sufficiency. Out of tears came responsibility and life was a paradox of 
“grace and grief.” 
Self-interest had its place in a realistic political theory, but as a 
moral ideal it repelled him. He was suspicious of all calls for self-
fulfillment. ... Personal contentment was a long-range by-product 
of communal engagement, not of a course in ‘growth.’ He was 
uncomfortable with the traditional, Aristotelian notion of self-
realization - the gradual development of talents and virtues, the 
acorn becoming the oak – because it was too complacent about the 
power of mind to discipline and control the self. ... Happiness could 
be found only on the other side of unhappiness and it came as a 
gift, no an acquisition. The moral existence demanded a 
provisional unfulfillment. Yet the brokenness and brutality of the 
earthly vale of tears provoked not resignation but expectancy. For 
                                                 
106
 “The most grievous mistake of Marxism is its assumption that an adequate mechanism of social 
justice will inevitably create individuals who will be disciplined enough to “give according to their 
ability and take according to their need.” The highest achievements of social goodwill and human 
kindness can be guaranteed by no political system. They are the consequence of moral and religious 
disciplines which might be more appreciated in our day if the Christian Church had not mistakenly 
tried to substitute them for the coercive prerequisites of basic justice”  (Niebuhr 1935:201).  
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all his doubts about the power of mind, he was sure that men and 
women were called to enact justice, make their own history, in full 
awareness of the pride and foolishness that would plague their 
efforts. All the while they could shake their heads in wonder at the 
spectacle of a life that was forever, as he said to Scarlett, ‘full of 
grace and grief’ (Fox 297-98 my italics).  
 
Niebuhr speaks of the struggle for justice which will always be a struggle. 
This tells a lot about how justice cannot easily be achieved, and is 
something which needs continual attention. Justice is never perfect, and 
even the most just society is always in danger of becoming unjust, and the 
good which occurs may become oppressive and tyrannical on both an 
individual and communal level. Yes even in the tragedy of injustice, 
Niebuhr finds reason to be positive, “some beauty in our tragedy,” for “we 
can no longer buy the highest satisfactions of the individual life at the 
expense of social injustice.” He declares that some illusions are necessary, 
most importantly the illusion that “the collective life of mankind can 
achieve perfect justice” because “justice cannot be approximated if the 
hope of its perfect realization does not generate a sublime madness in the 
soul” (Niebuhr 1932:277).  
 
The boundaries of justice are ever-increasing, which makes it difficult to 
determine what action is right and wrong. Niebuhr insists on a 
contemplative interaction with society, which continually re-examines 
practices.  His realistic approach, rather than utopian view of human 
history, places each person as a part of a much bigger picture. Although 
his view of sin is inadequate, it does offer great insight into the greed 
which often leads to oppression and tyranny. It is necessary to live in a 
way which is not accepting, but is constantly questioning what we know to 
be true and right.  
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3.11 Conclusion 
 
Niebuhr’s theology was greatly influenced by his formative years as a 
pastor in Detroit. The social, political and economic circumstances which 
confronted him during his life bore an intense impact on his theology. 
Niebuhr was intensely critical of various world views which did not 
support his argument, and employed a methodology which sought rather 
to undergird his own thinking than to interpret the worldview in its own 
right. All his books and articles reflect engagement with the political 
arena and his influence as a theologian in the secular world remains 
undeniable. 
 
Niebuhr’s central theme throughout his work was justice, or the lack 
thereof in society. This was firmly based in his Christian realism, through 
which he attempted to encourage a neither too pessimistic nor too 
optimistic view of reality, history and human nature. Niebuhr emphasises 
the transience of human life, and our inability to perfect justice or love in 
history. This realism is closely linked to his view of human nature and 
human destiny. The sins of pride and sensuality are responsible for many 
of the injustices in society; our refusal to accept our finitude means that 
we are continually trying to overcome it. However, this weakness and 
dependence finds hope in the Cross, which calls each person, created in 
the image of God, to live in a responsible way. Niebuhr’s discussion of 
human nature and human destiny are closely linked, and offer most 
fruitful insights when considered together. Faith, hope and love offer 
alternatives to the hopelessness of the finitude of life.  
 
Justice needs to be firmly grounded in community. Relationships are 
corrupted by injustice and power though, and Niebuhr remains slightly 
suspicious of the ability of community and society to act in a just way. He 
did admit that community was necessary for the formation of values and 
for education, although he was always wary of their ability to corrupt. For 
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Niebuhr, more justice is a more equal justice, particularly where power is 
concerned. Justice is always measured by love, which remains an 
impossible possibility for Niebuhr. His self-sacrificial understanding of 
perfect love renders it impossible for people to achieve, making justice the 
political reality instead.  
 
Faith and religion provide us with hope, although most specifically in a 
religious setting, rather than in a secular environment. Its wisdom is not 
exclusive though, and dialogue between religious leaders and secular 
leaders is important. It is necessary to guard against pride and arrogance 
and to continuously evaluate the effects of our belief on the world. Also, 
says Niebuhr, religion is not designed to offer comfort and security – it 
should rather create a feeling of intense uneasiness, pushing us towards 
action, continually searching for a better truth and a more equal justice. 
And our Christian understanding needs to be translated into the secular. 
Our motivation might arise from our response to salvation, but it needs to 
be played out in society. There is no specific Christian programme, but a 
Christian ethic which reacts in a responsible way in society. Thus for 
Niebuhr, responsibility and community remain inseparable from the 
struggle for justice.  
 
Rawls and Niebuhr approach justice from two very different perspectives 
and deal with it very differently in their work. Rawls draws our attention 
towards the necessity of caring for the least disadvantaged in society. His 
focus on institutions and society as the place where justice belongs begs 
discussion of the place of community in developing a sense of justice in 
people, which ties in with Rawls’s moral psychology. Rawls also points out 
the need for justice between generations, which emphasises the need for 
justice for future generations, but also leads to discussion of what justice 
is needed to address past injustices.  
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Niebuhr reminds us of the responsibility which everyone has to live in a 
way which is ethical. He was intent on the social and political issues of his 
day, not attempting to turn justice into a single theory which could be 
applied to any situation at any given time. He used words like sin, pride 
and power, continually reminding us of our fallibility and subjectivity.  
 
These observations are now discussed with other theological ideas, 
sometimes in dialogue with other theologians. We now ask how justice 
relates to poverty, moral reasoning, human dignity, community and a 
global world. The importance of the Christian community and 
eschatological hope ends the discussion.  
 
165 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Chapter 4 
Justice between fairness and love? 
 
 
 
4.1 Introduction 
 
The chapter begins with a brief overview of Rawls’s and Niebuhr’s views 
of justice as has been discussed in the previous two chapters, with 
particular emphasis on what is pertinent to the discussions which follow. 
Rawls’s priority of liberty over equality offers possible cause for concern, 
although when addressed from a human dignity and rights perspective, it 
becomes acceptable; it is necessary to ensure that it does not achieve 
absolute priority. Rawls leaves no place for religion or morality in his 
principles of justice, although his later overlapping consensus creates a 
platform for people with different beliefs and points of view to reach a 
consensus. Despite his lack of common good and his insistence that the 
right is prior to the good, Rawls places great value on community, 
particularly with regard to moral formation and uses gifts and talents for 
the betterment of everyone.  
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Niebuhr is far more pessimistic than Rawls about human nature and the 
achievement of justice in society. His Christian realism takes seriously 
the presence of sin in the world, as well as the grace of God. He 
emphasises responsible contemplation and action to make the world more 
just. Although pride and sensuality influence our judgement, he insists 
that we must always aim for a higher justice, while emphasising that the 
struggle for justice will always be a struggle. Niebuhr’s faith is 
inseparable from his discussions on justice, and for him it is impossible to 
achieve justice in any measure without the grace of God.  
 
The insights of both Rawls and Niebuhr are enlightening, but a justice 
which seeks to be more than fairness must move beyond the contract 
theory proposed by Rawls and take seriously the plight of humanity in an 
unjust world. Anticipating justice without taking seriously the injustices 
in society would be a grave mistake. The five themes which are discussed 
in this chapter (poverty, moral reasoning, human dignity, community and 
a global world) offer insights which build on Rawls and Niebuhr, but 
which also pose challenges for future engagements.  
 
Taking poverty, oppression and injustice as a starting point for talking 
about justice can be helpful in certain situations. The biblical preferential 
option for the poor is undeniable, and needs to be a part of any justice 
discussions. Meeting the basic needs of people is also often not enough; 
their capabilities need to be adequately met, too.  
 
It is possible for theology to offer a transforming worldview by means of 
critical discussion. Justice is not only about the economic and political 
injustices, it needs to incorporate ethical and moral discussion and 
reasoning. Theology can offer a language of sin and sacrifice, both of 
which can greatly enrich understanding of injustice and development of 
justice.  
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Restoring human dignity is central to justice; it is important to take 
people seriously and listen to their side of the story. Biblical ethics remind 
us of the inalienable dignity of each person and remind us to take 
seriously the need which each person has for respect. Justice without 
dignity cannot be true justice.  
 
Community is an important part of moral formation. It provides us with 
meaning in our lives and a place where people can learn how to behave in 
a just way. Community must take human dignity seriously and be a place 
of justice and equality. The church community should offer a place where 
people can seek refuge from the evils of the world and should also be a 
place where moral formation takes place and where people can learn to 
see the world differently and act accordingly. The importance of liturgy, 
worship and prayer needs to be taken seriously, as well as the necessity of 
the church’s social involvement. The church can offer a safe space for 
dialogue to take place, where people can share their stories. As part of our 
community, it is necessary to also take seriously the plight of the earth 
and the animals.  
 
Beyond the community, justice extends to a global level, which brings 
with it its own set of complications. Not only do different groups and 
traditions need to exist in harmony with each other, but radical 
differences in wealth and power need to be more evenly distributed. 
Tolerance, in a positive version, is necessary to accept differences on 
global and on local levels. Respect for people and for their practices is 
necessary if prejudice is not going to lead to oppression and injustice. At 
the same time, tolerance must not lead to apathy.  
 
The eschatological hope which is found in Christianity also offers a very 
specific hope, which is accompanied by responsibility to make the world a 
more just place. For Niebuhr, the eschatological hope was a call to action. 
While recognising the imperfection of any human attempt at justice, there 
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is always a responsibility to respond to what we know will be perfected in 
the future. We are called to be critically challenging and to try to find a 
better and more equal justice.  
 
Theology can offer a very specific ethical discourse to justice discussions. 
Not only does it take seriously the dignity of each and every person but it 
also involves itself in political and economic life. It affirms what is good, 
and critiques that which is less desirable. In a Christian community, 
Christians can learn to be Christians in the world. This means living in a 
way which is ethically responsible and takes justice seriously. It also 
means living in the hope that the way things are can change. It is not only 
outward but also inward facing. Always critical of civil society, it is 
important that the church is critical of itself, too, and does not develop a 
superiority complex or become too proud.  
 
4.2 Rawls’s fairness and Niebuhr’s love 
 
4.2.1  John Rawls 
 
John Rawls’s theory of justice (I refer here specifically to the two 
principles of justice developed in the original position) is dependent upon 
both a social contract which is acceptable to all members of the society 
and just institutions to promote justice in society. This, however, paints a 
very idealistic picture of society. Not everyone, possibly not even many, 
people will accept the same principles of justice and institutions will 
probably only have limited success in promoting justice without the 
cooperation of individuals of the community. Rawls did, however, offer a 
profound alternative to utilitarianism, and much of the work that was 
done on justice in the late 20th century is a response (whether critical or 
affirmative) to his theory of justice.  
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Rawls accepts the moral nature of people (this is often inferred, rather 
than explicitly stated) although he leaves no room for morality when 
talking about justice in the political realm. Although there is much to be 
critical of in his work (such as the priority of the right over the good), 
there are important lessons to be learnt as well. The fact that people are 
moral beings, deserving of liberty, self-respect and certain basic needs 
which must be met provides us with building blocks when talking about 
justice. While the theory of justice as fairness might fail us as a theory, 
the content offers valuable insights into the functioning of society, 
particularly in his later work, and enriches any debate on justice.  
 
Rawls has been criticised for the priority which he gives to liberty, but 
this is not an absolute priority and emphasises the necessity of freedom in 
ensuring that equality is as fair as possible. The connection between 
liberty and human dignity is of the utmost importance when addressing 
this subject. If society accepts the liberty of all people, will equality not 
follow more easily? Equality does not guarantee liberty, but then again, 
liberty does not guarantee equality. So how do we prioritise the two? Is it 
better that people are equal, but lack dignity, or have dignity but lack 
equality? What Rawls, and many other theorists, seem to presuppose is 
that basic needs are met in discussions about justice and equality is 
implying something far more than providing all people with food, 
adequate shelter, clothing, education and medical care. Once these needs 
are met, the liberty of the people becomes important. Their establishment 
as full, participating members of society is essential, as is the assurance 
that they will be capable of making full use of the resources presented to 
them.  
 
The second principle (fair equality of opportunity as well as the difference 
principle), sets high standards for society, probably impossibly high 
standards. It presents a clear challenge for a redistribution of wealth in 
society. What is not made clear is how a system for redistribution would 
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work. The proponents of the capabilities theory would disagree that 
equality of opportunity and the difference principle are enough. Giving 
individuals the means to live a certain standard of life is worthless if they 
are incapable of making use of these resources (Rawls makes this 
distinction when talking about the worth of a liberty). It is perhaps 
necessary to accept that the majority of people, given an equal opportunity 
and the means to fulfil certain goals, would live a certain way and 
participate in society in a relevant and responsible way.  
 
Rawls leaves no place for religion, morality or love and benevolence in the 
public and political discussion of justice. “Morally justifiable principles” 
are not necessarily  as unacceptable as Rawls would have us believe 
(Rawls 2003:190). Rawls quotes Aristotle that it is the common 
understanding of justice inherent to men and women that makes a polis. 
But surely this ties us into a community? Our idea of justice is not amoral 
or irreligious. There is surely a close relationship between justice and the 
religious, or at the very least, communal nature of human beings. While a 
rational argument can be made for the value of human life and the 
importance of human dignity (cf. Kant), the inherent moral implications of 
this for human life and human dignity cannot be denied. Rawls speaks of 
a comprehensive view of justice, which will then include “conceptions of 
what is of value in human life, as well as ideals of personal virtue and 
character, that are to inform much of our non-political conduct” 
(1993a:174). This is excluded from both the principles of justice and the 
political conception of justice in particular.  
 
Rawls draws important parallels between self-respect and self-confidence 
and being a fully participating member of society who can have their 
needs met and achieve their goals. Having a suitable plan for life is a good 
which all people should have. This is different to the idea of the right. But, 
for a rational person, their good plan will fit in with what is right and the 
right is determined by the principles of justice. For Rawls, people should 
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be left alone to determine what their life plan is without involvement from 
the state, so long as they do not violate the rights of other people. Maybe 
the right fits better into policies and laws, where the good is determined 
not only by individuals but by their communities and their involvement in 
society but nevertheless does include some conception of what is right. 
Faith communities and social groups determine what a person looks for in 
life. These connections are undeniable and play a large role in developing 
self-esteem and self-respect. They also become a place where the value of 
each person is affirmed. Rawls does not deny the influence of various 
relationships and associations on the moral formation of the person; he 
merely attempts to keep the personal moral opinions out of the debate 
about justice.  
 
For Rawls, the idea of having just principles governing society is partly to 
establish a just way of life in that society. He sees the sense of justice in 
society increasing in direct proportion to the loyalty between people 
(between individuals, their communities and society as a whole). The 
importance of the principles of justice lies in their neutrality. They do not 
appeal to a certain religion or philosophy. They create a space in the 
political where an overlapping consensus becomes the standard – religion, 
morality and philosophy move to the background allowing the political 
(unencumbered by any doctrine) to become the determiner of actions.  
 
Rawls himself acknowledges in later works (most notably Political 
Liberalism) that pluralism plays an important place in society. Provided 
people and doctrines are ‘decent’ they can participate in a democratic 
society without necessarily accepting the same rules of justice. The 
overlapping consensus in turn creates a space for people to talk of their 
specific, comprehensive views; that is, the religious, moral and 
philosophical influences. If people have already agreed that certain 
principles are just, they cannot suddenly decide that they are unjust. So 
the idea of the overlapping consensus, or something similar, can be a 
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starting point, or a platform, for dialogue between various disciplines. 
Rawls thus moves from excluding morality in his earlier work to making a 
space for it later.  
 
Rawls’s moral psychology, which maintains that justice is formed in 
communities, is an important part of his work which is sadly neglected, 
often to the detriment of his theory of justice. It shows that justice is not 
an individualistic notion but is formed by and applicable to the various 
relationships and associations in the society in which we live. The idea of 
respect is not asocial, but finds its very root in the way people interact. 
Rawls connects this to the idea of reciprocity; when we realize that other 
people wish us well and want the best life for us, we will want the same 
for them. Although this will not stretch so far as to make altruists of 
people, and most people will not act only out of benevolence, the majority 
of people are interested in the community beyond themselves and they 
have political, social and cultural interests.  
 
Community is important for Rawls and not only the immediate 
community, but also the links between generations. Each generation can 
benefit from previous generations, and the present generation in turn 
leaves something behind for the future generations. Justice is not only 
about fair practice and equality at the present time, but ensuring that 
what is happening today will have just consequences in the future. It is 
here that we begin to talk about redress and reparations for past 
injustices.  
 
Gifts and talents are complementary; science (and scientific discovery) is 
interlinked between generations and between people and art is also 
dependent upon others (such as an orchestra, which needs all the different 
players). Sport is another example of how the talent and commitment of 
many different people lead to success as well as forming a common ground 
for drawing together supporters and fans from different communities and 
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social backgrounds to enjoy the one thing they have in common in 
supporting their team. This once again enforces the importance of 
community. It is in such a social setting, a community where people are 
inherently dependent upon each other for realizing their goals, that a 
sense of justice can be fostered. Rawls believes that people in a community 
who are relying on the skills and expertise and assistance of others should 
behave in moral way (for Rawls, in a way which is in accordance with the 
principles of justice). One of the aims of Rawls’s theory of justice is to 
allow people the opportunity to pursue a good plan for their lives. This 
plan relies on community for its fulfilment; it does not stand in isolation 
from society.  
 
It is the task of the institutions of which society is comprised to formulate 
justice in a way which will give each person the best opportunity to reach 
their goal. This institutions encompass the family, the broader 
associations made in society (school, clubs and the like) and finally the 
broader public community. Each individual in turn, should have a sense of 
responsibility to the members of the various associations and communities 
and respect their rights.  
 
4.2.2 Reinhold Niebuhr 
 
Niebuhr’s Christian realism stands in sharp contrast to the ideological 
principles of justice put forward by Rawls. His realism accepts the 
realities of the world, and the pain, suffering and injustice which are a 
part of life. This realism stands in contrast to the eschatological hope 
which is grounded in faith and realized in love. For Niebuhr, love always 
remains the ultimate goal which is unattainable in this world. Love does 
not need justice because it is perfect justice; but because of the failure to 
fully realize love on earth it will always be only imperfect and therefore 
justice is a necessity. Niebuhr’s justice developed in response to the social 
injustice which he saw every day.  
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A driving force behind Niebuhr’s work was his belief that people not only 
should take responsibility but that they can take responsibility. If people 
thought and lived in a way which was ethically responsible, it would make 
a difference to history and change society. Niebuhr’s thought was always 
inherently connected to the current political situation and the social 
issues of the day received his attention. This is a reminder that we live 
neither in a static environment nor in a vacuum. It is imperative to 
respond in a responsible way when addressing the issues at hand and 
developing a culture of justice in response to the injustices in society.  
 
We have a subjective view of reality, which means that our truth is never 
the truth. People are prejudiced, and will seek to look after their own 
political, economic and social interests. Contrary to Rawls’s opinion, 
Niebuhr sees the struggle for justice as being a continuous struggle 
because people will never voluntarily give up their power and self-
interest. However, people are capable of finding common ground between 
opposing interests, which has been proven in society by the justice which 
has already been achieved. It is humanity’s anxiousness at being unable 
to control its destiny that leads to injustice. The realization that we are 
finite beings leads us to attempt to attain infinity and achieve freedom 
from the natural constrains placed on us by our humanity. 
 
Sin as pride and power plays a pivotal role in Niebuhr’s work. For 
Niebuhr, the corrupting force of power leads to injustice. With power, 
people tend to forget their finiteness, and think that they can control their 
destiny. Conversely, sin as sensuality represents the attempt to ignore the 
finiteness rather than trying to overcome it. People seek to immerse 
themselves in over-indulgence, consumerism or finding another god, be it 
person, state or status.  Sin as pride also warns against assuming that we 
know everything, and that our way is the right way. We should never 
confuse our truth with the truth and we should always search for a higher 
and better justice.  
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Taking responsibility for our lives negates the sin which is ever-present, 
and yet unnecessary. In the Biblical law of love there is peace instead of 
tension between freedom and finitude. For Niebuhr, justice is a result of 
reason, not benevolence. But reason can never be so pure as to be true 
justice; power, pride and sensuality will always be corrupting forces which 
make justice less than just. The presence of sin makes an ideological 
theory of justice impossible. Our anxiety about our finiteness will always 
push us to protect what is our own, more so in a group than individually. 
The culture and lifestyle which the rich and powerful want to protect 
leads to social inequality and justice. However, Niebuhr sees class loyalty 
as being easier overcome than national loyalty.  
 
A higher justice, which is interpreted by Niebuhr as a more equal justice, 
means the right to the goods which not only sustain life, but promote a 
good life. The church offers an alternative to the ideological principles of 
justice; by acknowledging the sin in our lives, and the corruptive forces of 
power and wealth, we can be better equipped in our attempts to realise 
the eschatological goal of absolute equality. The responsibility of the 
church as the people of God is not really given attention in Niebuhr’s 
work, but is something which can be derived from the passion with which 
he approached his work as pastor and lecturer as well as the way he lived 
his life. It is important to ask how the church community functions in an 
unjust society to make it more just, and more equal, and to attain better 
life for all people. 
 
Although love might be the motivation, and love as the telos is the hope, 
love in the present is an unrealistic hope for no one can love perfectly and 
benevolence will not create a just society.  Niebuhr describes justice as a 
rational form of love, the rules of which will keep people from taking 
advantage of each other.  
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Niebuhr’s faith is inseparable from his view of justice, and particularly his 
ideas about the nature and destiny of humanity. The cross plays an 
important part in calling people to act responsibly, as does the 
eschatological hope that will find its fulfilment through God, rather than 
people. For Niebuhr, religion is not a security blanket. Rather, it creates 
uneasiness about the world we live in, about our social values and about 
our idea of justice. We can never accept what we know as the truth, we 
must always search for a higher truth, a more equal justice and a better 
way of living. Faith is a motivation for action, and it needs to be 
complemented by a social intelligence.  
 
Agape love should be the yardstick by which justice is measured. Our 
human destiny requires us to live a lifestyle of responsibility and positive 
action in response to the grace of God as revealed on the cross. Personal 
morality is of the utmost importance, and is necessary to cultivate a group 
morality. Thus the responsibility of the individual is once again 
highlighted but we can never escape the community which is a part of this 
responsibility.  
 
The importance of a prophetic faith when talking about justice gives hope 
to the situation and calls each person to meaningful action. There is no 
Christian economic system or Christian government, but there is a 
Christian response to social, political and economic challenges which can 
help shape life in way which is meaningful, just and equal by respecting 
the inherent dignity of every person in the community – valuing them not 
because of their merit, or their virtue, but valuing them as a person. 
Equally important is being intensely critical of the Christian community 
and Christian involvement itself in society; avoiding the pride which 
Niebuhr warned against and accepting the fallibility of theology and the 
church by remaining self-critical is an essential facet of a Christian 
approach to justice.  
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Justice is not a once off creation of just policies. It is too easy for justice to 
become injustice and so our policies need to be continually evaluated. And 
since our goal is always a higher justice, we can never be content with 
what we have achieved. Although Niebuhr does not use the word 
toleration, he does speak of the importance of one group achieving a 
degree of reason and sympathy with others, so that they can see the 
viewpoint of the others and understand their interests as vividly as they 
understand their own interests. He, however, sees this as lying well 
beyond the capacity of human societies.  
 
Rawls offers us two principles of justice, the merits of which have been 
discussed. Although they have their problems, they offer us a tangible 
goal. It may not be possible to increase the benevolence of people, but they 
can be encouraged to allow others a space to live out their lives with 
dignity. Part of this dignity is being heard and not being shunned by 
society. Part of this dignity is being given a space to use the resources 
which society provides in as equal measure as possible. Part of this 
dignity is being given the capability to use the resources, and where the 
capability is lacking, acquiring additional resources. Perhaps part of 
having the capability to live a good life is having liberty because without 
freedom all the basic resources are not of much good. What good is it being 
able to read and write, if what you read is controlled and what you’re 
allowed to write is restricted?  
 
Rawls highlights respect as the most important good, and this is closely 
related to Niebuhr’s idea of pride and anxiety resulting in injustice. It is 
the unwillingness to relinquish power which causes people to abuse and 
misuse others and it is their greed which refuses to allow them to give 
other people a voice or a chance to live their lives in a dignified way.  
 
Niebuhr realized that our truth is never the truth and therefore our 
rationality can never be neutral. Thus, we will always be speaking from 
178 
 
the position of either the oppressor or the oppressed. However, this 
becomes a challenge hard to overcome, because of the lack of liberty and 
dignity which results from the injustice amongst the oppressed people.  
 
What we need to ask is how Rawls’s principles of justice and just 
institutions can be put into practice in a world which is not entirely 
rational or reasonable. As Sen puts it, we have to think about  
how institutions should be set up here and now, to advance justice 
through enhancing the liberties and freedoms and well-being of 
people who live today and will be gone tomorrow. And this is 
exactly where a realistic reading of behavioural norms and 
regularities becomes important for the choice of institutions and 
the pursuit of justice. Demanding more from behaviour today than 
could be expected to be fulfilled would not be a good way of 
advancing the cause of justice” (2009:81).  
Institutions, he says, should promote justice rather than being mere 
“manifestations of justice” (Sen 2009:82). Sen suggests a framework for 
public reasoning where all aspects and demands of justice can be 
considered (2009:91). To be effective, institutions need to express what 
enough people feel to sustain an important role in creating social and 
economic equality (Nagel 1991:96). People need to be made aware of 
unjust behaviour, and often this will mean making people aware of how 
they are benefitting from the injustices in society.1 Theology can offer a 
critical response to the injustice in society and the proposed theories of 
justice.   
 
 
 
 
                                                 
1
 Nagel writes that we need “a psychological and institutional transformation which would permit 
innovation and cooperative production without generating substantial inequalities of reward.”  He 
suggests that a starting point could be to cultivate an “intergenerational shift in people’s sense of what 
they were entitled to” (1991:125-126).  
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4.3 A Critical Theological Response  
 
Reformed theology promotes the idea of not only serving God in the public 
realm through various social services, but actually transforming the 
economic, political and social world where possible.2 The church stands 
apart from the political realm, though. Perhaps the move away from 
established religion is a call to the church to take a firmer stand for 
specifically Christian values and offer a clear and firm alternative to the 
amoral attempts of liberalism and secular society to create a pluralistic, 
tolerant society.3  Max Stackhouse sees the task of theological ethics as 
discerning the “operating values and norms” which form the “scaffolding 
for organizing of common behavior and moral debate in an institution, 
movement, organization, or tradition, even if many people hold, as 
personal convictions, other values and norms” (Stackhouse 2000:10). But 
theology then goes a step further to determine whether what is going on 
ought to be going on by offering guidance about how “a more valid ethos” 
might be developed (Stackhouse 2000:11-16).4  
                                                 
2
 We know God as a God of justice and love and this is what it is necessary to proclaim in the 
world. Duncan Forrester, and Walter Breuggeman, offer arguments to substantiate this claim. 
“Christians believe in a God of justice and of love; and more, they teach that God is justice as God is 
love. In our experience of God we encounter both love and justice and learn what they are. Christian 
therefore claim, however tentatively and provisionally, to know what justice is because God reveals 
himself as justice and as love. The insights into justice which arise from revelation, in worship, and in 
experience, are often fragmentary and frequently hard to relate to conventional accounts of what it is. 
But because they believe these insights are true, Christian down the ages have sought to relate them to 
the accounts of justice which prevail in the public realm and have struggled with the questions of how 
and when justice may be realised” (Forrester 1997:205).  
“One of the crucial insights of the Bible is that God is on the side of justice, i.e., God is concerned 
for the well-being of those who lack power to secure it. God is presented as aware that, in the 
unrestrained process of social life, injustice will develop because some have more power than others, 
and those with power will use their power to secure greater self-advantage at the expense of the less 
powerful and the powerless. If unchecked, the unequal distribution of power expressed as injustice will 
enhance some, while others are robbed of their dignity and well-being” (Brueggemann 1976:105).  
 
3
 In Church, State and Civil Society David Fergusson (1998) argues that the end of Christendom, 
and the disestablishment of the church, can lead to a more differentiated approach in dealing with civil 
society.  
 
4
 Robert Veatch offers similar thoughts. “Despite the claim that the definitive gap is not between 
those who are explicitly religious in their starting point and those who believe they are more secular, 
the question of justice may be one area of ethics where theology does make a difference. For the other 
basic ethical principles in most ethical systems there is substantial agreement among the philosophers 
and the theologians… The key working assumptions of the egalitarian secular philosophers are based 
upon or compatible with the theological assumptions of those in religious ethics: an infinite making 
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Coherent arguments that are reasonable and critical without becoming 
too emotionally involved in the situation, while remaining empathetic 
need to be a part of justice discussions. There needs to be clear thinking 
and objective reasoning when talking about justice and morality, and 
particularly when talking about political and social sciences.5 Ethics, 
morality and theology greatly enrich any discussion on justice; justice is 
not an exact science and no formula can be applied to unjust 
circumstances.  Justice does not exist in a vacuum and so dialogue and 
communication are an indispensible part of justice. There is no clear, 
immediate and universal theory of justice or even principles of justice. 
Amartya Sen, in The Idea of Justice, emphasises the importance of 
realizing that failure to achieve absolute justice is not, in any way, 
negative (2009:103). Justice, and theories of justice, will always be 
incomplete; a constant work-in-progress. The process of critical dialogue 
and arguments are far more important than bold assertions of justice and 
remove the emphasis from attaining a perfect justice to lessening injustice 
and inequality. Theology is able to play a crucial role in critical dialogue 
with other disciplines when talking about justice.6 
                                                                                                                                           
finites equal, some prior claim on apparently unowned resources, and a notion of human responsibility. 
It looks strangely like Judeo-Christian theology once removed… it looks like the doctrines of God, 
creation, and stewardship. If those are really Judeo-Christian theological assumptions, while the anti-
egalitarians are making contrary faith moves derived from some other sources, then here is one point 
where at least indirectly theology makes a difference” (1986:111-112 my italics). 
 
5
 Sen points out the difficulty of ethical questions involving a complex mixture of philosophical, 
religious and factual beliefs (2009:41). 
 
6
 Biblical, historical and systematic theology can all play an important role in developing a 
particular theological contribution. Smit mentions six possible ways in which theology can contribute 
to the dialogue: “Firstly, this specific theological perspective brings an eschatological (in philosophical 
terms: teleological) orientation to the discourse. It speaks a language of hope. ...  
Secondly, because of this eschatological orientation, it strengthens critical and self-critical thought. 
This theology encourages those involved in working for justice, particularly those in legal, political 
and economic spheres. ...  
Thirdly, based on the content of the Biblical traditions, particularly as they have come to be 
understood in certain twentieth-century contexts of historical injustice, this theological perspective 
advocates a view of justice that takes the perspective of those who suffer under such injustices very 
seriously. ...  
Fourthly, it is therefore to be expected that this theological perspective will show a special 
sensitivity for all those – individuals, groups and categories of people – who suffer forms of injustice, 
oppression, rejection, exclusion, violation or abuse. For this reason, the church sometimes, under 
specific historical circumstances, feels itself called to be a voice for the voiceless, a public conscience, 
an advocate for the oppressed, or a critical, prophetic challenge to authorities and powers. ... 
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For some social problems to reform, moral transformation is necessary. 
For some injustices to be overcome, ethical and moral reasoning is needed. 
Values are indispensible when thinking about the right way about life and 
the lives of others.7 We are not beings who can be programmed to live in 
the right way or will live the right way simply because it is part of the 
law; we are spiritual beings who long to live in a meaningful way which 
sustains life and adds value to community. We are social beings who do 
not determine right and wrong based on idealistic principles; our 
judgements are formed in community by our beliefs and by the way of life 
which surrounds us. The complexity of justice is demonstrated by Michael 
Walzer by approaching the various spheres of life and the different 
approaches required in each one to ensure just standards. He goes on to 
speak of the relativity of justice and how closely related justice is to the 
specific community and the specific epoch (Walzer 1983:312). Max 
Stackhouse also speaks of the “spheres of life” which “implies that, while 
some areas of life may be rooted in creation, others may be rooted in the 
functional requirements of human living in complex societies. These 
demand the formation of viable institutions that cannot be controlled by 
family, regime or traditional religion” (2004:182).8 
 
                                                                                                                                           
Fifthly, this theological perspective understandably shows a strong affinity for those theories of 
justice where the dignity of the human person is regarded as central. ...  
Sixthly, for that reason, contemporary ecumenical theology (after earlier hesitation) also strongly 
supports theoretical paradigms in which human rights, as the concrete embodiment of the inalienable 
human dignity, are central” (2005:229-233). 
 
7
 Sandel quotes Barack Obama, in his “Call to Renewal Keynote Address” given in Washington, 
D.C., on 28 June 2006: “ “Our fear of getting ‘preachy’ may ... lead us to discount the role that values 
and culture play in some of our most urgent social problems,” Obama said. Addressing problems such 
as “poverty and racism, the uninsured and the unemployed,” would require “changes in hearts and a 
change in minds.” So it was a mistake to insist that moral and religious convictions play no part in 
politics and law” (2009:246). 
 
8
 Recognising the different spheres which make up our lives adds a new dimension to where and 
how justice functions and how the right and the good are intertwined. “The classic theological 
“spheres” are “orders of creation” which God established – familial, political, economic and religious. 
However, today it is more widely recognised that economics, culture, science and technology are 
distinct spheres apart from family, regime and religion” (Stackhouse 2004:182).  
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Rawls placed the right prior to the good and rejected any theory of justice 
based upon a common good. While the freedom of a person remains 
important, the conceptions of what a good life comprises are formed in 
society and it becomes impossible to reason about justice without taking 
into consideration our position in that society.9 A religious community (as 
one form of community in society) forms a place where values are learnt 
and passed on from one generation to another.10 It should also be a place 
where people are welcomed regardless of class, race or gender. It is in 
community that we find the argument for and justification of human 
rights, human dignity and respect.11 This stands in stark contrast to the 
non-moral justification which is sought by Rawls, where justice and its 
undergirding principles become almost clinical in their detachment. 
Community provides the morality for rights. This does however run the 
                                                 
9
 David Fergusson argues that moral codes can only be understood as forms of social life and 
inherited traditions (Fergusson 1998:2). 
 
10
 Rasmussen places a lot of emphasis on the dignity of all people, which means that they need to 
be treated with respect in society. This dignity finds a special place in Christian ethics. “For life in 
community all deserve attention and an unexceptionable rule that no one is to be casually sacrificed. 
Each person is immeasurably dignified by God. No one is an alien and barbarian or belongs at the 
bottom. Nor dare any be consigned to silence or deprived of those powers that mean full participation 
as members of the community. Here we find the basis for universal human rights. People are to be 
cared for when they cannot care for themselves, they are to respected no matter which class they 
belong to, and they are to be accorded privacy when they do not break the law, and treated and tried 
fairly when they do… for Christians, all have intrinsic value as God’s creatures. All are sacred whether 
or not any are good… this means living as if the barriers between rich, poor, and underclass were not 
the givens the present economy says they are; living as if the chief actor of the past two hundred years, 
the nation-state, were no longer the only chief power, since it is now too large for local problems and 
too small for global ones; living as if the world were indeed a single public household or world 
house… living as if we constituted a single moral community wrapped in a common garment and 
shared destiny” (Rasmussen 1993:149). 
Hollenbach emphasised that religious faiths influence the government and policy-formation most 
often in an indirect way. “The impact of religion on politics understood as the sphere of governmental 
activity is mediated through its influence on the multiple communities and institutions of civil society 
and on the public self-understanding of a society called culture (1993:878). 
 
11
 Walzer notes the difference between self-esteem and self-respect, and the link between self-
respect and honour. Self-esteem is defined as “a favourable appreciation or opinion of oneself,” while 
self-respect is “a proper regard for the dignity of one’s person or one’s position.” Thus, self-respect is 
“dependent upon our moral understanding of persons and positions.” Respect is judged by a certain 
standard – whether it’s self-respect or respect shown by others (2004:274).  De Lange explains the 
difference as follows: “Self-respects is seen as the subjective internalisation of the dignity belonging to 
status worth. Self-esteem is the internalisation of social merit in the concrete context of particular 
communities. ...self respect is an egalitarian notion, independent of personal achievement. It is based 
on the moral dignity that all human are equally entitles to as rational beings or creatures of God” 
(2007:215). 
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danger of excluding those who are not a part of the community. It is 
imperative that communal loyalty does not become parochial.  
 
Seeing justice as both policy and virtue gives a different perspective. 
MacIntyre distinguishes between the two. He views justice “as a virtue of 
the individual and as an ordering of social life” with justice as a virtue 
being subject to and definable by justice as rules (1988:122).12  Can we, or 
should we, separate justice into fairness and rights on the one hand and 
arguments about honour, virtue and moral desert on the other? Aristotle, 
for example, connected justice with honour and virtue. Modern theories of 
justice try to keep the ends neutral, allowing people to choose their own 
ends (Sandel 2009:187).13 But our lives are inevitably bound up in justice 
and the political sphere should be the concern of all people. A critical 
theological interpretation of justice can offer enduring insights.  
 
                                                 
12
 For justice to be effective, it is necessary for people to obey a set of rules which define their 
relationship with others in pursuit of their goals. “For justice defined in terms of the goods of 
excellence, justice as a virtue of individuals is definable independently of and antecedently to the 
establishment of enforceable rules of justice. Justice is a disposition to give to each person, including 
oneself, what that person deserves and to treat no one in a way incompatible with their deserts. The 
rules of justice, when they are in good order in terms of this conception of justice, are those rules best 
designed to secure this outcome if they are observed by everyone, including both the just and the 
unjust. So someone may obey the rules of justice and yet be an unjust person who obeys the rules only 
from, for example, fear of punishment. But for the justice that is designed to serve the goods of 
effectiveness a perfectly just person is no more and no less than someone who always obeys the rules 
of justice; until there exists an enforceable set of rules defining what is required of the relationships of 
each person to every other in the pursuit of their particular goals, the concept of justice lacks any 
content. When such rules have given it content, the virtue of justice is nothing other than the 
disposition to obey those rules. So the virtue of justice is, on this latter view, secondary to and 
definable only in terms of the rules of justice” (MacIntyre 1988:39 my italics).  
 
13
 For Aristotle, politics and being a good citizen was essential for a good life since it was an 
expression of our nature and a place where our human capacities could develop. “We can now see 
more clearly why, for Aristotle, politics is not one calling among others, but is essential to the good 
life. First, the laws of the polis inculcate good habits, form good character, and set us on the way to 
civic virtue. Second, the life of the citizen enables us to exercise capacities for deliberation and 
practical wisdom that would otherwise lie dormant. This is not the kind of thing we can do at home. 
We can sit on the sidelines and wonder what policies we would favour if we had to decide. But this is 
not the same as sharing in significant action and bearing responsibility for the fate of the community 
as a whole. We become good at deliberating only by entering the arena, weighing the alternatives, 
arguing our case, ruling and being ruled – in short, by being citizens. Aristotle’s vision of citizenship is 
more elevated and strenuous than ours. For him, politics is not economics by other means. Its purpose 
is higher than maximizing utility or providing fair rules for the pursuit of individual interests. It is, 
instead, an expression of our nature, an occasion for the unfolding of our human capacities, an 
essential aspect of the good life” (Sandel 2009:199-200).  
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In the following argument, five such conceptions are developed in dialogue 
with the thoughts of Rawls and Niebuhr. They are certainly not 
exhaustive, but are rather five points which have developed from the 
critical study of Rawls and Niebuhr and are therefore pertinent to the 
critical dialogue of this thesis. Theological insights form the basis of the 
discussion, but this does not imply exclusivity; the five points are certainly 
relevant to all people regardless of faith. However, the discussion pursues 
a theological critical direction which hopes to enrich theological debates on 
justice and offers an insight as to how a Christian notion of justice may be 
developed between fairness and love.   
 
Firstly, theology should take seriously the plight of the poor and the 
oppressed. It can advocate for those who cannot speak for themselves, and 
offer a platform for dialogue between the oppressed and the oppressors. 
The biblical preference for the poor offers a firm grounding for caring for 
the less fortunate.  
 
Secondly, theology can also provide a critical approach to justice, seriously 
considering all the aspects involved. The moral reasoning and ethical 
approach enriches the political and economic debates. Theology should 
always remain self-critical, too, and not fall into the trap of pride and self-
righteousness.  
 
Thirdly, theology takes human dignity seriously, firmly entrenched in 
biblical roots. It should always advocate for all people to live lives which 
are free from shame, where people are empowered to make decisions and 
live a good life, being able to participate in community where they can feel 
secure.  
 
Fourthly, theology realizes the importance of community for sustainable 
life. Individuals are dependent upon each other. It is in community that 
growth takes place and it is here that morals and values are learnt. 
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Community provides a sense of belonging, and hopefully a sense of 
security, where people can feel that they are taken seriously.  
 
Lastly, the borders of all aspects of our lives are ever-increasing, and 
justice is no longer relevant only for our immediate community or nation, 
but needs to be seriously considered internationally. This comes with its 
own tensions and challenges as a universal concept of justice clashes with 
specific cultural and religious concepts.  
 
4.3.1 Justice and Poverty  
 
It should be impossible to talk about injustice without talking about 
poverty. Poverty is so closely related to a lack of dignity, and is 
inseparable from powerlessness. Poverty is often the result of unjust 
institutions, although sadly, it is often regarded as the fault of the poor 
people themselves, thus giving society reason to avoid responsibility.  
Poverty is unfortunately not directly addressed in the work of either 
Rawls or Niebuhr. They both appear to largely ignore the plight of the 
poor in their work on justice, rarely mentioning the people who are 
starving and lack access to basic resources such as clean water, electricity, 
housing and health care. Although equality and liberty are clear features 
of their work, the poor are not necessarily seen as suffering more than 
others and facing unique challenges. Rawls’s difference principle can be 
regarded as a form of preferential option for the poor, which shows how 
closely he associated injustice with poverty.  
 
The idea of a preferential option for the poor has long played a crucial role 
in theology discourse on poverty and justice. Heinrich Bedford-Strohm 
speaks of a preferential option for the poor when speaking about justice 
which not only focuses on overcoming the material poverty, but is closely 
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related to giving the people a voice in the community.14 There are 
numerous rationales for an option for the poor including the creation of 
humanity in the image of God (Catholic), the proximity of God to the weak 
(Bundestheologie) and the theological statement that God did not only 
become human in Christ but that that God revealed himself as poor 
(Kreuzestheologie) (1993:294-297). Thus, there is strong theological 
reasoning for protecting the poor and including them in society rather 
than leaving them struggling at the periphery. 
 
Lebacqz speaks of an “epistemological privilege” to those who are poor and 
oppressed (1987:61). Those who are on the wrong side of injustice are 
better able to understand its oppressive and corruptive nature than those 
who are benefitting from the injustice. If principles of justice are to be 
developed fairly and if it is our hope to overcome injustice, we cannot 
begin from an ivory tower because the needs and desires of the poor and 
oppressed need to be heard. Too often the church has judged the poor, too. 
Poverty is often seen as either a punishment from God, or a special state 
given by God from some reason (Lebacqz 1987:45). Such judgement will 
not allow a space for overcoming poverty and gives a reason for 
oppression.  The fragility of justice suggests that there must be a concern 
for providing sufficient power for the oppressed to negotiate for justice 
(Lebacqz 1987:146).  
 
To know and respect a person’s intrinsic value is crucial for enacting 
justice. Lebacqz points out the necessity for the oppressed to appreciate 
their own value before they can “rage against injustice” (1987:89). It is 
essential to understand the different viewpoints of the rich and poor, of 
the oppressors and the oppressed. When we speak of a preferential option 
                                                 
14
 Bedford-Strohm (1993) discusses the preferential option for the poor which developed in 
American liberation theology as well as the emphasis which the option for the poor as put forward in 
the pastoral letter from the Catholic Bishops 1986. He examines the crucial question of “who are the 
poor” and looks briefly at the biblical roots of this idea. He concludes that the option for the poor can 
be used as a critical scale for the validity of concepts. In the work of John Rawls he finds a 
philosophical, and therefore non-Christian, use of the preferential option for the poor in a theory of 
justice.  
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for the poor, we are speaking of granting dignity and value to human lives 
which are often considered worthless, and allowing the people at the 
bottom of the community a chance to voice their story and share in the 
resources which other people, the wealthier people, take for granted.15 
 
Creating a space for the poor is but one part of justice. Inclusion of the 
oppressed people is important, but so is the remorse of the oppressors. 
Saying sorry is not enough. It is necessary that someone, generally a 
group of people, take responsibility for the past. By acknowledging the 
injustice committed, the dignity of the people can be restored. Lebacqz 
says that “grief, or remorse, is crucial for keeping alive historical memory” 
(1987:116). It is important to remember that some goods are not 
exchangeable and that some transactions are not exchanges (O’Donovan 
2005:36). Poverty may be an important aspect of justice, and a very 
serious injustice to redress, but the correct distribution of wealth cannot 
create justice, not by itself. It is essential to realize the equal worth of all 
people, so that they can gain respect and dignity, rather than only 
monetary or material wealth.16 
 
Sen proposes looking at the capabilities of a person, rather than their 
utilities or happiness. His idea is that a in theory which takes human 
capability seriously people are not only provided with resources and 
                                                 
15
 “To know that one has value is to affirm the particularity of one’s existence: “my humanity 
includes my thinness, my fatness, my shortness, my tallness, my big nose, my small ears, my blackness 
or my whiteness” And to this list, one might add: my femaleness, my disability, my age, my poverty, 
my imprisonment – or any other characteristic used for discriminatory and oppressive purposes. 
Instead of an affirmation of the value or ‘alien dignity’ of humankind in general, what is needed is an 
affirmation of the value and dignity of the specific person in her or his community” (Lebacqz 1987:89-
90). 
 
16
 This sounds like such a trivial argument when there are so many people starving in the world. Of 
course, it is of the utmost importance to ensure that all people have enough to eat, and that children are 
not malnourished. But it is equally important to realize the necessity of justice beyond food and 
clothing; freedom, dignity, respect and capability being a few of the necessary components of justice. 
Forrester argues that “at the heart of the notion of equality lies the conviction that each person is of 
infinite, and hence equal, worth and should be treated as such” (Forrester 1997:30).  It is imperative 
that policies reflect the equal worth of people, and thus their dignity (treating them as ends rather than 
means).  
 
188 
 
opportunities, but also held accountable for what they do; “freedom to 
choose gives us the opportunity to decide what we should do, but with that 
opportunity comes the responsibility for what we do – to the extent that 
they are chosen actions” (2009:19).17  This approach moves beyond the 
means of living (such as Rawls’s primary goods) to the actual 
opportunities of living because people are not necessarily capable of using 
the resources at their disposal (Sen 2009:254-7).  
 
In a similar way, Veatch suggests that equality should refer to the 
outcomes rather than the opportunities available because this will take 
into consideration social, psychological and biological factors.18 What can 
be suggested by equality of outcomes is a set of circumstances in which 
people have an equal opportunity to flourish despite their differences even 
if the outcomes are not equal.19 The capabilities approach is both a 
                                                 
17
 He later goes on to emphasize that “the capability perspective is inescapably concerned with a 
plurality of different features of our lives and concerns. The various attainments of human functioning 
that we may value are very diverse... The capability that we are concerned with is our ability to achieve 
various combinations of functionings that we can compare and judge against each other in terms of 
what we have reason to value” (Sen 2009:233).  
 
18
 Veatch explains what he means by equality of outcome: “Ultimately, what we are really after is 
something like equality of outcome (with some very limited qualifications). Exactly what this means 
will require more analysis. It is neither equality of moral worth nor equality of opportunity. Equality of 
moral worth will be a necessary precondition, but it will not be sufficient. Equality of opportunity will 
often further that goal as in cases where extraneous social, psychological, or biological factors are 
excluded from consideration. In some cases, however, when people have differing needs or differing 
abilities, this kind of procedural equality of opportunity will actually hinder equality of outcome. In 
those cases we abandon equality of opportunity as defined by everyone having an equal chance to 
compete for some resource. When needs are different ... we distribute on the basis of need replacing 
equality of opportunity with equality of outcome. When abilities differ, we, with some exceptions, give 
special consideration to those with lesser ability – we give them a handicap – so that they have an 
equal shot at a desired outcome. That may be considered equality of opportunity (i.e., opportunity for a 
given level of well-being), but it is a far cry from the liberal, procedural notion of equality of 
opportunity.  
A commitment to equality as the meaning of justice and to a sense of responsibility to use social 
resources – including people’s intellectual and physical resources – to move society toward greater 
equality has radical implications for a wide range of public policies: competitive sports, competition in 
the marketplace and in the classroom, and in just about all other phases of life” (Veatch 1986:149). 
 
19
 Equality is not realistic because of our inherent differences, but when inequality is a result of 
power, equality is a suitable end for which to aim. “Equality, taken by itself, is not realistic. Persons 
are not equal. They are different. But when we must deal with persons in large groups and in whole 
societies, equality becomes an instrument of love by opposing all the inequalities that do not result 
from love, but from the exercise of power over those in need. When equality is a regulative principle of 
justice, the generalization and abstraction from real personality that elsewhere renders persons subject 
to exploitation now establishes the conditions under which they can flourish. For any particular person, 
189 
 
criticism of Rawls and at the same time extending his basic needs into 
something workable, possibly by employing his idea of equal worth of 
liberty.  
 
Martha Nussbaum, like Sen, suggests that we measure equality by 
capability rather than by wealth. Her list of central human capabilities 
includes life (living a good quality of life); bodily health (having adequate 
nourishment, adequate shelter and good health); bodily integrity (being 
free from assault and having choices involving your own body); senses, 
imagination and thought; emotions, practical reason (including liberty of 
conscience and religious observance); affiliation; other species; play; and 
control over one’s environment (political and material) (2006:76-78).20 This 
list expands the expectations of equality so that it includes far more than 
just distribution of resources and equality of opportunity. It also draws 
attention to how many facets there are to the equality which is necessary 
to live a good life. It is interesting that Nussbaum includes liberties in the 
list of capabilities rather than as a separate entity.  
 
The Human Development Report 2000 notes the very close link between 
human development and human rights.21 Human development needs to 
                                                                                                                                           
these conditions can be stated quite specifically, but it is also possible to generalize about the things 
that persons need in order to live well” (Lovin 1995:220). 
 
20
 Nussbaum sees the capabilities approach and Rawlsian contractarianism as being “allies” since 
both have the idea of human dignity and the inviolability of the person at their core (2006:80-81). She 
does, however, remain critical of the contract approach, listing three problems that she feels Rawls’s 
theory ignores (2006:14-21):  
1) The situation of women, children and elderly people, as well as those with severe and atypical 
physical and mental impairments who are unable to participate in society because of [social] exclusion 
2) The role which nationality, or place of birth, plays in influencing people’s basic life chances; 
especially the inequalities between rich and poor nations that affect the life chances of their citizens.  
3) Non-human realm (animals) which are affected by the choices of humans every day.  
The main criticism which Nussbaum levels against the social contract theory is that, because of the 
allegedly crucial importance of human rationality in defining both reciprocity and dignity, those with 
severe (mental) disabilities are excluded, injustices between nations are excluded (as the nation-state is 
the basic unit of the contract theory) and there are no obligations to animals (we can add here, or the 
environment) (2006:93).  
 
21
 The report defines human development as focussing “on the enhancement of the capabilities and 
freedoms that the members of a community enjoy” while human rights “represent the claims that 
190 
 
include human rights in its assessment of living standards (by means of 
the human development index), once again showing the importance of 
both liberty and equality when talking about justice as well as capability 
and participation.  
 
It is not sufficient to couch justice, or injustice for that matter, in 
philosophical terms and idealistic theories. Michael Sandel speaks of 
“outrage” as an appropriate response to justice (2009:7).  Outrage is not 
merely mindless anger but points instead towards a “moral argument 
worth taking seriously.” Rawls’s difference principle and his later 
requirement for nations to assist burdened peoples point towards taking 
poverty and oppression seriously.22 People who cannot participate in 
society cannot be regarded with pity and given charity; they need to be 
given the dignity and the opportunities to live out their life plans and be 
able to be active participants in society. On an international level, this 
does present its own complications.  
 
Whichever form justice takes, it will always have to be agreeable to most 
of the people; on the one hand it is obligated to give preference to the poor 
and oppressed people, but on the other hand it cannot exclude the wealthy 
and powerful, although it will probably mean distributing their wealth 
and power differently. Mutual advantage and reciprocity will be an 
imperative part of such a form of justice.23 MacIntyre sees justice as 
                                                                                                                                           
individuals have on the conduct of individual and collective agents and on the design of social 
arrangements to facilitate or secure these capabilities and freedoms” (2000:20).  
 
22
 Naudé argues for a positive reading of Rawls, which points towards Rawls’s sympathy for the 
least advantaged people and burdened societies, arguing for redress of the inequalities (see Naudé 
2007b and Naudé 2007c). 
 
23
 MacIntyre suggests that there will need to be reciprocity between the members of society. “What 
the rules of justice will have to prescribe is reciprocity, and what is to be accounted as reciprocity, 
what is to be exchanged for what, will depend on what each party brings to that bargaining situation of 
which the rules of justice are the outcome. …where the justice of cooperative effectiveness prevails, it 
will always be as if justice was the outcome of a contract, an episode of explicit negotiation. And the 
various individuals will behave accordingly. Those who are least vulnerable to having the pursuit of 
their own ends frustrated by others will be in a position to demand most and to give least in terms of 
the rules governing the distribution of power and other resources; those who are most vulnerable will 
be in a position to demand least. But the rules will have to be at least minimally acceptable to almost 
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necessarily always being some form of a contract because there will have 
to be terms which are agreed upon, even if the less wealthy have more of a 
claim than the wealthy (MacIntyre 1988:37). The rules of justice will 
determine what is or is not allowed in society, which demonstrates the 
importance of the inclusion of all members of society in the decision 
making process without anyone being marginalised.  
 
4.3.2 Justice and Moral Reasoning  
 
Liberty is an important part of justice for Rawls and Kant similarly saw 
justice as neither an attempt to maximize welfare nor to promote virtue. 
Instead, respecting the freedom of the person was the main aim. He 
argued that every person is deserving of respect because they are rational 
beings, capable of acting and choosing freely (Sandel 2009:107). People are 
not a means to an end, but are ends in themselves. However, to protect 
the rights of the individual, any concept of the good has to be removed 
from liberal society (we see this clearly in Rawls’s exclusion of the good 
from the right). Justice is ideally based on principles which are acceptable 
to all people and the right always remains prior to the good. But, argues 
religion, justice cannot be so easily separated from morality.24 It remains 
inherently moral, ethical and, for many people, religious.  
 
Much of Rawls’s optimism is based on how people will behave, namely in a 
rational manner, in society. This finds strong opposition in Niebuhr’s 
analysis of humanity, where the sins of pride and sensuality lead to 
injustice in various ways and where even justice is open to corruption. 
                                                                                                                                           
all for them to function as rules of justice for any extended period of time, and this will 
characteristically involve that some of the same constraints are imposed on those who are relatively 
rich and powerful as well as on those who are relatively weak and powerless” (MacIntyre 1988:37). 
 
24
 Sandel strongly contests defining the rights and duties of citizens separately from competing 
conceptions of the good life. He points out that justice and rights cannot be debated without taking up 
“controversial moral and religious questions. ... And even when it’s possible, it may not be desirable” 
(2009:243).  
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Even if thought may always be rational, which it most likely is not, 
behaviour will not necessarily be the same. In biblical terms, the spirit 
would be willing while the flesh would be weak.25 What a dialogue 
involving sin brings to the table, is personal accountability and 
responsibility as well as inability and finitude. We need to do the right 
thing for the right reason; that is, it is our duty to behave in a certain 
way. At the same time we are painfully aware of our inability to always do 
what is good and what is right because of the nature of our humanity.  
 
When talking about collective sin and injustice the self-interested element 
should be removed from justice, making justice about the other rather 
than about the self. It is not enough to pity those who are oppressed and 
struggling. We should not want to improve our own situation by 
improving the situation of others, although the idea of something being 
beneficial to all might appeal to the often less than altruistic nature of 
people. However, we should avoid attempting to overcome or escape our 
own reality and seek the improvement of conditions for people solely for 
the direct results thereof. There is a communal responsibility to free the 
victims of injustice from their situation and create more just institutions 
and policies by which to protect their liberty.  Justice should develop from 
commitment rather than from sympathy.26  
 
                                                 
25
 Philosophers would obviously not use such biblical terms, but there is still an idea that rational 
thought would not lead to rational action. Sen speaks of the weakness of will. “One may know fairly 
well what one should do rationally, and yet fail to act in that way. People may over-eat or over-drink in 
a way that they themselves may think is foolish or irrational, and yet they might still fail to resist the 
temptations. ... It is important to note that this problem is concerned with the failure of people to act in 
a fully rational way, but these departures in actual behaviour do not, in themselves, suggest that the 
idea of rationality or its demands should themselves be modified” (2009:177).  
 
26
 Sen makes an interesting distinction, which I find particularly enlightening, between ‘sympathy’ 
and ‘commitment.’ He defines sympathy as “one person’s welfare being affected by the positions of 
others” whereas commitment is “concerned with breaking the tight link between individual welfare 
and the choice of action.” He goes on to say that “sympathy is combinable with self-interested 
behaviour. ... If one tries to remove the misery of others only because – and only to the extent that – it 
affects one’s own welfare, this does not signify a departure from self-love as the only accepted reason 
for action. But if one is committed, say, to doing what can be done to remove the misery of others – 
whether or not one’s own welfare is affected by it, and not merely to the extent to which one’s own 
welfare is so influenced – then that is a clear departure from self-interested behaviour” (2009:188-
189).  
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When unjust behaviour is punished, society is affirming the civic virtue of 
shared sacrifice for the common good. A fair and just society depends to a 
large extent on certain attitudes and qualities of character; virtue is 
important (Sandel 2009:8). Rules assume, or hope, that people will behave 
in a certain way; a way that they have learnt at home and from their 
various associations in their communities and from institutions in society. 
Any sacrifice which is required by the rules of justice should not be a loss, 
but rather something which “sustains and enriches the community that 
sustains and enriches oneself” (Rasmussen 1996:112).   
 
Justice cannot be separated from moral arguments – it is not only political 
or economic; justice deals with the very core of what it means to be 
human. Rawls argued against religious and moral arguments when 
speaking about justice, but any talk about justice will be tainted, to a 
greater or lesser degree, by religious beliefs. Our challenge is to find 
common ideas that do not necessarily have the same reasoning behind 
them so that we can move from “my” justice and “your” justice to “our” 
justice. There need not be complete agreement about justice just as there 
need not be any principles of justice since justice is always changing 
dependent on the situation.27 Sandel sees justice as inescapably engaging 
us in thinking about the best way to live (2009:10).  If justice involves 
                                                 
27
 There need not be complete agreement all the time about everything. Wolterstorff points this out: 
“The agreement arrived at need not be agreement based on principles rich enough to settle all 
substantial political issues whatsoever. Sufficient if it be agreement on the matter at hand. It need not 
be agreement based on principles shared by all alike. Sufficient if all, each on his or her own principles 
come to agreement on the matter at hand. It need not be agreement for all time. Sufficient if it be 
agreement for today and tomorrow. It need not be agreement that one can reasonably expect of all 
human beings whatsoever. Sufficient if it be agreement among us. It need not even be agreement 
among each and every one of us. Sufficient if is be the fairly-gained and fairly-executed agreement of 
the majority of us” (Nicholas Wolterstorff, ‘Why We should Reject what Liberalism Tells us about 
Speaking and Acing in Public for Religious Reasons’, in Paul Weithman (ed.), Religion and 
Contemporary Liberalism (Notre Dame: University of Notre Dame Press, 1997), 181. (Cited in 
Fergusson 2004a:71)  
Scanlon similarly argues that the principles of justice can never be finally agreed upon: “The 
reasons we have to treat others only in ways that could be justified to them underlie the central core of 
morality, and are presupposed by all the most important forms of human relationship.  These reasons 
require us to strive to find terms of justification that others could not reasonably reject. But we are not 
in a position to say, once and for all, what these terms should be. Working out the terms of moral 
justification is an unending task” (1988:361). 
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“cultivating virtue and reasoning about the common good” then religion 
has an essential place in debates about injustice. 
 
For Niebuhr, justice was intensely theological and moral; his social 
concern could not be separated from his roles as pastor and theologian. 
Theology brings the language of sin to the table as illustrated by Niebuhr. 
But it also brings a language of hope and joy with an eschatological 
expectation. Sandel points out that “justice is not only about the right way 
to distribute things, but also about the right way to value things” 
(2009:261).  Theology brings humility to counter human pride, but this 
humility comes with awe and is accompanied by the responsibility of 
stewardship, care for all of creation and ensuring that all people have the 
opportunity to use that which is given to them.28  
 
Theology can also bring to the table a language of sacrifice. Injustices are 
impossible to overcome without some people needing to sacrifice some of 
their power and wealth for others. Sacrifice will move the attention from 
the self to the other, thus drawing attention to what is good for everybody. 
A common good brings with it a dedication to the whole, and all citizens 
should share this concern in a just society. Even though there may not be 
a single common good, a plurality of goods which culminate in the good of 
everyone can be helpful. Sandel speaks of a civic virtue which needs to be 
cultivated against privatized notions of a good life (Sandel 2009:264). A 
common good, or a civic virtue, is not private but needs to involve the 
community. A “politics of moral engagement” encourages public debate 
about the good life. He insists that moral disagreements can provide a 
stronger, rather than a weaker, basis for mutual respect (2009:268-269). A 
                                                 
28
 Rasmussen calls attention to our neglect of the earth when talking about justice; it is not only 
people that need justice, but the whole of creation. “The point is that like race, gender, and class in 
many quarters, the standing of nature is modernity is overgrown with moral callousness. Nature’s 
suffering and pain leaves us unmoved. So we soon inflict pain, with little understanding; or seeing it, 
are unmoved. Socialization renders nature a matter of utilitarian interest only or, on our better days, of 
aesthetic and recreational interest. Then the life of other kinds falters as a realm of binding moral 
obligation. If nature beyond us is not scenic, edible, or otherwise useful, it does not stir us” (1996:344).  
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language of virtue is also indispensable when talking about moral 
formation, thus making it essential to any discussion of justice. Virtues 
are learned, practised and developed in human communities (Fergusson 
1998:52). Justice thus remains a rational process which has many 
foundations in religious thought and it finds itself in both the realm of the 
law and in form of virtue in creating moral and just people. 
 
Part of the rationality of justice is in realizing that our truth is not the 
truth, and that there are many truths which colour our worldviews. Being 
just is learning how to live with and as part of this plurality. One of the 
basic questions with which Rawls is concerned is how people can live 
together despite having opposing reasonable comprehensive doctrines. His 
solution lies in the overlapping consensus, where there can be some form 
of agreement on what basic justice might consist of (such as principles 
which transcend various religious ideas and different views of what 
constitutes a good and worthwhile life).29 It is only with a strong sense of 
community, belonging and responsibility for the neighbour that adequate 
reasons can be provided, or assumed, for sharing benefits amongst 
everybody. Who our “neighbour” is, though, is a question which requires 
careful consideration. Perhaps talking about the neighbour is best 
understood as moving the focus away from the individual to the 
community.  
 
                                                 
29
 Fergusson offers insightful critique of Rawls’s overlapping consensus, which does not go far 
enough in giving recognition to thick theories of the good: 
“In Rawls’s later writings, the principles of political liberalism cannot be demonstrated on 
metaphysical grounds. Yet they do represent something approaching a consensus in many societies 
today and may be considered in good working order. As such they provide a sound basis for the 
regulation of society and the conduct of political debate. Anyone advancing a political measure or 
programme should be able and willing to justify this on the basis of reasons accessible to most other 
citizens within a liberal society. Thus a proposal which is based on an appeal to an authoritative text or 
ecclesiastical institutions cannot be propounded unless this is capable of being justified also by 
reference to publically recognised principles of freedom, equality and justice. ...its effect is rather to 
determine the appropriate language within which debate can take place. It remains possible for those 
espousing political liberalism to differ sharply over a range of issues.... policy making must inevitably 
repose upon particular, thick traditions of justice that presuppose agreements beyond those recognised 
by the terms of Rawls’s own theory” (2004a:51-2). 
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The smaller the group the easier it becomes to understand others. This 
can be an important role of the church – a mediator between different 
groups and encouraging people to hear each other’s stories and genuinely 
create a place for the other. The fewer groups there are, the easier it will 
be to reach consensus. Talking about different points of view, often 
opposing points of view requires all parties to be flexible and to admit that 
their truth is not the only truth. It also necessitates self-criticism and a 
refusal to be content with what we have achieved.  
 
Nothing about justice should be subjective when seeking a consensus; 
judgements and decisions need to be made from an objective place which 
takes into account interests and beliefs beyond our own. Sen suggests that 
“even the identity of being human may have the effect, when fully seized, 
of broadening our viewpoint correspondingly. ... the normative demands of 
being guided by ‘humanity’ or ‘humaneness’ can build on our membership 
of the wide category of human beings, irrespective of our particular 
nationalities, or sects, or tribal affiliations (traditional or modern)” (Sen 
2009:142). This objectivity is, of course, incredibly difficult to achieve as 
both Rawls and Niebuhr go to great lengths to point out.  
 
This being said, we need to appraise what would be considered reasonable 
conduct towards others. Following Rawls, it is necessary to pay attention 
to others and our behaviour in relation to them, since they will have a role 
in what is considered just and reasonable in society.  Toleration moves us 
beyond parochialism by asking us to accept the plurality of what may 
reasonably constitute justice.30 Mutual aid, respect and dignity extends 
across political, cultural, religious and linguistic frontiers. Justice remains 
important because there is not enough love and benevolence to make it 
unnecessary; however, its focus is on the community rather than on the 
                                                 
30
 Emphasis needs to be placed on “reasonable” because toleration cannot overstep what is 
reasonably unjust in favour of toleration itself. Although, it must be noted, this line is very far from 
clear.  
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individual, or perhaps it is better stated that human rights can seek 
justice for the individual in community.31 
 
To be tolerant does not mean forsaking what it is that you believe; if 
anything, a stronger belief is necessary so that there is a firm, unwavering 
foundation upon which the other can be accepted in their otherness. In 
this sense, tolerance is not negative. It is not merely accepting or 
tolerating that which you may dislike or deplore. We cannot live and let 
live; such tolerance asks us to ignore both the good and the bad to be 
found in community, even ignoring community itself in an individualistic 
way. Rather than suggesting in impersonal existence together, tolerance 
suggests “cultivated ways of living together” (Fergusson 2004a:79). It is 
essential that tolerance is understood in a positive way which fosters 
community and communication.32 Tolerance, suggests Fergusson, is not so 
much “one value but a set of attitudes and practices that may be adopted 
for different reasons” (Fergusson 2004:92). Living in a truly multi-cultural 
society rests on a mutual acknowledgment of the other where the 
existence and the rights of other cultures are respected. “Respect for 
human dignity in the person of strangers, tolerance for their way of life, 
and nonviolence when participating in a conflict between different claims 
                                                 
31
 Sandel asks similar questions. Liberal freedom protects the rights of people who previously had 
their identity assigned to them by caste, class, custom, tradition or inherited status. So how is it 
possible to acknowledge the moral weight of community while still giving scope to human freedom? 
(2009:221).  
 
32
 Writing about the development of the idea of toleration in theology, Fergusson notes that 
“arguments for freedom of conscience in matters of faith, freedom of worship, and respect for other 
religions signal a shift from some of the nostrums of medieval and Reformation Christianity. ... For 
example, there needs to be the recognition that God is active in other faiths and social movements, and 
that therefore the choices of others are to be affirmed on account of the goods that these realise for 
individuals, communities and the world. Without this assumption, a theology of tolerance will not 
stretch far enough. ... Religious diversity can be tolerated for the sake of peace. It can be welcomed for 
the positive contribution it makes to the self-understanding and witness of the Christian community 
and to the pace and prosperity of civil society. ... A properly placed humility will acknowledge that in 
the history of the church the beliefs and practices of one generation are neither complete nor immune 
to revision by the next. ... A theology of tolerance that recognises the partial unity that can be achieved 
through the suppression of intolerance, the promotion of mutual respect and a commitment to civil 
conversation can anticipate something of the promised reign of God” (2004a:91-2).  
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to truth, are decisive conditions not only for the pluralistic society as a 
whole but for the multicultural society as well” (Huber 1996b:63).  
 
Tolerance, for all the good it does do, is neither the answer to many of the 
problems created by injustice nor the problems which cause injustice.33 
Tolerance must not lead to acquiescence. Solidarity must instil a sense of 
responsibility in people so that they do not merely accept those who 
surround them, but are furthermore concerned with their fate. There 
needs to be some idea of a common good so that people will refuse to 
accept a lower standard of living for anyone because it would be inhumane 
to do so.  Tolerance should require people to recognise the significance of 
group identity and solidarity. Fergusson says that “for individuals and 
groups to participate in the common good of a society, what is required is 
not merely the absence of persecution but something more akin to 
recognition, acknowledgement or respect” (2004b:117).34 
 
Hollenbach speaks of an “intellectual solidarity” which is “a willingness to 
take other persons seriously enough to engage them in conversation and 
debate about what they think makes life worth living.” This differs from 
“pure tolerance” by seeking “positive engagement with the other through 
both listening and speaking” and hopes to create a “community of 
freedom...which is itself a major part of the common good” (1993:892). It is 
impossible, however, to take pluralism seriously without any 
accompanying conflict. This is where the concern for those who have 
                                                 
33
 Tolerance needs to be considered with the poverty which often accompanies it. “The reality of 
urban poverty illustrates the fact that tolerance, taken by itself, is not a sufficient resource for 
addressing the urgent problems confronting American public life today. Economic deprivation, 
unemployment, single parenthood, homelessness, and frightening drug-related violence mark the 
quality of life in American cities ... The linked realities of urban poverty and race continue to be 
among the most urgent problems facing the country today” (Hollenbach 2002:34).  
 
34
 Fergusson’s interesting article argues that tolerance has always been much more than simply 
tolerating what we disagree with. A “theology of tolerance” will recognise “the partial unities that can 
be achieved through the suppression of intolerance, the promotion of mutual respect and a commitment 
to civil conversation” (2004b:119).  
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neither basic necessitates nor freedom should become a priority.35 Both 
respect and tolerance are needed in society to prevent tolerance from 
becoming nothing more than the acceptance that people might hold 
different views. Tolerance needs to go a step further to realize that despite 
different views, people are nonetheless worthy of respect and dignity. We 
might even go so far as to say that respect and tolerance are political 
concepts of agape, as Timothy Jackson (2003:54) does.  
 
When talking about tolerance, it is necessary to point out that it is not 
only needed between a Christian worldview and other religions and 
disciplines, or between different cultures, but also between different 
Christian perspectives. Huber and Tödt make the point that there may be 
consensus on many points when talking about justice in theological 
circles, but that this often denies or ignores the plurality of justice 
discourses, such as the emphasis on individual liberty or on social rights.36 
They ask the important question of wherein a specific theological and 
church interpretation and implementation of human rights can be 
grounded.  Theological critique is essential, offering key questions to 
which any theological dialogue needs to return time and time again to 
prevent a secularisation of theological principles.  
 
                                                 
35
 The rights of the oppressed and the poor need to be given priority. “The condition for translating 
an inclusive theory of rights into a strategy for action and policy is the recognition that pluralism is 
inevitably accompanied by conflict. Defense and support of the full range of rights for every person 
under current patterns of economic and political conflict, therefore, calls for a choice. This choice is 
one that will orient policy toward preferential concern for the rights of those who have neither bread 
nor freedom. It means that the rights of the oppressed, those denied both political and economic power, 
should take priority in policy over privileged forms of influence and wealth” (Hollenbach 1988:99).  
 
36
 „Wir haben in der Zwischenbilanz festgestellt, daβ es einen weitreichenden kirchlich-
ökumenishen Konsensus in vielen Fragen gibt, oft allerdings um den Preis eines Nichtbewusstmachens 
oder einer Einebnung der vielen in der Sache selbst liegenden Kontroversen und Spannungen. Diese 
Kontroversen werden sofort virulent, wenn es um die weltweite Konkretisierung der Menschenrechte 
geht; besondere Bedeutung gewinnt dabei dasjenige Ringen um das Verständnis der Menschenrechte, 
in dem die einen vorrangig von individuellen Freiheitsrechten, die anderen von sozialen Grundrechten, 
die Dritten vom Selbstbestimmungsrecht der Völker ausgehen“ (Huber & Tödt 1977:64-65). Thus we 
are made aware of just how complicated it is to talk about justice.  
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4.3.3 Justice and Human Dignity 
 
Justice needs to extend beyond a philosophical notion of fairness. 
Forrester suggests that it is generosity that is needed. “Generosity is 
necessary if the position of the weak, the handicapped and non-citizens is 
to be secured. It underlies any decent and humane welfare provision and 
is the only way of overcoming social division” (Forrester 1997:232).37 
Generosity will realise the inherent dignity of every person in the 
community, more so than fairness, because equality does not guarantee 
dignity and respect. It is essential that justice remains closely connected 
to human dignity.38 Wolterstorff concludes his chapter on respect for 
worth that a person should never be treated with ‘under-respect,’ that is, 
“it is necessary to always act in such a way as to allow respect for the 
worth of human beings to trump balance of life-good considerations” 
(Wolterstorff 2008:310).39  
 
As justice needs to be a response to a large extent to injustice, injustice 
needs to be measured by some sort of idea of justice. However, it needs to 
be accepted that perfect justice is an idealistic state and we will mostly 
have to settle for it in some sort of imperfect form. Therefore, it is 
sometimes more appropriate to speak of the elimination of injustice in the 
                                                 
37
 Forrester places generosity at the centre of the community. He sees a “broad, loving and 
generous understating of justice” as being essential for a healthy community. “A community depends 
on people who do not always claim their rights, who are generous and who are more than fair. This is 
not to deny that fairness is of central importance in the way a community is run. A community in 
which everyone is demanding fairness for themselves is quite different from a community in which the 
stress is upon fairness for others” (1997:233).  
 
38
 Russel Botman often emphasises the need for human dignity. “...the restoration of human dignity 
after the advent of oppression requires of governments the responsibility to fulfill and protect the social 
rights of people, especially the most vulnerable. These responsibilities of governments would of 
necessity require intervention in markets and even regulation of such markets to protect the poor and 
marginalized. The restoration of human dignity must be seen to be more than a mere social goal. It 
ought to be more specifically an institutionalized practice” (Botman 2003:21). He goes on to argue 
later that a “dignity enriched human rights discourse” will not only respect the relationships between 
individuals in the community, but the common interests of the community will “override the interests 
of investors, states, systems and the financial market” (28).  
 
39
 In a number chapters in the last section of his book, Wolterstorff offers a comprehensive 
discussion of  the nature and grounding of natural human rights, the feasibility of a secular grounding 
of human rights and a theistic grounding of human rights (Wolterstorff 2008).  
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hope of a more just society.40 We need critical scrutiny of society and not 
just goodwill towards others to prevent injustice.41 Rawls spoke of certain 
duties which we owe to persons as persons. Each person should be free to 
pursue their conception of the good, without infringing on the rights of 
others. This is acknowledging the essentiality of community as well as 
attempting to create a space where a plurality of goods can be 
accommodated.42 However, no principles can exist in a moral vacuum, no 
matter how much liberal theorists would like them to. Our morals and 
values and our very conception of the world and of what is good (both for 
us and for our community) is based upon some belief. It is necessary to 
treat all our belief systems with suspicion, since they may conceal 
patriarchal and oppressive ways of thinking, but it is imperative to affirm 
those relationships which are positive.43  
 
Too often people, and relationships, are treated as commodities. 
Gratification is expected instantly and other people are expected to satisfy 
our wants and desires with little regard for their humanness and the 
                                                 
40
 Sen argues that any theory of justice will be formulated under the currently dominant 
transcendental institutionalism will reduce “many of the most relevant issues of justice into empty 
rhetoric.” People aim for more global justice which is not looking for minimal humanitarianism, nor 
for a perfectly just world society, but rather the elimination of some outrageous injustice (2009:26).  
 
41
 Sen speaks specifically of the lack of regard for the deterioration of the natural environment. He 
says that “through lack of reasoned engagement and action, we do still fail to take adequate care of the 
environment around us and the sustainability of the requirements of good life” (2009:48). Benevolence 
is not enough when talking about treating human beings with respect and dignity, reason and intellect 
form an indispensible part of the process. Reasonable arguments are part of making informed 
decisions, rather than only revelation or faith, which is possibly what Rawls is arguing. 
 
42
 Fergusson discusses Johns Rawls’s theory of justice as providing some sort of neutral place for 
the priority of certain political values. He later goes on to say that it is still necessary to ground the 
political principles and values on some conception of the human good (1998:147, 154).  
 
43
 Mary Stewart Van Leeuwen argues that marriage needs to be recognised as a positive institution, 
rather than as a form of oppression of women. She gives a positive interpretation of Genesis 1, 
suggesting that “women and men are to work out God’s vision of shalom in ways that are sensitive to 
different settings and times in history and to the life cycle of male and female beings.” Thus, “any 
construction of gender involving an exaggerated or inflexible separation of the cultural mandate by sex 
... is creationally distorted and therefore potentially unjust toward both males and females” (2000:189). 
She contends that “at the level of public policy and theological ethics, a proper appreciation of 
marriage and family requires a capacity to discern the appropriate shape of social justice and well-
functioning civil society for a given time and place” which is not measured by some “rigid, atemporal 
set of gender and familial roles” (196).  
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inherent dignity owed to them.44 Conversely, the family offers a locus 
where we can learn about generosity and welfare through the care of 
dependants, discover education through the transmission of wisdom from 
one generation to the next and learn to be concerned about and invest in 
the future of the world beyond our own lives (Fergusson 1998:142). 
Jackson argues that the family is the place where moral persons can 
evolve over time because parental care is not premised on the reciprocity 
characteristic of justice (Jackson 2003:7).45  
 
Fergusson describes liberalism as “a project for securing the peaceful 
coexistence and prosperity of different groups and subcultures, since 
individual moral identity is inextricably tied to community, tradition and 
belief system” (2004a:63). By taking community and tradition into 
account, it is easier to recognise the oppression of certain groups based on 
race and also the oppression of women. Wolterstorff argues that moral 
rights should be grounded in respect for persons rather than in duties.46 
To wrong a person, or to treat them unjustly, is to treat them in a way 
that is disrespectful of their worth (Wolterstorff 2008:296).47 This implies 
the acceptance of human beings as having non-instrumental worth and 
                                                 
44
 Fergusson writes that “a consumerist notion of the individual has now invaded discourse about 
personal relationships. The gratification of the individual’s interests is the criterion by which marriage 
and the family are to be evaluated. In the absence of such gratification, divorce and desertion can by 
justified. The rhetoric of the market-place has now invaded the home ... The fundamental defect, 
therefore, in the moral chaos of our private lives, is a faulty understanding of what it is to be a person. 
The person is not an individual with interests to be satisfied. He or she is a person whose identity and 
fulfilment are inextricably bound up with relations and communities. Other people are constitutive of 
rather than instrumental to my identity and well-being as a person” (1998:142-3).  
 
45
 Jackson argues strongly that persons are formed by society, as well as by receiving unconditional 
love (whether by a parent or substitute) for at least the early years. “People get to be people and 
continue to act like people only when they are extended care by others and are schooled in how to 
extend it to others. Any society that fails to appreciate and act on these facts will inevitably find itself 
chaotic, confused, and unjust” (2003:63-64). Or course, it needs to be taken into account that not all 
families are safe and loving places.  
 
46
 He explores in some detail what rights grounded in duties encompasses, since it is such a 
common notion (2008:242ff). He later also rejects rights which are based on the authority of God as 
the source of morality (the Divine Command Theory) (264ff). 
 
47
 This also implies that certain actions have “respect-disrespect import; that is to say, they are 
cases of treating someone as being of a certain worth.” It is also assumed that “one’s action may or 
may not fit the actual worth of the human being who is the object of the action” (Wolterstorff 
2004:296).  
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treating them as if they have a certain worth. The value of human beings 
is inherent in justice which goes beyond fairness.  
 
A so-called compassionate justice would argue that “legal justice and the 
ethos of compassion and sacrifice cooperate to bring forth a life of justice 
and dignity for all humans and the environment” (Koopman 2005b:135). 
We can only hope that justice will become more than obligation and 
contract and become compassionate and empathetic. Dignity might begin 
in justice, but the hope of what people might become is found beyond 
justice. By recognising justice as an imperfect love, and seeking the 
pinnacle of a more equal justice that grows in love and fraternity, the 
dignity and worth of all people is taken seriously.  
Although epistemic realists rightly affirm the intrinsic worth of 
some human goods, the final goodness of the world depends upon 
love’s going beyond the just distribution of what is antecedently 
judged valuable… A neglected issue of social justice is the basis on 
which virtues (including justice itself) are distributed: who has 
been allowed to become whom, so to speak. It remains the case, 
nonetheless, that modern accounts of justice distinguish it from 
agapic love. Justice is a largely retrospective virtue for instance, 
focusing on what others have done or who they have been; while 
agapic love is more prospective, attentive to who others are or have 
been but emphasizing what they might become (Jackson 2003:29 
my italics).  
It is love which empowers all people to reflect the image of God by 
transcending justice when it brings individuals to fuller personhood and 
sustains their well-being (Jackson 2003:34). This love, however, is also in 
danger of becoming tyrannical and so needs justice to temper it.48  
                                                 
48
 Stanley Hauerwas maintained that it is necessary for love to be tempered by justice to prevent it 
from becoming tyrannical: “If Christianity is primarily an ethic of love I think that it is clearly wrong 
and ought to be given up, since our moral experience reveals that such an ethic is not sufficient to give 
form to our moral behavior. … Christian ethics as an ethics of love reinforces our illusions by 
retreating into an ethic of interpersonal understanding and acceptance as if becoming an I to a Thou is 
the height of human attainment. But ethically our life involves more than person-to-person interaction; 
we exist as social creatures, and as such we confront social problems that require not love but 
justice…. Good will is no less tyrannical than bad will in its control of the other. … My argument is 
that love, even in interpersonal relations, that is embodied without justice is sentimental and 
destructive rather than realistic and up-building (Stanley Hauerwas in “Love’s Not All You Need” 
Cross Currents 24, Summer 1972. Quoted in Jackson 2003:230).  
 
204 
 
Kant spoke of an idea of reason which would test the rightfulness of every 
public law (Rawls’s principles of justice are an attempt to concretize this 
idea). Justice should not be based upon the interests or desires of a 
community, such agreements can have disastrous results for other 
communities or peoples.  But loyalty within a community is also necessary 
to enforce obligatory assistance of other members of the community. 
Loyalty finds its beginning and its fulfilment in the recognition of the 
dignity and worth of others. However, conceptions of a good life are 
embedded in particular world views and moral ideas of what a good life 
entails. By prioritising the right over the good, individuals can be left 
feeling rootless and aimless, without any overriding moral or spiritual 
purpose (Fergusson 2004a:60). 
 
Christianity provides a reference point for the inalienable dignity of each 
person, and thus the necessity of protecting each person by human rights. 
For Christians, the theological reference point that each person is created 
imago dei is the starting point when talking about human rights.49 We 
believe that the earth is God’s earth, and that each person must be 
accorded dignity and fundamental rights, a view which gave support to 
much of Beyers Naudé’s theology.50 This differs to the reference point 
found in philosophy and politics, but it still helps with our understanding 
of human rights. Piet Naudé gives an idea of what systematic theological 
study of human rights might entail, with the “creative tension between 
distinct personhood and reciprocal indwelling in the Trinity” providing 
clues for our understanding of human rights: individual human rights, 
social rights, gender equality and procreative rights, rights of future 
                                                 
49
 Emil Brunner said that “The doctrine of the imago Dei in particular is the fundamental principle 
of the Protestant doctrine of justice” (1945:36). 
 
50
 “We are committed to the recognition of the dignity and the fundamental rights of every human 
being, regardless of race, colour, creed or sex; we are committed, in accordance with our 
understanding of the Christian faith, to do everything in our power to achieve these goals by peaceful 
means; we are committed to the task of reconciliation based on justice and of Christian liberation 
through justice without which no lasting reconciliation could be procured. ... Because this earth is 
God’s earth, such rights must be accorded to all God’s children everywhere on this globe” (Beyers 
Naudé 2005:115).  
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generations, ecological rights and socio-economic rights (Naudé 
2007a:144-145).51  
 
Similarly, Nico Koopman (2003) suggests that not only a Trinitarian 
understanding of anthropology but the notion of ubuntu can offer 
enrichment of a human rights culture. This focuses on a special African 
addition to the human rights debates. Ubuntu can help public policy and 
theories of justice to emphasise reciprocity, communion, care, 
responsibility and hospitality. This emphasises the necessity of 
community and inter-dependence in the lives and development of all 
people.  
 
Human dignity and worth are also achieved through interaction with 
others.52 Justice must require a minimum level of solidarity to enable all 
people to live with basic dignity. Hollenbach says that “human dignity 
cannot be even minimally realized when persons are simply on their own. 
The norm of justice spells out the minimal requirements of solidarity that 
are a prerequisite for lives lived in dignity. The requirements of justice 
establish a floor below which social solidarity cannot fall without doing 
serious harm to some of society’s members” (Hollenbach2002:192-193). 
Hollenbach further holds that “persons can only live in dignity when they 
                                                 
51
 Fergusson says that “the truth is what God wills for us and all people, although this may only be 
known through divine revelation in history and the patterns that this establishes in the traditions of 
Israel and the church. Truth is thus not relative to a particular framework, although knowledge thereof 
is available only to those who inhabit the framework” (1998:7). He later goes on to say that “the 
Christian tradition has persistently claimed that there are laws of morality which are known outwith the 
visible church and which Christians share with all other human beings. …anyone who wishes to learn 
a practice to achieve those goods towards which it is directed must espouse justice, courage, and 
honesty. The social nature of the goods we seek entails a commitment to these virtues in one form or 
another. …the achievement of our human good is dependent upon observance of principles, respect for 
which is necessary condition of social well-being” (1998:129). 
 
52
 “Because humans are relational beings whose identity, worth, and dignity is attained in 
interaction with others, human flourishing is always public or social. ...civil society is the primary 
locus in which human solidarity is realized” (Hollenbach 1993:884).   
Jackson argues strongly (in criticism of liberal critique of agape) that persons are formed in society 
and by receiving unconditional love (whether by a parent or substitute) for at least the early years. 
“People get to be people and continue to act like people only when they are extended care by others 
and are schooled in how to extend it to others. Any society that fails to appreciate and act on these 
facts will inevitably find itself chaotic, confused, and unjust” (2003:63-64). 
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are capable of interacting with others in society, whether in the economic, 
political or cultural spheres” (2002:198).  
 
Human dignity is a crucial part of justice. It is a very controversial 
matter, but like justice can sometimes best be explained by injustice, 
dignity is best understood by those whose dignity has been ignored and 
abused; “its meaning is established by the denial of it” (Huber 1996b:10). 
Someone who has dignity deserves respect and thus deserves to be treated 
in a respectful way. “Dignity and worth are obtained on the basis of 
personal talents and achievements which are highly estimated by modern 
culture,” but dignity can also be more universalised; simply being human 
can suffice for having human dignity (De Lange 2007:214-215). Fritz De 
Lange emphasises, as did Rawls, that “self-respect as a primary social 
good needs political arrangements, economic conditions; justice and daily 
bread. ... (C)aring communities that make people experience that their 
past and their future really matter, make them feel that they are welcome 
as full members of the moral community” (2007:223).53 Human dignity 
and human worth are not accolades which are earned, but are an inherent 
part of our humanness, and as such are owed to each and every member of 
the community. 
 
4.3.4 Justice and Community  
 
Liberalism has been accused of creating an asocial society in which the 
autonomy of the individual is juxtaposed to that of an individual as part of 
a community. Counter arguments have emphasized the need for 
                                                 
53
 Iris Young links self-respect to how a person defines themselves and how they are defined by 
community: “People have or lack self-respect because of how they define themselves and how others 
regard them, because of how they spend their time, because of the amount of autonomy and decision-
making power they have in their activities and so on … Self-respect is at least as much a function of 
culture as it is of good, for example… None of the forms and not all of the conditions of self-respect 
can meaningfully be conceived as goods that individuals possess; they are rather relations and 
processes in which the actions of individuals are embedded” (Iris M. Young. 1990. Justice and the 
Politics of Difference. Princeton: Princeton University Press, p. 27) (Cited in Forrester 2001:186). 
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community. Liberalism, however, cannot be wiped aside and merely 
replaced by localised communities. A balance is needed between 
Gemeinschaft and Gesellschaft; or alternatively, as Daly and Cobb 
(1989:172) suggest, viewing community as one part of society. Community 
and voluntary associations provide necessary rootedness and will tend to 
be personal, thus essential to both identity and moral formation, while 
society and associational ties give each person the opportunity to exercise 
their creativity and will tend to be impersonal.54 But involuntary 
association forms the most basic association in our society; it is those 
connections that we do not choose that generally place us in one or 
another group (or several groups).55  Rasmussen suggests that community 
is “no longer a place and a tradition but instead an experience,” it is not 
something which is static but is continually changing both setting and 
cast (1993:38)56. The boundaries between society and community are not 
always very clear.57 What is clear is how the lives of the members of a 
                                                 
54
 Bellah et.al. (1985) did a study of individualism and community in American life, which is still 
widely referred to in works emphasising the necessity and inescapability of community in our lives 
(Habits of the Heart). They emphasise that it is necessary to affirm our interconnectedness, not only 
through voluntary associations but by our mutual dependence on each other. “Generosity of spirit is 
thus the ability to acknowledge an interconnectedness – one’s debts to society – that binds one to 
others whether one wants to accept it or not. It is also the ability to engage in the caring that nurtures 
interconnectedness. It is a virtue that everyone should strive for, even though few people have a lot of 
it - a virtue the practice of which gives meaning to the frustrations of political work and the inevitable 
loneliness of the separate self. It is a virtue that leads one into community work and politics and is 
sustained by such involvements” (Bellah et.al. 1985:194).  
 
55
 It is hard to imagine individuals not bound into involuntary ties – free from class, ethnicity, 
religion, race or gender associations. Walzer suggests that we are never truly free, as much as some 
theorists like to take about “self-fashioning.” Where we are born, when we are born and to whom we 
are born all play an important role in fashioning who we are and in determining our life plans. It is 
with dealing with these constraints that can encourage democratic debate and reform (Walzer 2004:14-
15, 19).  
 
56
 Rasmussen argues that capitalism has become a culture, and the market is a model for society 
(both of which were never intended by Adam Smith). Such a view correlates to an argument for the 
reverence of the Sabbath. One day to remember that we are not only consumers and are not dependent 
upon goods and products, but to revel in the joy of relationships. It is necessary to find a time of leisure 
for family and friends, in short, a time for engagement.  
 
57
 However, the importance of relatively intact, small-scale communities cannot be downplayed. It 
is here that “we learn trust, temper individualism as a moral style, agree to freely serve, hone 
leadership skills for work together, have and raise children, learnt to give to charities, volunteer for 
dirty, difficult, and unpleasant jobs, clean up after ourselves, restrain appetites, take out the garbage, 
help friends, care for siblings, parents, children, relatives, and friends, learn to read, learn to return 
books to the library, observe meaning-giving traditions, receive all manner of moral direction, 
including basic moral rules and social etiquette, find out by increments what moral responsibility 
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community are intertwined by that which they share, and their focus will 
find similar points of convergence. The good which they want may not 
always be the same, but it will sometimes be the same or at least similar, 
and it is the similarities which draws them together.58   
 
Rasmussen describes community as “faith’s own vocabulary” (1993:11) 
and community together with critical thought humanise and harmonize 
liberty and equality. Community is where people learn to think ethically, 
and where moral character is developed. Community is a place where life 
                                                                                                                                           
means from childhood up, develop qualities of character, practice decision making, acquire a moral 
language, nurture moral sensibilities, take responsibility for a pet, pant, or sibling, recover from serious 
mistakes, find out first models of behaviour, and , most important, learnt to forgive and start anew. In a 
word, we discover in microcosm how the bewildering world works and how to find our way in it” 
(Rasmussen 1993:71-2).   
O’Donovan describes the movement between community and society, where tradition plays an 
important part in shaping the identity of the particular people: “Through the mediation of 
representative signs, then, members of a community conceive of their community as such; they are 
recognizable to one another, and they attract one another’s love. These are the means by which a 
community attains coherence. For it knows and loves itself as a kind of whole, a self-contained totality 
that embraces its members’ various communications. Its self-love, therefore, is an organizing function 
within its understanding of the world, a decisive key to the evaluations it shares among its members. It 
interprets the order and rhythm of the cosmos and the nature and destiny of humankind. In the 
conception of “holy” things and places we can observe this confluence of political and cosmological 
meanings. What is holy in ancient Israel – the Sabbath, the temple, the land – at once organizes and 
structures the people as a political society and discloses the universal divine purpose for the world.  
In this reflective movement a community is more than a sphere of sharing. It is what we call a 
‘society,’ the object, to use a phrase of Erich Voegelin, of ‘transcendental representations.’ Not all 
‘common objects of love’ are transcendental representations, for society shares a range of material 
goods and understandings which bear none of this special burden of meaning. But these form the 
communal self-understanding which structures all other shared meanings. ... they constitute the central 
core of the society’s common way of seeing the world and living in it. And because the existence of a 
society is not atemporal, they constitute the core of its continuing identity in time, providing 
intelligible connections between past and present. In this function we refer to them as the ‘tradition’ of 
the society” (2002:32). 
 
58
 O’Donovan points out the relationship between goods and community and how from our 
community common objects of love develop. “The new factor introduced into the analysis of moral 
reasoning is this: from its reflective roots to its deliberative fruits moral reasoning is a shared and 
collective enterprise, not a private and individual one. Loving, like knowing, is something we do only 
with others. Together, not alone, we acquire our capacity to engage the world in cognitive affection. 
The goods that we love, created and uncreated, are goods common to all, and we love them properly as 
our own goods only as we understand that they are everybody else’s. Simply in loving them, we 
become part of a community that is not constructed to accomplish some task but is given in the very 
fact that we cannot but love them” (O’Donovan 2002:19). 
“Augustine’s interest was focused, as ours will be, upon how community has its root in evaluations 
that we form and hold together, the common objects of love. Loving is the corporate function that 
determines and defines the structure of the political society; it is the key to its coherence and its 
organization. Loving things, not loving one another. Augustine also affirmed that members of a 
community loved one another; but that is a second step. The love that founds the community is not 
reciprocal, but turned outward upon an object” (O’Donovan 2002:26). 
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is giving meaning by stories and history and tradition. However, critical 
thought is necessary to keep the community in check.59 It is necessary to 
continually review practices and policies to ensure that their justice is not 
being corrupted. By sharing common practices, policies, history and 
tradition, we become aware that our community consists of other 
individuals which means that while individual liberty is important, we 
need to remember that the liberty of the other is as important as our own. 
But to do this we need to firstly be sufficiently sure of our own identity, so 
that we can use our freedom responsibly (Huber 1996a:8).  
 
The essential nature of communities as a part of our society cannot be 
denied and the church as a community plays an important role in not only 
moral formation, but also providing a safe space for people to share their 
insecurities as well as providing a solid foundation for a just way of life, or 
a thick theory of the good. The challenge is to do this not only in a liberal 
society, but in an increasingly technologically advanced society where it 
becomes increasingly easier to avoid personal associations and “real” 
relationships are exchanged for “virtual” ones.60  At the same time, it is 
necessary to not lose sight of the struggle for justice and equality; the 
community needs to be transformed into a place where participation can 
offer each person dignity. We need to remember that “the community is 
not sacred, it has to be equal, just and participatory to claim its own right 
                                                 
59
 The critical thought and continual analysis of the moral behavior of the community is necessary 
because too often the community becomes self-righteous, even Christian communities. “The formation 
of moral conviction in Christian communities has often been its malformation. Good people who did 
not know they were not quite as good as they thought have been racist, sexist, elitist, and blithely 
uncaring about nature or distant neighbors” (Rasmussen 1993:15). Huber draws our attention to several 
important questions that we need to ask, to keep ourselves in check: “What way of life will prove 
durable and responsible? For what living conditions can we in the long run be responsible, not only 
economically, but also ecologically and socially? What form of living together conforms to our 
concept of humanity?” (1996:8). 
 
60
 Technology is bringing with it increasing challenges for fostering community as well as new 
boundaries for the limits of justice as we move into a realm that is not necessarily controlled by the 
same rules that govern our political lives. Rasmussen (quoting Albert Borgmann) writes that the 
“promise of technology (liberation, enrichment, and the conquest of scourges that long assailed 
humanity) has led to the irony of technology. The irony is “when liberation by disburdenment yields to 
disengagement [from most every context], enrichment by way of diversion is overtaken by distraction, 
and conquest makes way first to domination and then to loneliness.”” (1993:83).  
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for protection and equality in the broader national or international 
community.... Through participation, members of that community 
collectively form and transform its life and structure” (Botman 1998:102). 
Hollenbach sees social capital as a translation of the strength of civil 
society (2003:220). Communal solidarity empowers people to shape the 
institutions of public life, such as the state and the economy and civil 
society provides a social base which allows the governing institutions to 
function effectively.  
 
It is essential to recover the concept of meaning in our society. We need to 
remember that “what we do, is a result of who we are. And who we are is 
determined by the narrative communities in which we are formed” (Naudé 
2005:539).61 Relationships are important, not goods and services. As such, 
relationships and the very life which sustains them are vital. Life is 
sacred and needs to be treated as such. A life is not more or less valuable 
according to what value it offers to other people or to the community. The 
sanctity of life needs to be taken seriously and life needs to be valued 
simply because it is life.  
 
For Rawls, the importance of the community in forming an individual’s 
ideas of justice is inherent. There are, however, not necessarily many 
communities where this can happen as so much of day to day interaction 
occurs over an ever-increasing spatial dimension – technology has 
extended our boundaries, not only increasing the space where justice 
needs to take place and increasing our responsibility to our “neighbour” on 
the other side of the world, it has also brought about changes in the way 
                                                 
61
 Daly and Cobb similarly speak about the importance of relationships: “People are constituted by 
their relationships. We come into being in and through relationships and have no identity apart from 
them. Our dependence on others is not simply for goods and services. How we think add feel, what we 
want and dislike, our aspirations and fears – in short, who we are – all come into being socially. To say 
this does not deny that every person is something more than simply a social product. People also have 
some freedom to constitute themselves. Personal responsibility is based on that freedom. But this 
transcending of relationships does not introduce something separable from the social relationships. It 
can be only a partial transcending of just those relationships, and it is the quality of those relationships 
that makes real freedom possible. We are not only members of societies but what more we are also 
depends on the character of these societies” (1989:161).  
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we deal with other people on day to day basis. Many of our interactions 
have become impersonal, corporations are spread across the globe and the 
internet has replaced much communication which previously took place 
face to face. The church represents one such community where people may 
learn to live in a just way.  
 
Particular examples and communal instructions teach us how to act 
morally (Fergusson 1998:6). For Christians, God’s command is our highest 
good. Because it is the source of our joy and delight, it fulfils our deepest 
aspirations. However, this presents problems for how it relates in contexts 
which are not specifically Christian.62 Theological ethics will always be 
interested in philosophical and political ethics. The challenge is how to 
remain uniquely theological while at the same time not becoming 
irrelevant to the non-Christian communities.63  
 
Here it is important to recognise the work of God outside of the Christian 
community. Specifically for Christians though, it is the recognition of 
Christ’s grace in the world that calls us to action, as we have seen in the 
prophetic theology of Niebuhr. The church needs to maintain its 
distinctiveness in the world while at the same time not ignoring the world; 
                                                 
62
 Fergusson’s discussion of Barth’s view of Christian ethics in this regard is particularly 
enlightening (2004a:22ff).  
 
63
 It is important not to be self-righteous and exclusive. “Churches and faith communities do not 
bear the mandate of moral values and conduct that affirm human dignity alone, for it belongs to all. At 
the same time, there is a definite resourcefulness within the religious traditions that might 
meaningfully contribute to moral renewal in society at large. An important starting point rests with the 
renewal of human solidarity as an ethic to be sought and lived out and experienced in the manifold 
spheres of society” (Le Bruyns 2007:210).  
The church can offer a biblical interpretation of justice, which will always seek to be more than 
justice: “The more “doing justice” is associated with faithfully imitating divine goodness and 
creatively meeting human needs, for example, the less the phrase will carry its preeminent modern 
connotation of keeping contracts or rewarding merit. The more one identifies “justice” with biblical 
“righteousness” the more “love” and “justice” will tend to coalesce without remainder. It is important 
to note how justice is used today and to contrast it with the more ancient and more comprehensive 
ideals of faith, hope, and especially love. … Love without justice or a love that lapses into injustice is 
less than loving, but a justice without love or that does not aspire to love becomes less than just” 
(Jackson 2003:37-38).   
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the difficult paradox of living in the world yet not being a part of it.64 
Specific Christian ideas about justice, based on the righteousness and 
justice of God as revealed in Scripture, can provide a thick theory of 
morality and justice in the public arena.65  
 
The intensely religious, or spiritual, nature of human beings cannot be 
denied. The church thus forms a community where justice can be 
developed on numerous levels – it can foster a safe space for individuals to 
be given a voice to speak out and be heard about injustices; it can offer 
ideas and ideals about how society can become more just (on local and 
global levels); and it can teach individuals to live in such a way that they 
live with care and concern for other people in the community and in 
society, teaching them to think responsibly and ethically about social, 
political and economic occurrences. While the particularity of the 
Christian community cannot be denied, neither can the influence which it 
has on society, or at least the influence which it should have. Community 
in society needs to develop at grassroots levels, and the church offers a 
structure which can foster involvement in the community and encourage 
                                                 
64
 This is not necessarily an ‘alien’ identity. “Many Christians would not necessarily see themselves 
as aliens, even if their obedience and loyalty to certain obligations and commitments to the church are 
stronger than those to the state. There will always be some sense of loyalty to one’s country and its 
traditions” (Fergusson 2004a:27).  
Hollenbach argues that there needs to be a “more substantive discussion of the relation between 
Christian faith and respect for religious freedom than advocacy of a simple relativism provides. It 
requires showing how the Christian understanding of God and the human good can also lead to respect 
for the pursuit of the civic good. This calls for theological argument about the implications of Christian 
belief in a religiously diverse world” (Hollenbach 2002:115).  
Jackson insists on identifying justice with biblical righteousness: “The more “doing justice” is 
associated with faithfully imitating divine goodness and creatively meeting human needs, for example, 
the less the phrase will carry its preeminent modern connotation of keeping contracts or rewarding 
merit. The more one identifies “justice” with biblical “righteousness” the more “love” and “justice” 
will tend to coalesce without remainder.  It is important to note how justice is used today and to 
contrast it with the more ancient and more comprehensive ideals of faith, hope, and especially love. 
Love without justice or a love that lapses into injustice is less than loving, but a justice without love or 
that does not aspire to love becomes less than just” (Jackson 2003:37-38). 
 
65
 In his discussion of Hauerwas’ ecclesial ethics, Fergusson notes that there is always a danger that 
the church accepts the underlying social structures of society, and does not remain critical, challenging 
and confronting society when necessary. Also, the attempt to present Christian morality to a secular 
audience can result in the theological dements appearing either unnecessary or marginal (Fergusson 
1998:50).  
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participation, as opposed to the state which governs on a national level, 
where anonymity is almost impossible to avoid.   
 
Justice is about community and about relationship, particularly when 
speaking about mutual responsibility. Throughout Scripture, justice is 
about the relationship between God and his people, and between the 
people with each other.  Justice in a community is about listening, about 
sharing, about recognizing the present injustices, and about working 
together to find a solution.66  When speaking about justice, it is not 
enough to speak only of rights. Duty and responsibility are also important, 
particularly when talking about community and neighbours. Lebacqz sees 
the notion of mutual responsibility as being a biblical notion of justice.67  
 
The element of religion is also important. Liturgy and tradition play an 
important part in remembering, which provide meaning for the people 
and for their work (Lebacqz 1987:101). Smit mentions four things which 
happen during worship and impact the worshipers: subversion, formation, 
calling and community (2007b:387-388). Subversion liberates the 
worshipers from everyday reality and allows their view of reality and the 
world to be radically transformed; they look and see with new eyes. Both 
moral formation and character formation of human beings takes place 
during the worship service. People experience a calling during Christian 
worship and they are reminded of their vocation, the responsibility of 
being followers of Jesus Christ. Lastly, people experience koinonia and 
learn how to be with others in a community; they learn to love, belong and 
share. 
                                                 
66
 Lebacqz makes the point that “If we take injustice as the starting point for a theory of justice, we 
do not need “need, effort, merit, equality” etc. as the basis” (1987:150). This, however, runs the grave 
danger of never progressing beyond listening, although I must agree that it is impossible to talk of 
justice without acknowledging the injustice. Rules for a just society will not make any sense in an 
unjust society.  
 
67
 She speaks of three forms of responsibility that are of the most importance: The first is 
responsibility for social structures. The injustice of structures needs to be realized and new structures 
need to be formed. The second form of responsibility is the preferential option of the poor. The poor 
should be the litmus test for justice. Finally, solidarity, as a way of embodying justice, is an important 
response to injustice by oppressors (Lebacqz 1987:106-107).  
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In another article, Smit discusses the importance of the sermon and of 
prayer in moral formation (2007c:446-451). Listening to and hearing God’s 
word in a worship sermon helps us to see properly, giving us the glasses to 
interpret the world differently. Faith and ethics flow from prayer. The 
worship service is a place of remembrance and expectation (Wolterstorff 
1983:156). Wolterstorff closely connects worship, mercy and justice in a 
relationship whereby they enrich each other. The influence of Christian 
worship on who we are, how we see the world and how we act is of utmost 
importance in the struggle for justice.  
The church can bring about a sense of regret about the state of the world 
and remorse for what is happening and create a space for people to truly 
lament the brokenness of the world. Both regret and remorse are essential 
when confronting injustice since there is no just utopia, but instead, a 
broken and battered world which invites us to constantly review how we 
are thinking and acting from a place of humility.68 It is necessary to 
change the way we see things before we can change the way we act.69 
 
The Church does not confront the world in absolute antithesis and 
mutual exclusion (sectarianism), nor does it simply surrender itself 
to the world’s agenda, as if it were merely a valuable resource for 
the accomplishment of secular ends (acculturation). The Church’s 
solidarity with the world allows it to seek valid forms of 
contextualization while guarding against flaccid conformism. Yet 
its precedence over the world requires it to maintain its essential 
distinctiveness without retreating into rigid isolation (Hunsinger, 
‘Barth, Barmen and the Confessing Church Today’, 292. Quoted in: 
Fergusson 1998:33).  
                                                 
68
 Lebacqz uses both the words “rue” and “reparation” when speaking of injustice. Rue expresses a 
sense of “sorrow, remorse, or regret ... [and] it is only from a stance of rue that the Christian can begin 
to ask about justice in our ruptured world.”  “Reparation means repairing, mending, or restoring to a 
proper state. ... It is therefore the proper response from the perpetrator of injustice to the victim of 
injustice” (1987:50 & 117). The careful use of specific words (and the necessary avoidance of others) 
is an important part of dialogue. It is not enough only to talk, action needs to be implicit in the words.  
 
69
 McFague, talking about the “beguiling major models – worldviews” portrays them as covering 
the world “with their interpretive grid” preventing us from seeing the world differently, which means 
we cannot act differently. Thus, she argues, “one very important piece of the planetary agenda is 
envisioning alternatives to the dominant economic worldview” (2001:74).  
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It is not necessary to develop a specific Christian theory of justice, 
particularly one which would be considered politically relevant despite 
being exclusive. Rather, it is imperative for the church to remain engaged 
with the political world;  
sometimes affirming, sometimes critiquing ... Major Reformed 
theologians (...) and major events and places in the history of 
Reformed churches (...) stand for such debates about the critical 
implications of the gospel of salvation for life together in society, 
and therefore for questions of law, morality and faith (Smit 
2009:349).70 
 
Lebacqz emphasises the necessity of “right relationship” rather than 
merely giving to each person what is his due. Responsibilities and 
mutuality, rather than rights, are also important in the Christian 
vocabulary. This means that domination and exploitation are the primary 
injustices. But of course, any justice which seeks to redress injustice will 
be incomplete and impartial (1987:154-55). However, the church should 
seek to be responsible in its own actions. “If the church is to be in any real 
sense an exemplary community, a community which demonstrates the 
possibilities and the blessings of loving fellowship, it must take very 
seriously in its own life the message and the principles it offers to the 
world” (Forrester 2001:199). By dealing correctly with its own power and 
wealth, the church can be an exemplary community to the secular orders. 
By taking appropriate care of the elderly, the sick, the needy and the 
handicapped, the church can be a living testament to how justice should 
function and the responsibility which is owed to those who are most in 
need. Part of the responsibility is creating a safe space where a voice can 
be given to the voiceless. 
 
When people participate in community there needs to be a place where 
they can talk about the injustices which they have suffered and the 
                                                 
70
 See also Smit’s article The Impact of the Church in South Africa (2004) for a discussion on how 
congregations and the ecumenical church function in civil society in South Africa as well as how the 
role of the church and individual Christians has changed (and is changing) after the end of apartheid.  
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oppression which they have endured. And they need to talk about this 
with the perpetrators of the injustice and the oppressors. It needs to be a 
space where both parties can feel safe and can be given an opportunity to 
remember together, giving voice to the pain and suffering, and creating an 
identity for all people, where toleration and respect and honour are 
granted regardless of circumstances. Liberation and equality need to go 
hand in hand with participation.71 
 
Karen Lebacqz suggests that the place to start speaking about justice is 
from injustice (1987:35).72 Her reasoning is that there is more consensus 
of what is unjust than what is just. Sen is in agreement. He argues that 
the question ‘what is a just society?’ is not a good starting-point for a 
useful theory of justice.73 This perhaps has some logic in creating a just 
community. Speaking about injustice is giving a voice to those who are 
being treated unjustly. It is opening a space where people can talk and 
share their stories, a process which is vitally important on the road to 
recovery. When talking only of justice, the task will often inevitably fall to 
the educated and the wealthy – those who are supposed to know what 
                                                 
71
 Lovin emphasises people must be a part of the deliberations about themselves. “To seek the good 
of others requires that we empower them for this participation in their own right. Because justice 
requires both liberty and equality, we cannot render to persons what they are due simply by giving 
them a full share of their entitlements – thought that is important. They must also be free to take part in 
the deliberations that determine what those entitlements are, and they must resist in the name of this 
more complete liberty any version of liberty that offers freedom without participation, or any version 
of equality that offers entitlements without deliberation” (Lovin 1995:230). 
Wolfgang Huber similarly says that“Wirkliche Gerechtigkeit kann also nur in dem Maß 
verwirklicht werden, in dem ein Gleichgewicht zwischen Freiheit und Gleichheit ermöglicht wird; sie 
zielt also auf gesellschaftliche Strukturen, in denen Freiheit und Gleichheit sich wechselseitig fördern 
und begrenzen” (1996a:171). Thus, giving equal priority to liberty and equality possibly remains one 
of the greatest challenges in the struggle for justice. 
 
72
 She later suggests that it is inappropriate to search for absolute rules for justice. “Justice is not 
“to each according to need.” Nor is it “benefit the least advantaged.” Nor is it “the greatest good for the 
greatest number.” Because justice emerges out of protest against injustice, justice is not so much a state 
of being as a struggle and a constant process. It is the process of correcting what is unjust. It is the 
process of providing new beginnings, not an ideal state of distribution” (Lebacqz 1987:152). 
 
73
 Sen goes on to say that a systematic theory of comparative justice does not need, nor does it 
necessarily yield, an answer to the question ‘what is a just society?’” (2009:105).  
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justice is.74 Listening to the voices of those who are the victims of 
injustice, also gives them dignity. Injustice is not only physical, but the 
dehumanization and the lack of dignity are the results of being treated as 
a second-class citizen or as undeserving of any status as a human being.75  
 
Sen speaks of “transcendental institutionalism” (2009:5ff). This focuses, as 
does Rawls, on the nature of justice, in an ideal society therefore by 
default, rather than comparing just and unjust practices and finding less 
unjust alternative. Rawls expects all citizens to act in a just way, which he 
himself acknowledges (1971:7-8). This is probably not a reasonable 
expectation and does not take into account the fallibility of human nature 
and the injustice present in society.  It also does not allow a space for the 
oppressed to stand up against the injustice, and offer their opinions and 
experiences.  
 
Theology, as opposed to law, and the church, as opposed to government 
structures, offers a unique space, hopefully a safe space, for individuals to 
find community and a place to express themselves freely. Justice develops 
in many different ways – those who speak about justice, those who speak 
against injustice, those who give people opportunities to learn and to 
grow, and the space that is created for people to remember in a place of 
safety. Naudé, writing about the Truth and Reconciliation Commission 
which took place in South Africa in the 1990’s, speaks of restorative 
justice (reparation) alongside questions of memory, truth and 
reconciliation (2003:140). The emphasis is placed on reconciliation, not 
retribution. Smit suggests that true reconciliation and restorative justice 
should accompany one another (2007d:339). There needs to be discourse 
                                                 
74
 When we are searching for truth, it is necessary that there is always a right attitude. It is 
important to build right attitudes in our mutual human relationships before something lasting can be 
achieved in the world (Beyers Naudé 2006:18).  
 
75
 Duncan Forrester writes that the “voice of the victims should be treated as a primary and 
privileged insight into the nature of injustice, which must not be pushed aside” (1997:57). We need to 
discover what justice is by not ignoring the injustice, or attempting to define injustice from a position 
of privilege and dominance 
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about truth, guilt and reconciliation and it is to this end that shared 
stories are important, particularly when they give people the opportunity 
to lament that which was lost.76 
 
By creating a dialogue between all peoples, we are protecting any 
authority against absolute superiority. Both Rawls and Niebuhr 
emphasise that there is always a more just way of doing things and we 
continually have to scrutinise our own practices and principles to ensure 
that we are not becoming unjust, or to put it more subtlety, that there is 
not a more just way of living. While it is important to have a place where 
all people can feel safe enough to voice their experiences, it is also 
important to have a place for reflection on the policies, and to take 
responsibility for acting in a way which is most just under the 
circumstances.77  
 
Too often, moral superiority has stood in the way of justice. We do not 
necessarily see things clearly from our perspective, and the perspectives of 
others are necessary to give more liberty and equality. There are not 
necessarily two principles of justice as put forward by Rawls. It is 
important to realize that there is more than one way of overcoming 
injustice.78  It is also important to realize the necessity of involving the 
                                                 
76
 See Smit’s insightful discussion about dialogue with regards to the Anglo-Boer War and the 
Truth and Reconciliation Commission in South Africa and the importance of not only forgiving, but 
also remembering as well as the limitations on the stories we share (Smit 2007d).   
 
77
 Dialogue is not straight-forward however. What we share in common may not always be enough, 
and a common heritage may not offer enlightenment to our problems today. Smit discusses the 
difficulties of dialogue in a specifically reformed tradition where he addresses problems encountered in 
doctrine and ethics, reception and authority, which all impact on how dialogue can take place and the 
effectiveness of the interaction. Despite all the difficulties and divisions, however, he concludes that 
the very same issues which are divisive may “lead to more serious involvement and participation” 
(Smit 2007a:249).  
 
78
 Sen focuses on seven points that social choice theory contributes to a theory of justice. While I 
have no intention of entering into a dialogue with social choice theory, I do believe that this argument 
holds relevance for the argument of this thesis. “Perhaps the most important contribution of the social 
choice approach to the theory of justice is its concern with comparative assessments. This relational, 
rather than transcendental, framework concentrates on the practical reason behind what is to be chosen 
and which decisions should be taken, rather than speculating on what a perfectly just society (on which 
there may or may not be any agreement) would look like. …  
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people in decisions. Sen points out that the “basic connection between 
public reasoning, on the one hand, and the demands of participatory social 
decision, on the other, is central not just to the practical challenge of 
making democracy more effective, but also to the conceptual problem of 
basing an adequately articulated idea of social justice on the demands of 
social choice and fairness” (2009:112-113).  
 
Hollenbach argues that the pursuit of the common good is dialogic. 
“Cultural differences are so significant that a shared vision of the common 
good can only be attained in a historically incremental way through deep 
encounter and intellectual exchange across traditions. It is also dialogic 
because it sees engagement with others across the boundaries of 
traditions as itself part of the human good” (2002:153). He suggests that 
although the starting point for the church is the gospel and Christian 
                                                                                                                                           
Social choice theory has given considerable recognition to the plurality of reasons, all of which 
demand our attention when issues of social justice are considered, and they may sometimes conflict 
with each other. This inescapable plurality may or may not lead to an impossibility result, yielding an 
impasse, but the need to take note of the possibility of durable conflicts of non-eliminable principles 
can be quite important in the theory of justice. …  
We often think, if only implicitly, of the plausibility of principles in a number of specific cases 
which focus our attention on those ideas – the human mind cannot often enough grasp the immense 
reach of general principles. But once the principles are formulated in unconstrained terms, covering 
inter alia a great many cases other than those that motivated our interest in those principles, we can run 
into difficulties that were not foreseen earlier. We then have to decide what has to give and why. …  
Social choice theory allows the possibility that even a complete theory of justice can yield 
incomplete rankings of justice. Indeed, the incompleteness in many cases can be ‘assertive’, yielding 
statements such as x and y cannot be ranked in terms of justice. This contrasts with an incompleteness 
that is tentatively accepted, while awaiting – or working towards – completion, on the basis of more 
information, or more penetrating examination, or with the use of some supplementary criteria. …  
A person’s voice may count either because her interests are involved, or because her reasoning and 
judgement can enlighten a discussion. Also, a person’s judgment may be seen as important either 
because she is one of the parties directly involved (this may be called ‘membership entitlement’), or 
because the person’s perspective and the reasons behind it bring important insights and discernment 
into an evaluation, and there is a case for listening to that assessment whether or not the person is a 
directly involved party (this can be called ‘enlightenment relevance’). There is some general merit in 
the explicitness of fully stated axioms and carefully established derivations, which make it easier to see 
what is being assumed and what exactly they entail. Since the demands that are linked to the pursuit of 
justice in public discussion, and sometimes even in theories of justice, often leave considerable room 
for clearer articulation and fuller defence, this explicitness can itself be something of a contribution. …  
Given the complex nature of human values and social reasoning, they may often be hard to capture 
in precise axiomatic terms, and yet the need for explicitness, to the extent that can be achieved, must 
have much dialogic merit. How far to go towards axiomatization cannot but be, to a considerable 
extent, a matter of judgement in dealing with the competing claims of precise characterization, on the 
one hand, and the need to take note, on the other, of the complexities that may be hard to axiomatize 
but which are nevertheless significant concerns that can be usefully discussed in more general – and 
somewhat looser – terms. … (2009:106-111) 
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tradition, a commitment to dialogue and mutual inquiry suggest that 
“there is a truth about the human good that must be pursued and that 
makes a claim on the minds and hearts of all persons” (Hollenbach 
2003:12).79 Thus, creating a space for dialogue and a participatory 
community is indispensable in the pursuit of justice. 
 
4.3.5 Justice and a global world 
 
“The neighbourhood that is constructed by our relations with distant 
people is something that has pervasive relevance to the understanding of 
justice in general, particularly so in the contemporary world. We are 
linked with each other through trade, commerce, literature, language, 
music, arts, entertainment, religion, medicine, healthcare, politics, news 
reports, media communication and other ties” (Sen 2009:172).80 But as our 
borders grow ever wider, the need for community and a sense of belonging 
becomes more pressing as it becomes more desperate to retain a 
communal identity. The growing need for awareness of how our actions 
affect not only those people who surround us or who share our government 
but those on the other side of the world has also become imperative. For 
every action there is a reaction, and we need to become aware of what our 
actions are doing, even when we do not witness the results, whether this 
                                                 
79
 Hollenbach views dialogue as the key to the challenge of pluralism and interdependence. There is 
“interaction between fidelity to the distinctive religious beliefs and distinctive traditions of 
Christianity, on the one hand, and the pursuit of an inclusive, universal community, on the other. 
Dialogue – the active engagement of listening and speaking with others whose beliefs and traditions 
are different – is the key to such dynamism. Where such dialogue is absent, the chances of obtaining a 
vision of the common good of the world we are entering will be small to the point of vanishing” 
(2003:15).  
 
80
 A recent study, Dreaming a Different World, Globalisation and Justice for Humanity and the 
Earth. The Challenge of the Accra Confession for the Churches, has recently been published and is 
available online. The objective of the Globalisation Project was “to interrogate the issues emanating 
from the Accra Confession, share our experiences from within our different historical, social, 
economic, political and theological contexts; and to seek common understanding of the complexities of 
the challenges confronting the church.” The Evangelisch Reformierte Kirche in Germany and the 
Uniting Reformed Church in Southern Africa formed the two task teams which studied issues affected 
by injustice such as gender, water, food, consumerism and poverty, to mention just a few. The 
Globalisation Report, edited by Allan Boesak, Johann Weusmann and Charles Amjad-Ali,  is available 
online at 
    http://academic.sun.ac.za/tsv/downloads/Globalisation%20report%202010%20proof%203.pdf.  
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is because our immediate neighbours are not affected or because of a 
temporal void. What are the implications of how we live (where we shop, 
what we eat, how much petrol we use) to the political decisions made by 
our government for other peoples and other nations, as well as for future 
generations?81  
 
We are intimately linked to many other people, even if those ties are not 
visible or immediately recognisable.82  We have a responsibility to other 
people and we have a duty to assist them. This is juxtaposed with the 
obligation we have through solidarity and membership to members of the 
same group or groups.83 A person will belong to many different groups at 
the same time, although some scholars (Sen among them) argue that it is 
increasingly popular to see people in terms of “one dominant ‘identity’” 
which is “not only an imposition of an external and arbitrary priority, but 
also the denial of an important liberty of a person who can decide on their 
respective loyalties to different groups” (Sen 2009:247). It is local groups 
that will help improve the morality of the community. On a global level, 
the political realm is not large enough to protect everybody and 
everything.84 Universal justice brings with it its own inequalities as is 
                                                 
81
 Walzer is supportive of liberalism’s human rights argument. He claims that “we should defend 
the human rights of individuals across the globe and look for international agencies that can undertake 
some, at least, of the function of the liberal state: redistributing resources to enable the largest possible 
number of individuals to pursue happiness; sustaining a liveable environment for all the world’s 
inhabitants; maintaining a system of law enforcement aimed at equal protection for men and women, 
rich and poor, and so on. Liberalism’s theoretical drift – even if practice lags far behind – is toward a 
global regime that relates directly, with equal respect and concern, to each and every human 
individual” (2004:132-3). 
 
82
 “The concept of ‘global civil society’ has been developed in recent literature to articulate the 
sense that contemporary problems facing local and international communities can only be addressed by 
a robust set of global networks. These must transcend nation states while remaining independent of 
political and economic institutions at the multinational level. [The development of a global or 
transnational civil society] is necessary to address the economic imbalances of international capitalism, 
threats to the earth’s ecosystem, and the problems of terrorism, abuse of human rights and the dangers 
posed by the proliferation of nuclear weapons. On this scale, civil society is a reminder that we are 
dealing with something crucial to human survival and well-being” (Fergusson 2004a:147). 
 
83
 Sandel speaks of “obligations of solidarity” that are not natural duties (what we owe to persons 
as persons on a global level) and go beyond what we other people (2009:223-5). 
 
84
 Communities are continually changing to adapt to the way in which life is becoming more 
global. “Local citizens’ movements and alternative institutions are emerging and are trying to create 
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seen in the large space between rich and poor, powerful and dependant 
countries.85  
 
The world is roughly divided into a wealthy sector (North America, 
northwest Europe and Japan) which forms the core of the economic 
system and the poorer periphery (Wolterstorff 1983:31). The core is 
engaged in “capital-intensive, high-technology, high-wage production, 
whereas the periphery is dominantly engaged in labor-intensive, low-
technology, low-wage production.” The periphery is thus dominated by the 
core, leading to extreme unevenness in wealth and inequality in lifestyles. 
The core generally grows at the expense of the periphery.86  
 
Because of this glaring inequality, immigration laws are a growing 
concern when talking about global inequality.87 One of the greatest 
                                                                                                                                           
greater economic self-sufficiency, internalize costs to earth in the price of goods, sustain livelihoods, 
work out agricultures appropriate to regions, preserve traditions and cultures, revive religious life, 
maintain human dignity, repair the moral fiber, resist the commodification of all things, be 
technologically innovative with renewable and non-renewable resources, revise urban designs and 
architecture, preserve biological species and protect ecosystems, and cultivate a sense of earth as a 
sacred good held in trust and in common” (Rasmussen 1996:351).  
 
85
 Injustice is glaringly apparent in the inequality of national wealth and this presents serious 
problems for dealing with injustice, oppression and responsibility. “The inequality of nations 
complicates the case for national community. If all countries had comparable wealth, and if every 
person were a citizen of some country or other, the obligation to take special care of one’s own people 
would not pose a problem – at least not from the standpoint of justice. But in a world with vast 
disparities between rich and poor countries, the claims of community can be in tension with the claims 
of equality. The volatile issue of immigration reflects this tension” (Sandel 2009:230). 
 
86
 Rasmussen describes this in slightly different terms: “The economic and cultural drive pushing 
the forward stampede is concentrated in the industrialized world and its extensions in the “developing” 
world. It is globalization that includes the vast majority of people as measured by impact but excludes 
most of them as measured by benefit” (1996:349). 
 
87
 Sandel argues that open immigration can be opposed on moral grounds only if we “accept that 
we have a special obligation for the welfare of our fellow citizens by virtue of the common life and 
history we share” (2009:232). He quotes Walzer (1983:32-33), who says that “it is only if patriotic 
sentiment has some moral basis, only if communal cohesion makes for obligations and shared 
meanings, only if there are members as well as strangers, that state officials would have any reason to 
worry especially about the welfare of their own people ... and the success of their own culture and 
politics.”  
Ayelet Shachar in The Birthright Lottery, Citizenship and Global Inequality draws attention to the 
specific exclusion people face by citizenship, as opposed to the inclusion. When the national 
government is able to protect its people and offer them a decent life, citizenship offers countless 
opportunities. When people are poor, oppressed and suffering, citizenship can be a burden. This is a 
segment of justice (and injustice) which is rarely considered as a political and juridical form of 
oppression and exclusion.   
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challenges is how to be free while respecting civil society, or how to be an 
individual in a group which might often seek to challenge the autonomy of 
the individual. Finding the balance between our identity-forming 
associations, while also respecting the individual’s right to freedom, 
requires dialogue between competing groups and competing ideas.88 It is 
almost impossible for people to fulfil their ambitions and live a good life 
without some transfer of resources at some stage in their life cycle. For 
this, “societies rely on the contributions of different generations at 
different stages in their life cycles” (Shachar 2009:159). This means that 
the working population will, to a greater or lesser extent, support the 
elderly, the young and others who are unable to work. This protects the 
citizens of a country, but offers no assistance to immigrants or to citizens 
of other countries; in many cases it does not offer enough assistance even 
to citizens. Huber draws attention to the right of foreigners including 
discussions on the right to asylum, the humanitarian right to stay, 
immigration law and the rights of resident aliens (Huber 1996:387ff).  
 
Global rights, or “global emancipation,” can ensure equality for more 
people in more places, if implemented correctly. It represents the 
“loosening of the grip of the sovereign state on its individual members” 
(Walzer 2004:134). A global politics needs to work hand in hand with a 
stronger state – redistribution will depend ultimately upon the state 
                                                                                                                                           
Brian Barry points out that it one of the most important things that determine people’s prospect is 
the country in which they are born and as such the institutions which define life chances in the world 
need to be subjected to criticism on the basis of the principles of justice (1989:237). 
 
88
 Pluralism and freedom are often contradictory. There are many instances where autonomy is 
subordinated to the practices of a certain group. “In theory, civil society is created by autonomous 
individuals, but in practice many of its associations are unfriendly to autonomy. More than this, many 
of the groups that coexist in civil society, that seek recognition and empowerment within it, are not 
themselves liberal or democratic, even though they appeal to liberal and democratic norms. Let’s 
consider now the inequalities that prevail within them, in the form of charismatic leadership, 
hierarchical organization, elite dominance, and gender discrimination. The effect of all these, 
singularly or together, is that some of the members are more free than others. ... The question is, How 
do we defend freedom under conditions, first, of group autonomy, and, second, of hierarchical 
subordination in many of the autonomous groups? Or, given the fact of pluralism, what sorts of 
subordination and what sorts of subordinating practices are we prepared to tolerate, and what sort not, 
in the civil society of a democratic state?” Walzer’s answer to this is to emphasise the mutual 
dependency of citizens (Walzer 2004:85,87). 
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rather than global egalitarianism, although international laws protecting 
women and children, for example, are necessary to ensure the 
emancipation of all citizens of all states and nations. Huber presents an 
interesting discussion on ethics in human rights in his discussion of 
international law. He suggests ten points which he feels are necessary to 
develop a planetary ethos. He includes recognising the quality of all 
people as well as the value of nature, tolerance of the convictions and 
lifestyles of others, taking seriously the lives and right to life of the next 
generation, addressing oppression and discrimination and using freedom 
in a responsible way (Huber 1996a:383).  
 
What is noticeably lacking, particularly in light of recent concern over the 
well-being of the earth, is any engagement with ecological ethics in the 
work of both Rawls and Niebuhr. A theology which is concerned with the 
entire creation can extend justice discussions beyond the political, social 
and economic realms. Justice should extend beyond human beings and 
account for both the animals and the earth upon which we are dependant 
for our existence. The language of stewardship needs to become more 
prominent in our discussions of justice. We do not only have an obligation 
to our neighbour, but we are to care for the earth and all living creatures, 
too. Sally McFague speaks of the necessity of developing a culture of 
“enoughness.” This is realizing that “the cruciform way of Christ means 
making sacrifices so that others might live” (2001:33). The greed of our 
(Western, capitalistic) culture has left many oppressed and the idea of the 
“good life” which is a part of the consumer life-style needs to be replaced 
with a giving, caring and sharing culture.89 We should not shy away from 
                                                 
89
 “...the common good of public life is a realization of the human capacity for intrinsically 
valuable relationships, not only a fulfillment of the needs and deficiencies of individuals. It is true, of 
course, that social life is necessary to meet a person’s needs for food, shelter, familial nurturance in 
childhood, basic educations, the protection of public safety, etc. From one point of view, therefore, 
these dimensions of the common good are instrumental to the good of the individual. Human beings 
are vulnerable and needy. But it is also true that eating with others, sharing a home with others, and 
benefiting from education, intellectual exchange, and friendship are all aspects of a life of positive 
social interaction and communication with others. They are not extrinsic means to human flourishing 
but are aspects of flourishing itself. ... If we overlook these bonds of relationship, the goods of the 
relationships themselves will not be part of the picture of the common good. The good of the 
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the search for a moderate lifestyle; we need to learn to share for the sake 
of solidarity and community.90 It is also essential that we recognise the 
complexity of justice, particularly when trying to affirm the richness of 
society.91 There are so many facets and so many aspects to justice that any 
discussion of justice will be incomplete, and any list of injustices will be 
boundless.   
 
Globalisation offers many exciting opportunities, but any attempts to 
become “religious” need to be “resisted, confronted, and where possible 
transformed with a “Christ-centered” ethics” (Naudé 2006:281). This calls 
a community to a “renewed vision of Christ’s Lordship as constitutive for 
their very existence as a community, and as identity-confirming narrative 
in times of change and transition” (Naudé 2006:282). As boundaries 
decrease, sense of meaning needs to increase. Recognising where our 
meaning is situated, and what that means for our lives, our lifestyles, and 
the lives of those around us, needs to be affirmed and evaluated. We have 
a responsibility to live in a way which promotes the equality of all people 
and their right, both individually and in community, to freedom and 
participation.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                                                                                                           
community itself will be ignored. The common good ... is a value to be pursued for its own sake” 
(Hollenbach 2002:81).  
 
90
 Forrester captures this beautifully: “We need to learn to live simply so that others may simply 
live” (Forrester 2001:179-180).  
 
91
 Justice can never be straightforward; different relationships call for different interpretations of 
justice. “Justice has a plurality of meanings because we have many kinds of relationships in our lives. 
... Respect for the richness of social life, therefore, calls for a nuanced and differentiated understanding 
of the meaning of justice. A single criterion, such as need or merit, administered by a single institution, 
such as the government or the market, betrays the rich and complex reality of social existence” 
(Hollenbach 1988:81).  
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4.4 Justice and the Christian Community 
 
The involvement of the church, theology and church law in society can be 
ambivalent. Wolfgang Huber discusses relationship between theology and 
law in Gerechtigkeit und Recht (Huber 1996a:30ff). The popular 
philosophical position holds that there is no relationship between theology 
and the law, a position which can find much substantiation in a painful 
history. But Huber contends that it is the task of theology to ensure that 
religious freedom is maintained in society while the religious neutrality of 
the state is preserved as well as to relate Christianity to the coexistence of 
people in society. The Christian perspective, the perspective which springs 
from the unconditional love of God, remains essential to the relationship 
between state and church. God is not separated from the state and from 
the law, but theology has the twofold task of ensuring the religious 
freedom as well as the religious neutrality of the state.92   
 
So Christianity is not a private religion, but is critically engaged within 
society. It is the task of the church to direct people towards that which is 
most precious in their lives: namely reconciliation with God and mutual 
recognition of love. However, together with the state, it is the task of the 
church to search for justice and peace (Huber 1996a:454). Thus the church 
as community has a specific role to play in ensuring justice.   
 
                                                 
92
 „Doch er anerkennt seine Grenzen wie seine Aufgaben nur dann, wenn das Bewuβtsein lebendig 
bleibt, daβ er von Voraussetzungen abhängig ist, die er selbst weder hervorzubringen noch zu 
garantieren vermag. Der Theologie ist wachsame und kritische Begleitung nach beiden Seiten hin 
aufgetragen. Sie hat das Ihre dazu beizutragen, daβ die Religionsfreiheit geachtet und die staatliche 
Religionsneutralität gewahrt bleibt. Aber sie hat ebenso das Ihre zu tun, um die Voraussetzungen alles 
staatlichen Zusammenlebens zu klären and zu verdeutlichen, welche Folgen sich ergeben, wenn das 
gemeinsame Leben im Staat aus der Perpektive des christlichen Glaubens betrachtet wird. Aus der 
Perspektive des christlichen Glaubens – das heiβt: aus der Perpektive der vorbehaltlosen 
Menschenfreundlichkeit Gottes. ...  
Deshalb wird selbst in Verfassungstexten von politischer Verantwortung gesprochen, etsi Deus 
daretur. Die Rolle der Theologie für die Deutung des Rechts besteht darin, diese Voraussetzung wie 
ihre Folgen zu präzisieren. Doch sie hat zugleich dafür einzustehen, daβ dies in einer Form geschieht, 
welche die Religionsfreiheit aller Bürgerinnen und Bürger ebenso achtet wie die Religionsneutralität 
des Staates.“ (Huber 1996a:40).  
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The church should provide people with a solid moral grounding so that 
they can live a distinctive life in a society which is often a confusing mass 
of divergent communities and diverse voices. People need to believe in 
something which can provide an alternative to, while not completely 
rejecting, modern society, the freedom of liberalism and the confusion of 
plurality. It is necessary for theology to engage critically with other voices 
in the political arena, as well as to encourage church members to do the 
same. Fergusson warns against developing a “works righteousness”; we 
are reliant upon the Holy Spirit to guide us, and a strong pneumatology is 
necessary in our political involvement. He describes the mission of the 
church as “providing an authentic moral voice in a world too often 
compromised and confused” (2004:98).93  
 
O’Donovan calls Christians to take a responsible interest in politics, and 
when entering into Christian deliberation to undertake a specific 
Christian reflection.94 At the same time, the Christian voice in the 
political arena will be apologetic, addressing “a crisis that is more 
pressing on unbelievers than on believers; and so it also offers reasons to 
believe” (O’Donovan 2005:xii).95 For Niebuhr, his intense involvement in 
                                                 
93
 The church is required to be one voice amidst a plethora of voices. “Moral formation in the 
church is not exclusively preoccupied with the particular ethical insights of the Christian faith. Much 
of the time, these insights will be shared with others in the overlap of moral traditions and the wisdom 
they generate. Yet the grounds for moral action, commitment, and persistence will be determined by 
the specific character of Scripture together with the devotional and educational practices of the church. 
In a post-Christian setting, these will clash much of the time with forces inside secular society. For the 
sake of moral formation, therefore, countercultural passions, activities and groups will require to be 
kept in good working order. This will generate not merely an ethical orientation that is in part 
distinctive to the life of the church; it may also provide an antidote to the amoralism that can be highly 
tolerant while indifferent to the common good” (2004:114-5).  
 
94
 Theology has to enter into critical dialogue and put forward its unique position; thus, it needs to 
enter the public forum without losing integrity. “Theology may have a modest but constructive and 
questioning contribution to make both to the theoretic discussions which undergird policy and to the 
policy-making itself” (Forrester 1997:31).  
 
95
 A few pages later he says that “ethics has by its nature the force of an apologetic, not merely 
because the existence of a community reflecting systematically out of Christian belief upon the 
challenges of living in love is “attractive,” ... but because it is interpretive. It gives us reason to believe 
that our lives are not, after all, merely thrown together, but are susceptible of coordinated social 
meaning, even a beauty...” (O’Donovan 2005:xv).  
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politics could never be separated from the church – he was firstly a pastor, 
but that certainly did not limit his ministry to Christian circles alone.  
 
James Gustafson makes use of a fourfold moral discourse which involves 
prophetic, narrative, ethical and policy discourses.96 This is an attempt to 
translate a specifically theological discourse into a discourse which can be 
understood in civil society. Similarly, Heinrich Bedford-Strohm describes 
a “public theology model” which is a bilingual model; “on the one hand, 
[the church] gives account of its biblical and theological roots using 
biblical text and metaphors, and on the other hand it shows why its 
proposals and affirmation are plausible and make sense for all people of 
good will, using the language of secular discourse” (2005:151).  
 
Smit describes the task of theology as seeking “to engage with existing 
theoretical frameworks by drawing on its own sources and resources” 
(2005:228). In this way, theology attempts to contribute broad ideas 
concerning justice which can help formulate, evaluate and implement law.  
It does not attempt to Christianise politics but rather to engage critically 
with society, introducing a different perspective.  
 
Human rights in the secular are not at all strange to Christians. Rather, 
the Christian faith brings a different orientation with regards to human 
rights and human dignity.97 Huber and Tödt (1977) discuss Luther’s three 
                                                 
96
 Naudé (2008) makes use of this for an analysis of the Accra Confession, and as a discourse 
model I think it offers valuable insight into how theology can enter into the public realm, offering hope 
for the future while also affirming the dignity of people by placing them in the centre of the change 
and remaining true to belief in God. At the same time, it also emphasises the necessity of also 
focussing on the necessary policy and institutional changes, most often in dialogue with other 
disciplines.  
Koopman (2005a) applies Gustafson’s model to the churches’ quest “to speak appropriately about 
public issues like economic justice.” He concludes that it is necessary to challenge people (individuals 
and communities) to reconsider their values and their identity and their self-understanding in an 
attempt to restore their dignity.  
 
97
 For example, while the indispensability of a person in the political is grounded in the principle, in 
Christianity the uniqueness is deepened by belief in God and relationship to God (Huber & Tödt 
1977:174).  
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spiritual fundamental rights of brotherly love, equality and freedom (as 
understood by Johannes Heckel). These are the complete converse of the 
secular fundamental principles of freedom, equality and brotherliness 
(Huber and Tödt 1977:173). Christian’s can thus enter the human rights 
debates with their own perceptions about the foundations of rights and 
justice, which can strengthen their arguments when arguing for the 
freedom, equality and participation of all people. The foundation may not 
be acceptable to all people, but it can offer some sort of validation may 
find an echo in secular arguments.  
 
It is necessary, though, for the church not to confirm the status quo but to 
seek continual transformation. While it may prefer a democratic society 
it’s task is not primarily to legitimate democracy but rather to “inject into 
the democratic system a vision that pushes democracy beyond its present 
achievements towards a greater expression of what we believe it God’s 
will for the world” (De Gruchy 2004:59). While recognising how valuable 
democracy is in according freedom and equality to people, the church also 
recognises the weaknesses of democracy, and the limits which are placed 
upon the state (Huber 2004).98 The state is neither inherently good nor 
evil. It should be recognised as a tool of governance which has the 
possibility to improve life for all people, yet its policies and practices need 
to be continually evaluated to ensure that the power is not abused. It is 
necessary that theology “affirms the importance of political, social and 
economic life as the sphere of God’s grace and involvement, and critiques 
the present state of political, social and economic life precisely because 
                                                 
98
 „Eine besondere Zustimmung der Christen verdient die Demokratie, so habe ich das schon 
damals ausdrücklich erläutert, vor allem deshalb, weil sie eine Würde des Menschen anerkennt, die 
aller staatlichen und gesellschaftlichen Macht vorgeordnet ist. Dass die Würde der menschlichen 
Person nicht vom Staat hervorgebracht oder entzogen werden kann, ist dem christlichen Glauben 
besonders wichtig – versteht er doch den Menschen als Gottes Ebenbild  und zugleich als den Sünder, 
der von Gott angenommen, trotz aller Sünde also von ihm selbst mit Würde und Anerkennung  bedacht 
wird. Von der Unverfügbarkeit der menschlichen Würde geht  jede christliche Beschäftigung mit der 
Demokratie aus. Deshalb aber beginnt das Verständnis der Demokratie mit der Einsicht in die 
Grenzen, die dem Staat gesetzt sind.“ (Huber 2004) 
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God’s will of grace and salvation has not been fulfilled in any historical 
situation and in any given society or system” (Smit 2007b:382).  
 
Huber and Tödt (1977:162ff) suggest that there are certain analogies 
between human rights and fundamental content of the Christian faith.99 
According to the Bible, the indispensability of human freedom is based on 
the freedom found in the grace of God. By this grace, all things belong to a 
person (1 Cor. 3:21-23) and all things are allowed, with the condition that 
all things are not good (1 Cor. 6:12). Thus for the Christian, freedom is 
inseparable from community and from responsibility to the world; it is not 
an individualistic freedom which is pronounced by law. 
 
Similarly, the Christian idea of equality is based on the equality found in 
Jesus Christ, where all determining characteristics are stripped away 
(Gal 3:26ff). Equality in the law should overcome all differences, making 
inequalities invalid, but this has the danger of being only law, not true 
acceptance of the other (Huber & Tödt 1997:167).100 Closely linked to 
equality is participation. People are not always given the opportunity to 
participate in society, often either by exclusion from a small group or 
specific community or blatant excluded from society on a whole. In the 
Christian community, everyone is included in the community by baptism 
(Huber & Tödt 170-171).101  
 
The community of the church, as opposed to privatized religion or 
spirituality, is necessary to foster care and concern for others. 
                                                 
99
 „Grundinhalten des christlichen Glaubens” 
 
100
 „Analog hierzu nimmt der Mensch als Mensch auch in der Rechtsgemeinschaft eine Gleichheit 
in Anspruch, die er nicht hergestellt hat, die durch offenkundige Ungleichheiten immer wieder 
verdunkelt wird, auf die er sich aber gleichwohl als auf einen unaufgebbaren Titel beruft. ... Gleichheit 
als Grundmuster der Sozialität kann als kühle Zuordnung von Individuen, die einander bloβ auf der 
Basis von Rechtsansprüchen begegnen, ausgelegt werden.“ 
 
101
 This inclusion has often been limited in the past, and still is by the exclusion of certain races 
from worship services extreme cases, or positions of authority, and the exclusion of women from 
holding certain positions or offices in the church.  
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Commitment to a community joins us to others, making us aware of their 
needs and their circumstances, and the necessity of our involvement in 
righting wrongs and basically looking after other members of the 
community (Rasmussen 1993:104-5). The church as the body of Christ 
functioning in society is an important part of the church’s work in the 
world.102 The church needs to discover its voice in affirming secular, 
political ideas from a Christian perspective (a perspective which often 
strengthens the existing ideas) without losing its distinctive Christian 
voice.  
 
Smit, in his article on Reformed ethics and economic justice, suggests 
three questions that are relevant when considering the ethical or moral 
dilemmas: “What constitutes a good and moral society? What constitutes 
good and moral people? And: What constitutes good and moral decision-
making?” (Smit 2007b:380). These three questions ensure that we act in a 
way which is continually trying to reform and renew society and structure 
by offering support and getting involved and doing what we can.  
 
But Christians are not only members of a Christian community. They 
need to be equipped to deal with their specific Christian ethics and 
convictions in a non-Christian environment. Christianity offers a thick 
morality which gives meaning to many of the more liberal and secular 
principles. People need to be aware of the Christian basis of what they do 
and why they do it, and the importance of the specific Christian ethic, so 
that Christianity does not become meaningless, or silent, in their lives. 
                                                 
102
 Huber refers to a study of expectations of the church in Germany. The primary role of the 
church is to provide a place for spiritual communication, in the forms of pastoral care, worship and 
prayer and other social involvement has often taken second place and is expected by members to take 
second place. The division between private religion and public church is growing and it is necessary 
for the church to equip members to be Christians in their public lives. “Die Kluft zwischen 
privatisierter Religion und öffentlicher Kirche ist in den letzten Jahrzehnten gewachsen. Diese Kluft 
wieder zu verringern, gehört zu den großen, keineswegs leicht zu lösenden Aufgaben. 
Glaubenscourage ist nötig, wenn man – ohne Bekehrungspenetranz – auch im öffentlichen Leben, im 
Beruf oder in den persönlichen Beziehungen sein Christsein erkennbar macht. In dieser alltäglichen 
Gegenbewegung gegen die Privatisierung des Glaubens sehe ich den wichtigsten Aspekt im Verhältnis 
von Zivilcourage und Kirche.“ Social involvement and political participation offers the church, and its 
members, a chance to increase their contact with society (see Huber 2004 (online)).  
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The specifically Christian ethics need to be translated into a more secular 
discourse so that it can remain relevant. Theology needs to be contextual 
and to continually engage people in the situations in which they find 
themselves.103 Beyers Naudé was described as being “at once a deeply 
spiritual and a profoundly secular person...His is a worldly Christianity, 
but one deeply grounded in a very traditional understanding of theological 
identity” (Villa-Vicencio, A life of resistance and hope. In: Villa-Vicencio, 
C. and J.W. De Gruchy (eds.). 1985. Resistance and hope. South African 
essays in honour of Beyers Naudé. Cape Town: David Philip, 3-13. Cited 
in Pauw 2006:9). It is necessary to be socially and historically aware to be 
a Christian not only in a limited Christian community, but to be a 
Christian in the world.  
 
The Christian community draws strength from the increasing dissociation 
of church and civil society in the western world (Fergusson 1998:1).104 
There is no longer Christian justification for the standards, morals, 
lifestyles, assumptions and policies of global, secularized and multi-
cultural societies; the era of Christendom has passed. But this does not 
mean that the voice of the church in the public realm is silenced; it rather 
means that the way in which the church and society interact with each 
other has changed.105 The Church as a community can articulate a vision 
                                                 
103
 Christina Landman points out the need for a specific theology for times of poverty (particularly 
in response to the recession of 2008/2009). Theology needs to  hold people accountable (for their own 
and for each other’s dignity), it needs to remind people that suffering is not always senseless but 
should be a reminder of vulnerability and that social justice needs to continually re-evaluate the social 
situation (she speaks particularly of an empathetic justice) (Landman 2009).  
 
104
 Fergusson speaks of “Christian communitarianism” but I find this term problematic and so opt 
to rather speak of a Christian community, which is still very much a part of society.  
 
105
 Huber argues that despite the fact that the voice of theology is so often disregarded in law, it is 
impossible to deny the Christian origins of human rights. He argues that justice and justification should 
not be separated. „Theologische Beiträge zur Ethik des Rechts sind heute alles andere als 
selbstverständlich. Sie werden von der Rechtswissenschaft und der Rechtsphilosophie in aller Regel 
auch nicht erwartet. Dabei braucht es jedoch nicht zu bleiben. Denn eine historische Besinnung zeigt 
schnell, dass unser Rechtssystem sich in beständiger Auseinandersetzung mit Grundeinsichten des 
christlichen Glaubens, insbesondere mit Grundaussagen des christlichen Menschenbildes, entwickelt 
hat. Diese Auseinandersetzung hat zu einem Menschenbild des Rechts geführt, nach welchem alle 
Menschen – unbeschadet der Verschiedenheiten des Geschlechts, der Rasse, der Fähigkeiten, des 
Vermögens und sofort - als mit gleicher Würde begabt angesehen werden weshalb ihnen allen die 
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which is distinctive and often contradictory to common culture. Huber 
states that the church’s involvement in society cannot ignore or forget 
about its roots: the Bible, the reformation, the Protestant devotion to 
social issues and the church’s devotion to justice and solidarity (2007a).106 
The Christian community needs to be representative of the kind of people 
God has made possible in Jesus Christ; a people committed to forgiveness, 
to loving one another, to seeking to serve one another and to making peace 
(Fergusson 1998:5).107 The celebration of the Eucharist, as a place where 
all differences are abolished and a place where people stand as complete 
equals before God is a reminder of the community which we are being 
called to display in this world.  
 
Niebuhr continually emphasised that although we strive for a just society, 
it will not be realized within history. This inspires a prophetic faith which 
calls us to meaningful action and responsibility. Niebuhr saw the struggle 
for justice as a responsibility which developes from our response to 
salvation. Thus, any Christian response to political, social and economic 
matters is in the light of the eschatological hope of our salvation.  
 
                                                                                                                                           
gleiche Achtung geschuldet ist. Die Radikalitität dieses Menschenbilds des Rechts erschlieβt sich, so 
heiβt meine These, am ehesten aus dem Gedanken der Rechtfertigung. Nicht nur unter historischen, 
sondern auch unter systematischen Gesichtspunkten ist deshalb der Beitrag der Theologie zur Ethik 
des Rechts von erheblicher Bedeutung. An keinem Thema erschlieβt sich das deutlicher als an der 
Verhältnisbestimmung von Rechtfertigung und Recht” (2000b:11).  
 
106
 „Für das, was wir heute „Sozialen Protestantismus“ nennen, muss man zumindest vier Wurzeln 
nennen: die biblische Botschaft, den reformatorischen Aufbruch, die protestantische Zuwendung zur 
sozialen Frage und schließlich das Ja der Kirche zu Gerechtigkeit und Solidarität.“ 
For Huber, freedom is an important them throughout his work, specifically what he calls 
“communicative freedom.” Because of the freedom sinners have by their justification, we are called to 
responsible action in and continual engagement with society.  
For a South African perspective on Huber’s communicative freedom, see Willem Fourie’s 
unpublished doctoral thesis: Communicative Freedom? Wolfgang Huber’s critical engagement of 
modernity (2009).  
 
107
 Fergusson suggests that both the Old and the New Testament human life under the rule of God 
is inescapably political. It has a covenantal, social dimension that is fulfilled not merely by the practice 
of individual holiness but by the observance of standards of justice. The well-being of individuals 
cannot be abstracted from the common good. These belong together. An apolitical faith makes no 
sense at all (2004a:21).  
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This is a hope that is borne of the conviction that the present injustice will 
be overcome. This rejoicing is not from relief of oppression, but simply 
from the opposite of sadness (Lebacqz 1987:134). Because we know that 
the future is secured by the grace of God alone, it removes the burden of 
having to be successful. The church can patiently await the justice which 
will reign in God, while witnessing to this hope in a prophetic way in civil 
society. Faith, rather than success, accompanies the eschatological hope. 
The eschatological hope is not apathetic though. It emphasises our 
responsibility in community. It seeks to get involved and ease the pain 
and suffering in the here and now. Prophetic theology seeks to criticise 
existing practices and to bring hope for the future. The freedom which we 
have in life through God is a freedom which calls us to a life of “helping, of 
edifying, of letting humanness emerge” (Brueggemann 1976:68). Huber 
similarly connects freedom and responsibility. Our freedom is realized in 
our relationships – to God, to fellow human beings and to the earth. But 
with this freedom comes a great social responsibility.108  
 
According to Huber and Tödt, this eschatological perspective calls 
humanity together in a “universal community of responsibility.”109 The 
solidarity which is found before God clearly shows the great divide 
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 According to Huber, human beings live in different relationships, and in all of them freedom and 
social responsibility go together. „Grundsätzlich versteht christliche Sozialethik gerade in ihrer 
evangelischen Gestalt den Menschen als Beziehungswesen. Die Freiheit verwirklicht sich in diesem 
Verständnis nicht einfach im Selbstsein des Menschen, sondern sie prägt die Beziehungen, in denen 
sich sein Leben vollzieht. Die Beziehung zu Gott, die Beziehung zur Welt, die Beziehung zu anderen 
Menschen und die Beziehung zu sich selbst sind die vier Hinsichten, in denen sich die Existenz des 
Menschen als Beziehungswesen auslegen lässt. Wenn er das zur Freiheit bestimmte Lebewesen ist, 
dann muss sich diese Freiheit folglich auch in all diesen vier Hinsichten zeigen: als Freiheit des 
Glaubens, als Freiheit des Umgangs mit der Welt, also insbesondere auch ihrer forschenden 
Durchdringung und technischen Gestaltung, als Freiheit im Miteinander der Menschen, also 
insbesondere auch in Solidarität und wechselseitiger Verantwortung, als Freiheit im Verhältnis zu sich 
selbst, also insbesondere in der Möglichkeit zu einer gewissensbestimmten Lebensführung und in der 
Freiheit zur Verwirklichung des für richtig Erkannten. Betrachtet man die menschliche Freiheit so, 
dann liegt in einer nur auf Selbstverwirklichung und Eigenverantwortung bezogenen 
Freiheitsauffassung keineswegs eine konsequente Durchführung des Freiheitsgedankens; es handelt 
sich dabei vielmehr um eine inkonsequente und verhängnisvolle Verengung des Verständnisses der 
menschlichen Freiheit. Aus dieser grundsätzlichen Erwägung heraus plädiert christliche Sozialethik für 
den unlöslichen Zusammenhang von Freiheit und sozialer Verantwortung” (Huber 2007b).  
 
109
 “universalen Verantwortungsgemeinschaft”  
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between this world and the Kingdom of God. Thus, the person who finds 
freedom in the majesty of God does not live in an egocentric way, but in 
communicative freedom, thus living in a “universal community of 
communication.”110 Huber and Tödt conclude that it can be seen as an 
indirect expression of the coming majesty of God when Christian 
participate in the universal rights community with courage and hope 
(Huber and Tödt  1977:176-181) and that it is possible to understand 
human rights in the promise of the majesty of God (Huber and Tödt 
1977:175): 
Hier steht die Zukunft von Welt und Mensch im Blick: die 
Erwartung des eschatologischen Gericht Gottes, die Hoffnung auf 
ein Bestehenkönnen in diesem Gericht und die Hoffnung des 
Menschen für die Welt, für einen neuen Himmel und eine neue 
Erde. 
 
Courage and hope are necessary because where there is sin and 
selfishness there will always be a struggle for justice. Justice is fragile 
and sometimes, if not often, it will fail. It is a process and as such will 
need constant rethinking, reordering and redoing. We need to continually 
pray for eyes to see and ears to hear. Smit (2004b), making use of H.E. 
Tödt’s model, suggests that it is necessarily to engage in a process off see, 
judge and act. We need to be aware of the problems in the world and 
accept them as an ethical challenge, which means that a responsible 
analysis of the situation is necessary. This necessitates a critical analysis 
of what ethical and moral answers are appropriate, beyond the law and 
politics. Accepted ways of thinking and living need to be challenged and 
changed, new world-views need to be introduced which call people to 
responsibility for their own lives and actions and for the lives of people 
and the world surrounding them. People need a framework of reference, 
however, and they need to be given a different, and better, way of thinking 
and doing when their way is no longer working. Applicable norms and 
criteria need to be evaluated, and the opinions of others need to be taken 
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 “universalen Kommunikationsgemeinschaft”  
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into account. Once a decision has been made, it needs to lead to action, to 
change the existing reality (Smit 2007b:393).  
 
For Fergusson, it is the dominion of God that elicits, and indeed demands, 
lifestyles which respond to divine justice and goodness. However, this 
cannot be fully realised and thus generates an eschatological hope that is 
measured and reassessed by the life and crucifixion of Jesus, now risen, 
ascended and present within his community. The coming reign of God is 
anticipated by the church and at the same time fulfilled partially by his 
grace. The eschatological message is about “rectification; it is about the 
final and all encompassing flourishing of justice” (Bedford-Strohm 
2008:162):  
This eschatological message is not a message of fear; it is good 
news. It contains a vision of good life for our existence here and 
now; this vision is the all inclusive pursuit of happiness. If we 
cannot be happy against others but only with others, then a world 
which promises a life in dignity for every human being is the most 
fascinating vision of good life and of happiness that can be 
imagined. It is a vision for all people of goodwill; therefore it is a 
public vision, and Christian are called to be its most passionate 
public witness.  
Thus, we see a promise of a community which is just; it is a community in 
which life is valued and in which all people share the responsibility but 
also delight together in the rewards. It is some approximation of this 
perfection that we are called to seek on earth, waiting in anticipation. 
This waiting in anticipation is also a discontent with the way things are. 
We must always strive for a more perfect justice, and not settle for what 
institutions and policies are calling justice.111 
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 Niebuhr’s Christian Realism tries to do just this, by being critical of what is being done and 
realistic about what can actually be achieved. “Christian Realism, however, points to the biblical 
suspension of the circumstances of justice, not to set up an alternative moral reality for Christian to 
dwell in, but precisely to redefine the circumstances of justice for everyone. The biblical account of 
human sin and the requirements of original righteousness are ‘maintained not purely by Scriptural 
authority but by the cumulative experience of the race.’ 
To the subjective circumstances of justice, among which Rawls identifies the factual pluralism of 
human aims and the concern that we all have to protect our own interests, Niebuhr would insist that 
experience – and not just Christian faith – requires us to add a disposition not to be satisfied with any 
system of justice that only balances competing interests. To the objective circumstances of justice, 
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What our eschatological hope can bring to the table for justice is found not 
only in a prophetic theology but in our prayer lifestyle.112 A Trinitarian-
focused theology offers the space for creation to cry out in pain, and for 
believers to praise God, to admit their guilt and inadequacy, to seek God’s 
will in their lives and in the life of the church and to ask for mercy and for 
strength and for hope. When Niebuhr criticises the liturgy of the church, 
it is a reminder that our faith does not simply exist in a vacuum, but is 
part of a narrative which connects us in history as we remember those 
who have walked the earth before us, it connects us to our contemporaries 
as we remember both our and their pain and suffering, and it connects us 
to a future, where there is hope that things will be different. The 
Christian faith does not only see the world as worthy of improvement, but 
also as capable of improvement (Bedford-Strohm 1993:143).113  
It would be wrong ... to view the history of the world’s cultures and 
civilization with an eye only upon their decline. They die in the 
end; but they also live. Their life is a testimony to the creativity of 
history, even as their death is a proof of the in history. ... For God’s 
judgments are never precipitate and the possibilities of repentance 
and turning from the evil way are many. According to the degree 
with which civilization and cultures accept these possibilities of 
renewal, they may extend their life indeterminately (Niebuhr 
1943:305-6).  
Thus there is always hope for change, a hope which activates us to live in 
a way which seeks to lessen injustice and to increase dignity, given each 
person the opportunity and the freedom to participate in society.  
 
Rasmussen (1993:138) points out that before Christians were called 
“Christians” at Antioch, they were “the people of the way.” To walk in the 
                                                                                                                                           
which Rawls links to the conditions of scarcity that require us to be concerned about distribution in the 
first place, Niebuhr adds that the objective circumstances of justice must include the impossibility of a 
system of justice that fully satisfies the subjective circumstances of justice” (Lovin 1995:207) 
 
112
 Smit writes about the importance of prayer in the life of a church as well as the celebration of 
communion where the baptised call out to God and then take the message to those in need, so that they 
may also taste something of the goodness of the presence of Jesus Christ (2004a:351-353).  
 
113
 “Der christliche Glaube sieht die Welt nicht nur als verbesserungswürdig, sondern auch als 
verbesserungsfähig an.“ 
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“the way” as a “people of the way” involves a moral style so intimately 
related to the destination itself that to wander from the way is also to 
miss the goal, which is a righteous life in a community faithful to God as a 
“foretaste of what is to come.”  In the Christian community of the New 
Testament, being took priority over doing (Fergusson 1998:12). The kind 
of people Christians were, and are, called to be should result in a certain 
kind of behaviour. The Biblical history provides us with the hope and the 
courage to live in anticipation of life which is to come. The present is filled 
with injustices; but we know from the past that God is a God of life. The 
purpose of a people who live in such anticipation is to give present social 
form to a hoped-for-future (Rasmussen 1993:144). Thus to choose a life of 
love, lived out in justice, is to choose to live in an alternative way as a 
community of hope in the secular society. As Martin Luther said 
The church is the pupil of Christ, sitting at his feet and hearing his 
Word so that she may know how to pass judgment on everything, 
how to serve in one’s calling, how to administer public offices, aye, 
also how to eat, drink, and sleep, that there may be no doubt about 
the proper conduct in any walk of life but, surrounded on all sides 
by the Word of God, one may constantly walk in joy and in the 
light.114 
 
For justice to apply as an ethic for a renewed and restored world, it is 
necessary for the church to live in this way.115 While the community is 
committed to love of God and neighbour, it is also committed to concrete 
kinds of conduct (Harrelson 1980:190). The Christian context of love and 
grace, which calls us to act with justice, respect, and dignity for human 
life, must be kept alive. We need to live in an eschatological reality so that 
we can act in a way which is life-giving, life-restoring and life-sustaining. 
It is in this way of life that shalom, peace and wholeness, for life as God 
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 Quoted in Rasmussen 1993:153. The quote is taken originally from Herbert Borkering and 
Roland Bainton, 1985. Luther’s Germany. Minneapolis: Augsburg. Page 51 
 
115
 Theology has already made crucial contributions to discussions on human rights. The challenge 
now “is to explore ways of contributing to the fulfillment, implementation and actual practicing of 
these rights; to develop theories, ways of seeing and thinking, ways of public thinking, that foster the 
practical and concrete enforcement, implementation and fulfillment of these rights” (Koopman 
2005b:130). 
239 
 
intended it be can become a reality. Hollenbach suggests that an “ethic 
under the sign of the cross” would open our eyes to the suffering of the 
world today and draw us into solidarity with those who suffer, calling us 
to action to alleviate the suffering and overcome its causes (2003:67). He 
thus uses the cross as symbol to push human suffering to the centre of 
social ethics, giving a universal appeal to a specifically Christian symbol. 
It is the voice of the suffering to whom theologians should listen to, and 
also to those “whose Christian faith and conviction gives them a way of 
coping with adversity, evaluating policies which affect them and 
transforming their circumstances” (De Gruchy 2004:61).  
 
We are faced with the interminable injustice of a fallen world. Yet, in the 
midst of the pain, the lack of love, and the lack of justice, we find room for 
rejoicing. This is a joy which comes from claiming one’s own identity in 
the midst of the struggle for justice (Lebacqz 1987:133). This is the joy 
which comes from seeing the truth, life as it can be, and moving towards 
it. It is a determination to keep on going despite the injustice of the 
circumstances. It is a determination to continue to act out of love despite 
the hate. It is a joy which speaks hopefully of a world which can be very 
different to the reality of the present.  
 
4.5 Conclusion 
 
Rawls and Niebuhr both offer interesting and convincing discussions of 
justice. The optimism of Rawls and the realism of Niebuhr offer a good 
balance for critical discussion. Rawls’s social philosophy is complemented 
by Niebuhr’s theological ethics and bringing the two scholars into dialogue 
with each other and with theology has produced rewarding results.  
The biblical notion of a preference for the poor highlights an important 
part of justice which will always need attentions. While this has not been 
prominent in the work of Rawls or Niebuhr, Rawls’s difference principle 
240 
 
offers a good example of how the Christian position can be translated and 
implemented by other disciplines.  
Theological ethics offers rich and diversified arguments about justice, 
taking seriously social, economic and political theory, while at the same 
time remaining intensely critical, aware of the fallibility of human nature 
and the inability to achieve perfect justice in this world. It also remains 
self-critical, seeking always for a more equal and better justice, refusing to 
become self-sufficient and all-knowing.  
Human dignity is an important biblical concept, valuing the dignity of 
each and every person, and taking seriously their need for respect and 
dignity. Community, and solidarity in that community, is necessary for 
each person to recognise their inalienable value as a human being and 
their potential to succeed.  
Community is essential for the development of values and respect. People 
should have a place where they can learn to treat each other justly and 
fairly. In community they can learn to think ethically and develop a sound 
moral character, with an emphasis on responsibility and duty. Human 
beings are essentially spiritual beings, and the church can provide a place 
which can fulfil this need. The church community can be a place of 
instruction, a safe place where people can learn to live together with 
differences and care for others.  
It is not only local communities that are relevant to justice, but global 
communities, too. Justice needs to be practiced on an ever-increasing level 
and nations need to learn how to deal not only with their own injustice 
but with the injustice of their neighbours and the effects of their actions 
on other people.  
In a Christian community people are confronted with agapic love of God, 
which was the yardstick by which Niebuhr measured human justice. It is 
this love to which we are ultimately striving, seeking for something more 
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than fairness in our justice. Love reminds us of the value of every person, 
the need for respect and dignity, the community of which we are a part 
and to which we owe a responsible ethic and lifestyle.  
The eschatological hope is where the church is called to action. Merely 
hoping for a different future is not enough; that hope is encouragement to 
search for more justice every day. It is about remaining intensely critical 
of how justice is implemented in society, and the failure of human 
institutions to fully realize justice. However, it does not give in to apathy 
and hopelessness, but looks and judges and acts on what it sees.  
 
While overarching, universal, ahistorical principles of justice may be 
appealing and indeed a necessary yardstick by which to measure injustice, 
justice will paradoxically always remain contextual and rooted in our 
beliefs and morals. To find a solution for a particular unjust situation and 
to correct the current evils requires a specific solution suitable for the 
present community. Wolterstorff speaks of a community of shalom and a 
“city of delight”; he suggests that “where shalom exists, there we enact our 
responsibilities to one another, to God, and to nature. But shalom is more 
than that. It is fully present only where there is delight and joy in those 
relationships” (1983:124). We nurture our biblical visions as a “narrative 
of a radically other world made possible by the knowledge of the Lord” 
(Naudé 2006:286).  
 
We are continuously aware, as Niebuhr was, that our justice is always 
pointing towards something more. Emil Brunner, too, pointed this out:  
When we call something just, we mean to denote by the word 
something which is morally good – morally good insofar as the 
word justice can only be used where the human will is involved. … 
Love refers to persons, never to things. In the personal sphere, 
love, not justice is the highest good. … Looked at from the 
standpoint of love, it presents the appearance of a kind of inferior 
morality, of a mere preliminary stage of the good (Brunner 
1945:16-17). 
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What is needed is an increased sense of meaning in life, value of human 
life and a refusal to accept anything less. Our lives are not institutions, 
and should not be treated as such. The inescapability of institutions which 
govern our lives needs to be kept separate and be accountable to different 
laws that what our individual lives are accountable to.  
 
For the Christian faith, love plays an essential role at the base of any 
discussion about justice. But love is an unsuitable ethic for a political 
community. Justice needs to be found between love as the starting point 
and love as the end point. Imperfect love is translated into justice, albeit 
also imperfect. But it is a justice which is more than fairness. It does not 
only give to each person what is their due, but gives them dignity and the 
opportunity to be a person in a community of persons. It remains 
intensely critical of justice, knowing how imperfect justice is, and 
acknowledging the fallibility of people and institutions, but living always 
in hope. 
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